The NATO Intervention in Libya

Kjell Engelbrekt, Marcus Mohlin, Charlotte Wagnsson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781134514106
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: National Security
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book explores 'lessons learned' from the military intervention in Libya by examining key aspects of the 2011 NATO campaign.

NATO's intervention in Libya had unique features, rendering it unlikely to serve as a model for action in other situations. There was an explicit UN Security Council mandate to use military force, a strong European commitment to protect Libyan civilians, Arab League political endorsement and American engagement in the critical, initial phase of the air campaign. Although the seven-month intervention stretched NATO's ammunition stockpiles and political will almost to their respective breaking points, the definitive overthrow of the Gaddafi regime is universally regarded as a major accomplishment.

With contributions from a range of key thinkers and analysts in the field, the book first explains the law and politics of the intervention, starting out with deliberations in NATO and at the UN Security Council, both noticeably influenced by the concept of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It then goes on to examine a wide set of military and auxiliary measures that governments and defence forces undertook in order to increasingly tilt the balance against the Gaddafi regime and to bring about an end to the conflict, as well as to the intervention proper, while striving to keep the number of NATO and civilian casualties to a minimum.

This book will be of interest to students of strategic studies, history and war studies, and IR in general.

Part I

The law and politics of intervention

1 Able but not willing

A critical assessment of NATO’s Libya intervention

Jeffrey H. Michaels

Introduction

NATO’s ostensibly ‘successful’ intervention in Libya was notable in many respects, not the least of which was that the mission occurred at all, and when it did, the majority of Alliance members had little enthusiasm to meaningfully participate. Yet when the ‘defensive’ mission that was originally envisaged to protect civilians soon became a ‘regime change’ operation, rather than withdraw their support, NATO members continued to ensure the primacy of Alliance solidarity, even though this did not translate into providing additional military assets. The result was a half-hearted air campaign that lasted for months with little change to the stalemate on the ground and with increasing political frustration at the lack of progress. Fortunately for NATO, a series of rebel military successes in mid-August that culminated in the capture of Tripoli transformed a potential ‘quagmire’ into a ‘success’.

In the aftermath of Gaddafi’s fall, the official narrative about the Libya campaign has, not unsurprisingly, tended to focus on those aspects that highlighted the Alliance’s ‘flexibility’, ‘openness’, and ‘strength’.¹ Where there have been ‘lessons learned’, or at least ‘lessons identified’, these have been limited to technical military matters. Overlooked in this ‘critical’ discourse are the political dynamics that shaped the military campaign. When examined through a political prism, rather than a strictly military one, the NATO campaign looks far less ‘successful’, and indeed, it will be argued that it is the political lessons that are likely to have more far reaching consequences for the future direction of the Alliance.

This chapter will examine the intra-Alliance politics of NATO’s intervention, and to a lesser extent the Alliance’s relations with partner nations and the rebel forces. As NATO’s intervention was not a foregone conclusion, the chapter will begin by focusing on the debates within NATO that led to it taking the lead in Libya, to include the political compromises that were made to secure consensus, and the limits placed on the military mission. It will then analyse the varying levels of commitment made by NATO members and partners, with a focus on the limited participation of the United States. Related to this, the different national attitudes towards both the means to be employed and the ends to be achieved in Libya will also be assessed. For instance, some NATO members and partners chose to operate as a coalition within the Alliance, and also to conduct more sensitive operations outside the NATO framework altogether. The problem of transatlantic burden-sharing will be specifically addressed by examining NATO’s failure to secure a handful of ground-attack aircraft shortly after it took over the mission from the US-led Operation Odyssey Dawn. Another key feature of the campaign to be examined were the limited, and often indirect contacts, NATO was obliged to maintain with the rebels, and the impediments this placed on achieving a more rapid downfall of Gaddafi’s regime. The chapter will conclude with a discussion about how the political and diplomatic ‘lessons’ may influence future NATO interventions.

Deciding to intervene

Before proceeding to the specific circumstances surrounding the Alliance’s decision to take on a military intervention in Libya, it is important to preface this with a few general remarks about the position in which NATO found itself at the start of 2011. The circumstances NATO was facing at this time were hardly ideal for the launching of a major military operation, since it was during this period in which the Alliance commitment to Afghanistan, in terms of attention and resources, was at its most significant point compared to any earlier period.² Nevertheless, the Alliance retained a plentiful supply of uncommitted air and naval assets, although a large-scale land campaign may have been beyond its capabilities.

