War in International Society

Lacy Pejcinovic

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135629076
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Is war an institution of international society and how is it constituted as such across the evolution of international society? This book is an inquiry into the purpose of war as a social institution, as originally put forward by Hedley Bull. It offers a comprehensive examination of what is entailed in thinking of war as a social institution and as a mechanism for order.

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the subject of war has become increasingly relevant, with questions about who can wage war against whom, the way war is fought, and the reasons that lead us to war exposing fundamental inadequacies in our theorisation of war. War has long been considered in the discipline of International Relations in the context of the problem of order. However, the inclusion of war as an 'institution' is problematic for many. How can we understand an idea and practice so often associated with coercion, destruction, and disorder as contributing to order and coexistence? This study contends that an understanding of the core elements that establish the character of war as an institution of modern international society will give us important insights into the purpose, if any, of war in contemporary international relations.

This ground-breaking book will be of strong interest to students and scholars of international relations, international relations theory, the English school, security studies and warfare.

1 The Theory of International Society and Institutions

There are two main theoretical concepts involved in the understanding of war in this book: international society and institutions. The purpose of this chapter is not to say anything new about international society or institutions, but to explain my understanding of the meanings of these concepts as the basis on which the book is proceeding, as well as to demonstrate the relationship between the two and how war will be examined with reference to them. Martin Wight (1991; 30 and 41), a ‘founding father’ of the English School of International Relations theory, asked two fundamental questions about international society which are the basis of the first two sections of the chapter: what is international society? And how far does international society extend? This chapter will first provide an overview of the element of ‘society’ in International Relations theory, tracing the limited ‘history of ideas’ of international society through the ‘English School,’ members of which both selfconsciously recognise and are externally understood to place ‘international society’ at the heart of their theoretical enterprise. I compare and contrast the international society approach with the units of analysis in alternative theories such as Realist ‘systems’ and Revolutionist ‘communities,’ to explain why I privilege the societal element. This discussion will also engage with second and third generation English School scholars who have called for a ‘reconvening’ of the English School since the mid-1990s and have worked to illuminate the societal dimension of English School theory and its tensions in current international relations.

Section two moves back to the theory of international society to elaborate on the meaning and role of institutions in international society. It is the understanding of war as an institution which is considered controversial and what I seek to make a contribution to understanding through this book. As such, an elucidation of the concept of an institution is essential. The section explains the difference between institutions, organisations, and regimes in International Relations scholarship with the intent of showing the importance of the Bullian definition of institutions as a dimension of the broader problem of order in international society, and how this pertains to war. In the final section, the international society and institution analyses are bought together in order to outline the historical junctures that are the basis of the following empirical investigation of war as an institution of modern international society.

The element of ‘society’ in International Relations theory

The element of ‘society,’ or for that matter the idea of a ‘system’ or ‘community,’ are important because they are the dimensions through which we can inquire into a central problem of international politics – the nature of order. To say something is ‘ordered’ is to imply that its constituent elements or units are related according to a particular pattern, ‘that their relationship is not purely haphazard but contains some discernible principle’ (Bull 2002; 3). In social life, it is not just any pattern of order, but a particular pattern which gives order meaning for social life. A pattern of order can be evident at a range of levels. As David Wrong (1994; 6) comments, ‘the problem of order is seen as embracing units ranging from single individuals to organised political communities including millions of people, it spans the entire continuum from face to face encounters between individuals to the relations between great powers in world politics.’ Individuals are important because they are the components that constitute larger formal organisations such as states, which when operating effectively are able to check individual motivations and desires and mitigate the realities of disorder as understood to exist in the ‘state of nature’ (Buzan 2004; 8 and Wrong 1994; 14–16). Order is also purposive. It is related to certain functions, goals, or values. For Bull, there are three elementary or primary goals essential to the condition of social life as such.¹ The first is the goal of securing life against violence, bodily harm or death. Second, order requires that promises or agreements once made are upheld or carried out. Finally, property or the ‘possession of things’ must be secured. Order for Bull (2002; 4), then, is a ‘pattern of activity that sustains elementary, primary or universal goals of social life such as these.’ On an international level these goals of social life are articulated with respect to an understanding of ‘society,’ and reflect the units, structure, rules, norms and values that are a part of the meanings of society.

Society has been conceptualised in many ways in the discipline of International Relations. For example, one such understanding is Evan Luard’s (1976; viii) study of types of international societies, which defines ‘society’ in a broad sociological manner as ‘a relatively permanent association of nations and other groups, linked together by ties of intercourse, trade, and diplomatic relations, not necessarily … always peaceful, still less tightly organized and integrated, but possessing some common customs and traditions, common expectations concerning the relationships and behaviour to be expected among its members, even, in many cases, common institutions for discussing common problems.’ It is in the theoretical tradition of the ‘English School’ so named by Roy Jones (1981) that the idea of international society has gained prominence. The following sections will examine what Linklater (2005; 106) has described as the English School’s long discussion about the relative importance of ‘system,’ ‘society’ and ‘community’ in international affairs as it was framed by the First Generation scholars Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, and then how international society and its varying tensions have been adopted and expanded upon by second and third generation scholars to firmly entrench the element of ‘society’ in International Relations theory.

