The Open Society and its Enemies in East Asia

Gregory G. C. Moore

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317811664
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

The ideas contained in Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies —one of the most important tracts in political philosophy in the twentieth century—are relevant to anyone seeking to understand the recent history of the East Asian economies. Even though Popper wrote his tract to provide an explanation for both the rise and objectionable nature of totalitarian regimes in Europe in the twentieth century, many of the arguments that he advanced in this European context also explain the social, political and economic relationships that are seen in modern South Eastern Asian economies.

The narrative of this book is driven by a research agenda that is inter-disciplinary in nature, since to make the link between the Popperian framework and East Asian socio-economic relationships the contributing authors needed to draw upon research fields as far apart as political philosophy and East-Asian studies. With one or two exceptions, however, nearly all of the contributing authors have a background in economics, and this background is reflected in the way that they have sought to tackle the research question. This book is, in short, an inter-disciplinary exercise undertaken from an economics perspective, and hence it may best be described as an exercise in political economy rather than pure analytical economics.

The novelty of juxtaposing Popperian ideas with a discussion of social, political and economic development in South East Asia makes this narrative of interest to both political philosophers and specialists in South East Asian economies. The key insight drawn from the analysis is that although Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies was a product of a European time and place, it is also relevant to anyone seeking to understand the recent history of the East Asian economies.

1
Karl Popper and the idea of an open society

Jeremy Shearmur

1 Introduction

People in Western societies often think of the societies in which they live as being ‘open societies’ – at least in aspiration – and for an explication of the idea of an open society they may well refer to Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies. While the term ‘open society’ was used before Popper by Henri Bergson, in what Popper indicates is a rather different sense, the idea did receive its classic exposition in Popper’s work.¹ The key idea is in some ways best understood as a statement and defence of what is involved in a modern, individualistic and abstract society, made in the face of nostalgia, of various kinds, for the values of community. It is important here to note that while Popper was, emphatically, a democrat, he did not simply equate an open society with democracy, and one can see important aspects of his analysis as warning democratic populations about the problems of certain ideas that they may find all too appealing. At this level, Popper’s argument is that, while communitarian ideals, and the idea of a society in which people would not be subject to the strains and tensions that arise in an individualistic and abstract society, might be attractive, there is no going back to them from the kind of social arrangements with which we are now living. For Popper argues that, rather than the restitution of some kind of Gemeinschaft, the attempt to do so would produce not a community of the kind that its proponents would find attractive, but, rather, a kind of tyranny.

Popper’s account was written with an eye to the situation of societies undergoing problems associated with certain particular kinds of modernization in the first part of the twentieth century. However, beyond talking in this context about the problems of a ‘fatherless society’, and of ‘the strains of civilization’ as an ongoing problem facing those living in such societies (something that I will discuss below), Popper did not offer a detailed sociological analysis of the issues with which he was concerned.² But it is interesting that he suggested that there were certain similarities between the situation against which Plato was writing, in Classical Greece, and his own analysis – as well as between Plato’s response to them, and those of whom Popper was critical in mid-twentieth century Europe.³ The contemporary situation in the various – and very different – countries of South East Asia is itself somewhat different; not least because, if they are aspiring towards the ideal of a commercial and open society, they are typically doing so against an authoritarian backdrop. That is to say, the problem situation in those countries may more typically be that of people aspiring towards life in open societies, rather than that of people in open societies aspiring towards goals that may be problematic for the continued existence of such societies as open societies.

Popper’s ideas, however, still seem to me to be very pertinent. First, Popper places emphasis on the significance of individual responsibility for what occurs in politics and history. Such a stress is not incompatible with an appreciation of the importance of institutions (and of the difficulties that arise, if appropriate institutions are not in place). It is also, obviously, compatible with the idea that we act in the setting of problems which no one intended to bring about, and which may be difficult to tackle. But Popper stresses the difference between an appreciation of these things, and the idea that what happens in history is inevitable: that there is no option for us but to go with the flow, or to adopt what we take the outcomes of social trends to be, uncritically, as normative goals that we should further.