However, it was not simply a matter of operational overstretch that constrained the Alliance. There were also important political and economic factors at play, most notably the decline in defence budgets brought about by the global financial crisis.³ The combination of increasingly burdensome operational costs in Afghanistan and shrinking defence budgets at home meant that as of early 2011 most NATO member states wished to avoid any additional military expenditure, and to the extent these expenditures were necessary, it was essential to minimize them. Consequently, even with a significant number of air assets being technically uncommitted, there was little political willingness to employ them. As will be shown, the number of air assets committed to the Libya operation compared to other air campaigns, most notably the 1999 Kosovo campaign, was extremely limited.⁴

At the start of 2011, there was no notion that NATO would soon conduct a major military operation in North Africa. Similar to the ‘Arab Spring’ more generally, Western governments had little early warning of the political crisis that was to unfold, nor any coherent plans for how to deal with it. In the aftermath of large-scale protests in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East beginning in late 2010, the wave of demonstrations spread to Libya by mid-February. Initially, the protests in Libya gathered steam but were insufficient to overthrow Gaddafi’s regime. In response, Gaddafi cracked down hard on the demonstrators. What had started as relatively peaceful protests soon developed into a full-fledged rebellion between those forces loyal to Gaddafi based in Tripoli, and the opposition based mainly in Benghazi. On 27 February, the rebel factions formed the National Transitional Council (NTC) in opposition to Gaddafi’s government. Rebels also took over Libya’s third-largest city, Misrata, while other outbreaks of rebellion occurred in the Nafusa mountains in northwestern Libya.⁵ Although the rebels benefited from large-scale defections from the Libyan military, Gaddafi’s forces had the advantage of heavier firepower at their disposal, including the country’s air assets. There was also the fear, albeit somewhat exaggerated in the media, that Gaddafi might employ chemical weapons against the rebels.⁶

For Western policymakers, the situation in Libya presented three problems. First, there was the overriding priority to ensure the safety of their citizens who were in Libya. Second, due to the increasing turmoil, and the news coverage it generated, and with the prospect that the instability would worsen, Libya was high on the policy agenda. Therefore, some type of military action had at least to be contemplated, even if the prospect of actually conducting a military campaign was less certain. Third, it was initially unclear which side had the upper hand, and whether Gaddafi was likely to be able to survive for long anyway even without the necessity of an outside intervention. The converse was true of the rebels as well. At times it seemed as though they were winning, whereas at other times they appeared to be disorganized and on the verge of collapse. Had the rebels collapsed, the prospect of an outside intervention would have been very limited indeed.

On 25 February, an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was convened to discuss the Libya crisis and to consider preparations for evacuation operations and to provide humanitarian assistance.⁷ By late February, both the British and French governments began planning for a no-fly zone, despite the scepticism expressed in both countries’ militaries about detracting from the main effort in Afghanistan.⁸ By early March, NATO members such as the US, UK and France began increasing their intelligence activities in Libya, to include dispatching personnel to rebel-held areas, as well as prioritizing intelligence collection by deploying more surveillance assets to monitor the situation.⁹ During this period, a number of NATO countries also began contingency planning in the event a military deployment was necessary. On 3 March, the Danish military was ordered to initiate planning for possible land, air and sea contributions, and five days later the Danish Air Force was told to prepare a deployment of six F-16s.¹⁰

However, at this stage, apart from the preparations of individual NATO member states, there was still little prospect of Alliance involvement. In particular, the French government insisted that any military support for the rebels would need to be authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but not carried out by NATO, since the Alliance was perceived to have an ‘aggressive image in the Arab world’.¹¹

While deliberations were ongoing in Brussels, the rebels scored some notable successes, capturing the coastal towns of Brega, Ras Lanouf and Bin Jawad, and moving closer to Tripoli. However, on 6 March, Gaddafi’s forces launched a major counter-offensive against the rebels.¹² Operating with the advantage of air cover, Gaddafi’s forces advanced towards Ajdabiya and Benghazi, though the rebels operating in Misrata continued to hold out.

As the rebels were placed on the defensive, the international community took an increasing interest, though there was considerable reluctance on the part of defence officials from NATO countries to take on another mission in Libya whilst preoccupied with Afghanistan. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates referred to ‘loose talk’ in reference to calls for setting up a no-fly zone, while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen noted that it would be ‘an extraordinarily complex operation to set up’.¹³ At the 10 March NATO Defense Ministerial at which it was agreed to reposition warships in the region and plan for humanitarian aid, Gates said publicly that military planning for a no-fly zone would continue ‘but that’s the extent of it’.¹⁴ Similarly, British defence officials were not enthusiastic about the prospect of another major military commitment either since they did not w...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Figures
• List of Contributors
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part I The law and politics of intervention
• 1 Able but not willing A critical assessment of NATO's Libya intervention
• 2 Why Libya? Security Council Resolution 1973 and the politics of justification
• 3 A legal view on NATO's campaign in Libya
• Part II The military campaign
• 4 Executing strategy from the air
• 5 Naval assets — not just a tool for war
• 6 Fragments of an army Three aspects of the Libya collapse
• Part III Auxiliary measures and arrangements
• 7 Managing perceptions Strategic communication and the story of success in Libya
• 8 Cloak and dagger in Libya The Libyan Thuwar and the role of Allied Special Forces
• 9 Conclusion Lessons and consequences of Operation Unified Protector
• Select bibliography
• Index