Morality and Nationalism

Catherine Frost

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2006
• ISBN:
  9781134182107
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book takes a unique approach to explore the moral foundations of nationalism.

Drawing on nationalist writings and examining almost 200 years of nationalism in Ireland and Quebec, the author develops a theory of nationalism based on its role in representation.

The study of nationalism has tended towards the construction of dichotomies – arguing, for example, that there are political and cultural, or civic and ethnic, versions of the phenomenon. However, as an object of moral scrutiny this bifurcation makes nationalism difficult to work with.

The author draws onprimary sources to see how nationalists themselves argued for their cause and examines almost two hundred years of nationalism in two well-known cases, Ireland and Quebec. The author identifies which themes, if any, are common across the various forms that nationalism can take and then goes on to develop a theory of nationalism based on its role in representation. This representation-based approach provides both a basis for the moral claim of nationalism while at the same time identifying grounds on which this claim can be evaluated and limited.

It will be of strong interest to political theorists, especially those working on nationalism, multiculturalism and minority rights. The special focus in the book on the Irish and Quebec cases also makes it relevant reading for specialists in these fields as well as for other area studies where nationalism is an issue.

1 Introduction

It is remarkable to me that so much contemporary theorizing on nationalism pays so little heed to what actual nationalists have had to say on the topic. Perhaps this is in part due to the broad dismissal issued to nationalist writings by the influential theorist Ernest Gellner, who in the early 1980s confidently advised his fellow scholars that “we shall not learn too much about nationalism from the study of its own prophets” (1983: 125). Much though I admire Gellner’s work, I respectfully disagree with this pronouncement. For if we do not turn to nationalist voices to help us understand the roots of the phenomenon – its deep motivations and aspirations – then we must rely on other scholars and theorists to represent them for us. Yet if we never check these representations against the original, we can never be sure that the nationalism these theorists are talking about is the same as the nationalism we face in everyday life. Since nationalists are rarely heard in their own voice in the theoretical debate, there has not been much opportunity to confirm how well these theories capture nationalist concerns. This makes the theoretical effort somewhat suspect from the beginning, and it contributes to deep divisions in thinking on the topic.

There is a second reason for going to the source rather than settling for a theoretical rendering of nationalist motivations. By looking at nationalist arguments we can ask whether they have something to say about the moral worth of nations that is missed in existing moral theorizing. As it now stands, nationalist arguments are studied mostly for their historical or sociological insights, but rarely as claims about political or social good. Yet I believe that these arguments reveal a genuine concern for the conditions of the populations involved and this insight may help us to recast our thinking on nationalism.

Moved by these concerns, I began reading the very nationalist writings that Gellner felt were “hardly worth analysing” (1983: 124). I turned in particular to two cases that I knew to have a long and rich nationalist history – those of Ireland and Quebec. Both can trace their nationalist activism back over two hundred years and both had prominent figures and movements who served as leading voices for the nationalist cause. My goal in starting this work was perhaps overly optimistic. I hoped to identify a central theme to nationalist argument, and through it to gain better insight into what nationalists felt justified their claim and what they aimed at achieving. As it turned out, nationalist argument presented a more complex picture than I had anticipated, but in the end I believe the effort to make sense of this complexity yields its own rewards.

But of course, such work does not take place in a vacuum. There is much to be learned from existing theories of nationalism especially once we have an appreciation of how these ideas appeared in the thinking of nationalists themselves. Many existing theories of nationalism already recognize that nations can pay dividends at two levels. At the personal level they can provide benefits via a secure sense of one’s context and a feeling of belonging and esteem. These benefits have been recognized in the work of theorists such as Will Kymlicka (1995), Charles Taylor (1995b, 1999), and Avishai Margalit writing with Joseph Raz (1990). But often these accounts stop there, at the individual level, and this leaves out an important part of the picture. Because of this, these accounts run into problems when individuals are attached to different national origins, as in the case of immigrants. If nationalism is justified solely at a personal or individual level, then everyone has an equal claim to seeing his or her nationality politically or socially established. This faces us with a situation of almost certain moral stalemate.¹

There is also a collective level to be considered. At this collective level, theorists such as David Miller (1995) and Yael Tamir (1993) recognize that nationalism pays a dividend in terms of political efficacy. But they attribute this to the existence of affective ties between co-nationals, and promise that a richer kind of collective life will result. This account proves problematic however, because it cannot explain the origin of these ties without becoming circular – I have ties to my co-nationals because they are my co-nationals (Canovan 1996: 53).

So the first thing that distinguishes the approach taken in this project is that by turning to nationalist argument, it starts from a point that other theories of nationalism overlook. This gives us reason to hope we can bypass some of the intellectual cul-de-sacs that have stymied existing theories of nationalism. The second major feature of this project is that it employs a methodology that aims to keep theory close to the ground. This methodology, sometimes called “contextualism” involves using a case-study approach to help understand and evaluate moral phenomena. It’s based on the belief that observing real-world experience can provide vital feedback into normative thinking, and it calls on the theorist to pay close attention to how events and ideas unfold in practice (Carens 2000: 1–6).

