Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Euro-Atlantic Security

Paolo Foradori

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136203220
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Libertad política

This book offers a comprehensive examination of the important security issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament have returned to the top of the international political agenda. The issue assumes particular importance in regard to NATO, given that some 150–200 US tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are still present in five countries belonging to the Alliance (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey). The past few years have seen animated debate in the United States and Europe on the role of such weapons in the current scenario of international security, and whether they can be further reduced or completely removed from Europe.

Bringing together leading scholars and analysts of TNW with country-specific competences, this volume improves our understanding of this debate by providing in-depth analysis of the presence, role, perceived value and destiny of TNWs in Europe. The book addresses the issue in a systematic manner, taking into account the perspectives of all main actors directly or indirectly involved in the debate. This approach provides new and important insights that can inform both theoretical and policy work on a very critical and timely international issue, especially during the ongoing review of NATO's deterrence and defence posture.

This book will be of much interest to students of European politics, European security, nuclear proliferation, and IR in general.

Part I

European hosting countries

1 Belgium

Tom Sauer

NATO’s nuclear weapons policy dates from the Cold War. During this period, the NATO countries saw the need for a nuclear deterrent that would compensate for their inferiority in conventional weapons vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. This extended deterrence policy also included the stationing of US nuclear weapons in Western Europe. In the midst of the Cold War — between 1954 and 1963 — US nuclear weapons were sent to eight European states, including Belgium.

The US-Belgian bilateral agreement for cooperation regarding mutual defense was signed by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak on 17 May 1962, and entered into force on 5 September 1962. The first US nuclear weapons arrived in Belgium in November 1963.¹ Belgium has been a part of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group since its creation in 1967. Since this time, the Belgian government has guarded its privileges in this regard. Although Spaak had promised during preparations for the agreement that the Belgian Parliament would be consulted before nuclear weapons were stationed on Belgian soil, these consultations never took place.²

Over time, different nuclear weapons systems have been installed in Belgium. For a short time during the 1980s, Belgium was also one of the host nations for Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The first B-61 bombs may have arrived in 1979, concurrent with the first deployments of Belgian F-16 fighter aircraft. At present, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), there are between 10 and 20 US B-61 bombs, each with a destructive power of 175 to 345 kilotons, remaining in 11 WS-3 vaults on Belgian territory. In wartime, these weapons are intended to be used by Belgian pilots flying F-16s, and Belgian pilots still train for nuclear missions. In peacetime, the weapons remain under US custody on Belgian soil. The bombs are located at the Kleine Brogel Air Force Base in Peer in the northeast (Dutch-speaking) part of Belgium. The base houses the 31st “Tiger” Squadron and the 349th Squadron, both belonging to the 10th Wing of the Belgian Air Force. The American 52nd Munitions Support Squadron is charged with protecting the inner perimeter and the bombs themselves at Kleine Brogel.

The Belgian government has never confirmed the presence of these weapons, let alone the exact number of weapons. Although most experts believe that the weapons remain in place, some argue that these weapons are transferred between different bases in Europe on a regular basis.³ Already in the 1990s, André Dumoulin, who at that time was affiliated with the Belgian Royal Military School, openly doubted whether US nuclear weapons remained in Belgium.⁴ However, he did not question the fact that the infrastructure to host these weapons still existed.

This chapter begins from the assumption that the US tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are still in Belgium. Because the non-nuclear weapon states (including most Non-Aligned Movement states) regularly criticize NATO’s extended deterrence policy, the Belgian government has an interest in announcing any withdrawal. Maintaining an ambiguous declaratory policy without a force structure policy is not credible either, especially in the medium and long term.

The recent debate in Belgium

In comparison with other political issues, the intensity of the debate over the presence of US nuclear weapons is rather low in Belgium, as it presumably is in the rest of Europe. In peacetime and with no major perceived direct threat, people are more interested in welfare and domestic issues than foreign policy.

Belgian politics, both in socioeconomic policy and ethical issues, has always been divided according to conflict lines: north (Dutch-speaking) versus south (French-speaking), and conservative versus progressive. The linguistic conflict in particular has occupied a great deal of political energy, especially since 2007. It took one-and-a-half years to form a new government after the June 2010 elections because of the nationalist schism.

However, the issue of TNWs seems more politicized in Belgium than in other European states for two primary reasons. First, Belgium has a pacifist culture. Historically, this relatively small but strategically located territory has been occupied by different tribes, states and empires, including the Romans, the Habsburgs, Napoleon and the Dutch. In 1830, Belgium became an independent country. During the twentieth century, Belgium was twice invaded by Germany. The poem ‘In Flanders Fields’ is known worldwide. These experiences certainly explain Belgium’s aversion to war.

