Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey

William Hale, Ergun Ozbudun

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2009
• ISBN:
  9781135214913
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) were elected to power in 2002 and since then Turkish politics has undergone considerable change. This book is a comprehensive analysis of the AKP, in terms not just of its ideological agenda, but also of its social basis and performance in office in the main theatres of public policy – political reform, and cultural, economic and foreign policies.

Based on an extensive analysis of official and party documents, interviews, academic sources and media coverage, the book outlines the main features of the current global debate on the relationship between Islam, Islamism and democracy. While most top AKP leaders come from an Islamist background, the party has behaved as a moderate, centre-right, conservative democratic party who are fully committed to democracy, a free market economy and Turkey's EU membership. The book explores and analyses these changes in Turkish politics, and provides coverage of the workings of the contemporary Turkish political systems, policy and ideological issues that go to the heart of Turkish identity.

Filling a gap in the existing Turkish and English literature on the subject, this book will be an important contribution to Political Science, particularly the areas of Turkish politics, Middle Eastern studies, Islamic studies and comparative politics.

Part 1
The AKP’s history, ideology, social bases and organisation

1 The history of Islamist parties in Turkey from the National Order Party to the Justice and Development Party (AKP)

The first Turkish political party with explicit Islamic references was the Millî Nizam Partisi (MNP–National Order Party) founded on 28 January 1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, an independent deputy from Konya and a professor of engineering at the prestigious İstanbul Technical University.¹ Mehmet Zahit Kotku, the sheikh of the İskender Paşa community of the Nakşibendi order (tarikat) strongly encouraged the formation of an Islamist party. Erbakan and some of the other founders of the MNP belonged to that community. But the party was also joined by some prominent members of another influential Islamic community, the Nurcus.²

The MNP was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1971 on account of its alleged anti-secular activities, partly as a result of the political conjuncture created by the military intervention on 12 March 1971. A successor party was founded on 11 October 1972 under the name of the National Salvation Party (Millî Selamet Partisi (MSP)). The first leader of the party was Süleyman Arif Emre, but he was soon replaced by Erbakan.

The MSP contested the 1973 parliamentary elections and emerged as a medium-size party with 11.8 per cent of the votes and 48 assembly seats. Because no party had a majority of seats and the two major parties (the Republican People’s Party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) and the Justice Party, Adalet Partisi (AP) were reluctant to cooperate, the parliamentary arithmetics put the MSP in the position of the king-maker. Thus, the MSP first joined the coalition government of the left-of-centre Bülent Ecevit with Erbakan as the deputy prime minister. After the collapse of the CHP–MSP government in 1974, the MSP joined ranks with the other right-wing parties, namely AP, the Nationalist Action Party, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) and the Republican Reliance Party Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (CGP) in Süleyman Demirel’s so-called Nationalist Front Government.

The MSP’s vote share fell to 8.6 per cent in the 1977 parliamentary elections and its Assembly contingent was halved to 24. One reason for this decline may be the desertion of the Nurcus on account of policy differences with Erbakan. However, the MSP was again a partner in Demirel’s new Nationalist Front government until the government fell as a result of the desertion of some AP deputies to support a CHP-dominated government formed by Ecevit.

The MSP was closed down together with all the other political parties by the military (National Security Council) government in 1981 and its leadership cadres were tried on account of their alleged anti-secular activities. At the end, they were acquitted, however, and when the National Security Council permitted the formation of new political parties in 1983 the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi (RP)), representing the same political line, was established under the leadership of Ahmet Tekdal. Erbakan and the leading cadres of the MSP, like those of the other pre-12 September 1980 political parties, were constitutionally banned from political activities for a period of ten years. Moreover, the National Security Council did not permit the RP to contend in the 1983 elections.

