Social Justice, Global Dynamics

Ayelet Banai, Miriam Ronzoni, Christian Schemmel, Ayelet Banai, Miriam Ronzoni, Christian Schemmel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781136742149
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Many theoretical publications make assumptions about the facts of globalization, and in particular about the role and autonomy of the nation state. These factual claims and assumptions often play an important role in justifying the normative conclusions, yet remain under-explored.

This interdisciplinary volume examines questions that are central to the problems of both social and international justice, and in particular, to their interdependence:

• How do global and transnational factors influence the capacity of states to be internally just?
• Has the state lost its capacity for autonomous action in the global economy, and thus its ethical significance for theories of justice? If so, which institutional reforms could address this problem?
• What is the role of the state in a just international order?

The authors address important connections between domestic social justice and global dynamics, by identifying problematic practices and trends in the current global order. They examine political, economic and legal changes and offer normative views on concrete policies and institutions that are particularly important and/or problematic – i.e. international health policies, the World Bank, taxation policies and the World Trade Organization.

Focusing on the relationship between social and global justice and establishing connections between political theory and empirical research, this book is vital reading for students and scholars of Politics, International Relations, and Development Studies.

Part I

Theoretical approaches

1 Global distributive justice and the state¹

Simon Caney

It is widely assumed that the state is the main, perhaps the sole, context in which principles of distributive justice should be applied. We are familiar with citizens and political philosophers arguing about what principles of justice should apply among fellow citizens. The debates frequently focus on what distributive principle is appropriate (distribution according to need, or desert, or equality, or as the market distributes) but the scope of justice is often taken as obvious. Principles of justice, it is assumed, apply primarily (if not exclusively) within the state. This conventional wisdom has recently been challenged by some cosmopolitan political philosophers who have argued that there should be global principles of distributive justice. Many nonetheless resist this cosmopolitan critique and they hold fast to the claim that principles of justice should be applied (either wholly or primarily) within states. The state, on this view, has normative significance as a context of justice. In this chapter I wish to explore two arguments for this type of account of the normative significance of the state, both of which draw in different ways on John Rawls’s political philosophy. Neither of these arguments, I contend, succeeds in establishing that the state has the kind of normative significance they attribute to it. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the relationship between ideals of justice and existing political institutions and, having criticized one account of the normative significance of the state, it proposes four alternative ways in which state membership may have moral relevance.

A theoretical framework

Prior to examining the two arguments to be scrutinized, I would like to introduce a theoretical framework for thinking about the issues at stake and to give a more general overview of how one might argue for, or against, the normative significance of the state.

First, it is important to record that the views to be considered make a distinctive claim about the normative significance of the state. They maintain that the state has normative significance, in part, because it defines the scope of some (or all) principles of distributive justice. In virtue of this let us say that those who argue in this way affirm the Statist Scope Thesis. Second, it is also important to note that one can distinguish between two distinct versions of the Statist Scope Thesis – what might be termed the Extreme Version and the Moderate Version. The Extreme Version avers that all principles of distributive justice apply only within states and that none apply at the global level (Freeman 2007, chapters 8 and 9; Nagel 2005). This position can be contrasted with the Moderate Version of the Statist Scope Thesis. This contends that some principles of distributive justice apply globally but that others apply only within the confines of the state. A familiar version of this position holds that some basic rights obtain at the global level and that other distributive principles like equality apply only within the state (Blake 2001; D. Miller 1998 especially 171; 1999a; 1999b: 19–20 and 273 footnote 32; R. Miller 1998).²

With this distinction between the Extreme and Moderate Views in hand we may now examine what one would need to show to establish either. Consider the Extreme View first. To establish that principles of justice apply only within the state and not at the global level one would have to supply an account of how the domestic realm differs from the global realm in a morally significant way. More precisely, one must show that

1 all principles of distributive justice apply only when some property (or set of properties) is present;

2 that property (or set of properties) exists at the domestic level; and, finally,

3 that property (or set of properties) does not exist at the global level.

Only if one can perform each of these three tasks can one show that principles of distributive justice obtain at the domestic level but not at the global level. By satisfying these three conditions one is providing what might be termed a Comprehensive Disanalogy Argument, where a Comprehensive Disanalogy Argument, as I define it, shows that the global realm is disanalagous to the domestic realm in such a way that none of the principles of distributive justice that apply to the latter apply to the former (Caney 2001: 117–18; 2005: 270–1).

