China's Development

Michel Aglietta, Guo Bai

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136200458
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Política

China is entering a phase where deep structural changes will arise throughout society. These multi-fold processes will be intertwined in a globalized world, impacted by the transformation of capitalism in the aftermath of the financial crisis and under the threat of severe environmental damage.

Focussing on sustainability, this book explores the future of China in light of the successful reforms undertaken in the last thirty years. It combines Chinese economic history and up-to-date macroeconomic theory in order to show how economic transformations and institutional changes are intertwined in developing capitalism under state sovereignty. The book is divided into three parts:

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• Part 1 analyses the structural changes ahead, drawing on the knowledge of the causes of the demise of imperial China and of the social disruptions due to political warfare in the 20th century.

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• Part 2 examines the reasons why the last thirty years of reform were successful and why the present growth regime will undergo a dramatic mutation in future decades.

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• Part 3 seeks to address the question: what type of political economy can support the purpose of achieving "harmonious society"?

China's Development will be of interest to students and scholars of Chinese economics, politics, history and development.

Part I

Putting China today in historical perspective

1 The role of history and culture in the resilience of China’s institutional framework

In the 30 years of reform most Western economists not acquainted with China have repeatedly announced its doom. A return to state planning or the opposite, a collapse of the political regime, Soviet style, was foreseen. Policies and performances have often been gauged against the ideology of the perfect foresight market equilibrium fostered by unbridled individual rationality. Reality, however, has put this flawed perspective into question. Obviously, Chinese reform is not a convergent process toward any normative concept of an optimal economic equilibrium. It is an ongoing co-evolutionary process of economic structures and social institutions.

The theory of regulation of capitalism, contrary to orthodox economic thinking, which elevates the market as an all-powerful coordination mechanism, acknowledges that institutions of civil society, in-between markets and the state, interact constantly with the economic dynamics. Not only do they play an important role in alleviating tensions between economic actors, setting conventions and informal rules of behavior that foster trust and reduce uncertainty, their consistency or their conflict with one another contributes to defining a mode of economic growth that evolves over time. Such institutions are rooted in the past and, anchored in the culture of the people, transmitted through generations. They shape beliefs and patterns of behavior, and make valuable contributions in absorbing shocks. Therefore understanding and exploring China’s path today requires us to recognize the peculiarities of China’s historical trajectory, its social fabric, and collective memories that derive from very ancient cultural traits but still exercise strong influence on the behavior of its population and the configuration of its society.

Stemming from the distinct process of state formation of imperial China, this chapter attempts to identify the basic social institutions in Chinese tradition that have played eminent roles in stabilizing social orders while being conducive to creativity and continuous change. These social institutions evolved over time but, together, they formed a self-consistent system that has contributed strongly to the relatively uninterrupted continuity of Chinese civilization. They are of essential importance for us in understanding where the sense of togetherness lies in China and how this sense of togetherness translates into a mode of legitimization of the state that is profoundly different from the democratic Western states and logic of economic dynamics divergent from the classic growth models based on European experiences.

Early history of state formation of imperial China

Chinese civilization is far from being the most ancient in human history. Both Egypt and ancient Mesopotamia emerged much earlier than China. However, for one recognizably similar civilization to remain from pre-Christian age down to modern times, China stands out distinctively. Especially long-lasting was the Imperial Age of China, which started after the unification under the Qin (221–206 BC) and consolidated during the Han dynasty (202 BC–AD 220). The succeeding regimes in the following 2,000 years maintained key Han imperial institutions. Many so-called “Chinese” cultural, social, and political features were formed during this long imperial age and have far-reaching influences on the behaviors of Chinese people even today. Most of the traits synthesized in this chapter would be oriented on this historic period.

Imperial China is not simply a centralized and united empire. Its true identity lies with the maintenance and reproduction of certain social and political orders. The formation of these orders was a complex and ever-evolving historical process shaped by both the given circumstances and chance factors. In this part of the book we display the earliest formational stages of imperial China ’s basic orders by outlining the history from Western Zhou (1122–770 BC) and especially Eastern Zhou (770–256 BC) to the early Han Empire (202 BC–AD 220). During this historical period, especially around the turning point of Qin ’s unification (221 BC), Chinese civilization experienced fundamental socio-political developments which altered how Chinese people interact and coordinate. These developments eventually enabled the emergence of macro orders with which we identify imperial China, or even today’s Chinese civilization.

