Multiculturalism, Identity and Rights

Bruce Haddock, Peter Sutch

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781134377336
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy

This innovative volume brings a selection of leading political theorists to the wide-ranging debate on multiculturalism and political legitimacy. By focusing on the challenge to mainstream liberal theory posed by the surge of interest in the rights of minority groups and subcultures within states, the authors confront issues such as rights, liberalism, cultural pluralism and power relations.

1 Introduction

Bruce Haddock and Peter Sutch

Political theory has always had an uneasy relationship with the political world. The language of normative theory has been forged in response to political forms varying from small city states to vast empires, yet out of practical necessity we have had to avail ourselves of concepts fashioned in widely different circumstances. This has generated confusions which, as historians of political ideas, we can try to address and resolve. We enjoy no such luxury in our normative theorizing. Contingent situations demand attention. We bring received understandings to bear on problems that resist orthodox treatment. From time to time we despair of our established institutions and theories. Moral and political theory, we are sometimes told, rest on a mistake.¹ Without the support of grounding assumptions that we can no longer take seriously, our normative theorizing might come to resemble a sophisticated species of special pleading. But even in these circumstances, we cannot avoid the necessity of making normative judgements. These may be well or ill considered, but the demands of social co-operation and co-ordination are relentless. The complexity of our circumstances makes normative theorizing difficult; yet as practical agents we are compelled to try to chart a course through a labyrinth of possibilities.

In this book we focus on the challenge to mainstream liberal theory posed by the resurgence of interest in the cultural identities that inform and legitimize polities, particularly since the 1990s. Our concern is primarily theoretical, though we are profoundly aware of the difficult practical issues raised by groups and sub-cultures within states that reject standard liberal means of adjudicating conflict and allocating resources. Claims for special treatment or exemptions from certain burdens necessarily introduce divisions within a citizen body. Liberals have always acknowledged that additional resources may be required to enable disadvantaged groups to contribute effectively to cultural, economic and political life. But the problem becomes much murkier if the fundamental values of particular groups are hostile to the standard tenets of liberal political order. The liberal principle of equal respect may be exploited in order to foster and facilitate projects and attitudes that actually constrain the options of individuals. Faith-based schools may propagate a limiting view of a woman's role; parents may claim an exclusive right to make important life choices for their children; the diversity of a modern society may be treated as a cultural threat. Liberals are torn between endorsing a pluralism that may help to sustain fundamentally illiberal practices and views and insisting that conditions of equal citizenship should prevail. The problem is rendered more acute because the universalist assumptions on which liberalism was built are now widely questioned. Few people now find very plausible the view of society as an aggregation of atomic units. And yet acknowledging the cultural contingency of values makes it difficult to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable pluralisms. This is a very old argument that goes back to the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment. What is novel in the modern context is that some liberals are themselves deeply sceptical about the individualism and rationalism of the Enlightenment.

Contemporary discussions of these issues have been at the forefront of political philosophy and political theory, with practical implications that are evident and sometimes disturbing. What is especially revealing theoretically is that some proponents of ‘identity’ politics adopt positions which discount the possibility of resolving disputes discursively. We can all recognize situations in which discursive politics is difficult. It is quite another matter to assume from the outset that it is impossible (a ‘clash of civilizations’²). In this volume we have brought together scholars who have helped to shape the argument in order to explore the assumptions that underpin contrasting views. The point is not simply to benefit from the clash of ideas but also to see in practice how far theoretical bridges can be built between sharply divergent positions.

Various chapters in the book focus on the scope for a restatement of liberal principles that avoids the charge that ethical and political theory is always (and necessarily) parochial. Communitarians and multiculturalists, exploiting earlier Marxist, poststructuralist and postmodern critiques, have sought to show that liberalism, like any other political doctrine, serves as a vehicle for the articulation of economic and cultural interests. Liberal universalism, in this view, is simply an effective strategy for the projection of dominant interests in the complex game of global political and economic competition.