The RP had a modest start in the 1984 local (provincial assemblies) elections in which all legally established parties could participate with 4.4 per cent of the votes. In the 1987 parliamentary elections, following the repeal of the constitutional ban on the political activities of former political leaders and the return of Erbakan to the RP leadership, the party polled 7.2 per cent of votes, but was unable to send any representatives to parliament because of the 10 per cent national threshold. The RP increased its votes to 9.8 in the 1989 local elections, and it contested the 1991 parliamentary elections in alliance with the MHP and the Reformist Democracy Party (IDP). The alliance received 16.9 per cent of the vote enabling the RP to be represented in the Assembly by some 40 deputies (after the MHP deputies resigned and returned to their fold).

The spectacular rise of the RP took place in the local elections of 1994 when it increased its votes to 19.1 per cent and captured the mayoralties of 29 provincial centres including Istanbul and Ankara, which came as a great shock to the secularist establishment. The RP further improved its showing in the parliamentary elections of 1995 with 21.4 per cent of the votes and 158 out of the 550 seats in parliament making it the strongest party.

In the fragmented composition of the 1995 parliament, the RP was able to form a coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP)) in 1996 despite the efforts of the secular establishment to prevent the formation of an RP-dominated government. The RP–DYP government of Erbakan lasted for only eleven months and was forced to resign in 1997 under strong pressure by the military and most of the leading secular civil society organisations. The process leading to the fall of the Erbakan government is commonly called ‘the 28 February process’ in reference to the 28 February 1997 meeting of the National Security Council whose declaration was a not-too-subtle ultimatum to the government.³ The fall of the RP–DYP government was followed by the closing down of the RP in 1998 by the Constitutional Court on account of its anti-secular activities. The Court also banned Erbakan and six other leading members of the RP (including its two vice-presidents and three MPs) from political activities for a period of five years in accordance with Article 69 of the Constitution.⁴ The 28 February 1997 process also involved the introduction of a number of restrictions on religious education and the activities of Islamist leaning business firms.

The RP was immediately substituted by a new party, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi (FP)) under the leadership of Recai Kutan, an old associate of Necmettin Erbakan. Although all RP deputies and most of its cadres joined the FP, the latter’s discourse was much more moderate and circumspect than that of the former. The short life of the FP witnessed a growing confrontation between the so-called traditionalist (geleneçiler) and the modernist (yenilikçiler) wings of the Islamist movement. The beginnings of this cleavage go back to the 1990s as will be analysed in greater detail later. But now the conflict came to the fore when at the FP Congress in 2000, Abdullah Gül, the candidate of the modernists, challenged Recai Kutan, the incumbent leader and the candidate of the traditionalists, for party leadership. Gül lost the race by a small margin (he got 521 votes against 633 for Kutan) in a competition unprecedented in the history of Turkish Islamist parties.⁵ The Congress was the harbinger of the split between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi (SP)) which was to take place a year later.

The FP contested the 1999 parliamentary elections in which its percentage of votes fell to 15.4 making it the third largest party in parliament. This rather significant decline may be because of the more moderate and conciliatory approach of the party, as well as because of the confusion in the Islamist voters’ minds as a result of the closure of the RP. In any case, the FP’s moderation could not save it from being closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 on account of its agitation for the repeal of the headscarf ban on female university students.

The banning of the FP finalised the split between the modernists and the traditionalists. The former founded the AKP under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, while the latter were organised in the SP under the leadership of Recai Kutan. The AKP won the 2002 parliamentary elections with a landslide with 34.3 per cent of the vote and almost two-thirds of parliamentary seats, while the SP was reduced to an insignificant minor party with only 2.5 per cent of the votes.

The ‘national outlook’ ideology

The Islamist parties in Turkey from the MNP to SP have referred to their ideology as the ‘national outlook’ (millî görüs) and maintained this ideological line consistently, with only slight variations, over time. The constitutional and legal bans on the anti-secular activities of political parties did not permit these parties to explicitly use the Islamic terms and symbols. There is no doubt, however, that what was meant by the ‘national’ outlook was an Islamic outlook. Similarly, their promise to enhance ‘national and moral values’ (millî ve manevî değerler) has to be understood as the promotion of Islamic values.

