Nordic Cooperation

Johan Strang

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317626947
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique

The recent crises in global economy and in European integration have caused a considerable revival of interest in the Nordic Welfare Model. However, less attention has been given to the ways in which the nations that form Scandinavia or 'Norden' are connected through various forms of inter- and transnational cooperation.

With contributions from a team of experts in the field, this volume analyses Nordic cooperation in a European perspective and argues that this special form of transnational cooperation has been crucial in the development of the Nordic Welfare Model. In addition, it also contends that the Nordic model of transnational cooperation is a relevant case study when pondering the present problems of European integration.

This text will be of key interest to students, researchers and policy makers studying the Nordic Model and transnational cooperation and more generally to those interested in European studies, Scandinavian studies, welfare studies, international relations and regional integration.

1 Introduction

The Nordic model of transnational cooperation?

Johan Strang¹

A Nordic renaissance?

The Nordic region has captured the imagination in new ways in recent years. As Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden regularly appear at the top of international rankings – whether of prosperity, transparency, education, gender equality, peace or happiness – the Nordic countries have re-emerged as ‘models’, with best practices to share.² The comparative success of the Nordic countries during the crises in the global economy and European integration has testified to the strength of the Nordic welfare state, while Nordic crime fiction, TV series, design and even food have gained an international following. Against this background, The Economist featured an article on ‘The Nordic countries: The next super model’ in February 2013. Also within the Nordic region itself, ‘Norden’³ has returned to the agenda after a couple of decades in the shadow of the European project. Leading Nordic politicians have rediscovered the ‘Nordic brand’, which they want to utilize in global arenas, and there seems to be an increased will to present a united Nordic front to the outside world.⁴

To some extent this ‘Nordic renaissance’ has translated into new initiatives of Nordic cooperation, especially in the field of foreign and defence politics. The Nordic countries have embarked on ambitious cooperation regarding training of forces and exercises, as well as acquisition of defence material. Coordinated by the NORDEFCO structure (Nordic Defence Cooperation, established in 2009), much of this cooperation is conducted on the basis of a report written by the former Norwegian foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg in 2009, and with the more anxious geopolitical situation in Europe following the events in Ukraine in 2014, the calls for joint Nordic security policies have only increased. The public debate has even witnessed the somewhat surprising return of a pan-Nordic or ‘Scandinavianist’ discourse, spearheaded by the Swedish historian Gunnar Wetterberg and his proposal for a United Nordic Federation (2010). Both the Norwegian and the Danish Nordic Associations have in fact taken on the Nordic Federation as their official aim.⁵

At the same time, however, there are also significant signs pointing towards a continuous decline of Nordic cooperation, at least in the form it has traditionally been understood. Nordic cooperation may be flourishing in the area of foreign and defence policy, but it is waning in such traditional key areas as welfare, law and culture. Even if politicians are keen to use the Nordic welfare model as part of their nation-branding strategies, there is very little focus on joint Nordic initiatives in the social sector or regarding welfare policies at large (see Chapter 4). The institutions of official political Nordic cooperation, the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers, are struggling for prestige and have been completely overtaken by the EU in terms of political and juridical relevance (see Chapter 2). Wetterberg’s proposal for a Nordic federation was largely discounted as a curiosity by the leading Nordic politicians. Even if the Nordic region arguably never formed a common public sphere, the Nordics have recently become even less familiar with each other’s key debates, leading politicians and celebrities, and studies show that they understand each other’s languages more poorly than ever before (Delsing & Lundin Åkesson 2005).⁶

The ‘Nordic renaissance’ and the ‘decline of Nordic cooperation’ suggest that Norden is at a crossroads where the role of the region is debated against the background of the persistent economic crisis in Europe and an increasingly challenging geopolitical situation. These debates are interesting not least because during the past 20 years Nordic cooperation has been relegated to the margins of the political discussions. Indeed, the last time Norden was discussed with similar intensity was two decades ago when the region renegotiated its place in Europe as a result of the end of the Cold War and accelerating European integration with the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992). In particular, the period leading up to the accession of Finland and Sweden to the European Union in 1995 witnessed a lively debate on the future of Nordic cooperation: while some proposed a strengthened Nordic union as an alternative to the EU, others envisioned reinvigorated Nordic cooperation within the EU framework (Hansen & Wæver 2002; Laursen & Olesen 2000).