For this reason I focus on the experience with nationalism in two historical cases – those of Ireland and Quebec, as mentioned. However, what makes these two cases interesting from my point of view is not what makes them engaging for most scholars of nationalism. I am interested in the fact that some aspects of these cases are often thought to be morally uncontroversial. In Ireland, changing the political order to establish an independent state in the twenty-six counties is generally regarded as a morally legitimate measure, even though nationalist efforts to uphold a certain “character” for the population – affecting women’s rights, language use, and economic development, for instance – proved problematic. In Quebec, efforts aimed at cultural self-preservation – such as regulating language use and fostering economic development – are often defended as legitimate, but changing the political order is considered more problematic. Because similar measures appear in a different light in these two cases I think they can help highlight factors that establish the moral standing of the nationalist claim.

In addition a distinction is commonly made between these two cases by designating Ireland as a case of postcolonial liberation, while viewing Quebec as part of an ongoing multicultural project. While there is some truth to this reading, there are too many historical similarities between the cases for this explanation to account for all the differences in how we evaluate their nationalist experiences. The ease with which this distinction is commonly accepted, then, raises more questions than it does answers. This means that their respective experiences provide a fruitful starting place for an examination of the national claim.

Chapter outline

In the next chapter (Chapter 2) I initiate this project by considering previous attempts to theorize nationalism. The chapter introduces the reader to seven major theoretical approaches, assesses their strengths and weaknesses, and uses them to establish a set of criteria that an account of the moral worth of nationalism should meet.

The following two chapters (Chapters 3 and 4) then look at nationalist argument in Ireland and Quebec from 1780 to 1950. These chapters find that arguments in defense of the national claim fall into two major formulations, and moreover, that these two formulations are historically distinct. In the Irish case addressed in Chapter 3, nationalism first appeared as a claim to an independent legislature and nationalists argued that good government required legislators to share a stake in Irish conditions. But by the middle of the nineteenth century a second formulation of the nationalist claim appeared. This one focused on creating a strong national character so that a population could express itself and its conditions adequately and authentically.

Chapter 4 then asks whether similar formulations appeared in Quebec. As in Ireland, early Quebec nationalists argued that political representatives should share the conditions of the national population in order to adequately represent its interests. And again, by the end of the nineteenth century nationalist argument was focused on issues of national character (and in particular on language) as a source of authenticity and expression.

While the two formulations start out from different points when it comes to political and cultural life, Chapter 5 cautions against reading these differences as yet another nationalist dichotomy. Reflecting on current work in liberal-nationalism, it argues that this work is premised on a divide between the political and cultural aspects of nationalism that simply cannot be maintained. Theory in this area has developed along two divergent paths, yet neither seems to be able to deliver a viable solution. Instead, to overcome this impasse, theory should focus more closely on the political/cultural dynamic to nationalism and ask how the two sides of the national equation are tied together.

Chapter 6 then sets out to reconstruct the development of nationalist argument as a conceptual history in order to understand its dynamics and to look for common themes through this development. The exercise suggests that the second formulation of the national claim may amount to an inversion of the logic of the first and that the two are inter-related in a manner that cannot adequately be reflected in an approach based on dichotomies or bifurcation. Further, it suggests that the two formulations are connected by a common concern for representational resources. Nations can provide a shared frame of reference for both political and cultural representation, and for this reason they have a claim to moral standing. However, in order to serve their representational purpose, national frames of reference are also characterized by a need for selectivity, currency, and relevancy.

Chapter 7 takes the approach to nationalism that understands it as a claim about representational resources and evaluates it in light of existing theory in this field, including contrasting it with republican, multicultural, or post-national alternatives to nationalism. This exercise indicates the importance of establishing limits on a national claim, and the chapter suggests both internal and external limits that should play a part in a representational approach.

Returning to the original case studies, Chapter 8 asks what a representational approach can tell us about the nationalism that unfolded in Ireland and Quebec. Four main areas of interest for the chapter include the appropriateness of political independence; the conduct of nationalist governments; the role of multinational frames of reference; and the experience of minorities. While both cases have their successes and failures, it becomes clear that when understood as a claim about representational resources, nationalism is more constrained in practice than is always recognized.

Beginning in the mid-to late twentieth century both Ireland and Quebec went through a period of dramatic social change, yet the idea of the nation remains a powerful element in both communities. Chapter 9 argues that this process confirms that nations can handle a high degree of change without compromising their representational role. This suggests that from a normative point of view we need to shift our focus away from long-standing social or cultural traits as major markers of nationalism.

