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Introduction
This book endeavors to explain why nations choose to accept the risks associated with nuclear power technology and support the development of nuclear power programs. It draws from comprehensive studies of the nuclear power programs in eight leading nuclear nations â the United States, France, Japan, Russia (the former Soviet Union), South Korea, Canada, China, and India â to identify common factors responsible for nuclear power evolution. In the process, a theory on the international socio-political economy of nuclear power emerges that goes beyond traditional economic or energy security justifications to explicitly identify the conditions that are common to nations which nurture nuclear power.
In the epic 1946 Frank Capra movie Itâs a Wonderful Life, the hero George Bailey tries to woo his partner by offering to âlasso the moonâ and give it to her. This offer displays the grandiloquence and high ambition that only one species on this planet possesses. Indeed, the ambitions of human beings have led to wondrous technological achievements that have significantly enhanced the material well-being of our genus.
Amidst all the technological advances of humankind, cultivating the ability to manipulate matter arguably represents the most stunning of all achievements. We have gone beyond lassoing the moon; we have managed to lasso the building blocks of life. As part of our achievement in this regard, we can now initiate and control nuclear fission and in the process have developed a new form of electricity supply â nuclear power â that holds tremendous potential, especially in a world that is increasingly challenged to find a suitable replacement to fossil fuel energy.
As science writer Christian Parenti summarizes:
Nuclear fission is a mind-bogglingly complex process, a sublime, truly Promethean technology. Letâs recall: it involves smashing a subatomic particle, a neutron, into an atom of uranium-235 to release energy and more neutrons, which then smash other atoms that release more energy and so on infinitely, except the whole process is controlled and used to boil water, which spins a turbine that generates electricity. ⌠In this nether realm, where industry and science seek to reproduce a process akin to that which occurs inside the sun, even basic tasks â like moving the fuel rods, changing spare parts â become complicated, mechanized and expensive. Atom-smashing is to coal power, or a windmill, as a Formula One race-car engine is to the mechanics of a bicycle.1
Unfortunately, there are also inherent risks to harnessing the atom in this way. As the March 2011 disaster in Fukushima, Japan illustrates, the technology is susceptible to failure and when it fails, the adverse repercussions can be monstrous from economic, environmental, and human perspectives. Furthermore, the industry faces staunch resistance from the general public when it comes to storage of radioactive waste created from the nuclear fuel cycle. So in most countries where nuclear power programs exist, radioactive waste continues to pile up in temporary storage facilities posing threats to planetary health. Lastly, the technology in its current state requires natural resource inputs in the form of uranium, plutonium, or thorium â all of which are finite and susceptible to depletion at increasingly high rates should the industry continue to expand.
The bookâs purpose is not to take a stance for or against nuclear power. Rather, the inspiration for writing a book which attempts to broaden the enquiry into catalysts of nuclear power development to incorporate social and technological criteria arises in part from an indelible analogy made by sociologist James M. Jasper. Jasper provocatively described nuclear power development in France as consisting of three groups â âgodsâ (governments), âtitansâ (large industries and utilities), and âmortalsâ (the general public). Jasper suggested that success of the French program stemmed from the inability of the âmortalsâ to alter the conduct of the gods and titans.2 Jasperâs analogy prompted us to explore this social threefold in greater detail to try to document the specific conditions that gave rise to nuclear power in France. Upon completing an initial study for France, it seemed a natural extension of our research to evaluate the extent to which the factors influencing French nuclear power development existed in other nations.
Eight case studies later, our analysis had uncovered some commonalities that led to the development of a âsocio-political economyâ profile that describes the conditions that are conducive to nuclear power development. To our knowledge, this book offers the first comprehensive identification of the dynamic, multifarious factors which tend to facilitate support for nuclear power development.
Why nuclear power?
This book is timely in that the nuclear power industry has emerged from a 20-year period of phlegmatic growth to face a critical crossroad that could decide the fate of the industry. It is not hyperbole to suggest that we all have a stake in the development of nuclear power. What happens in the nuclear power industry in the next few decades will influence energy market dynamics which in turn will significantly influence global economic conditions, climate change mitigation prospects, and international security.
