Terrorism, Talking and Transformation

Harmonie Toros

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136339622
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Terrorism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Using rare field research, this book investigates whether and how talking may transform terrorist violence.

Given the failings of today's dominant counterterrorism strategy, is talking a viable policy option to transform conflicts marked by terrorist violence? This book examines the reasons why "negotiating with terrorists" is so often shunned by decision-makers and scholars as a policy response, concluding that such objections are primarily based on a realist and statist understanding of terrorism that has dominated the field so far.

Based on interviews with top rebel and military commanders in the southern Philippine region of Mindanao and interviewing key actors in Northern Ireland, Terrorism, Talking and Transformation investigates how talking may contribute to the transformation of conflicts marked by terrorist violence. The result of this analysis is a theoretically grounded, empirically recognizable and emancipation oriented framework that can be used to investigate the potential of talking in transforming not only terrorist (and counterterrorist) violence, but also the underlying structural violence that often surrounds it.

This book will be of much interest to students in the fields of terrorism studies, security studies, Southeast Asian studies, conflict resolution/transformation and IR in general, and of use to practitioners in the field.

Part I

Building a critical approach

1 Terrorism

In Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, Richard Wyn Jones embarks on what he describes as the “ambitious attempt to combine the insights of previous alternative work in the [security studies] field with a particular set of metatheoretical principles and precepts to develop a new, emancipation-oriented paradigm for the theory and practice of security” (Wyn Jones, 1999: ix). Using many of the same metatheoretical inspirations – in particular the work of Max Horkheimer (1982a, 1982b, 1982c, 1993; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1973) – as well as drawing on Wyn Jones’ (1999, 2005) and especially Ken Booth's (1991, 2005, 2007, 2008) key application of critical theory to security studies, this chapter has the equally ambitious aim of developing a critical theory-based approach to terrorism. Indeed, its goal is to articulate an understanding that is theoretically grounded, empirically recognizable, and emancipation oriented.

The foundations for this articulation have been laid in earlier work (particularly Toros and Gunning, 2009). The aim of this chapter is to further develop this groundwork and address some of the incisive but constructive critiques it prompted (see Stokes, 2009; Michel and Richards, 2009; Hayward, 2011; Heath-Kelly, 2010; Joseph, 2011; Porpora, 2011) as well as more critiques of the broader critical terrorism studies project (Hülsse and Spencer, 2008; Jarvis, 2009). Although I will not address all the concerns raised by these scholars, I have attempted to engage with the key concerns related to this project, offering in particular a more thorough grounding in Frankfurt School critical theory and a clearer elaboration of my position with regard to emancipation.

Nevertheless, the aim of this chapter is not to offer a comprehensive discussion of critical theory, but rather to articulate a critical theory-based understanding of terrorism. I will thus engage with critical theory as well as the work of other scholars (mostly from critical approaches but also from traditional terrorism studies) to the degree necessary to achieve this goal, while aiming to maintain epistemological and ontological coherence.

It is argued here that critical theory¹ offers a basis for an ontological, epistemological and methodological approach to terrorism that overcomes many of the key drawbacks of most terrorism research to date, while retaining a category of violence that can be studied and for which policy recommendations can be made, and thus avoiding arguably one of the main pitfalls of critical investigations of terrorism undertaken so far.² Most critical investigations in fact reject the term “terrorism” to describe a category of violence, analyzing it instead as a discourse that needs to be deconstructed (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996; Oliverio, 1998; Hülsse and Spencer, 2008).³

Critical theory, on the contrary, not only offers a lens through which to examine and critique the realist, statist and positivist conception of terrorism offered by most work in traditional terrorism studies, but also puts forward a framework that allows for a reconceptualization of terrorism. The aim here is therefore to offer an understanding of terrorism which sees it as a category of violence that can nonetheless be examined critically. A positive side effect of this approach is that it leaves open the possibility for a discussion on terrorism with traditional terrorism scholars and policymakers.

Traditional terrorism studies and its critique

Before engaging in a critique of traditional and critical terrorism scholarship, it is essential to examine what is meant by these terms. This study follows the separation made by Horkheimer (1982a, 1982b, 1982c, 1982d) between traditional theory on the one hand and critical theory on the other.⁴ In traditional theory, the scholar sees the world “as a sum-total of facts: it is there and must be accepted” (Horkheimer, 1982a: 199). Traditional theory “relinquishes its claim to exercise criticism and to set tasks” by adopting “purely recording and calculatory functions” (Horkheimer, 1982b: 178). The aim is to improve the system or order, which itself is not challenged. Critical theory on the other hand does not aim “simply to eliminate one or other abuse, for it regards such abuses as necessarily connected with the way in which the social structure is organized” (Horkheimer, 1982a: 207). Summarized succinctly by Mark Hoffman, the push behind critical theory today is “the belief that society [is] in need of radical transformation and not simply reform” (1987: 232). This means challenging “the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable . . . and refus[ing] to take them as nonscientific presuppositions about which one can do nothing” (Horkheimer, 1982a: 207).