The decay of the feudal system

Under the reign of Western Zhou, China resembled much of feudal Europe. The first kings of Zhou parceled out the kingdom as large fiefs among the king’s sons and brothers, who assumed titles equivalent to duke, marquis, and count. The king (also called “the son of heaven”) had strong feudal monarchical power and was able to allot newly conquered territories to his faithful followers or kinsmen.

However, in the Eastern Zhou period this feudal system began to collapse. Certain vassals grew more and more independent along with the increment of their powers. They defied the authority of “the son of heaven” by annexing the smaller fiefs and warring among themselves. This was a period of political fragmentation. The first half of the period is referred to as the Spring and Autumn period (770–404 BC) when the Zhou kings continued to reign by default. Over time, military conflicts became fiercer and more frequent to an extent that the second half of Eastern Zhou is vividly named the Warring States period (403–221 BC). By then the Zhou king had completely lost his power and all smaller fiefs were conquered and absorbed by the seven largest states whose rulers began calling themselves kings in 335 BC as a symbol of total denial of the sovereignty of Zhou.

The Warring States

During the Warring States period China exhibited completely different behaviors compared with the later imperial one. In fact, it is far-fetched to call the Warring States “China,” as a unified Chinese identity was purposefully dismantled. Brutal and continuous wars required the people of each state to seriously consider the question of who belonged to “us.” Strong national identities were developed with the state one came from rather than with the Zhou kingdom. Hence each of the major states had its distinct identity based on its own history and specific culture. The uniqueness of these identities was accentuated in order to arouse sharp patriotic emotions and foster tighter military unity. The natural family ties were intentionally cut or minimized in particularly aggressive states like Qin. Constant warfare required iron control by the governments over people and land. Family-based societal organization was too loose to serve this purpose. Often strong family attachments would even hinder direct commands from the state to individuals, thus sabotaging the efficiency of military and economic mobilization. The most famous case against family ties in the Warring States period was the reforms applied by Shang Yang (390–338 BC) in Qin state. Not only did he apply a strict direct domicile registration system to every individual Qin resident, he also forcefully broke the patriarchal lineage. No two male adults, given they were father and son, or brothers, were allowed to live in the same household. Tax contributions were doubled for those who did not follow that policy. The warring states usually took active roles in supporting trade and other commercial activities, with the purpose of seizing higher fiscal revenues to sustain their armies and to build massive defense walls. The emergence of government-led coin casting serves as proof of this pro-commerce attitude. Politically, centralized bureaucratic control began to be favored and thus created demands for professional administrators. For the aristocrats who had lost their fiefs and status, the opening of those positions served as great opportunities for social advancement. Many of them started different schools carrying diversified socio-political proposals and travelled from court to court in search of a wise king to implement their theories, or at least give them a job. Philosophical thinking and political theories flourished. Among those wandering scholars were the most influential philosophers in Chinese history, such as Confucius (around 551–479 BC), Mencius (around 370–290 BC), Laozi (around 600–470 BC), and Zhuangzi (around 369–286 BC).

Regardless of how deeply Confucianism and Taoism were ingrained into Chinese civilization in the imperial age, they were by no means the dominant schools of philosophy in the Warring States age. The chief early competitor of Confucius was Mozi, born around or soon after the death of Confucius. In Mozi’s theories we can easily pick up elements that resemble Christian teaching, or even Puritanical ones. Mozi preached “universal love” as against the “graded love” endorsed by Confucius, which was dependent on the specific relationships among individuals. Mozi believed that the interest of all would be better served if “everyone would love every other person as much as he loves himself” (Mozi, IV, 14). He was also strictly utilitarian. He advocated measures to enrich the country, increase the population, and bring order to the state. He envisioned rigidly disciplined organizations in which the subordinate at each level would follow the lead of his superior in all matters. It is believed that, for a while, his ideas may have had greater currency than Confucianism (Fairbank and Reischauer 1979: 51).

Another school that prevailed first in Qin state and then the whole of China after the unification under Qin was the Legalists. They were hard-core. The only thing that mattered for them was how to make a prosperous and militarily strong national state. And the only way to achieve this objective, in their mind, was by setting up strict laws and harsh punishments. All aspects of life should be regulated so as to produce maximum wealth and military might. Counting on people’s moral virtues was regarded naïve. This school reached its ultimate triumph at the famous “Burning of the Books” event, which took place immediately after the centralized Qin Empire was founded. During this event, all works of other schools were destroyed, and only those of the Legalists remained.

