Federalism and the Dictatorship of Power in Russia

Mikhail Stoliarov

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• ISBN:
  9781134417797
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Stoliarov presents an analysis of the historical traditions and distinctive features of modern Russian federalism. He reviews the state of affairs in today's Russia as it strives to become a federal democracy securing the rights and liberties of its citizens. By tracing two contrasting ideas - federalism and derzhavnost (dictatorship of power) - in the legacy of the Russian state, and in relations between the modern federal government and the regions, he demonstrates the need for balance in the delimitation of power. The election in 2000 if Vladimir Putin as President raised doubts about the future of federalism among politicians and citizens, but Stoliarov believes that the development of federalism is the only way forward for this multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. He shows that the strengthening of 'vertical power' and 'dictatorship of the law', despite their patriotic appeal, are likely to have a negative effect on the building of democracy and federalism in Russia.

1

STATEHOOD LEGACY

Sovereign Russia: traditions of power

One has to be Russian in order to understand the power of a monarch’s gaze …

Marquis de Cuistine, French traveler

At all times, and especially in periods of great social changes and reforms, citizens of multinational Russia looked to the past of their country in order to trace back the sources of Russian derzhavnost’ (great power or dictatorship of power).¹ The word derzhavnost’ is not easy to translate. It has quite an abstract meaning and yet it is very understandable and dear to Russians. It is used to express a complex and contradictory concept. In derzhavnost’ one may find patriotism, appreciation of traditional values and love for the Motherland, and at the same time authoritarianism, dictatorship, and disregard for civil rights, especially when democracy and federalism are concerned.

Derzhavnost’ inspires today’s statesmen to carry on the traditions of their great predecessors who ruled Russia before them. Often we look to historical manuscripts with piety and admiration in order to understand present-day events and sometimes to justify the actions of modern politicians. Historical precedents, thus, serve in many instances as an excuse for the abuse of power. In our analysis of Russian history we discover to our great surprise that the ruling regime in Russia in essence has not changed much from the immemorial times of Kievan Rus’ to Ivan the Terrible, from Peter the Great to Nicolas Romanov, from Lenin and Stalin to the latest leaders of the Communist party. In the latter case, even if some people in Russia may consider Soviet times a less imperial and hardhearted regime compared to the previous ones, millions of victims of that period would declare quite the opposite. The strivings for the great power and political conservatism have the same origin.

President Putin’s policy today is a cluster of derzhavnost’, political conservatism and craving for democracy and modernization. The target of the recent steps taken by Putin’s administration was the reformation of the very structure of power. A new social contract was set at the core of the reform. Its basic points were to strengthen “the vertical line of power,” to end the practice of “political bargaining,” to reduce the influence of “corporate groups of interests,” and to increase the control over the elite in the regions. It is noteworthy that post-Soviet Communist and nationalist ideology did not become a part of this new policy.

Analyst A. Morozov writes about President Putin’s actions in Nezavisimaia gazeta: “The so-called new policy of Putin contains evident traits of neo-conservatism. From the moment of the address to the Federal Assembly, this policy has prevailed in all Putin’s speeches and actions.”²

According to Morozov, “neo-conservatism” is derzhavnost’ that is planted in the grounds of a democratic federal state. In this way, terms like “state conservatism” as well as “enlightened conservatism” that have centuries-old traditions are now revived in the modern context.

The recognition of economic freedom and the inviolability of private economic initiative are important parts of modern “stately conservatism.” A sovereign neo-conservative is very careful about the democratic institutions, especially the power structures and social sphere. Being a true pragmatist he or she supports the military, police and other attributes of a powerful state, at the same time accepting elected representative power as an unavoidable compromise in the state administration and in the public service system. Elections and other democratic procedures are viewed as an instrument for the selection of personnel needed for various levels of administration. The sovereign neo-conservative respects the “social consent” because it was achieved with his or her help and it is based on high moral and ethical values.

In order for us to fully comprehend the origins of Russian sovereign neo-conservatism, let us turn to historical sketches of Russian life by Radishchev, Kostomarov, Kluchevskii, Solov’ev, Il’in, and other great Russian historians.

From far back into history, Finns and Turkic tribes have inhabited the eastern part of modern Russia. In the West, various Eastern Slavic tribes neighbored with the Baltic and Finnish tribes, spread along the Baltic Sea coast. The Slavs usually settled along the rivers, such as Dvina (Daugava), Volkhov, Dnieper, Pripiat, and others. They formed small communities, centered around fortified settlements. There was no intertribal political power. Princes ruled numerous Eastern Slavic tribes, and there were many military conflicts between the tribes. Because of this isolationism separate Eastern Slavic tribes were often not able to protect themselves from outside enemies and were subjugated by other tribes.