Up until five years ago, nuclear power industry prospects were far from rosy. Between 1996 and 2006, total global primary energy consumption increased by 26 percent; yet, the aggregate increase of installed nuclear power was a mere 15 percent. Chernobyl aside, the unresolved challenge of finding permanent geologic repositories for spent nuclear fuel and the rising cost of decommissioning aged facilities had vitiated the appeal of nuclear power in most of its traditional markets.3
The highly concentrated nature of the nuclear power industry has exacerbated market development problems. As of 2009, more than 90 percent of the worldâs nuclear power plants were located in 22 countries, with three countries â the United States, France, and Japan â possessing half of the worldâs 436 nuclear reactors.4 With the exception of Japan, investment in further nuclear power development has significantly diminished in established markets. In the United States and France, the average age of reactors has risen to 24 years. In fact, from 2007 to 2008, global nuclear electricity generation actually decreased 2 percent. In the European Union, capacity fell 6 percent, the highest decline since the first reactor was connected to the Soviet grid in 1954.5
From 2008, nuclear power industry prospects were on the upswing due to fossil fuel price volatility and international pressures to abate CO2 emissions. Heralded by advocates as being one of the few low-carbon electricity sources able to meet large-scale escalations in demand for energy services, the International Atomic Energy Agency reports that more than 60 countries had formally expressed interest in introducing nuclear power to their energy mixes.6 In addition to fledgling nuclear power programs in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea which have garnered international attention,7 a host of countries previously characterized as economically, technologically or politically incapable of nuclear power development such as Bangladesh, Belarus, Indonesia, Jordan, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe have all quietly been moving ahead with programs of some kind or another. Meanwhile, the traditional markets were beginning to show signs of revitalization with nations such as Canada, Germany, the U.S., and Japan all investigating capacity enhancement possibilities. According to the World Nuclear Association, as of 2008, conservative projections pointed to an increase in nuclear reactors to 602 units by 2030 (up from the current total of 436), while high side estimates projected an increase to 1,350 units by 2030.8
However, on March 11, 2011, the bubble of euphoria surrounding prospects of a nuclear power renaissance was broken by the disaster in Fukushima, Japan â where four nuclear reactors suffered criticality incidents after being pummeled by a massive tsunami â prompting many nations to reconsider nuclear power expansion strategies. Not only are prospects of a nuclear renaissance significantly diminished, the possibility of the demise of the industry is increasingly discussed in the popular press.
So what can we expect going forward? Does Fukushima represent a death blow to the nuclear power industry or is this just a temporary setback? To address such questions, we need to know more about the factors that facilitate nuclear power development. In short, we can learn from the past to predict the future. This is precisely what this book hopes to achieve. For stakeholders concerned with international security, global energy policy, international environmental governance, energy sector business strategy, or any other related field, the capacity to foretell where nuclear power expansion will take place and the extent to which expansion will occur will be significantly enhanced by the analytical framework presented in this book.
Contribution to nuclear scholarship
What makes this book novel, or distinct from other studies? First, the book adopts a comprehensive socio-technical approach to examining the conditions conducive to nuclear power development. In doing so, it presents a more complete picture of the forces which influence nuclear power by examining the complex interplay between political, economic, and social elements which lend it sustenance to. This stands in marked contrast to many studies on the future of nuclear power which tend to distill the influences down to three factors â energy security, climate change mitigation, and public support. These three factors undoubtedly exert a sizable influence on nuclear power development decisions, but as our analysis will demonstrate, there are other factors related to political strategy, energy market dynamics, ideology, social structure, and political-economic structure that must be understood if one wishes to make a reasonably accurate study of the prospects of nuclear power expansion.
Second, the book embraces a global focus. Most books which analyze nuclear power development focus narrowly on one or two countries. Previous studies which have expanded the scope to clusters of nations have predominantly focused only on experiences in Europe and North America.9 We investigate the dynamics of nuclear power development in Asia, Europe, and North America, providing a level of comparative and cross-national analysis that few other books on the topic even attempt. In conducting such a diverse study we have managed to enhance the validity of our findings by confirming that the framework put forward appears valid across an array of socio-demographic conditions.
Third, the nations analyzed in the book currently host over 70 percent of the worldâs reactors and, if the projections of the World Nuclear Association are correct, will continue to host nearly 70 percent of the worldâs reactors in 2030. Understanding nuclear power development trends in these markets represents a significant contribution to applied energy policy.
Fourth, rather than narrowly examining engineering, science, or economic perspectives, our book utilizes interdisciplinary social science methods and an inductive, grounded, case-study approach. As one study concluded
Social science research on nuclear power is surprisingly sparse, and it tends to focus on issues we find unexciting and secondary (like siting disputes). One of the striking features of the nuclear power story is the extent to which technology did not dominate human will. Except for the earliest years, technical experts were not really in charge of framing the enterprise; the key decisions were sociopolitical more than technical.10
Our study is the first that we know of to tell this fascinating story in a manner more comprehensive and complete than scholarship relying on disciplinary concepts or methods in isolation.
Fifth, the book makes an important theoretical contribution by introducing a framework that has both academic and practical value. To our knowledge, this is the first study to explore the socio-political economy affecting nuclear power development in such a comprehensive manner. Our case studies demonstrate that there are deeper dimensions behind nuclear power expansion and present an updated perspective of the nuclear industries in eight key countries.11 Moreover, our framework is based on proven inductive social science research methods that can be further validated by applying the framework to evaluate the development of nuclear power in other nations.
From an applied perspective, the framework is of value to practitioners who are interested in predictive analysis related to nuclear power development. Each case study demonstrates how our framework can be used to evaluate future nuclear power development prospects in any nation. This will have value to experts working for financing agencies and intergovernmental organizations as well as those involved in researching energy security, energy economics, and climate change.
Methods and key concepts
We have employed an inductive, grounded, comparative case study approach for this book. Case study methodologies allow social scientists to achieve greater depth of insight in regard to ethnographic issues.12 This enables us to circumvent the superficiality inherent in pure statistical analysis and delve into the root causes of a phenomenon.13 Put another way, the case study method is an investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context to explore causation in order to find underlying principles,14 in this instance the search for factors which affect nuclear power development.
Our book is âinductiveâ in the sense that we commenced our research without preformed hypotheses or predetermined conclusions. Instead, for each of the case studies, we compiled as much data as we could that described the evolution of nuclear power and then used the strength of the data to guide conclusions. The value o...