Revolutionary Subjectivity in Post-Marxist Thought

Oliver Harrison

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317063339
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy

Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis the ideas of Karl Marx have once again become prominent in social and political thought. This book turns to Marx's theory of revolutionary subjectivity as a means of assessing the work of three contemporary global theorists: Ernesto Laclau, Antonio Negri, and Alain Badiou, considered here together for the first time.

Chapter 1 Introduction

DOI: 10.4324/9781315606330-1

Revolutionary Subjectivity Today

In recent years, the question of revolutionary subjectivity has become more and more prominent in contemporary social and political theory. With the failure of ‘actually existing socialism’ and the seemingly unsurpassable hegemony of neo-liberal globalisation, one might be forgiven for asking why. Throughout the twentieth century, both politically and theoretically it was Marxism that dominated the discourse of left-wing revolutionary politics. Speaking at Karl Marx’s funeral in 1883, Frederick Engels argued that Marx had discovered the ‘fundamental law’ that governed the constitution of human history, a law that when applied to the modern world had unveiled the means to which it would inevitably falter, and in so doing usher with it a fundamentally new form of communist society (Engels 1989, pp. 463, 464). The history of Marxism, however, was to be a painful one. Although it could claim relative success with the revolutions in Russia (1917), China (1949), and Cuba (1959) amongst others, politically it ossified into a doctrine that justified state terror, rather than one that advanced the cause of universal human emancipation. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in the winter of 1989 the demise of Marxism was deemed complete, leaving only a disastrously disfigured legacy in its wake.

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century Marxism was also challenged theoretically. Coinciding with its many explosive political failures –Khrushchev’s 1956 public denunciation of Stalin, the crushing of the rebellions in Hungary (1956) and in Prague (1968), and the terroristic excesses of the Chinese Cultural Revolution – throughout this period many Marxists found these revelations too much to bear, and gradually began questioning some of Marxism’s most elementary claims. With the emergence of so-called post-Marxism in the 1980s, Marxism’s political defeat appeared to be complemented theoretically, and as such – to use Trotsky’s oft-quoted phrase – Marxism seemed well and truly consigned ‘into the dustbin of history’. Despite this, following the Global Financial Crisis of September 2008, elements of Marx’s thought have returned, inspiring numerous commentaries that have sought to explain it (see for example Callinicos 2010; Harman 2009; Harvey 2010). At times of capitalist crisis, then, it would appear that the Marxist critique of political economy remains authoritative for those attempting to understand the contradictory logic of capital accumulation. Yet, whilst this critique might have stood the test of time, the return to Marx hasn’t usually also included his revolutionary prescriptions with respect to resolving such crises. Today however, this seems to have changed; particularly with respect to the resurgent theoretical interest in the question of revolutionary subjectivity and, more generally, its connection to notions of ‘communism’. In March 2009 for example, a conference held at the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities – entitled ‘The Idea of Communism’ – drew around one thousand spectators, and brought together some of the most significant of today’s contemporary radical theorists. Deemed ‘the hottest ticket in town’ (Campbell 2009), amongst others this included the likes of Slavoj ၽiၾek, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri and Terry Eagleton. A follow-up to this conference was held in New York in 2011 and both of the conferences’ proceedings were eventually published by Verso Books (Douzinas and ၽiၾek 2010; ၽiၾek 2013).

Purpose of the Book

Given the resurgent interest in the notion of revolutionary subjectivity and its connection to Marx’s work, the purpose of this book is to examine the theory of revolutionary subjectivity in the work of Ernesto Laclau, Antonio Negri – both individually and in his co-authored work with Michael Hardt – and Alain Badiou. I will argue that it is Marx’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity that remains at the heart of each of these thinkers’ theories, and yet, in their own particular way each of their respective theories has taken a gradual path away from Marx, into the realms of what might better be termed ‘post-Marxism’. After first introducing each of these thinkers, my justifications as to why I have chosen their work for this study serves well at this point as a means of pre-empting what the central arguments of this book will be.

The work of the late Ernesto Laclau is still considered by many as synonymous with post-Marxism, and his co-authored work with Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, is still considered the post-Marxist text. First published in 1985, Laclau and Mouffe’s text adopted the label without hesitation, although as we will see they used the term in at least two senses. Since then, although not as prolific as the other two theorists chosen for this study, Laclau published a number of influential works, all of which essentially deepened the insights developed from at that time. These works include New Reflections on the Revolution of our Times (1990), Emancipations (1996), Contingency, Hegemony and Universality (2000), and most recently, On Populist Reason (2005).