Criticisms of liberal universalism have been drawn from a variety of positions, some appealing to little more than the fact of cultural diversity. Indeed, it is clear that elaborate ideological positions (beliefs, values, and so on) often look like enclosed worlds of ideas. Practical reason is at its most vulnerable when attempts are made to discriminate between world views taken as a whole. And experience of mutual incomprehension at one level is taken as an illustration of the culturally parochial nature of practical reason as a phenomenon. Bruce Haddock (‘Practical Reason and Identity’) focuses, instead, on the style of practical reason in everyday situations. We recognize that we face more or less complex choices that often puzzle us. Our thinking, however, does not presuppose fixed terms of reference, even though our rooted situations demarcate areas of concern. It is a mistake to equate how we think with the matter that we customarily think about. Haddock takes seriously the fact that contingent identities frame our thinking, but he denies that this has radically subversive implications for the exercise of practical reason. Indeed, the complexity and changing nature of our identities presupposes a capacity to shape and amend our identities through reflection and engagement. Discourse is primary in identity formation. Questions of identity only arise because our identities are complex. The puzzles that confront us about identity are a reflection of our ability to abstract from the contingent circumstances we actually encounter. This is not to say that ‘reason’ floats mysteriously above and beyond our interests and identities; rather, discordance between ideas and identities forces us to think. In this sense, finding our way through pluralist cultures is not different in kind from negotiating issues between them. A ‘thin’ universlism pervades our efforts in both spheres, though how it might best be characterized and defended remains a deeply contentious question.

John Horton (‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: Once More unto the Breach’) addresses the debate as it has emerged in recent discussions of minority rights in the context of a hegemonic liberal culture. Kymlicka and Parekh, in particular, have been prominent, arguing that the realization of (at least some) liberal values in a context of deep value pluralism necessarily involves recognition and respect for groups which may be hostile or indifferent to a dominant political culture. Kymlicka has tried to stretch the liberal position such that consensual collective expression will be treated as a core commitment, even when the substance of that expression may be incompatible with standard liberal rights. The point is not that core liberal rights should be devalued, rather that there should be public recognition of the incommensurable values that may be endorsed in pluralist cultures. Parekh, similarly, stresses the need for dialogue between groups if the public culture is not to be authoritarian or exclusive. Brian Barry, by contrast, argues that according a privileged place to substantive values undermines both the impartiality of the liberal state and the commitment to equal citizenship that is its distinguishing feature. Horton explores how far the multicultural position is, in fact, incompatible with a defensible view of individuality and claims that, in the event of conflict, it should not simply be assumed that the minority multicultural position would have to adapt. Everything depends here on whether or not the ground on which the liberal stands can be regarded as foundational. If liberalism needs foundations, and yet the traditional theoretical defences of foundationalism cannot be accepted, then political accommodation between cultures has to be pursued in more cautious ways. A strong commitment to substantive liberal values in a context of acknowledged value pluralism would involve indefensible political intrusion in individual life choices. Horton contends that Barry is both insensitive to the coercive impact of liberal values and naïve in assuming that theory is equipped to resolve tensions in cultural practices in any straightforward sense. In Horton's view, theory is a form of cultural self-understanding. While it should not be limited to a merely expressive role, it must remain sensitive to the cultural forms that sustain it.

Andrew Vincent (‘What is so Different about Difference?’) accepts the fact of cultural pluralism but queries its adoption as a political criterion. At the very least, when we grant that specific cultural differences are politically relevant, we must be appealing to a criterion that enables us to distinguish between kinds of ‘difference’. Access to public goods may need to be facilitated in all sorts of ways; and this may include lowering the cultural threshold for inclusion in various public projects and activities. This involves a recognition of cultural costs that may be borne disproportionately by specific minority groups. But judgements still have to be made about which public goods need to be distributed more broadly. In practical terms, there may be limits to the extent that a particular public good can be stretched before it ceases to be a good of a relevant kind. The argument about the political significance of actual difference (cultural, economic, linguistic, and so on) will have to be cast in terms of a discourse that is more than an articulation of the core values of a particular cultural community. Effective political argument in conditions of deep pluralism is driven towards inclusion rather than exclusion. This may not amount to a commitment to universalism in a strong or abstract sense, but it necessarily involves the construction of principled positions that justify particular commitments from an outsider's perspective.