Consider now the more moderate view that some principles of justice apply only within the state but that some other principles apply at both the domestic and the global level. These views hold that the domestic and global realms are partially disanalogous. The two realms are sufficiently analogous (so some principles that apply in the domestic realm apply in the global realm) but they do differ in some morally relevant ways (so some principles that apply in the domestic realm do not apply in the global realm). To sustain this kind of position one needs what might be termed a Partial Disanalogy Argument. Stated formally, Partial Disanalogy Arguments hold that

1 some principles of justice apply when some property (or set of properties) P is present,

2 P is present in both the domestic and global realms,

3 some other principles of justice apply only when some property (or set of properties) Q is present, and

4 Q is present in the domestic realm but not in the global realm.

These reflections are rather abstract. We can illustrate the preceding analysis by drawing on different Disanalogy Arguments. There is a variety of different Disanalogy Arguments. We might, broadly speaking, distinguish between ‘social’, ‘economic’ and ‘political’ Disanalogy Arguments. To illustrate each of these arguments I am going to focus on arguments which seek to show that some principles of distributive justice apply within the state but do not apply globally. For simplicity’s sake I am going to refer to arguments which claim that ‘equality’ is appropriate at the domestic level but, of course, one might hold, say, that the difference principle or a priority principle applies domestically but not globally. In referring to ‘equality’ I am not then assuming that it is necessarily the appropriate value that would obtain at the domestic level.

Let us now consider some different Disanalogy Arguments, starting with what I am (very loosely) terming ‘social’ Disanalogy Arguments. Such arguments defend the application of a principle of justice to the domestic realm on the grounds that the latter exhibits some social property that is absent at the global level. Three examples would be the following:

R1: the communitarian argument: equality applies domestically (but not globally) because equality is valuable if it produces community and equality within the state can produce a sense of community (but global equality would not produce a sense of global community);³

R2: the stigma argument: equality applies domestically (but not globally) because equality is needed to prevent stigma and domestic inequality produces stigma (but global inequality does not result in stigma);⁴

R3: the social unity argument: equality applies domestically (but not globally) because equality is a feasible ideal only when it is supported by a sense of social unity and this can exist within the state (but not in the global realm).⁵

Other Disanalogy Arguments invoke what we might term political properties. Consider, for example:

R4: the political cooperation argument: equality applies domestically (but not globally) because equality applies in a system of political cooperation and political cooperation exists at the domestic level (but not at the global level);⁶

R5: the coercion argument: equality applies domestically (but not globally) because equality is applicable among persons governed by a common system of coercion and the state is a coercive actor (but the global system is not coercive) (see Blake 2001; Nagel 2005).

R6: the domination argument: equality applies domestically (but not globally) because equality is needed to prevent some citizens from dominating others (but global equality is not needed to prevent some members of the world from dominating others);⁷

R7: the political participation argument: equality applies domestically (but not globally) because equality is needed to enable all citizens to engage in political participation and political participation is appropriate at the domestic level (but not at the global level);⁸

R8: the political legitimacy argument: equality applies domestically in liberal states (but not globally) because there is widespread support for it within liberal states (but there is no such widespread support for it at the global level) (see Rawls 1999b).⁹

Consider finally an argument which appeals to what we might, crudely speaking, term an ‘economic’ property.

R9: the economic cooperation argument: equality applies domestically (but not globally) because equality should govern systems where people join together and engage in joint economic cooperation and this takes place among co-citizens (but not at the global order level) (see Rawls 1999a).¹⁰

The preceding discussion has, I hope, given a picture of the variety of different arguments that might be invoked to explain why some (or all) principles of justice apply only within the state. Before proceeding further it is important to note that we should be circumspect in drawing conclusions from successful Disanalogy Arguments. Suppose that one (or indeed several) of the arguments cited above establishes that equality should apply domestically but that it (or they) does not also establish that equality applies globally. This conclusion would not entail that equality does not in fact apply globally. So even if, for example, we are persuaded that equality has value where it is needed to prevent stigmatization and even if we do not think that global inequality would issue in stigmatization (à la R2) it does not follow that inequality at the global level is not objectionable. There might be other reasons for embracing global equality. We should, therefore, be careful not to claim too much from any individual Disanalogy Argument.

In the next four sections I propose to focus on two arguments in particular – what I shall term the ‘Argument from Cooperation’ (the argument described in R4 on p. 5 and the ‘Argument from Coercion’ (the argument described in R5 on p. 5). Both seek to establish the normative importance of the state as the arena in which some (or all) principles of distributive justice apply.¹¹

The ‘Argument from Cooperation’

What I am terming the ‘Argument from Cooperation’ has been developed and defended by Samuel Freeman. Freeman’s argument involves a close reading of Rawls’s work on justice and seeks to show that Rawls’s cosmopolitan critics misunderstand the nature and plausibility of his theory of justice and his repudiation of cosmopolitanism. Freeman’s argument thus involves an exegesis of Rawls’s theory of justice but his aim is not purely interpretive for it is Freeman’s intention to show that Rawls’s theory, when correctly interpreted, provides a sound foundation for thinking that distributive justice applies only within the state. Freeman is a highly distinguished political philosopher and his recent Justice and the Social Contract is an important contribution to Rawlsian political philosophy. His opposition to cosmopolitan theories of justice thus requires careful attention.