Wight and Bull: the first generation

Martin Wight famously divided international theory into ‘three traditions’ each with a varying understanding of the fundamental aspects of International Relations including different answers to his question – what is international society? His three ‘Rs, ‘ revolutionism, realism and rationalism, correspond loosely to three seminal scholars of early political theory: Kant, Hobbes and Grotius respectively.² While Wight himself at times favoured different aspects of each tradition and as a consequence never published the work himself, by examining the construction of international society within a framework such as this Wight highlights several valuable dimensions of the various theories leading to or contrasted with the element of society.

The dominant theoretical tradition in International Relations has been Realism. There are many strands, the most well known are those associated with the ‘classical’ school and the ‘neo-realist’ school. In Wight’s (1991; 15–16 and Bull 2002; 23–24) three traditions the realists are those who ‘emphasise in international relations the element of anarchy, of power politics and of warfare … where reality is power.’ In classical realist political theory associated with Thomas Hobbes, international relations occur in the state of nature circumscribed by a social contract where the answer to the question of what is international society is ‘nothing’ (Wight 1991; 31). The anarchical nature of the states’ relations, that is the absence of any overarching government, means there is no natural society or community and the evidence of scholars in other fields such as international law and diplomacy is ‘too nebulous and constantly violated’ (Wight 1991; 32) to constitute a real challenge to this approach. Nonetheless, there is a second possible answer Realists might give which is that ‘the Great Powers constitute what international society there is’ (Wight 1991; 32). Where any notion of a society exists, it is not independent of the interests of states (great powers) as the primary members. It is based on admitting the existence of shared problems and an emphasis on material capabilities, where cooperation is compelled by the need to maximise economic and security interests in order to exploit power positions (Dunne 2001; 81–82). Where there is an international society for realists, ‘it is one that is reducible to the will of the powerful’ (Dunne 2001; 84).³

On the other end of the Wightian theoretical spectrum lies the most amorphous of his categories, Revolutionism. This represents everything from what we understand today as ‘critical theory,’ through to cosmopolitanism and Kantian universalism. As Wight (1991; 12) himself acknowledges, ‘the revolutionist tradition is less a stream than a series of waves.’ Cosmopolitan ‘Revolutionism’ dismisses an international society of states in favour of an international society of individuals (Wight 1991; 45). The general category of Revolutionism and ‘international society’ within it can be summarised to represent the polar opposite of the realist tradition. Wight (1991; 40–41) argues that what they were doing, ‘was to revive, or perpetuate, the minority medieval idea of a single human republic, an imperium mundi (Dante), or to harden international society into a world-state, to define it and constitute it as a super-state.’ The project of the Revolutionists is akin to what has come to be understood as the ‘domestic analogy,’ which assimilates international rela-tions to a condition of domestic politics. Wight argues there are three methods by which a revolutionist international society might be realised. The first is a presumption towards doctrinal uniformity, of essentially ideological homogeneity between states. Wight (1991; 42) argues this is epitomised by Kant’s (1983) first definitive article in Perpetual Peace, which states that the constitution of each state should be republican. The second is a form of doctrinal imperialism where a single great power tries to spread a creed and impose uniformity which can maximise civil unity. Finally, cosmopolitanism proclaims ‘a world society of individuals, which overrides nations or states, diminishing or dis-missing this middle link’ (Wight 1991; 43–45). Inherent in the revolutionist understanding of international society is a deeply normative disposition, which considers what ought to be, rather than what is (Wight 1991; 46).

Wight’s final category is what many in the discipline consider to be the quintessential Wightian position, that of rationalism. In his famous article on ‘Western Values in International Relations’ (1966; 91), Wight described this position as a via media, or a middle way between the other two categories, distinguished from the realist denial of the role of common values in binding states into an international society, and from the revolutionist tradition that advocates in its various forms the transcendence of the states system (Cutler 1991). Rationalism has a statist focus. However, its analysis of states is in relation to the concept of a society of states. The way Wight uses the term ‘rationalism’ is considerably different in this respect from how it appears in American social science, in which it refers to positivist theories of neo-realism and to an extent neo-liberalism (Smith 2002; 70–72 and Waever 1998; 92–93). Generally, it considers that there is ‘no such absolute distinction between the state of nature and the social condition,’ but rather,

It was indeed the social contract which inaugurated the condition of society, but the state of nature was a condition of sociability, of the capacity for becoming social. The law of nature commands sociable behaviour; state of nature, therefore, is a condition of sociability, if not a society … given this view, international society is a true society, but institutionally deficient; lacking a common superior or judiciary (Wight 1991; 38–39).