Mark Evans (‘“Authenticity” in the Jargon of Multiculturalism’) focuses on a key issue at the heart of multicultural political theory. He distinguishes Charles Taylor as one of the few thinkers broadly sympathetic to a multicultural politics of recognition who has taken seriously the ethical question of distinguishing between different conceptions of the good life. Evans argues that multicultural theory fails sufficiently to problematize the ethical. Taylor, by contrast, recognizes that the condition of modernity typically forces us to see our life choices as contingent and revisable. For Taylor, ‘authenticity’ is the paradigmatic ethical ideal. Taken as a free-standing notion, it has a tendency to slide into capricious subjectivism and narcissism. Taylor argues that these tendencies can be resisted if individuals see themselves as culturally embedded creatures, endorsing in their daily lives attitudes and projects that derive from an external cultural framework. Evans contends, however, that even when we grant (as we must) the Hegelian dialogical account of identity, we should resist Taylor's ‘neutering’ of identity. Such a profoundly anti-assimilationist ethic actually hampers the principled accommodation that is the primary objective of a multiculturalist political morality. Evans goes back to Lionel Trilling, one of Taylor's authorities, in order to defend ‘sincerity’ as a more congenial candidate for a multiculturalist ethic. Pinning down multi-culturalism to a specific kind of ‘politics of difference’, Evans argues, allows us to reflect more rigorously on the likely nature of favoured forms of the good life under such a regime. Developing arguments from Trilling, Evans shows that discriminating between multicultural alternatives obliges us to take seriously the relatively difference-insensitive criteria of traditional liberal politics.

Jonathan Seglow (‘Theorizing Recognition’), on the other hand, contends that empirical work on the profile of multicultural societies should be reflected in normative theoretical argument. The universalist criteria of traditional liberal theory can be shown to facilitate outcomes that liberals should deplore. Equal citizenship in practice reinforces the positions of dominant groups that are best placed to frame political agendas. The assumption that the liberal state should be culturally neutral must be rejected. Seglow claims that orthodox liberal constitutional designs are shot through with partisan ethnocultural norms. Developing arguments from Kymlicka, Seglow suggests (pace Barry) that to continue to aspire to impartiality effectively perpetuates ethnocultural injustice. He argues that if we take liberal goals seriously, then we must necessarily address multicultural issues. Facilitating fair terms of political co-operation in deeply pluralist societies commits us to an endorsement and celebration of cultural difference. On this view, liberal values require a republican theory of multicultural society.

Multicultural politics makes heavy demands on the redistributive capacity of the state. It is a question not simply of aggregate resources here, but of the criteria to be adopted in discriminating between claimants. A politics of recognition involves discretionary judgements. Successful claimants will be exploiting cultural identities as trumps in a game of political brokerage. In this context, marginal cultural groups are likely to remain the most vulnerable. Paul Kelly (‘Identity, Equality and Power: Tensions in Parekh's Political Theory of Multiculturalism’) highlights the neglect of power relations in multicultural theory, focusing in particular on Parekh's defence of a cross-cultural discursive politics. He argues that effective representation, especially of the most disadvantaged groups, is best facilitated by universal commitments that do not require discretionary endorsement. In this view, the fact that rights claims are culture-blind is actually an advantage, leaving groups to pursue their interests in a public realm that involves all citizens. Kelly claims that marginal interests are best promoted through universal welfare provision. We can argue about the adequacy of established redistributive policies. But to link the receipt of benefits to the effectiveness of minority political advocacy would be a reversal of liberal priorities. Outcomes would be unpredictable and the upshot would be a clientelistic politics that would further divide a fragmented citizenry.

Andrea Baumeister (‘The Limits of Universalism’) challenges attempts to restate a liberal universalist position. She takes issue precisely with the aspiration expressed in Brian Barry's Culture and Equality that ‘eventually a common standard of reasonableness will prevail over a certain range of ethical questions, in a way similar to that in which the acknowledgement of the soundness of the physical sciences diffused through the world’, defending instead a version of value pluralism associated with Hampshire, Berlin, Bellamy, Gray and Parekh. She contends that, contrary to Barry, liberal value pluralism does not entail a belief that all cultures are of equal value. Thus value pluralism does not imply relativism. Nor is value pluralism insensitive to the fact that human flourishing requires certain values and commitments, such as some form of justice. However, whereas Barry seeks to characterize these norms in an impartial manner, value pluralists believe these norms manifest themselves in a variety of ways, each historically and culturally specific. Finally, while Barry fears that a regard for cultural diversity will give rise to a tendency to ossify cultures and thus hinder the development of a common standard or shared point of view, value pluralism need imply no such commitment. On the contrary, value pluralists such as Parekh expressly stress the importance of dialogue and mutual adaptation. Baumeister concludes that a commitment to value pluralism gives rise to a distinct political conception of liberalism which differs notably from the form of liberal universalism advocated by Barry. Whereas Barry remains firmly wedded to the liberal Enlightenment project, a liberalism informed by value pluralism will not only acknowledge its own historical contingency, but will also accept that it cannot insulate itself from the dynamic entailed in value conflict.