Had Chinese history and civilization gone on with the trend described above, it would be plausible to envision a China (more possibly in plural form) similar to European-style national states. Constant external threats to the regimes of the ruling class would have inspired strong political ambition and nationalist sentiments. The domestic societal organization within the state would have been much more compact than a family-based agrarian society. A more pluralist society would have emerged. The core social relationship would not have been that among the members of organic families but that among clearly institutionalized organizations (such as religious cults, city states, or national states). Cities, with heavy walls for defense purpose, would have taken a central role in the construction of a state, instead of the poorly protected rural area. A sharp division between citizens and peasants might have emerged, with quite possibly a superior class composed of warriors. Political power would likely have turned to local military and financial powers to strengthen the regime, but at the same time been hijacked by the voices of those local powers. Formal rules, including written laws, would have quite possibly been the main mechanisms to regulate the coordination among the population, instead of the often arbitrary and amorphous regulatory mechanisms that prevailed in imperial China such as authoritative persons, “guanxi” (social networks ), and moral values. And, of course, Confucianism would have never achieved its prominence, as it was so impractical in gathering the population to counter external threats. A better-organized school such as Mozi ’s would have served well as a uniting ideology. At some point in history, China could have even had its own version of “renaissance” or produced its own Montesquieu.

Yet, it so happened that Chinese history did not go that way.

The unification under Qin and Han

In 221 BC Qin ’s king, Ying Zheng (259–210 BC), united China. He called himself Shi Huang Di (literally “the First Emperor”). Following the advice of his Legalist chief minister Li Si (?–208 BC), the First Emperor was determined not to divide the country up again. He carried out harsh reforms to foster a united Chinese identity and a centralized political structure. All feudal states were abolished but new, small provinces were established and were under the direct command of the emperor. Weights, measures, coinage, and even the axle lengths of wagons were standardized. Thanks to him, the Chinese written language was consolidated in a single form, which is practically the same as it is today. He laid out a radiating system of roads throughout his empire, beat back the barbarians of the north, and built up the Great Wall as a permanent defense and explicit mark of China’s northern frontier. He conquered the far south, the Canton region, which had never before been part of China. Although the harshness of his reign finally devastated his own dynasty shortly after his death, China was radically transformed during the 11 years of his reign.

After several years of civil wars, when Liu Bang, better known by his posthumous title, Han Gaozu, established the Han dynasty (206 BC–AD 222), the first long-enduring dynasty of the new unified China, a new era in Chinese history opened. The Chinese people, rulers and farmers alike, found themselves in quite different circumstances from those faced by their ancestors. A massive population (59,594,978 was the reported population of a census carried out in AD 2) sharing the same language cohabiting in so vast a territory had never been achieved before.

Figure 1.1 The map of Han China.

Source: Minneapolis Institute of Arts. Accessed from http://www.artsmia.org/art-of-asia/history/pdf/china-han-dynasty.pdf(February2012)

The once frequent life-or-death battles suddenly disappeared from the everyday life of the ordinary Chinese. The only dangerous neighbors of China, the nomadic Tartar peoples, were concentrated on the northern frontier. Central government allocated heavy military strength to guard it with the help of such defense works as the Great Wall. But in the west China was naturally guarded by the Himalaya Mountains, inhabited then by harmless or weak savage tribes. The long coast on the southeast side was also naturally calm as, at that time, travelling through the Pacific Ocean was still infeasible. To the south the Chinese advanced into what is now Vietnam, absorbing smaller tribes along the way.

When wars became remote, identity became united and government singular, the logics of Chinese social and political structuring altered, and civilization had the opportunity to evolve on a fundamentally different path.

The predominant issue for the survival of the empire and the continuity of a royal family’s regime was no longer to increase military strength but to sustain domestic order. The Han dynasty inherited the Qin ’s centrally controlled bureaucratic system. A large body of bureaucrats ¹ was selected for their merit, not birth. The emperor had direct and absolute power over the personnel system of this vast bureaucracy. Integrating educated elites into a centralized bureaucratic system was a stone that hit two birds. Not only did the emperor gain considerable help with his rule, but he also deprived local elite groups of their human resources and political independence. For most of imperial history, the Chinese royal house endeavored and succeeded in establishing direct political control over its population while curbing the powers of other institutionally distinctive groups, which could have grown into indepe...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Rethinking Globalizations
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of boxes
• Introduction From imperial history to sui generis development of capitalism
• Part I Putting China today in historical perspective
• Part II Understanding Chinese reforms in the past 30 years
• Part III The new stage of reform toward sustainability
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index