It is from this tradition that we can establish Wight’s clearest articulation of what an international society approximates. It is a ‘system of states,’ to usurp the title of his most famous book, where Heeren’s definition is used to underpin his own conception. This definition of international society (or a states-system) is, ‘the union of several contiguous states, resembling each other in their manners, religion, and degree of social improvement, and cemented together by a reciprocity of interests’ (Wight 1991; 22). The key aspects which make this a society include reciprocal sovereignty or mutual recognition, a common ethos or ideology, and cultural unity. This notion of society implies a unity, not just physical, but as Suarez (quoted in Wight 1966; 95) argues, ‘in a sense political and moral.’

Hedley Bull’s work on international society closely approximates Wight’s categorisations. Bull (1966; 35) argues that the basic premise of the Realist position considers that ‘as a consequence of anarchy, states do not form together any kind of society.’ In essence, the Realist tradition Bull (2002; 24) outlines allows states to approach their goals in relation to other states free of moral or legal restrictions. The goals of states as well as their general interactions are governed by expediency and self-interest. This interaction occurs at a basic level – at the level of a system of states or an international system. For Bull (2002; 9) an international system is formed when ‘two or more states have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole.’ States form a system when we can say that their behaviour causes them to become a ‘necessary element in the calculations of the others’ (Bull 2002; 10). Behaviour does not have to be cooperative for the existence of an international system though. Political, strategic, economic and social conflict, neutrality, and indifference still take into account the objectives and behaviour of other states as the primary units of an international system.

Similarly, Bull acknowledges Kantian Revolutionism in international politics as the opposite end of the spectrum from Hobbesian Realism. He comments ‘the Kantian or universalist tradition … takes the essential nature of international politics to lie not in conflict among states … but in the trans-national social bonds that link the individual human beings who are the subjects or citizens of states’ (2002; 24). In the Kantian view, the relationship between states in international politics is only superficially the dominant dimension. Rather it is the relationship between men in the ‘community of mankind,’ where the equal interests of all men drive a cooperative international arena. Moreover, morality is paramount, and there exists a series of moral imperatives limiting the actions of states not in the hope of ‘cooperation and coexistence’ between states but with the intent of replacing the system of states with a ‘cosmopolitan society,’ a community of mankind (Bull 2002; 25). However, neither the Hobbesian Realist nor the Kantian Revolutionist positions accurately reflect the nature of international politics for Wight or Bull. Wight’s Rationalist position and Bull’s Grotian conception accept the reality of certain dimensions evident in the two extreme positions to provide a pragmatic theoretical tool within which to interrogate order in international politics.

The Grotian tradition describes international relations in terms of a society of states. That is, it accepts states as the chief units of international politics, but believes they are not embedded in overarching violent or conflictual relations whether political, economic, social or strategic. Rather their actions are circumscribed by common rules and institutions. Bull (2002; 25) comments ‘International politics, in the Grotian understanding, expresses neither complete conflict of interest between states nor complete identity of interest; it resembles a game that is partly distributive but also partly productive.’ States are bound in relations with one another by self-interest and prudence as well as by laws and morality. Bull (2002; 13 and Bull and Watson 1984) describes international society as one that ‘exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.’ It is his articulation of the importance of shared or common rules, values and institutions which distinguishes international society as a distinct realm of international interaction. Yet, it is also the way it is related to the extreme ends of the theoretical spectrum which makes the concept of international society analytically useful. Bull asserts that society presupposes the existence of a system in international politics. In Linklater’s (2005; 90) analysis, Bull used ‘system’ to show that a level of order could exist ‘between states which do not feel they belong to a common civilization.’ Prior to analysing international politics in terms of international society, we must first be able to recognise as the Realists do that a mechanistic pattern of relations among states as the basic units of international relations exists. Similarly, we must recognise that states and ultimately society is made up of individuals, albeit as citizens of states. The primary goals of social life – life, truth, and property – essential to the order that analytical concepts like system or society are to uphold, need to be simultaneously guaranteed at the individual and international level. Without the solidification of life, truth and property with regard to mankind as a whole, a state able to interact at the sy...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1. The Theory of International Society and Institutions
• 2. Infidels, Barbarians, and Dominium
• 3. Kings and Heretics in Late Medieval War
• 4. Great Powers and War in the Nineteenth Century
• 5. Historical Time, Commerce, and Tutelage
• 6. Wars of Decolonisation
• 7. The Era of Total War
• Conclusion: The New Millennium: An Institution in Crisis?
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index