My concern in what follows, however, will be with how Popper characterized an open society and also with some of the problems he highlighted about such societies. Popper, as I have mentioned, discussed what he called ‘the strains of civilization’: the way in which our societies thrust the need to make decisions, and for people to take responsibility for the decisions they make, onto people whether they like this responsibility or not. He also described such societies as ‘fatherless’, by which he meant that, in them, there were no ‘natural’ authorities such that if, within them, we wished to give over decision making to some authority, it is still our decision so to do. Popper’s Open Society also contains an interesting discussion of the way in which, within such societies, life can take on highly anonymous characteristics. We can live much of our lives doing work for people whom we do not know, consuming products made by people whom we do not know, and could, indeed, live for considerable periods without any direct contact with other people at all – while at the same time, benefiting from the products that many, many people have worked on. It is easy enough to understand how, in the face of this, people may look back with longing to life in settings which involved them in stronger notions of community; in which, in effect, the kinds of relationships that people now may enjoy only in families, and close friendships at their best, may come to define society more generally.

Popper’s book, however, was not concerned just to explore this issue. He was also critical of various ideas which, at the time, seemed to suggest that it would be both possible and good to move away from an open society towards arrangements which were more communitarian, while still enjoying the kinds of freedoms characteristic of an open society. In addition, he offered a positive characterization of an open society, and an account of how he believed it could most usefully conduct itself. I will discuss this positive characterization first, and then turn to ideas that he believed could call such an open society into question should we respond to them in ways that he thought inappropriate. I will, in conclusion, discuss some problems that face an open society.

2 The idea of an open society

There are, it seems to me, six particular characteristics of an open society in Popper’s sense: (at least) minimal democracy; pluralism; openness to criticism; the rule of law; markets; and what Popper called ‘protectionism’. Let me discuss them in turn.

Popper was, emphatically, a democrat, and he was also strongly egalitarian in sentiment. His work is scathing about those who consider others to be lesser than themselves. At the same time, Popper’s concern, here, is not with factual claims about people – say, about their intelligence and capacities – but with moral claims that they all deserve to be respected. There is, here, a strong if unorthodox Kantian influence upon Popper’s sensibilities, if not upon his arguments. At the same time, Popper is convinced that in a society of any size, it makes little sense to say that everyone should rule. Indeed, he is well known for having argued that we should not ask ‘Who should rule?’ – as positive answers to this can generate paradoxes (as when, say, democratic citizens vote to transfer power to a ‘strong man’) and more substantively invite us to contemplate ideas that are utopian, or simply call for the domination of some over others. Instead, he suggests that we should address the question: How can we design our institutions so that those with political power can do least harm? It is in this context – and indeed, in a very limited way – that Popper strongly favours democracy. His concern, here, is that the population should be able to get rid of bad rulers by means of elections, and without bloodshed. He also favoured the idea that governments should be clearly accountable, and was critical of forms of proportional representation which would dilute the extent to which voters could be sure of being able to get rid of people and governments whom they felt had done a bad job.⁴ Such an idea of democracy, while important, is obviously fairly limited in its scope. It is striking that Popper did not supplement it with more extensive notions concerning participation. Popper’s minimalist characterization of democracy led Carlos Verdugo to criticize his account,⁵ as being compatible with a regime like that set up by General Pinochet in Chile. In our present context one might ask: But does this not mean that Singapore, say, is democratic in this restricted sense of Popper’s? To this, one would have to respond: Democratic, yes; but this does not mean that it is a fully open society. I will return to this issue later, when I consider Popper’s ideas about the scope of the activities of government in an open society and what he says about openness to criticism.

Second, there is pluralism. Popper does not say much about this, although he does, in his ‘Of Clouds and Clocks’, refer to:⁶

one of the characteristics of an open society [as being] that it cherishes… the freedom of association and that it protects and even encourages the formation of sub-societies, each holding different opinions and beliefs.

Popper’s discussion of this is brief, and is – in terms of what we are used to in ‘Western’ societies – conventional. However, it is worth noting that there is a difference between two ways in which such organizations may be understood. One would be for them simply to be voluntary groups, which people form to pursue common aims or concerns. A second, which is more controversial, concerns the role such groups may have as vehicles for the pursuit of people’s political interests; i.e. where a key concern of theirs is seen as making representation of their concerns to the government. Two points may be noted about pluralism in this latter sense. First, pluralism of this kind is not necessarily to be found in all societies which are ‘democratic’ in Popper’s minimalist sense. In particular, while in Singapore there are certainly competing political parties, and people can form all kinds of organizations, there is a sharp line between social organizations and political activity, such that many of the quasi-political roles played by such groups in Western societies are there ruled out. Second, while ideas about politically related pluralism are deeply engrained in Western societies – ranging from the competitive pluralism of Britain and the United States, to the corporatism of some European countries – and while the freedom to form such organizations is deeply cherished, it is not so clear that their operation is necessarily in the public interest.

