Autonomy and Identity

Ros Hague

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781136754180
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Autonomy and Identity are key concepts in both political and feminist thought and have played central roles in both fields. Although there has been much academic work on both concepts there has arguably been little that has addressed the connections between autonomy and identity.

Autonomy and Identity seeks to draw innovative links between these concepts in order to develop a new understanding which sees autonomy as a process by which we change and develop our identity. It draws on thinkers from the canon of political thought such as G.W.F. Hegel, Mary Wollstonecraft, J.S. Mill and Simone de Beauvoir and features illustrative examples drawn from a wide range of contemporary issues including pornography, domestic violence and women's citizenship. Hague argues that identity is best understood as changing, multiple, and something we need to take control of ourselves. In order to support this version of identity there needs to be a concept of autonomy which emphasises self-direction to control our identity.

Providing valuable insight into the complexities of thinking about linking autonomy to identity, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, gender studies, contemporary political thought and the history of political thought.

1 Constraining the individual

Liberalism and autonomy

This chapter considers the evolution of the liberal tradition towards the Millian version of liberalism which is integral to my concept of autonomy. It also examines the ways in which autonomy can be constrained. Although I refer to ‘liberalism’ in general terms, the type which is of particular value to my concept of autonomy is the liberalism associated with John Stuart Mill.

Introduction

Autonomy is a process; being autonomous gives human life value by allowing us to act on our own choices and motivations. The process of autonomy is not a value, but the identity choices we make (even though we alter them) as a result of that process contain value because they are ours. We cannot make choices without motivations; motivations have to have a goal, even if never reached. Motivation to make choices implies the agent must have some end identity that she values, or thinks she would value. We place value on some identities more than others and also come to value certain identities that were once less important to us. Our conceptions of the good form the motivations from which we begin the process of autonomy.

Therefore, there is a link between our motivation and our identity. If our motivations hold value for us, then our identities reflect individuality. This gives us authenticity, a concept which will be discussed in the following chapter. The notion of identity as shifting and adaptable presented in this book does not mean that identity should be so fluid that the agent is washed away from her situation (her community, her relationships with others and her historical identity)¹ on a tide of free-flowing identity over which she has no control. Agents already have identities, and consideration of their identities and all aspects of their situation is part of the process of autonomy.

This chapter focuses on the liberal tradition in order to see both what it can offer to my concept of autonomy but also the pitfalls that await autonomy in some strands of the liberal tradition. It argues that the liberal tradition can offer important contributions to autonomy through its emphasis on individuality, self-direction and creativity. However, the liberal tradition struggles when it applies dichotomous thought to autonomy. For example, the notion that autonomy is something we either have or do not have fails to grasp the complexities of autonomy. My discussion considers two different constraints to autonomy in order to understand the value of the Millian version of liberalism. This version does not place severe restrictions on autonomy and the discussion first acknowledges the pervasive nature of constraints. It then offers a theory of autonomy by degrees in order to combat these constraints. The first constraint is the case of objectification, and the second coercion.

The first part of this chapter looks at individuality and autonomy and some of the liberal ideas that surround these two notions. Two key aspects of my concept of autonomy are self-direction and creativity. These aspects allow the individual to reflect on her motivations and ask: what identities are really mine? Through emphasis on creativity and self-direction the agent is able to arrive at identities autonomously, knowing that they match her own conceptions of the good. This is achieved gradually, and, for that reason, autonomy is conceptualized as a process by which people change and develop their identity. The process encourages self-direction, creativity and individuality: the value of individuality is associated with Millian liberalism and draws on Mill’s On Liberty.

The second part also draws on this work: it deals with harm, and in particular it focuses on Mill’s notion of individuality and self-direction. Mill will be used to demonstrate the further evolution of the liberal tradition from the negative emphasis on fear and distrust to the prospect of individual flourishing (the idea of flourishing and of being dynamic is vital to my concept of autonomy). This point in the development of the liberal tradition produces the emphasis on individuality rather than individualism, a distinction which will be discussed. However, the positive emphasis on individual potential is accompanied by a need for protection from others. Distrust of others haunts Mill’s thought and the liberal individual remains a somewhat solitary figure, but Mill argues that this is necessary in order to protect the individual from harm.