The scholarly discussion at the time was marked by a creative mood in which both the history and the geopolitical coordinates of Europe were rethought. The idea of ‘Norden’ as a fixed region consisting of five countries was contested. Some argued that it was a Cold War construction that had served its purpose well, but this was now making place for the European project or for expanded and more flexible regional identities such as the Baltic Sea Region or a reinvented Hanseatic space (Jukarainen 1999; Klinge 1995; Neumann 1992; Wæver 1992; see Musiał 2009). Scholars penetrated into the historical and cultural foundations of Norden, but were often rather pessimistic about the durability of the construction (af Malmborg 1998; Østergaard 1994; Sørensen & Stråth 1997). The volumes dedicated to a re-evaluation of official political Nordic cooperation were marked by nostalgia about the ‘golden ages’ during the Cold War period (Olsen & Sverdrup 1998a; Sundelius & Wiklund 2000a). Even the Nordic welfare model, which had been the source of great national pride across the region, was challenged both as a sustainable economic policy and as an exceptional model, compared to the rest of Western Europe (Hansen & Wæver 2002; Kiander 2005; Kosonen 1993; Kuhnle 2000).

It is probably fair to conclude that the 1990s attempts to redefine and forge a new role for Norden in a Europeanized post-Cold War context failed and that Nordic cooperation was relegated to a fading existence in the shadows of more exciting projects. Indeed, as late as 2007 the British scholar Christopher Browning argued that ‘Nordicity’ needed ‘rebranding’, as its traditional attributes – the Nordic countries as ‘peaceful societies’ marked by ‘international solidarity’ and ‘egalitarian social democracy’ – had either been forsaken by the political elite of the Nordic countries or undermined by the melding of Nordic with European practices and processes (Browning 2007). Two years later, two of the authors in the present volume noted that there seemed to be ‘a lack of vigour for reinventing Norden for the twenty-first century’ (Götz & Haggrén 2009b: 2).

Today, it seems that a reinvention, redefinition and rebranding of ‘Norden’ is taking place. This book is motivated by the lack of scholarly literature analyzing these debates, their significance to the ‘Nordic brand’ in general and to the tradition of Nordic cooperation in particular.⁷ The ambition is threefold. First, the book provides a historical analysis of the multifunctional and multilevel character of Nordic cooperation, arguing that this ‘Nordic model of transnational cooperation’ was crucially important in creating the political and social arrangements commonly known as ‘the Nordic model’ or ‘the Nordic Welfare State’. Second, and against this background, the book will discuss the ways in which Norden and Nordic cooperation is changing in the process of reinventing itself. What are the reasons behind the re-emergence of Norden in the political and popular discussions, and how does this new Norden relate to the one that was fading away in the wake of the Cold War? And third, the book considers the future of Nordic cooperation and the potential role of the Nordic region in Europe and globally. What, if any, are the lessons to be learned from Nordic cooperation when it comes to managing the current challenges for international cooperation, the European crisis, and for forging a new and more democratic and sustainable European Union?

The two narratives of Nordic cooperation

In historical accounts, Norden is often defined as five nation states that share historical experiences to a degree that makes it possible to distinguish them as a distinct historical region. Norden or ‘Nordicity’ (to borrow Browning’s term from above) has in different ways played a key role in each Nordic national narrative. Being a Nordic country has been a central part of the construction of all five nation states (Árnason & Wittrock 2012; Nielsen 2009; Sørensen & Stråth 1997). Nordic cooperation, however, is usually given a somewhat ambiguous role in the histories of the region. It is possible to distinguish between two narratives of Nordic cooperation: one of failure and the other of success (Götz & Stenius 2009; Hecker-Stampehl 2004).

The narrative of failure presents Nordic cooperation as a poor substitute for miscarried attempts to create a more fixed integrated unit, whether in the form of a Scandinavian nation during the nineteenth century (see Hemstad 2008, 2010; Stråth 2005), a United States of Norden in the wake of the Second World War (see Hecker-Stampehl 2011), or in the form of some ambitious formalized and treaty-based arrangement in a particular policy sector such as security or economy (see Hecker-Stampehl 2009; Olesen 1994, 1995). This narrative draws much of its strength from looking at the region in a long historical perspective by, for example, referring to the Kalmar Union (1397–1523) when the whole of Scandinavia was united under the same crown, or to the Scandinavianist movement of the nineteenth century, usually seen as a counterpart to the pan-nationalist movements on the European continent that produced Germany and Italy (Wendt 1981: 11–30; Wetterberg 2010: 30–31, 63–75). The argument is that the Nordic region has common historical and cultural legacies dating back to the Reformation, or even to the Viking age, which as such should have been sufficient in facilitating the formation of a Nordic nation or federation. From a security political perspective the failures are often attributed to external factors, such as the absence of a common foe – the Swedes and Finns have been more concerned with the eastern frontier, and the Danes with the southern – or to the disapproval of Norden’s mighty neighbours, which in different ways at different times have obstructed the formation of a strong rival in the North (Thomas 1996: 18–19; Westberg 2012a: 49–65; Wetterberg 2010: 12). From a more internal Nordic perspective, it is often claimed that the Scandinavianist movement was outdone by the ‘national’ nationalisms of the nineteenth century, with the Norwegians, in particular, being wary of Danish and Swedish great power ambitions (Stråth 2005: 181–192; Østergaard 1997: 38–41).