As several scholars have recently argued, much research in terrorism studies to date may be categorized as traditional (Gunning, 2007a; Jackson, 2007; Booth, 2008; Toros and Gunning, 2009).⁵ This does not mean that the research produced over the past four decades is not valuable and has not contributed to increasing our understanding of terrorism – on the contrary, some excellent research lines the shelves of traditional terrorism studies.⁶ The findings and theories put forward in the field are also incredibly varied, and one cannot simply lump together the likes of Grant Wardlaw (1989), Martha Crenshaw (1991, 2005), Walter Laqueur (1999), Bruce Hoffman (1998) and Paul Wilkinson (2000, 2001a, 200b, 2006). Hoffman (1998: 88), for example, rejects the possibility of state terrorism, a position criticized by Wilkinson (2001b: 62), who nonetheless agrees with the former that “religious” terrorism is far deadlier than “secular” terrorism.

However, all these authors may be broadly described as “traditional” terrorist scholars inasmuch as they take the established order as a given, i.e., although some do accept state terrorism as a possibility, their study of terrorism focuses almost exclusively on insurgent terrorism and is conceptualized as when a “legitimate” state comes under attack by illegitimate “terrorists” (see Blakeley (2007) and Rafael (2009) for a discussion of state terrorism in traditional terrorism studies). Furthermore, considering the evolution of terrorism studies – with very few scholars working closely together for several decades in the pre-September 11 landscape and remaining the key reference points of the suddenly expanded field in the twenty-first century (Reid and Chen, 2007; Rafael, 2009; Ranstorp, 2009) – the field appears to be particularly prone to what historiographies have described as “group think” (Ranstorp, 2009: 20; see also Reid and Chen, 2007). Indeed, an “invisible college of terrorism researchers” sharing resources and ideas may be identified as far back as the 1970s (Reid and Chen, 2007: 43).

Due to a striking poverty in primary research, “researchers tended to create closed and circular research systems where they relied on each other's work which was synthesized and functioned in a constantly reinforcing feedback loop” (Ranstorp, 2009: 20; see also Silke, 2004, 2009). Thus, it seems possible to make generalizations about traditional terrorism studies, while acknowledging that it has contributed useful and original knowledge to the field.

Positivism and traditional terrorism studies

Terrorism studies, as Booth argues, is a derivative field of study and the first aim of a critical enquiry is to unearth the assumptions that lie beneath terrorism scholarship about what constitutes politics and conflict and how they are to be studied (2008: 67; see also Wyn Jones, 1999: 102).⁷ To begin with, traditional terrorism scholarship is firmly anchored in a positivist epistemology (Gunning, 2007b: 371; Rafael, 2009: 50). From an objective standpoint, traditional scholars aim to find patterns in a neutral analysis of data leading to the establishment of typologies and laws, i.e., “eternal answers to eternal questions” (Bourdieu cited in Acciaioli, 1981: 40). Wilkinson insists there are “independent objective verifiable criteria to enable us to distinguish terrorism from other forms of activity” (2006: 1), while, emblematically, the mission statement of the RAND Corporation – one of the major think-tanks advising the U.S. and other Western governments on terrorism issues – is: “Objective Analysis. Effective Solutions.” As Annemarie Oliverio argues: “The dominant perspective is equated with ‘truth’ ” (1998: 35).

A direct result and powerful example of this positivist epistemology is the definitional quagmire that characterizes much work in terrorism. More than 100 definitions had already been classified two decades ago (Schmid and Jongman, 1988), and some 200 could be counted by the twenty-first century ( Jackson, 2008). Most scholarship indeed starts with whether and how terrorism studies (and the policy world) can agree on a single, universal definition of terrorism (see, e.g., Wardlaw, 1989; Weinberg and Davis, 1989; B. Hoffman, 1998; Wilkinson, 2001b, among numerous others). The fact that the field has yet to find this “holy grail” (Wardlaw, 1989: 3) is seen by many as a drawback, with some scholars arguing that it has held back the field conceptually as well as in terms of the production of empirical knowledge (Wardlaw, 1989: 3; Ganor, 1998; Silke, 2009: 36; see Jackson (2008) for an extensive examination of advantages and disadvantages of establishing a definition).