Following from Mill’s arguments for individual space, the third section examines what could invade this space. There will always be constraints to autonomy but, because my concept of autonomy is one achieved by degrees, it is possible to be autonomous to some degree in situations that offer little hope. Richard Lindley notes that autonomy is ‘a matter of degree’ (Lindley 1986: 69) as does Marilyn Friedman (Friedman 2003: 7). If autonomy is a matter of degree, then (as was noted above) emphasis on process is important; we can be more or less autonomous depending on how far we get along the process of becoming autonomous. This final part of the chapter looks at two possible constraints to autonomy: objectification and coercion. The pervasive nature of these constraints means that autonomy needs to be emphasized not only as a process but also as something gained (and lost), never completely but perpetually, by degrees.

Individuality and other liberal values

This chapter draws on Millian liberalism in order to emphasize the liberal values of individuality, creativity, self-direction, responsibility² and choice, all of which are associated with the liberal tradition but are also useful for my concept of autonomy. Self-direction, creativity and choice foster individuality, and taking responsibility for our identity is an important aspect of autonomy because it forces the agent to reflect critically on her identity. It is hoped that the concept of autonomy that is put forward will be adaptable and not suffer the limitations of aspects of the liberal tradition also described below. Chapter 2 develops the concept of autonomy with a different approach by looking at the agent in society. Therefore, although the liberal tradition contributes much to my concept of autonomy, autonomy is not presented as a purely liberal value. To do so would restrict the concept by labelling it liberal, thus associating it with all that is liberal and this form of labelling is what we need to escape from rather than to utilize. This section considers the difficulties connected to some values of the liberal tradition as well as the benefit of others.

Joseph Raz considers whether autonomy is something we value in itself or if it should be valued not for what it is, but for what it does. Autonomy is described as enabling a person to act:

An autonomous agent or person is one who has the capacity to be or to become significantly autonomous at least to a minimal degree. Significant autonomy is a matter of degree. A person may be more or less autonomous. (Significantly) autonomous persons are those who can shape their life and determine its course. They are not merely rational agents who can choose between options after evaluating relevant information, but agents who can in addition adopt personal projects, develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes, through which their personal integrity and sense of dignity and self-respect are made concrete.

(Raz 1986: 154)

The capacity to act makes a person autonomous, and Raz wants significant autonomy to be understood as something attained by degrees and as part of an ongoing process of ‘personal projects’, ‘relationships’ and ‘commitments’. Significant autonomy appears dependent on being able to exercise a capacity to act; when this capacity is thwarted by others, autonomy is diminished.

However, he then appears to argue that autonomy is also of ultimate value:

If having an autonomous life is an ultimate value, then having a sufficient range of acceptable options is of intrinsic value, for it is constitutive of an autonomous life that it is lived in circumstances where acceptable alternatives are present. The alternatives must be acceptable if the life is to be autonomous.

(Raz 1986: 205)

Raz explains the relationship between intrinsic and ultimate value as ‘an explanatory or justificatory one. Ultimate values are referred to in explaining the value of non-ultimate goods’ (ibid.: 200). The ‘capacity’ or ‘conditions’ for autonomy, the circumstances in which it is possible to be autonomous, is of value in a similar way to intrinsic value because it enables an autonomous life: ‘The ideal of autonomy is that of the autonomous life. The capacity for autonomy is a secondary sense of “autonomy” ’ (ibid.: 372). The value of the capacity for autonomy could also be of derivative value in that it contributes to an autonomous life.³ Raz says that it would be ‘hard to conceive of an argument that possession of a capacity is valuable even though its exercise is devoid of value’ (ibid.: 372); the capacity for autonomy then derives its value from the exercise of autonomy.⁴ Therefore the capacity for autonomy is a ‘secondary sense’ of autonomy and this capacity could be of intrinsic value in Raz’s thought because it is constitutive of an autonomous life, but it is also of derivative value because it is a value derivative of another value – that of the exercise of autonomy. It appears that the capacity for autonomy enables the exercise of autonomy which creates the possibility of living an autonomous life. For my concept of autonomy what is of interest is the way in which our autonomy enables us to manage our identity, therefore, it is Raz’s secondary sense of autonomy as capacity which is significant.⁵

Millian liberalism has much to say on the aspects of autonomy that I include here as part of my concept, especially independence, being left alone, and individuality. For Raz, independence is one of the key conditions for autonomy and requires independence from manipulation and coercion (ibid.: 379–80).⁶ However, emphasis on independence is not always helpful for a feminist concept of autonomy. Wendy Brown notes that the liberal individual is independent as opposed to ‘dependent on others’ (Brown 1995: 156–7). She goes on to argue that, in contrast to rights, dependence is associated with need and encumbrance: ‘Rights relations presume autonomy and independence while relations of need presume intimacy and dependence’ (ibid.: 159). Therefore, liberal emphasis on independence can deny the ties that we may feel to others.