Freeman proceeds thus. He starts with the assumption that:

(1) Principles of distributive justice apply to basic institutions.

(Freeman 2007: 305–6)

Freeman advances this as a conceptual claim. Principles of distributive justice, by their very nature, regulate the basic institutions within which people operate and make choices. Distributive justice is, thus, defined by its modus operandi. As such, distributive justice must not, according to Freeman and Rawls, be confused with what Rawls terms ‘allocative justice’, where this concerns the fair distribution of already existing wealth (Freeman 2007: 305, 306, 315, 316, 318, 319; Rawls 2001: 50–1, 170–1). Principles of distributive justice simply are those principles that govern the basic institutions that structure people’s lives. But what are these basic institutions? Freeman’s next step is to argue:

(2) Basic institutions involve both (a) social and (b) political cooperation.

(2007: 306)

Basic institutions are social in that they comprise legal and economic rules. They include, for example, rules governing the distribution and transfer of property, contract law, tort law, and so on. Crucially, however, basic institutions are also essentially political institutions (2007: 267–8). They involve self-governing and effective political bodies. The next step in Freeman’s argument is:

(3) The state is a scheme of social and political cooperation.

It follows from (1), (2) and (3) that we should accept

(4) Principles of distributive justice apply to the state.

Freeman, however, goes one step further and claims that:

(5) No global basic political institutions exist.

(2007: 308)

Global social cooperation exists, of course, but, argues Freeman, this all emanates from the decisions of states. The state is the fundamental or basic political actor and the cooperation at the global level is a ‘secondary’ or derivative phenomenon (2007: 306; cf. further 306–8: cf. also 268–9). The primary actors are states. Therefore:

(6) Principles of distributive justice do not apply at the global level.¹²

Two further observations are in order. First we should note that Freeman’s argument has the right structure to undermine a cosmopolitan approach for it identifies a property – social and political cooperation – and it then contends that this marks a morally relevant difference between domestic and global realms. Second, note that the main aim of this argument is to argue that cosmopolitan thinkers like Pogge have misconstrued the nature of the ‘basic structure’. The basic structure for Freeman can only refer to sovereign systems of political cooperation (like the state) and since there is no world state there can be no global principles of distributive justice. This emphasis on political cooperation is an important and striking feature of Freeman’s conception for without it his case against global principles of distributive justice collapses.

Objections

§1. Freeman’s argument is vulnerable to a number of different objections. The first problem is that he fails to justify his claim that distributive justice, by its very nature, regulates the basic social and political institutions that comprise the sovereign state. Four lines of reasoning can be detected in his work.

(A1) The Conceptual Argument. First, as noted above, sometimes Freeman’s argument just appears to be a definitional one. That is, he often simply insists that principles of distributive justice must, by definition, regulate the basic structure as he has characterized it. Distributive justice, on this view, just is concerned with regulating existing economic and legal institutions: that is what it is. It is in this vein that he maintains that cosmopolitan views confuse ‘allocative’ and ‘distributive’ justice. So whereas distributive justice is, for Freeman, defined with respect to the legal and economic institutions that distribute property, ‘allocative justice’ concerns the fairness of the actual distribution of resources and opportunities (2007: 305, 306, 315, 316, 318 and 319).

Several points can be made in reply to this strategy. First, it is critically important to note that there are other conceptions of the scope of distributive justice which differ from Freeman’s and he says little as to why his account is superior. Consider, for example, the following widely held view: principles of distributive justice apply to all those who belong to a common system of interaction and interdependence. Let us call this the Causal Interdependence Account. We can find this accou...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Routledge research in IR theory
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Editors' introduction
• Part I Theoretical approaches
• 1 Global distributive justice and the state1
• 2 Global justice and the morality of coercion, imposition, and framing
• 3 Global social justice The possibility of social justice beyond states in a world of overlapping practices
• 4 Resisting ‘global justice' Disrupting the colonial emancipatory logic of the West1
• Part II Economic policies
• 5 Growth is good! – but what growth?1
• 6 Tax competition and its effects on domestic and global justice
• Part III Health
• 7 Compatriot priority, health in developing countries, and our global responsibilities
• 8 International health inequalities and global justice1
• Part IV The role of institutions: inter-, supra-, and transnational
• 9 European and global inequality
• 10 Lifting the resource curse? The World Bank and oil revenue distribution in Chad
• 11 The World Trade Organization as subject of socioeconomic justice1
• 12 Social justice beyond bounded societies Unravelling statism within global supply chains?
• Bibliography
• Index