The national outlook ideology posits a fundamental conflict between Western (i.e. Judeo-Christian) civilisation and Islamic civilisation. The former is ‘false’ (bâtil) in the sense of resting upon force, while the latter is based on righteousness (hak). Western civilisation is described as materialist, oppresive and colonialist, and doomed to extinction.⁶ This fundamental opposition to Western civilisation has led the national outlook parties to take an extremely negative view of Turkey’s Westernisation process. In their view, the once-glorious Ottoman Empire began to decline and disintegrate when it started to imitate the West. By the same token, they are strongly critical of the secularising republican reforms. Erbakan has argued that the long years of the CHP rule harboured a strong hostility towards Islam.⁷ Therefore, the national outlook parties accuse all other Turkish parties of being blind imitators of the West, either of its exploitative capitalist version, or its materialist socialist version.⁸

The national outlook parties’ anti-Westernism is also strongly reflected in their foreign policy choices. They are vehemently against Turkey’s accession to the EU, the customs union with it, and critical of NATO. They describe the EU as a ‘Christian Club’ and predict that Turkey’s membership would result in her complete loss of sovereignty and cultural identity, as well as in her economic exploitation. Erbakan has gone so far as suggesting that once Turkey becomes an EU member, Israel would also join the organisation immediately, and thus Turkey and Israel would be the same state. Turkey’s application for membership is ‘a treason against our history, concept of civilisation, culture and most important of all, our independence’.⁹

The national outlook parties envisage an Islamic world unified under Turkey’s leadership. Turkey, because of her geographical position, large population and historical legacy, is the Muslim country best qualified for such leadership. More specifically, they put forward the idea of an Islamic United Nations, an Islamic UNESCO, an Islamic NATO and an Islamic Common Market with Islamic dinar as its monetary unit.¹⁰

Finally, the national outlook parties’ foreign policy is strongly coloured by anti-Zionism, often bordering on anti-semitism. They view Israel as an illegitimate and expansionist state whose ultimate aim is to create greater Israel by occupying, Syria, Egypt and Turkey. Even the United Nations Organisation was established in order to create an Israeli state.¹¹ The following quotations by Erbakan are good examples of his anti-Zionism: ‘Zionists are seeking to assimilate Turkey and pull us from our historical Islamic roots through integrating Turkey to the European Economic Community.’ ‘Whenever the UN talks about human rights, it means the rights of the Jews but nothing else.’ ‘Since the European Community is a single state, Turkey’s membership means being a single state with Israel. The goal is to create a Greater Israel by integrating Turkey to the Community.’¹²

The national outlook parties’ Islamism also contains a strong dose of Turkish nationalism. While the universal character of Islam is emphasised, the potential leadership role of Turkey in the Islamic world is also constantly alluded to. Thus, they praise the glories of the Ottoman past and declare the restoration of its former grandeur as one of their principal objectives.¹³ Hence, their slogan ‘Recreating Grand Turkey’.