Christianity came to Rus’ from the Byzantine Empire. At the end of the ninth century, after an unsuccessful military expedition to Constantinople, Russian Grand Duke Vladimir accepted Baptism from Byzantium. Before that, under the Rurik dynasty, barbaric practices were dominant. The dukes imposed heavy “tribute” on many Russian tribes. This “activity,” of course, was not regulated by any sort of legislation and was very arbitrary. The aim of such raids was to loot as much as possible. Dukes, however, did not interfere with the customs and traditions of the neighboring tribes. As long as they paid the “tribute,” the internal affairs of the subjugated tribes were left alone.

The barbaric practices in Rus’ were put to an end after the acceptance of Christianity that was soon followed by many governmental and legal Byzantine institutions. That was a revolution that transformed Rus’ and many ways determined its future. The Grand Duke Vladimir, a great man of his time, who was later canonized by the Orthodox Church as a Saint, played the pivotal role in this process.

Vladimir controlled a large territory of what is today’s Russia. Nineteenth-century historian Kostomarov writes:

he [Vladimir] ruled the entire Novgorod Land, along Volkhov, Neva, Msta and Luga rivers; Belozersk Land, Rostov Land, Smolensk Land in the upper parts of Dnieper and Volga, Polotsk Land on the Dvina river, Seversk Land on the Diesna and Sem’ rivers, Kiev (Polian) Land, Drevlian Land (eastern Volyn’) and most likely western Volyn’. The Rodimiches, who lived along the river Sozh, and the Viatiches, who lived along Oka and its streams, wanted to be independent from Rus’, but soon this riot was subdued. Vladimir was able to impose tribute even on the distant Pagan Iatviagians, a Baltic tribe that inhabited the western part of present day Belarus’. But it would be wrong to assume that the Grand Duke’s power over the subjugated tribes had any structure. It was only limited to the process of collecting the tribute during more or less regular raids. Vladimir himself settled in Kiev with the help of some Scandinavians (Variags) and gave them the right to tax certain cities.³

Another prominent figure in the pre-Horde period was Vladimir Monomach. He was a hard worker with a strong will and a realistic mind. Many important events in Russian history occurred during his rule (second half of the eleventh and first half of the twelfth centuries). Monomach belonged to the people that lived in the period when Christianity came to Rus’. In the eleventh to twelfth centuries barbarism and cross-tribal hostilities still existed. At the time when the understanding of the importance of treaties and laws was only forming, Monomach unified all political powers of Rus’. Eastern Slavs, who for a long time existed as separate tribes, one by one recognized the Kiev prince’s supreme authority. This enabled a gradual and slow growth of the governmental structure of the state.

The famous nineteenth-century historian V. Kliuchevskii paid much attention in his works to the formation of the Great Russian nation. He insisted that, already prior to the thirteenth century, there were some specific features of everyday life that were inherited from the previous tribes, i.e. Polians and Drevlians. But these peculiarities disappeared as time went by or they lay so deeply in the people’s minds that it is very hard for historians to uncover them. In particular, Kliuchevskii states:

I do not have in mind these old tribal or regional particularities, but rather the splitting of one nationality into two new tribes, which began roughly in the thirteenth century when the population of the central-middle Dnieper area, which was the basis for the Russian nation, went in the opposite directions. They both lost Kiev as a co-ordinating center and their common existence also came to an end.⁴

Between the Oka and Volga rivers Russian settlers lived along with Finnish tribes: Estonians, Ves’, Meria, Mordva and Cheremis. On a large territory between Oka and the White Sea one can still see many non-Russian names for cities, villages, rivers, etc. They are of Finno-Ugric origin.

The beginning of the Russian statehood originates specifically at the time of Vladimir Monomach, Rurik, and Romanov dynasties. It provides the basis of sovereignty and integrity of the Russian state. We cannot renounce our history and the great national traditions just because many of them are incompatible with modern democracy and federalism.

The Mongol–Tatars defeated Rus’ in 1236–40, which led to the total destruction of the ancient Kievan Rus’ without any peace treaty, without anything written about the results of the war, even without mention of the fact of Russian enslavement to the so-called “Golden Horde.” The tribute Rus’ was supposed to pay to the khans was never set at a specific amount and was changed after every census, regularly held by the Horde. The tribute amount also depended upon the relations between Russians and the Horde at each concrete historical setting.

The severe subjugation was not reflected in the agreements between the victors and the defeated side. As years and centuries went by (the Golden Horde existed roughly for 250 years), Russian dukes regularly paid the tribute, usually one-tenth of their income. If it wasn’t paid, the Horde invaded the principalities of their choice and sometimes even Moscow. Every year Russian dukes went to the capitals of the Horde, Sarai-Batu or Sarai-Berke, to settle all problems with neighbors, to deliver the tribute, to complain about each other, with requests to resolve disputes over land ownership. All these matters were settled orally during a personal meeting with the khan or his ministers. The illiteracy of many khans and dukes was not the only problem. Khans had to get help from literate people for a legalization of their relations with Genoa, the Byzantine Empire, and Egypt at that time. More specifically, peace treaties and martial contracts were signed. But when it came to Rus’ these legal forms were not in use. What then was the guarantee that the Russian dukes would fulfill their obligation? The answer was simple. The princes gave guarantees of their vassal subordination by sending their sons and younger brothers as permanent hostages, sometimes for as much as eight years.

