Federalism, Plurinationality and Democratic Constitutionalism

Ferran Requejo, Miquel Caminal Badia

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136584909
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Política

This book provides a theoretical and comparative analysis of federalism and federations in plurinational democracies, examining how states with distinct peoples and communities coexist (or not).

Through a theoretical approach to democracy and federalism, and interdisciplinary analysis of plurinationality in state organization, including case studies of the UK, Russia, Canada, Belgium, India, Spain, Switzerland and Bolivia, this text assesses the possibilities and limits of federalism as a way to recognize and accommodate multinationalism in plurinational democracies. It evaluates a range of strategies used by states to support national, ethnic, linguistic or religious collectives in present-day liberal democracies. Leading scholars in the field evaluate the institutional and practical repercussions regarding the issue of recognition and accommodation of national minorities in a globalised world, through different theoretical perspectives to build up a detailed picture of problems and solutions to multinationalism. Looking both within and beyond the state, this is an invaluable examination of dilemmas and institutional challenges faced by many modern democracies.

Federalism, Plurinationality and Democratic Constitutionalism will be of interest to students, researchers and scholars of democracy, nationalism, federalism and constitutionalism.

1 Democracy and federalism in
plurinational societies

Miquel Caminal and Ferran Requejo

1 Introduction

In recent years there has been an increase in empirical analyses and political theory studies relating to the territorial organization of states and national pluralism. The state is no longer a closed, uniform entity; it cannot be. It has ceased to be the domain of a single, sovereign nation. In all spheres of social life, from the economic to the cultural, states have inevitably become more porous, open and interactive. Diversity and polycentricism characterize a world that is at the same time global and local. The state has become a much more complex political organization which is much weaker in economic terms and less able to behave, in political terms, as the supreme authority of government, as well as being overwhelmed by the movements of capital and migratory processes. This weakening of the state is both the cause and the effect of a reawakening of identities and national loyalties. When the state is diluted or weakened as a political community, other types of community appear as forms of social organization and cohesion.

National pluralism is one of the most important aspects of the disintegration of the national state. In recent decades, there has been considerably more interdisciplinary debate regarding the accommodation of plurinationality in state organization.¹ This has resulted in a great deal of research, some of which has taken the form of case studies, while other projects have focused on the theoretical and conceptual debate. They are interdependent because they deal with the same problem, in spite of the singularity of each case. Moreover, both are necessary in order to improve our theoretical and empirical knowledge of the processes of change that the modern state is undergoing with regard to national diversity. For this reason, the editors have chosen to bring together in one volume a number of contributions on federal theory and plurinationality which will serve as an introductory framework to case studies within the democratic and liberal tradition.

This book is about federalism and plurinationality; that is, democracy and the recognition of national diversity. Democracy is the stage before one enters into the debate on national pluralism, the recognition of nations and their articulation in the state according to the principles of federalism. It is well known that, since Greek times and throughout history, democracy has not been present for very long periods of time. The Aristotelian idea that property, culture and politics go hand in hand makes it difficult for democracy to take root and establish itself in societies that are based on inequality. In fact, democracy as a system of government did not return until the modern era, when it was established on the foundations of liberal constitutionalism and under the principles of the Enlightenment. Democracy demands that all its citizens be treated as adults with the right to think, decide and act for themselves.

In 1900 there were fewer than ten political systems that could be called liberal democracies. One hundred years later there are between seven and eight times more liberal-democratic systems: around 80 of the nearly 200 states in existence in the world today, although the dividing line between democratic and non-democratic systems is not always easy to draw and depends on the classification criteria that one has previously established.² There are, for example, formally democratic systems with regular elections and political parties which are not functionally democratic and where a change in the government is effectively impossible. In any case, authoritarian political systems continue to outnumber them (civil or military dictatorships, traditional monarchies, theocracies, single-or dominant-party systems). However, democracy has spread sufficiently and enjoys enough prestige nowadays for everyone to want to join the club and this makes it necessary to enquire into the quality of existing democracies.

The majority system has been the method that has allowed liberal democracies to work, in contrast to authoritarian political systems. A majority based on a free, plural and competitive society that takes political decisions through elected representatives who enjoy the full trust of the citizens and are thus able to make decisions on their behalf in accordance with the majority system. The majority system is the first step to distinguishing democratic procedure from dictatorial procedure. But this distinction does not ensure that democracy is fair for everyone. The majority system ensures that the system and the selection procedure for the ruling class both work, but it does not ensure the correct functioning of democracy.³ Moreover, if we rely solely on this system, it becomes a monolithic, uniform vision of democracy that fails to reflect the enormous diversity inherent in modern-day societies. The majority system, based on the principle of one person, one vote is unable to convince us that we are all equal, that we all have the same political weight in democracy, that the nation is sovereign and that parliament reflects this sovereignty.