Issues of inclusion and exclusion have been raised in an especially acute form in relation to the rights of indigenous peoples. Ex-colonies based originally on the expropriation of ‘First Peoples’ confront issues that tax conventional liberal redistributive policies to breaking point. Toleration, integration and assimilation seem to be inadequate responses to the stark economic and cultural reality of domination and marginalization. Canadian political theorists, in particular, have made a concerted effort to reconcile the irreconcilable. Mark Francis (‘Canadian Indigenous Peoples and the Transformation of Political Theory into Cultural Identity’) traces sustained efforts to address the issue through the language of both rights and participation. He argues that both discourses endorse styles of nation building that fail to reflect the interests and views of indigenous peoples. Cultural identity, which figures so largely in the writings of Will Kymlicka, James Tully and Charles Taylor, lacks effective normative content. The failure of liberal universalism in these difficult cases, however, should not be treated as a pretext for abandoning normative arguments which extend beyond the confines of particular cultures. Yet it remains an open question how these arguments might be grounded.

Peri Roberts (‘Identity, Reflection and Justification’) explores an assumption at the heart of communitarian and multicultural theory. The strong rejection of different versions of universalism hinges on the claim that there are impenetrable boundaries to intelligibility that undercut the legitimacy or relevance of external criticism of practices and principles. The boundaries of intelligibility here are a consequence of the familiar communitarian assumption that key aspects of the cultural world and the inner world of the self are constitutive, beyond reflection and therefore necessarily antecedent to any choices that an individual might make. It follows (so the argument goes) that identities, both personal and cultural, have fixed elements that make cultures inherently exclusive. Liberal universalists (such as Barry) argue that this amounts to giving up on rational argument across boundaries. The key question here is whether the relevance or intelligibility of arguments is restricted by a frame of cultural reference. Roberts attempts to address this dilemma by developing recent defences of a ‘constructivist’ liberalism, in particular by exploiting a distinction between primary and secondary constructivism. To grant that in the variety of secondary constructions substantive values are culturally framed does not commit us to denying the intelligibility of defences of values from cross-cultural perspectives. The dynamic of critical cultural reflection provides a basis for comparative evaluation, even if the scope for practical accommodation remains limited. Crucially, however, limits to understanding are contingent rather than conceptual. Further, the process of critical reflection upon cultural understandings that underwrites the possibility of cross-cultural intelligibility may bring resources to bear that allow us, at the primary level, to construct minimal but substantive principles.

Among basic rights that liberals defend, rights to pursue our own life plans and to concern ourselves collectively with matters of public concern figure prominently. Margaret Moore (‘Brian Barry's Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism: A Liberal Nationalist Defence’) argues that this commitment to self-determination (both personal and public) cannot be effectively sustained if cultural constraints on collective engagement are not factored into our presentation of defensible public institutions and practices. A conception of rights that tactitly condoned avoidable obstacles to effective agency would fail to meet declared liberal aspirations. Moore specifically challenges Barry's attempt to marginalize ‘culture’ as a criterion in the appraisal of appropriate rights. She focuses on the implications for minority nationalists of a theory that champions equal citizenship against cultural particularity. She claims that the expansive concept of ‘culture’ employed by Barry (embracing ethnicity, national groups, religious groups, and so on) is not helpful when we focus more precisely on the circumstances that prevent minority national groups from assuming collective responsibility for their own public affairs. Moore argues forcefully, drawing on her earlier work, that liberals have to tr...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Routledge Innovations in Political Theory
• Full Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Notes on Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Practical reason and identity
• 3 Liberalism and multiculturalism: once more unto the breach
• 4 What is so different about difference?
• 5 ‘Authenticity’ in the jargon of multiculturalism
• 6 Theorizing recognition
• 7 Identity, equality and power: tensions in Parekh's political theory of multiculturalism
• 8 The limits of universalism
• 9 Canadian indigenous peoples and the transformation of political theory into cultural identity
• 10 Identity, reflection and justification
• 11 Brian Barry's egalitarian critique of multiculturalism: a liberal nationalist defence
• 12 Rights and human rights
• 13 The transition from natural rights to the culture of human rights
• 14 Reiterating rights: international society in transition
• Index