At the same time, the khans did not give any guarantees to Russian dukes. There were examples of executions without reason. The land of a punished duke was given to others. Even at times when the Horde was weak, rules or these relations didn’t change. Russian dukes personally depended on the khan, like serfs. The nation got used to its humiliating state, and a slave mindset began to form. We could say that the double standard began back then. From that time on, many Russians preached it. This ideology especially manifested itself at the time of Stalin’s dictatorship. Any citizen of the Soviet country could have been proclaimed as “the enemy of the people” for nonconformist behavior, free thought that contradicted basic party dogmas, for a joke that a person next to you didn’t like. Even after Stalin’s epoch (he was called “the father of nations”) a person could have ended up in Siberia for a small sin. It is evident that a sense of personal freedom and legal standards has never been a part of the Russian mentality. Every new generation was usually raised in the environment of full personal deprivation of rights and state power despotism, which hid under the “highest governmental interests” idea.

There was no ground for legal norms in Russia during the Golden Horde period, since no one anywhere wanted to give any guarantees to the population. Only in the eighteenth century, when Catherine II ascended to the throne, did the monarchy take responsibility for issuing the first written documents that provided for some civil rights.

The absence of any treaties and legal standards in relations with the Golden Horde slowed down the formation of the Russian statehood, led to the cult of master–slave relations and exerted a negative influence on the national mindset in general.

The Golden Horde carried out the first census of the population in Northeastern Rus’ in 1255. It was accompanied by spontaneous riots by Russians, who did not want “to give the numbers to the Tatars.” The character of the census itself was very progressive for that time, but its main purpose was the opportunity to collect more taxes. In 1262 a meeting of several Russian cities occurred. The participants discussed how to resist the Horde. After that, revolts broke out in several principalities; they were severely suppressed by the Bascaques.⁵ Soon the Golden Horde khans took into account their past experience in collecting the tribute and introduced a new system. After 1263 this task was turned over to the Russian dukes and city administration. They collected the tribute, took the whole blame for it from the population and transported the money to Sarai-Batu. Gradually this practice became quite ordinary and the fact that Russian dukes collected the tribute and not Mongol–Tatars was acceptable to everyone.

In the twelfth century, the Dukes of Chernigov and Kiev fought with each other, calling to the Polovets to intervene. In the thirteenth century, the Dukes of Northeastern Russia had numerous hostilities with each other and often relied on the Horde squads, who were invited to suppress one of the principalities involved in the conflict.

For example, in 1281 Andrei II, Alexander Nevsky’s son, called the Horde forces against his brother Dimitry I. Under the excuse of Dimitry’s prosecution and with Andrei’s support, they devastated a number of Russian principalities – Vladimir, Tver’, Suzdal’, Rostov, Murom, Pereiaslavl’-Zalessk, and their capitals. The Horde reached the city of Torzhok, having occupied all of Northeastern Rus’. Dimitry returned to Pereiaslavl’ and started preparing for revenge. Andrei went to the Horde with a request for help. In 1282 Andrei came to Rus’ with Tatar regiments under the supervision of Turai-Temir. He reached Pereiaslavl’ and drove out Dimitry again. The latter went to the Black Sea (Nogai Khanate) and brought the Horde army, forcing Andrei to return the principality to his brother.

As a result of this resistance Nogai khans received an additional income, called yasak,⁶ in Kursk, Lipetsk, and Ryls’k. Rostov and Murom again were devastated.

There are many examples of civil wars where the Horde acted as a mediator. This is why it is not completely justified to blame just the Mongol–Tatars for the ruining of the Russian land. On the contrary, there are a number of examples where the Golden Horde prevented hostilities between the Russian dukes.

Russian campaigns against the Horde started in the period of 1360–75, first of all toward the Bulgars. It was a new phenomenon in Russian–Tatar relations.

In 1380, in the Kulikovo field battle, 75,000 Russian and 150,000 Horde soldiers of the Khan Mamai were killed in four hours. After that, in 1382, Khan Tokhtamysh (energetic Mamai’s successor) invaded Moscow. It was unexpected, sudden, and arrogant. The Horde completely plundered and destroyed the city. The state treasury and the golden stock were taken away, all the icons from the Kremlin cathedrals was broken and the metropolitan’s diamond collection was stolen. During the robbery and destruction, 24,000 Muscovites who defended their home city were murdered. Following that, Tochtamysh’s army divided into groups and searched the whole area around Moscow and all the principality’s great cities. They sacked and ravaged everywhere and took people for servitude. The Tatar forces retreat...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Foreword: historical dimensions of Russian federalism
• Introduction: Russia on the way to the new millennium
• 1 Statehood legacy – Sovereign Russia: traditions of power
• 2 The rollercoaster of Russian federalism
• 3 Quo vadis, Russia?
• 4 “Union lasts forever …”
• Postscript
• Notes
• Index