Although a steady stream of translated earlier texts began to emerge during the 1980s and 1990s, the work of Antonio Negri – in the English speaking world at least – is also largely associated with one key text. Whilst works such as Marx beyond Marx (1982), Revolution Retrieved (1988), and The Politics of Subversion (1989) were crucial for those seeking to understand the nature of Negri’s earlier thought and the specificities of the tradition from which it emerged, it was the co-authored (with Michael Hardt) Empire (2000) – followed up by Multitude (2004) and most recently Commonwealth (2009) – that cemented Negri’s presence in contemporary radical thought. Interestingly, unlike Laclau, Negri has remained largely ambivalent to the label post-Marxism, even though he has been explicit about the need for taking ‘Marx beyond Marx’.

In the last decade or so, finally, the work of Alain Badiou has become increasingly central, spawning a more or less consistent release of translated materials. With works such as his Manifesto for Philosophy (1999), Saint Paul (2003), Ethics (2001), and perhaps most importantly Being and Event (2005) and Logic of Worlds (2009), there have also been a number of translations of his early works. Amongst others, alongside a number of key articles these include Theory of the Subject (2009) and, more recently, The Rational Kernel of the Hegelian Dialectic (2001). Badiou himself has neither adopted the label post-Marxist nor has he remained ambivalent towards it; rather, he has explicitly rejected it on the basis that it represents a form of politics that he has continually sought to distance himself from.

Given the prominence of each thinker’s work in contemporary theoretical debates, it is unusual that they have not been systematically brought together before – certainly not in the way I propose to do here. Perhaps the closest attempts has been Nick Hewlett’s Badiou, Balibar, and Rancière: Rethinking Emancipation (2007), and Alex Callinicos’ Resources of Critique (2006); although in both cases there is a different arrangement of thinkers and, more importantly, these studies did not focus on either the specificity of Marx’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity, or for that matter the complexities of what constitutes post-Marxist thought. Bringing Laclau, Negri and Badiou together for the first time whilst framing their thought specifically in relation to Marx’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity, then, constitutes my first justification with respect to why I have chosen them for this study.

My second justification for their inclusion concerns the interesting commonalities between them. On the one hand, and by their own admission, this book argues that each thinker’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity displays a remarkable degree of continuity from their early to later periods. Laclau for instance has stated that the trajectory of his work has been a ‘maturation of certain original intuitions’, rather than one characterised by any sharp break (Laclau 1990, p. 203). Negri too has retained his early intuitions, insisting as he did in early works that revolutionary change must still be understood on the basis of changing forms of labour (Casarino and Negri 2008, p. 79). Badiou, finally, explicitly accepts that his current work is guided just as much as it was by an attempt to both retain and yet reconfigure the philosophical and political notion of ‘the subject’ (Badiou 2009, p. 522). Crucial for understanding this shared continuity, however, is uncovering the precise link that connects each thinker’s earlier to later periods, for it is this link that complicates the extent to which each thinker fully abandons the conditions of Marx’s own theory. This book will argue that, somewhat ironically, each thinker’s post-Marxist theory of revolutionary subjectivity is established on the basis of a sustained engagement with aspects of a particular Marxist theorist’s thought. To be more specific: central to Laclau’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity is Antonio Gramsci’s notion of ‘hegemony’; so too for Negri is Vladimir Lenin’s flexibility with respect to organisational form; as too for Badiou is Mao Tse-tung’s notion of the ‘inquiry’ and the primacy of political praxis. Whilst Laclau, Negri and Badiou have all acknowledged their debt to each of these respective thinkers, I will argue that due to the fact that the latter were only reiterating something that was already present in Marx’s own theory, as stated above, this complicates the extent to which they move definitively beyond him.

My third and final justification for the composition of thinkers studied in this book would appear to contradict the second. In other words, although I will establish that each thinker’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity retains a distinct line of continuity, I will also argue that the post-Marxist nature to their theories is established via a significant break: one that sees all thinkers adopt a different ontological framework to the underlying Hegelian premises to Marx’s. Additionally, not only did each thinker make this break at a very similar moment in their thought – both theoretically and practically – they did so also as a means of solidifying the contours to their earlier theories. Hence, whilst their respective ‘ontological turns’ can be considered the moment in which they broke with the premises to Marx’s own theory of revolutionary subjectivity, this break was forged primarily as a means of shoring up the principles to their own. Laclau, for example, would turn to the Lacanian ontology of ‘lack’ as a means of deepening his earlier emphases on the development of a post-Gramscian theory of hegemony. In a similar fashion, Negri would turn to the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza as a means of providing his early theory of ‘self-valorization’ with a more positive ontological foundation. Finally, following the impasse of Maoism throughout the mid to late 1980s, Badiou would adopt the ontological principles of Cantorian set theory; again, as a means of solidifying his earlier re-worked theory of the subject. In sum, then, my third justification for the composition of the thinkers comprising this book lies in their shared attempt to adopt an alternative ontological framework as a means of overcoming the perceived inadequacies of Marx’s. Yet, what is shared in this respect is only complicated by the fact that each thinker adopts different ontological frameworks to each other – the consequences of which I will draw out in my concluding chapter. Ultimately, after making some general claims as to the nature of post-Marxist thought itself, this book will argue that each thinker offers something vitally important for understanding the notion of revolutionary subjectivity today.