The tenth and final chapter reviews the overall arguments of the book and puts them into context by considering the inevitable risks we incur when we engage in representation. We should always be ready, it suggests, to revise our frames of reference in order to capture missing elements. Nationalism need not be hostile to this requirement, but if the line between establishing a frame of reference and reifying one is not observed, then nationalism can become the source of new representational problems.

The argument of the book

This book argues that while nationalism can focus on different objectives and concerns, one constant in nationalist argument is the role of a shared frame of reference as a representational resource. Frames of reference are important because they are a pre-condition for representation, both political and cultural. The main claim of the book is that nations embody a process that establishes and maintains frames of reference at a very large and very general level. If this account is correct, it suggests that nations are evidence of an adaptive capacity that enables us to re-configure our ways of thinking, communicating, and acting together. Acknowledging this, however, does not give carte blanche endorsement to all nationalisms. There are conditions that a national frame of reference should meet in order for it to serve a population. These conditions include relevance (a frame of reference must reflect real circumstances), currency (it must be revisable), and equal moral worth (it must respect individual members of the population). In sum, the book argues that the grounds of nationalism lie in its role in representation, and that the limits of nationalism lie in the conditions for a useful frame of reference.

In pursuing this project I take a long view of the nationalist phenomenon, and cover almost two hundred years of nationalism in the two cases examined. In characterizing the nationalism that unfolded, I take my cue from the arguments of the leading figures and movements. This raises an important question. How seriously should we take the arguments of these elite figures as statements about normative political aims? Might such nationalism merely reflect a political project of the governing powers or elites, with the rest of the population swept along in its course? The difficulty with this reading of events is that it diminishes the agency and activism of a large portion of the population. Instead, one scholar, when examining the rise of British nationalism, made a point of addressing both its mass and elite aspects. Linda Colley’s findings confirm that nationalism requires the support and involvement of a range of groups. Britishness took root as a concept, she stresses, because it resonated with the larger population, “not just because patriotism was recommended from above” (1992: 371).² If we assume that Colley’s analysis of the British experience touches upon a dynamic that plays out in other nationalisms as well, then we must be wary of suggestions that nationalism can be accounted for as an elite project. As Colley argues, the main ideas may have been voiced by elites, but to have significance they needed to engage the broader population. Without their participation, nationalism would have none of the transformative power it demonstrated in the British, or for that matter, the Irish and Quebec cases.

As noted in the chapter outline, the investigation in this project revealed that in the Irish and Quebec cases nationalism appeared in two distinct formulations. If, as I suggest, the second formulation amounts to an inversion of the logic of the first, then this tells us that the central claim of nationalism must be contained in what is common to both formulations. For this reason I suggest that leaning too heavily on dichotomies to make sense of nationalism can lead us into even greater difficulties. Focusing instead on commonalities leads us to consider the role of shared frames of reference in representation.

Arguing that representational issues are at the center of many nationalist claims does not automatically establish anything from a normative point of view. Yet the claim that shared frames of reference are necessary to collective life, and that political structures should be sensitive to these needs, is not unique to nationalist argument. Similar ideas appear in the work of Nietzsche (1980), Arendt (1968, 1972), and Niklas Luhmann (1979). From these works we learn that, at their best, frames of reference serve to focus our attention on those aspects of reality that are most relevant, and therefore provide a kind of epistemic short-cut that manages the otherwise overwhelming potentiality of our world. At their worst they can obscure reality and handicap a population in its activities. Yet employing frames of reference is not really a choice, since in their absence we would have difficulty communicating about our world. How we build and employ these systems, however, is a matter of choice. So while nationalism does indeed raise a claim with which we should be concerned, we must also be concerned with the constraints on this claim.

The central idea developed though this work, therefore, is that the moral worth of nationalism arises in its role as a shared frame of reference that enables representation. The national frame of reference can serve as a mechanism for selecting and combining relevant information about a population’s common circumstances. Nationalism attempts to establish this broadly held frame of reference by means of either the political order or the population’s self-understanding and conduct. Since its moral worth is owed to the benefits it may secure for a population, nationalism can, under certain conditions, be an instrumental good. The capacity to create and re-create shared frames of reference (national or otherwise), however, is an attribute which is intrinsically valuable, in that it makes collective life possible.

Definitions and terminology

The choice of terminology is a critical part of any argument. Since discussions of nationalism are especially prone to problems in this area, I want to outline what I mean by a few of the basic terms I employ, and also explain why there are certain other terms that I avoid. For the purposes of this discussion, the term “nation” indicates an ideal type of community, rather than an actually existing one. “National,” however is a qualifier tha...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Routledge Innovations in Political Theory
• Full Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The worth of nations
• 3 Nationalism in Ireland
• 4 Nationalism in Quebec
• 5 Bifurcated nationalism and the impasse in theory
• 6 Nationalism as representation
• 7 Evaluating nationalism as representation
• 8 Applying the theory
• 9 Nationalism and social change
• 10 The ties that blind
• Notes
• References
• Index