Different languages, cultures, values, ideas, and traditions coexist in contemporary societies no matter how much effort has been made to achieve their uniformity. Something is fundamentally wrong with the definition and functioning of democracy if we do not put pluralism before the majority system. Over time, pluralism has gradually established its own meaning within the framework and evolution of liberal constitutionalism. The first important blow was struck by Kelsen when he said that democracy, necessarily and inevitably, requires a state of political parties. This is at odds with the opinion of Triepel and the uniformist tradition of the liberal nation, which considered the nature of the liberal state to be incompatible with its division into political parties.⁴ Ideological and political pluralism, through the constitutional recognition and regulation of public freedoms, constituted a significant leap forward in the democratizing evolution of the liberal state, which has slowly taken form over the last two centuries through universal suffrage. It has taken over two hundred years for the one person, one vote principle to be complied with, and it has yet to be complied with universally even now.

With regard to the political and institutional organization of a democratic state, in some cases pluralism must ensure that political minorities can become majorities in the future, in order to guarantee the democratic rules of the game that prevent majorities from perpetuating themselves in power by abusing their status. In other cases, it is a question of regulating the protection and the possibility of development of permanent cultural and national minorities – those which are unable to become majorities for demographic reasons. It must also open channels for the expression, manifestation, autonomous organization and social and institutional recognition of the diversity of beliefs, values, ideas, customs, as well as political options and those of any other economic, social and cultural nature. Liberal society has been built on the foundations of uniformity; its democratization involves the recognition and expression of its diversity.

2 Democracy and national pluralism

A very important aspect of this diversity is national pluralism. It is fair to say that until the end of the twentieth century the model that identified the state was the national state, as the synthesis and conciliation between the state and the nation. The state identified the nation, not the other way round. Thus, the view that the state, whether it was Spain, France, Argentina, Switzerland or any other, constituted ipso facto a nation was never questioned or put to the test. The original model and maximum expression of the state-nation equivalence was France.⁵ This is the case even for the confederal, and later federal, variants, represented by the USA and Switzerland, which borrowed from the original model by using federalism to construct a national identity that equated federation with nation.

To question the single-nation nature of the state is, for many, to attack its foundations and endanger its very existence. The state is one, as is the nation. There was no question about it; it was an axiom that preceded any debate on democracy and pluralism. But one question refuses to go away: what should be done about plurinational democratic states, and about those that are multilingual and multicultural? Dictatorships have an easy time of it, all they have to do is impose a single or underlying national, cultural or linguistic identity. However, after centuries of state activities oriented towards the creation of single-nation societies, the stubborn plurinational realities are still present. It is necessary to recognize and regulate them democratically. National pluralism involves the recognition of national diversity in states where it exists. This is not the place to get into a debate about sovereignty and its divisibility, but it should be pointed out that it is just as important for pluralist democracy to recognize freedom of thought and opinion and the fact that there are many ways of living, as it is to recognize equality of treatment and recognition of the rights of different national, linguistic and cultural identities. Value pluralism is flawed if it does not include national pluralism.

In the last 25 years much progress has been made in the debate on democracy and national pluralism, but much less progress has been made in terms of the will and political action aimed at its constitutional recognition and regulation. Nevertheless, there has been a change in the territorial conception of the state which has had a profound effect on its internal structure and its presence on the international stage. The end of the bipolar world of the second half of the twentieth century and the impact of globalization on the organization of states and relations between them are two factors that have changed the global scene dramatically. States cannot continue with the old organizational dogmas, based on sovereignties that are not what they used to be, nor on the antiquated principle of non-interference, which is still the norm in international political and economic practice. The internal and external political space of states, which was perfectly demarcated in the past, has become more diffuse. Borders are porous and states find themselves caught between two dynamics that are pulling in different directions: the local and the supra-state. In this respect, processes of regionalization and supra-state or continental political union complement each other and are shaping a horizon that will alter, to a greater or lesser extent, the territorial conception of the state.

This is the scenario which territorial pluralism inhabits in all its different forms, with their own virtues and limitations, as described in the second chapter of this volume by John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary. Territorial pluralism offers states a range of strategies to enable them to give a positive response to national, ethnic, linguistic or religious communities that seek a form of political recognition compatible with the unity and permanence of the state. These strategies may be territorial or “non-territorial” community-based in nature. Among the former it is worth distinguishing between (1) pluralist federations, (2) the devolution and decentralization processes of a unitary state, (3) federacies, or bilateral agreements through which the special status of one part of a territory is recognized constitutionally and (4) cross-border territorial links. One should also distinguish between territorial pluralism and other forms of “non-territorial” collective autonomy which involve recognition and powers of government over a (linguistic, cultural, national or religious) community. The origin of this community-based recognition, which is founded on personal and collective autonomy, is to be found in the theory of nationalities of the Austro-Marxists Renner and Bauer, in the context of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as a way of making state union compatible with the recognition of plurinationality. The advantages of community-based autonomy are useful for nations that are widely dispersed in territorial terms, and which are more permeable to shared communication and loyalty in multicultural societies. However, it is regarded as being insufficient by nationalists that advocate a direct relationship between the national community and territory, in extreme situations through the right to self-determination and the creation of their own state.