Chapter Outline

This book will adopt the following structure. In Chapter 2 I will situate the emergence of ‘post-Marxism’ in relation to the history of the Marxist tradition. Starting from the ‘Marxism of Karl Marx’ I will focus only on what I consider to be the most important points of development, especially for appreciating the emergence of post-Marxism towards the end of the twentieth century. In Chapter 3 I will establish the framework which I will use for discussing the post-Marxist nature of each of my chosen thinker’s theories. Here I will do two things. My main task, firstly, will be to explain Karl Marx’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity – both individually and via his co-authored work with Frederick Engels. The second task of this chapter will be outline the ways in which Lenin, Gramsci and Mao would adopt this theory; or to be more specific, the second part of the chapter will outline the extent to which their own theories of revolutionary subjectivity would essentially reiterate and expand something which was already present in Marx’s.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will follow a very similar pattern, and will broadly be split into three inter-related parts. The first part of each chapter will outline each thinker’s early theory of revolutionary subjectivity in relation to their own particular academic, activist or personal circumstance. Each chapter will suggest that these early formative experiences would be crucial for understanding not only the nature of each theorist’s mature theory of revolutionary subjectivity, but also the particular post-Marxist route this mature work would take. The second part of each chapter will identify the moment where each thinker’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity explicitly departs from Marx’s. At this stage I will argue that each thinker’s attempt to go beyond Marx is conditioned by their adoption of a different ontological framework. Despite this, however, a connection to Marx’s theory is retained due to their enduring fidelity to a respective Marxist theorist. The final part to each chapter will outline each thinker’s mature theory of revolutionary subjectivity, and then subject this theory to a critical analysis. Finally, in my Conclusion I will discuss the relative merits of each theory as a means of not only suggesting a productive synthesis, but also for making some general claims about post-Marxist theories of revolutionary subjectivity today.

Chapter 2 From Marxism to Post-Marxism

DOI: 10.4324/9781315606330-2

Overview

In this short chapter I provide an overview of the way in which Marxist theory developed since Marx’s death in 1883. I begin by outlining Marx’s own theory, specifically by splitting it into three overriding themes – philosophy, political economy, and politics. This theory will be discussed in greater lengths in Chapter 3. After outlining Marx’s theory, I concentrate on the way in which it developed into the various ‘schools’ of Marxism throughout the twentieth century. Here I will note not only the way in which Marx’s theory was developed within Marxism, but also, towards the end of the chapter, the way in which specific aspects of Marx’s theory would be eclipsed by the emergence of a new political and intellectual landscape, starting with structuralism and ending in post-Marxism.

The Marxism of Karl Marx

According to Vladimir Illich Lenin (1977a) ‘the Marxist doctrine’ is essentially an amalgamation of classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, French socialist theory – and ‘revolutionary doctrines in general’ (Lenin 1977a, p. 19). As a young philosopher Marx entered many of the debates in Germany at that time, the most important of which concerned the philosophical and political legacy left in the wake of Hegel’s death in 1831. Here Marx would align himself with the ‘young Hegelians’; those who believed that Hegel’s dialectical method needed retaining as a means of continuing the critique of existing social and political institutions (Sinnerbink 2007, pp. 43, 44). Marx would adopt Hegel’s method and apply it to his study of human history. Whereas Hegel understood the latter in terms of the transformation and dialectical development of human consciousness, Marx (1990a) famously gave Hegel’s dialectic a material twist, turning it ‘on his head’ to ‘discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell’ (Marx 1990a, p. 103). Working through their former ‘young Hegelian’ comrades – most notably Ludwig Feuerbach – in works such as The German Ideology (1846), The Poverty of Philosophy (1847) and the Communist Manifesto (1848), Marx and Engels argued that revolutionary change can only be considered historically, based on a given development of human productive activity. Discussed in more detail in the next chapter, according to them every historical form of society was constituted by a given ‘mode of production’, the unity of which was split between the ‘forces of production’ on the one hand, and the ‘relations of production’ on the other. Employing the principles of...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 From Marxism to Post-Marxism
• 3 Revolutionary Subjectivity in Marxist Thought
• 4 Ernesto Laclau – Hegemony and ‘The People’
• 5 Antonio Negri – Self-valorisation and ‘The Project of the Multitude’
• 6 Alain Badiou – Event, Truth, and the ‘Communist Hypothesis’
• 7 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index