Independence, when emphasized as being left alone, is a form of Isaiah Berlin’s negative liberty, which is concerned with limiting the intrusion of a government or society into an individual’s life (and where positive liberty is concerned with questions of self-government). Berlin associates negative freedom with Locke, Mill, Constant and Tocqueville because negative freedom supposes ‘that there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated’ (Berlin 1969: 124). This notion of freedom requires that ‘a frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and that of public authority’ (ibid.: 124). The drawing of barriers is problematic for my concept of autonomy which seeks to be flexible.

Positive liberty helps us understand what we are free to be or to do (Berlin 1969: 130), that we are able to ‘lead a prescribed form of life’ (ibid.: 131) and be self-directed. Berlin describes positive liberty as coming from ‘the desire on the part of the individual to be his own master’ (ibid.: 131). By this he means that the individual should understand that her actions are the result of her own will or deliberation; consequently they are hers and do not stem from the will of others. Although the sense of direction over our lives that positive freedom gives is useful to my concept of autonomy, the gendered language used by Berlin (‘he’ will be master) reflects not only a masculine language but also a patriarchal understanding of freedom as something we conquer.⁷ The version of independence I wish to stress for my concept of autonomy is one that allows for selfdirection but does not entail the vision of a rational unencumbered agent described by Brown: ‘Fiercely autonomous and diffident, he is unencumbered by anyone or anything, independent in both senses of the term (free of dependents and dependency in civil society)’ (Brown 1995: 149).

Any discussion of autonomy in the liberal tradition is hampered by liberal reliance on dichotomy. Dichotomies are problematic because they privilege one side over the other. This results in a way of thinking ‘in terms of presupposed but unthinkingly applied exclusionary dichotomies’ (Prokhovnik 2002: 3). Kimberly Hutchings argues that feminist philosophy is engaged in a ‘conceptual conundrum’ in attempting to ‘escape the conceptual binary oppositions … which have associated women with the denigrated term and prescribed the exclusion of women from the practices of both philosophy and politics’ (Hutchings 2003: 2). These binary oppositions are always hierarchical (Prokhovnik 2002: 4). The problems created by liberal dichotomy become apparent when addressing constraints as they pervade the binary of autonomous/heteronomous.

The liberal emphasis on reason and the assertion that autonomy is about rationality is also problematic for feminism because it relies on a dualism of reason and nature and this is underwritten by a gendered understanding of male/female and the public/private (which will be discussed in the section on harm). Through this dichotomy women are always aligned with the natural and therefore are denied autonomy. This is what Genevieve Lloyd terms ‘the maleness of Reason’ (Lloyd 1993: xix). This is a narrow sense of autonomy and it is problematic for feminism because it presents the identity of a rational man so, in order to be autonomous, women must assume that identity. Further, it begs the question that, if the rational is privileged over nature, then is the female, rational, autonomous subject disembodied? Autonomy is set up as disembodied subjectivity. Raia Prokhovnik argues that the disembodied presentation of reason has discriminated against women because of the practices and ideas that have developed around rationality and reason (Prokhovnik 2007: 13).

The primacy of reason results in the limited identity for the individual of liberal individualism. As such, it argues that the only identities agents have are either that of rational utility-maximizer (as in David Gauthier) or of the rightsbased, rational and reasonable chooser (John Rawls).

Dependency and not privileging ‘male’ reason is seen as a weakness in the liberal tradition as it not only limits the capacity for self-direction but it also invites interference from a paternalistic state. According to the liberal tradition, paternalism is something against which we should guard (for example Mill [1859] 1989a: 89). Paternalism is perceived as threatening to liberals because it limits self-direction and treats rational individuals as if they were not rational. The state is also described as a ‘night-watchman’ by some liberals: Berlin speaks of ‘the notion of the state as a traffic policeman and night-watchman preventing collisions and looking after property, which is at the back of much individuality and liberal thought’ (Berlin 2000: 33). Individuality requires the state to act as an arbiter but to remain in the background in order to foster individuality in its liberal citizens.