The national outlook parties’ views on democracy and secularism were ambivalent at best. Although some radical Islamist groups categorically reject democracy as un-Islamic and blasphemous (küfür),¹⁴ the leaders of the national outlook parties prudently refrained from challenging the basic premises of democracy and declared elections as the only legitimate route to political power. Moreover, the MSP members did not take part in the violent political actions of the late 1970s. On the other hand, it is not clear whether they attribute only an instrumental value to democracy or see it as an end in itself. The statements by Erbakan and Tayyip Erdoğan (at that time the mayor of Istanbul) lend support to the former view. They both stated that democracy was not an aim, but a means, a means to establish the ‘order of happiness’ (saadet nizami), apparently referring to the time of Prophet Muhammad, usually called the ‘age of happiness’ (asr-ı saadet) in Islamic writings.¹⁵ The RP’s 1995 electoral campaign described the current political system of Turkey not as a democracy, but as a ‘fraud’, a ‘guided democracy’ and a ‘dark-room regime,’ and announced its intention to establish a ‘real pluralistic democracy’. Apart from promises to enhance freedom of conscience and to make greater use of referenda and popular councils,¹⁶ real democracy was never denned. Erbakan and other RP spokesmen often emphasised that Turkey’s population was 99 per cent Muslim, and therefore there were only two groups of voters in Turkey: the RP supporters and the potential RP supporters, a notion hardly compatible with a truly pluralistic conception of society. Erbakan even said in October 1996 that soon the RP would have so many members that elections would no longer be necessary. They would just go to the notary public and get their victory registered. Thus, even a sympathetic observer argues that ‘Erbakan’s main concern was the politics not of pluralism but of authenticity. He believed that there is an authentic Muslim identity and voice that should govern day-to-day politics. Within the context of Erbakan’s authenticity, there seemed to be limited room for pluralism and tolerance.’¹⁷ Ruşen Çakir, a journalist specialising in Islamist movements and parties in Turkey points out to this ambivalence, saying that ‘the RP is neither pro-sharia nor democrat, because it is both pro-sharia and democrat in its own way.’¹⁸ While the RP leaders criticised Western democracy for its allegedly majoritarian character,¹⁹ the kind of democracy they envisage for Turkey seems at best majoritarian rather than pluralistic.

Ambivalence also marks the national outlook parties’ views on secularism. Although they never rejected secularism categorically, and did not openly called for the establishment of a regime based on the sharia, they described the current understanding of secularism in Turkey as anti-Islamic and oppressive towards devout Muslims. While they constantly emphasised the ‘freedom of religion’ aspect of secularism, they hardly ever mentioned the separation of religion and the state as the fundamental characteristic of secularism. In the RP’s view, freedom of conscience implied the ‘right to live according to one’s beliefs’, a concept which inevitably created frictions with Turkey’s secular legal system. In the 1990s, the RP went so far as suggesting the creation of multiple legal communities according to which each religious community would be entitled to be governed by its own legal system. The project reminds one of the ‘Medina Covenant’ that Prophet Muhammad concluded with the Jewish tribes of Medina. This proposal was among the major reasons behind the Constitutional Court’s decision to ban the RP.

On the economic front, the MSP, which emerged as a party of small Anatolian merchants and business people, advocated rapid heavy industrialisation, presumably as a means to restoring Turkey’s former grandeur and full independence, the abolition of interest taking, and a more equitable distribution of income socially and regionally.²⁰ As a result of the growing Islamic bourgeoisie in the 1980s and the 1990s, the RP seems to have moved away from statist, protectionist positions to views more in favour of a free-market economy and Turkey’s integration into the global economy.²¹ Indeed, ‘since the 1980s, the Islamist sector in the economy has expanded with large-scale holding companies, chain stores, investment houses, banks and insurance companies. Particularly noteworthy are the joint businesses and investments that Islamist organisations have with international companies based in the Gulf countries.’²²

The RP in its 1991 election campaign proposed an economic model which it called the ‘just order’ (âdil düzen). Just order was presented as a third way, different from and superior to both capitalism and socialism. Among its principles was an interest-free economy. Although the RP claimed the just order was the ‘true private enterprise regime‘, its implementation – even if it were possible at all – would have required heavy state control.²³ More generally, the RP denounced the current economic order as a ‘slave system’ based on the International Monetary Fund, interest payments, taxes, corruption and waste – a system maintained by a repressive guardian state that contravenes the history and beliefs of its own people.

Some observe...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Tables
• Introduction
• Part 1 The AKP’s history, ideology, social bases and organisation
• Part II The AKP in government
• Conclusions, Assessments and Expectations
• NOTES
• Sources
• Bibliography