One might, here, highlight two issues. The first – to which we will return – concerns how the operation of such organizations relates to other aspirations Popper has for an open society. The second relates to the body of critical literature that developed concerning American pluralism. Here, to cut a long story short,⁷ as a corrective to the idea that such arrangements allowed for the articulation of the interests of those whose concerns were not being adequately satisfied by society as it currently operated, it was argued that such arrangements systematically advantaged some people and disadvantaged others. While anyone was free to combine with others to pursue their shared concerns, issues of wealth, education, and the structural role of different bodies in the organization of countries, to say nothing of the kinds of issues which were raised in the ‘community power debate’,⁸ may well suggest that such a pluralism is, to say the least, a mixed blessing. Corporatism also poses problems: it may serve to entrench particular interests to the exclusion of others, or particular conceptualizations of what people’s interests are, and how they are best pursued.

Both Popper and his friend Friedrich Hayek, while democrats, stressed what seems to me the important point that democracy needs to be judged instrumentally, rather than being taken as something that is good in itself. But if this holds good in respect of democracy, we should also, surely, take the same view about pluralism and its character. While those of us who have grown up in societies in which such organizations are familiar typically favour them, and cherish our right to form them, what social organizations we have a right to form should, surely, be considered in the light of their consequences. It would seem, for example, perfectly reasonable that some of what had become the rights of trades unions should have been limited when they started to be exercised in ways that adversely affected the operation of society as a whole. Similarly, it would seem to me at least arguable that the influence the AARP has gained in the United States may equally be judged problematic; for example, in limiting the discussion of the possibilities of the reform of the Social Security system.⁹ Third, there is openness to criticism. This plays a key role in Popper’s work. First, it is significant because of his epistemological fallibilism – his view that even the best of our theories may be flawed, and may have content of which their originators will not be aware – and also because of his view that our actions typically have unintended consequences, many of which we cannot anticipate, and some of which may be problematic. These ideas are linked, in Popper’s argument, to the idea that anyone may be a pertinent source of criticism. Clearly, in ideas to do with theoretical knowledge, people may need to have appropriate capacities and also an appropriate training in order to be able to understand what is going on, and to make a contribution to its critical discussion. But in the sphere of political and social affairs, Popper in The Open Society stresses – developing his argument with the aid of interesting quotations from Pericles and Burke – that while not everyone may be able to initiate proposals as to how societies should be conducted, anyone may be able to criticize them. Perhaps the most obvious way in which we can cash out this idea is in terms of thinking that each individual typically knows their own situation best – that of themselves, and of those immediately around them – and if there are unexpected and undesirable consequences of the actions of other people or of government, each individual may have valuable potential input to social decision making with regard to these matters, and in this respect may be on a par with everyone else. Popper, here, refers to the Kantian notion of the ‘rational unity of mankind’, and it is worth noting that in Popper’s work, rationality is to be understood in terms of the potentiality to offer criticism.

Ian Jarvie (2001) has argued, I think persuasively, that Popper’s approach to the philosophy of science is best understood as a normative social theory (see also, on this theme, Shearmur 1980, 1985). Popper himself, however, tended to be impatient about the exploration of issues to do with the normative sociology of knowledge.¹⁰ However, there is an obvious sense in which the idea of the importance of individuals being able to offer criticism may suggest political and social consequences. Compare, for example, t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Prefatory remarks: the context for the open society and its enemies in East Asia
• 1 Karl Popper and the idea of an open society
• 2 Karl Popper and Thailand’s political crisis: the monarchy as the problem for an ‘open society’
• 3 Thai populism and the middle-income trap
• 4 Least free: the economic consequences of fifty years of totalitarian rule in Burma
• 5 Development and freedom in Burma
• 6 The rise and robustness of economic freedom in China
• 7 Singapore: Plato’s other republic?
• 8 Popular despotism: an economist’s explanation
• Index