Therefore the notions of independence and negative liberty are important in preserving autonomy but they, along with positive liberty, dichotomy and reason are also problematic for a feminist concept of autonomy.

I draw on the liberal tradition here to describe autonomy, but there are frequent attempts to distinguish autonomy from freedom and covering them in detail is beyond the scope of this chapter (Nancy Hirschmann 2003 and Ben Colburn 2010 are two examples). I argue for autonomy rather than freedom. Robert Young comments: ‘Freedom is only a necessary condition for autonomy. So autonomy involves more than just being free’ (Young 1986: 8). This means autonomy is concerned with specific aspects of our lives whereas freedom is concerned with the ‘bigger picture’. This fits with my understanding of autonomy as something we gain or lose by degrees. John Christman provides an example of a smoker who also enjoys watching baseball. The smoker exercises choice (preference formation) about whether to watch a baseball game but does not have the same autonomy over the habit of smoking. Christman argues that an individual’s autonomy depends ‘on the more basic characteristics of how each of her preferences were formed (“or the degree of control she had over her choices”)’ (Christman 1989: 13). Christman notes Robert Young’s objection to the assumption that autonomy can be applied to an overall view of an individual’s life. According to Christman, Young ‘views autonomy as a property of a person insofar as her desires fit in with her overall life plan. But he then must view this “episodic” autonomy as partial autonomy’ (ibid.: 13).

Both Christman’s and Young’s view of autonomy contain aspects useful to my concept. The insistence on defining autonomy as applied to specific examples of an individual’s life and the question of how much control the individual has is important to understanding how an individual can be autonomous in certain instances and not others. Christman’s description of Young’s autonomy as ‘episodic’ because it is partial also fits with my view of autonomy as attained by degrees. That an individual cannot be fully autonomous in every aspect of her life is not a failure of autonomy; rather, it is an acknowledgement that individuals can have some autonomy in very constrained circumstances – Christman’s smoker will be less autonomous when smoking but more autonomous when deciding on the baseball game. For my concept of autonomy this simply means the smoker is more autonomous in some situations than in others.

For Christman, the inability to act on preferences we have formed ourselves means we lack autonomy. Preference formation is a sign of autonomy and Christman contrasts this to freedom which ‘is a property of human action’ (ibid.: 13). Freedom has a wider application but, Christman argues, it must contain ‘an account of autonomy’ (ibid.: 13). For example, we are free to jump out of a window on the tenth floor of a building but we cannot consider this an autonomous act unless this is really what we want to do, that is, if we are in control of our autonomy and if this is an authentic expression of our desires. Marina Oshana argues that autonomy is a ‘ “thicker” concept’ than freedom. She relates freedom to the freedom ‘to realize one’s will’, but autonomy involves a lot more: it ‘concerns authority over and ownership of the affective and cognitive states as well as the social roles and relationships that provoke action and sustain action’ (Oshana 2008: 195). Autonomy, in Oshana’s description, means that the agent has authority over her actions (ibid.: 196 and again 199). Autonomy is a more useful concept than freedom for my purposes because it can acknowledge contingency and ‘episodic’ moments when we are more autonomous than others. Autonomy is also concerned with how we envisage our own identities, how we would like to change them and how we view the identity of others. This appears to fit better with the view of autonomy as partial than with Christman’s view of freedom as concerned with ‘human action’ and a ‘wider application’. Indeed, such a view of freedom would move us towards a discussion of universalism which, as was noted in the introduction, is not particularly helpful for thinking about self-definition.

What follows is a brief attempt to draw a distinction between individuality and individualism. This distinction rests on a tentative claim that individuality is a positive aspect of the liberal tradition, and useful for the concepts of autonomy and identity, whereas individualism contains the damaging image of the individual as a rational maximizing egoist who inhabits a universe of dichotomy. Marilyn Friedman notes that individualism is associated with egoism, domination and mutual indifference and, although she does not draw the same distinction between individualism and individuality as I do here, she does comment (after listing the problems with individualism) that ‘there may be good ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Constraining the individual
• 2 The social character of the autonomous agent
• 3 Mary Wollstonecraft and the politics of self-control
• 4 Leaving the nether world
• 5 John Stuart Mill and the limits on individuality
• 6 Freedom and other people
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index