But the perspective of failure is common also in analyses of Nordic cooperation in the twentieth century. Although the Nordic countries, and in particular the Scandinavian states, enjoyed some success in cooperating in the League of Nations (Götz 2009; Götz 2011: 84–112), Nordic defence cooperation was during the interwar-period characterized by ‘hasty promises and dashed hopes’ (Westberg 2012b: 114). Plans for a more shared or united military defence of the region never materialized and, despite a lot of intra-Nordic sympathies and material support, there was no Nordic alliance in place to back Finland in its conflicts and wars with the Soviet Union, or Denmark and Norway in the face of the Nazi-German attacks in the spring of 1940. After the Second World War, negotiations on a Scandinavian Defence Union broke down in 1949 when the Norwegian government – on the basis of lessons learned in 1940 – wanted to attach the Scandinavian union to a larger Western frame work, i.e. NATO, which was out of the question for the Swedish government (Molin & Olesen 1995; Petersson 2012; Pharo 1994). As a consequence, ‘small state realism’ found its own peculiar version in each Nordic country, making impossible any joint endeavours and even cooperation between the three NATO members (Denmark, Iceland and Norway) and the two neutrals (Finland and Sweden) (Hilson 2008: 116–134; Olesen 2004; Stenius et al. 2011).⁸

If security and defence politics has been a difficult area, the history of Nordic economic cooperation is arguably even less encouraging. The Scandinavian currency union, established in 1873, broke down gradually after the dissolution of the Swedish–Norwegian Union in 1905 and ultimately with the suspension of the gold standard at the outbreak of the First World War (Henriksen et al. 1994; Talia 2004). In the 1950s, a Nordic customs union was pursued in negotiations that ran parallel with the crafting of the European Economic Community (1957). The Nordic initiative was, however, buried in prolonged deliberations and investigations, the purpose of which was to wait for European developments (af Malmborg & Laursen 1995; Olesen 2009; Stråth 1980). In the end, a free trade area involving the Nordic countries was reached only through the establishment of EFTA in 1960.⁹ The failure of the Nordic customs union also meant that the plans for a Nordic investment bank (NIB) miscarried, and it took two more failed attempts (in 1961 and 1964) until the plan was realized in 1976 as a separate solution, without the context of a larger economic union (Sejersted 2002; Wiklund 2000a). The most ambitious Nordic initiative during the Cold War period was the plan for a Nordic Economic Community (NORDEK) at the end of the 1960s. This time the negotiations produced a treaty that was only waiting for signatures when the Finnish government announced its withdrawal. The Finnish government, or President Urho Kekkonen, could not accept Denmark’s plans of joining the EEC as this could have been conceived as a violation of the Finno–Soviet Treaty of 1948 (Arter 2008: 300–306; Hecker-Stampehl 2009; Sonne 2007). And despite the success of the joint Nordic Co-operative Wholesale Society in 1918 (Nordisk Andelsforbund, see Chapter 3) and the Scandinavian Airlines Systems (SAS) in 1946–51, the Nordic track record was rather poor when it came to large-scale corporate mergers or joint initiatives.¹⁰ This trend was only overturned in the 1990s, though not without a couple of high-profile failures such as the Telia–Telenor deal in 1999 (Sejerstedt 2002).

Given the number of miscarried projects it is easy to view the Nordic countries as ‘reluctant Nordics’ (Arter 2008: 297–313). Not even in the field of arts and culture, usually seen as the most successful area of Nordic cooperation, have the most ambitious plans materialized. Despite lengthy discussions and thorough reports in the 1970s and 1980s, the Nordic governments failed to agree upon a common TV satellite that would distribute Nordic programmes across the region (Wormbs 2000; see also Chapter 6). In fairness, though, almost any project looks like a failure when it is compared to the grandiose original plans. It has become a tradition to talk about a Phoenix effect in Nordic cooperation, as the grand failures often have triggered advances of a more moderate kind (Anderson 1967: 118 ff.). The miscarried NordSat project gave rise to Nordisk Film & TV Fond in 1989, which has been one of the major financiers of many Nordic films and TV series that have enjoyed international success (Wormbs 2000); the miscarried NORDEK plan was realized in a less ambitious form as the Nordic Council of Ministers in 1971; and the collapse of th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of contributors
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction: The Nordic model of transnational cooperation?
• 2 European challenge to Nordic institutional cooperation: Past, present and future
• 3 Nordic cooperation in the voluntary sector
• 4 The Nordic model and the rise and fall of Nordic cooperation
• 5 Cooperation in the field of law
• 6 Dreams and realities: The Nordic Council Literature Prize as a symbol of the construction of Nordic cultural cooperation
• 7 The Nordic passport union and its discontents: Unintended consequences of free movement
• 8 Nordic institutionalized cooperation in a larger regional setting
• 9 Nordic security and defence cooperation: Northern policies in a European perspective
• 10 Nordic countries as laboratories for transnational learning
• Index