Thus, one cannot avoid returning to the key point of the debate on democracy and plurinationality: are the territorial demarcations of states unalterable? History has already shown us that self-government is exercised by those who are able to do so. Historical processes of state-building and nation-building have followed different paths, but have converged in a state model which is essentially defined by the current state system. In the third chapter, Michael Simpson and James Tully contribute to the European and North American debate on constitutional democracy based on a dual principle: “A political association is legitimate if, and only if, it is constitutional and democratic; that is, provided it combines constitutional democracy and democratic constitutionalism. These two principles are the implicit, fundamental law of modern constitutions”.⁶ The democratic constitution is the framework that makes it possible to progress towards freer societies and, consequently, everything can be reformed if this is done in a certain way, respecting constitutional rules and always being open to debate, negotiation and consensus. The constitution cannot be regarded as sacred, nor can it become an obstacle that hinders or impedes democratic processes of change.

A democracy that works must achieve a balance between negative liberty and positive liberty and, above all, positive liberty cannot be “denied” or restricted; quite the contrary, because it expresses the citizens' capacity for self-determination and political participation. Thus, the constitutionalist principle may be insufficient in a liberal democracy if it is not developed in a democratizing sense, deepening democracy, involving the citizens in the defence of democratic principles. The constitutional principle and the democratic principle are equally fundamental, because both are part of the same deepening process of democratic quality.

When a constitutional democracy is at the mercy of, for example, partitocracy, or the connivance between political power and economic power, and with the growing disenchantment of the citizenry, it is clear that it is still possible to continue to formally comply with the constitutional rules, but democracy has been substantially weakened. In these circumstances, politics runs the risk of becoming discredited and false authoritarian or populist solutions may appear.⁷ The risk of democratic denaturalization may occur in any democratic system, including the oldest liberal democracies.⁸

The value of democracy was consigned to a secondary role during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries due to the confrontation between two economic and ideological models: liberalism and socialism. The twentieth century experienced two terrible totalitarian versions that reduced the importance of the democratic process as a way of resolving conflicts peacefully. The same occurs when it is faced with plurinationality and cultural diversity. Democracy as a system based on liberty and the equal recognition of the other, on deliberation and the negotiation of social problems, on mutual interdependence in increasingly complex and internationalized societies, constitutes a framework for the resolution of national conflicts.

However, there is an issue that has become increasingly important in recent years and that has a direct effect on the state system and the rights of stateless-nations, despite the fact that it is not new to the democratic debate: global economic liberalization, processes of economic and financial concentration and their impact on the international political order. The contradiction is that while economics is centripetal, politics is centrifugal. Both probably need correcting, so that they can meet up again in the right place. In economic terms, protection mechanisms are necessary to confront the growing strength of large plurinational financial and economic groups in order to democratize and control them. In political terms, there is a need for states to recognize and institutionally accommodate their internal diversity, on the one hand, but there is also a need for a process of supra-state political articulation, on the other. It is politics that is at fault here: with the economy in the hands of a small number of people, politics has yet to establish the basic foundations of a binding international law system. There is a clear lack of international control of the economy, as well as a significant lack of democracy at the international level. Perhaps this explains international disorder. As Habermas has pointed out along with other authors cited in Simpson and Tully's chapter, existing supranational institutions of global governance, particularly the United States, need to undergo a reform that is coherent with the principle of democracy and, at the same time, the need for the political constitutionalization of international relations must be satisfied.

3 Plurinational democracies and federalism

This is the global context in which we must situate the debate on federalism and plurinationality. In short, we are not in an ideal scenario to address this question; it would be more accurate to say that we are at the “beginning of the beginning”, with a world in transition and an uncertain future. For this reason, it is better to confine the debate on federalism and plurinationality to sufficiently consolidated liberal democracies. This will make it possible to conduct an analysis focused on the dual constitutional-democratic principle; one that is based on the desire to discover possible solutions to national conflicts in a democratic and peaceful way.

One should start by saying that federalism is a concept that, in its origins, has no historical or moral link with the regulation of national pluralism. What is more, for many analysts the archetypal example of federalism has always been, and continues to be, the Federation of the United States of America, which is organized on the basis of national union and a structurally symmetric territorial model. National pluralism has a dark history in the United States starting with a form of state-building characterized by the occupation/expulsion of indigenous peoples from the territory they formerly inhabited, to a form of nation-building that denies national pluralism or devalues it, as in the case of Puerto Rico. A form of federalism...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Federalism, Plurinationality and Democratic Constitutionalism
• Nationalism and Ethnicity/Routledge Studies in Nationalism and Ethnicity
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Contributors
• Series Editor's Foreward
• 1 Democracy and federalism in plurinational societies
• PART I Theory
• PART II Cases
• Index