This pacifist culture is stronger in the northern, Dutch-speaking region than in the southern, French-speaking part of the country, also for historical reasons.⁵ The so-called Flemish movement, which agitated against domination by the country’s French-speaking minority, largely stems from World War I, when Flemish soldiers — who made up 80 percent of the Belgian army — had to obey orders from French-speaking officers. Many of these soldiers died because they did not understand the orders given to them.⁶ This grievance on behalf of the Dutch-speaking community was not resolved after World War I, and the so-called “Frontbeweging” was born. Despite the recognition of Dutch as an official language in Belgium since the end of the nineteenth century, and the fact that the majority of Belgian people spoke Dutch, the only language that was used in the army, diplomacy and universities was French. In short, notions of Flemish nationalism and pacifism go hand in hand to a large extent. Pacifism was also an important principle of the main Flemish nationalist party to emerge after World War II, the Volksunie. This principle was also shared by the Flemish socialists (especially from the mid-1970s) and the left-wing section of the Flemish Christian Democrats. This pacifist culture in Flanders, and to a lesser but still substantial extent in the French-speaking part of Belgium, has an important impact on the debate over nuclear weapons.

The second major reason that the issue of US nuclear weapons seems to be more prominent in Belgium than in other Western European states has to do with the Euromissile crisis in the early 1980s. This crisis had a major impact on Belgian politics, likely more so than in neighboring countries, and was partly the result of the pacifist culture. While there had been anti-nuclear marches of more than 10,000 people in Belgium in the first half of the 1960s, it was the potential installation of Pershing II ballistic missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles in Western Europe that threatened the general consensus on Belgian foreign policy that had existed since World War II. Massive demonstrations boosted the Belgian peace movement. The first demonstration, organized by the newly established Vlaams Aktie Komitee tegen Atoomwapens (Flemish Action Committee against Atomic Weapons; VAKA) and its French-speaking pendant Coordination Nationale d’Action pour la Paix et la Démocratie (CNADP) attracted 50,000 people in December 1979, many more than expected. In 1981, 200,000 people marched on the streets of Brussels, one of the largest peace demonstrations in Europe that year. The demonstration in 1983 attracted 400,000 people (4 percent of the Belgian population), which in relative terms is larger than the demonstrations seen in neighboring countries. The 1983 demonstration remains the largest demonstration ever seen in Belgium. In March 1985, a demonstration attracted 150,000 people despite the fact that the Belgian government had decided to proceed with the installation of nuclear weapons several days earlier and that the Christian Democrat trade union had decided not to participate (in contrast to the demonstration in 1983).⁷ Another 115,000 people demonstrated in October 1985 at an event that had been planned to occur just prior to the parliamentary elections. However, probably because of the planned demonstration, the Christian Democrat/Liberal government changed strategy and decided to organize the elections before the demonstration. Again in 1987 and 1989, more than 75,000 people protested against nuclear weapons.

The peace movement was not successful in preventing the installation of nuclear missiles. However, it was successful in bringing a massive number of people to the streets, thanks to partnerships with well-established organizations such as trade unions (both Socialist and Christian) and youth movements, as well as with the so-called “new social movements” born in the 1970s, such as women’s, environmental, development and human rights groups. From nearly every village, buses of protesters left for Brussels. These demonstrations were bottom-up events that had a considerable impact on Belgian politics. While the protesters failed to prevent the installation of the cruise missiles in Florennes in 1985, they made it abundantly clear that these weapons were very unpopular.⁸ More fundamentally, the peace movement in the 1980s changed the Belgian political climate. As Professor Patrick Stouthuysen (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) argues:

Not only did the peace movement thus prevent this particular matter from being settled as part of the normal governmental routine, its actions and position seemed to be leading to a radical politicization of the entire Belgian foreign and defense policies. The traditional consensus concerning these policy areas broke down.⁹

With regard to political parties, the issue of nuclear weapons set the conservative parties (Christian Democrats and Liberals) against the progressive parties (Socialists and Greens). The Green party in Belgium has its origins in the anti-nuclear movement. The Christian Democrat party in Flanders, the largest party in Belgium after World War II, which provided most of the Prime Ministers and participated in government for nearly the entire period, was split between conservative and more progressive factions, the latter including the powerful Christian Democrat trade union. The progressive faction inside the Christian Democrat party was able to postpone the installation of the cruise missiles, but the conservative faction eventually triumphed. The party lost many votes in the 1981 election due to the nuclear weapons issue as well as other socioeconomic and institutional issues. Votes for the party fell from 26 percent in 1978 to 19.4 percent in 1981, the largest decline since World War II. However, the party did not lose the elections in October 1985, six months after the installation of the cruise missiles. Other issues were more significant during the election period.¹⁰ The Flemish Socialists who made an issue of the Euromissiles also gained votes, b...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Studies in European Security and Strategy
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: debating the last remaining case of the forward deployment of nuclear weapons
• Part I European hosting countries
• Part II A wider perspective
• Conclusion
• Selected bibliography
• Index