This search for scientific findings that are “universally valid” and can “transcend history” (Cox, 1986: 247) has led to research that ignores fundamental social, historical, political, economic and human contexts (Gold-Biss, 1994: 6; Silke, 2004; Gunning, 2007a: 371; Breen Smyth, 2007: 261).⁸ Thus, for Leonard B. Weinberg and Paul B. Davis, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Provisional IRA, the Basque ETA, the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ), the LTTE in Sri Lanka, and Sikh minority groups in India become examples of “Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism”; while the Tupamaros of Uruguay, anti-Peronist Montoneros in Argentina, the Weather Underground and Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States, left-wing groups such as Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left) in Turkey, and the Red Brigades in Italy become examples of “Revolutionary Terrorism” (Weinburg and Davis, 1989: 48–69). This leads to what Joseba Zulaika and William Douglass have called a “homogenization and trivialization of vastly different social realities under the buzzword ‘terrorism’ ” (1996: 23).

Since terrorism is “homogenized,” it is disconnected from the “vastly different social realities” of each individual conflict (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996: 23). This means that terrorism can only be understood as an aberration, an abnormal violence that strikes at the normality of our lives. Edward Said argues: “[T]he most striking thing about ‘terrorism’ . . . is its isolation from any explanation or mitigating circumstance, and isolation as well from representations of most other dysfunctions, symptoms and maladies of the contemporary world” (1988: 48). Although, as will be examined later in this chapter, traditional terrorism scholars do examine the “causes” of terrorism, they still look at terrorist violence as a symptom of a dysfunction in the social order rather than as a symptom of a dysfunctional social order. The question becomes how can the social order be fixed so that terrorism may be brought to an end – a traditional theory approach – rather than what functions does the violence serve in the social order and what power inequalities does it reflect – a critical approach (on the functions of violence see Vayrynen, 1991: 1).⁹ Terrorism is thus ideologically disarmed – it is depoliticized and turned into an “apolitical monstrosity” (Gold-Biss, 1994: 6).

This depoliticization of terrorism, however, is inherently political and ideological. As Booth powerfully argues, adapting a renowned phrase of Robert Cox, definitions and theories “are not objective reactions to the world ‘out there,’ the so-called real world, but rather are from somewhere, for someone, and for some purpose” (Booth, 2007: 150). Hidden behind the “neutrality” and “objectivity” of traditional terrorism studies is a realist base that stands in defense of the state – the legitimate actor – and sustains the status quo.

Realism and traditional terrorism studies

Indeed, Oliverio argues that terrorism as approached by traditional scholars is an “active part of statecraft” originating in nineteenth-century social theory and standing in defense of order and the nation-state from dangerous popular uprisings such as that of the French Revolution (1998: 14). “[W]hat has remained constant is the construct's reference to acts undermining the state and its re-presentative institutions and organizations in society as terrorism” (Oliverio, 1998: 31). Terrorism and terrorists come to represent a fusion of everything that is bad, while the opposing “we” takes on the characteristics of everything that is good (Said, 1988: 53). As noted above, traditional scholarship either denies the possibility or ignores the actuality of state terrorism. When state terrorism is contemplated it is defined as an aberration, as the work of a “bad” state compared to our “good” liberal democratic one (Oliverio, 1998: 34–35).

For example, Wilkinson (2001b) and Schmid (2004) compare terrorism to war crimes. Schmid says: “Terrorism distinguishes itself from combat through disregard for principles of chivalry and humanity” (2004: 203). There are thus norms and regulations (The Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions), set up by states and their representatives, and the violation of these norms of “chivalry and humanity” is at the very heart of what is understood as terrorism.

At the international level, terrorism “is framed according to a definite world view that opposes countries and cultures within a hierarchy of values in which ‘we’ are at the top and the practitioners of terrorism at the bottom” (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996: 13). In an example of this realist-based traditional approach, John Gearson (2002) argues that states should unite if they want to defeat the terrorist challenge: “The challenges of modern terrorism require unprecedented cooperation between civil and military agencies, intelligence-sharing by competing providers and allies, and careful consideration of which civil liberties need to be sacrificed and which do not” (Gearson, 2002: 23). What they do not seem to require is an investigation into how the current international order – partially made up of the very same civil and military agencies and/or the sacrifice of civil liberties – contributed to bringing about international terrorism.

The realist foundation of traditional terrorism studies thus places it firmly in defense of the state and the statist international order. It does not challenge the established order, but on the contrary – to draw on Andrew Linklater's critique of neo-realism – “performs the ideological function of perpetuating the international status quo” (1996: 283). Furthermore, by claiming to be neutral and objective, it presents its realist position as the only possible one – the only real one. The current power structures – in this case that of a legitimate state under attack by illegitimate terrorists – become immutable and natural.

Responses to terrorism in traditional scholarship

These positivist and realist underpinnings of traditional terrorism research have considerable repercussions for the kinds of policy recommendations put forward by traditional scholars to address terrorist violence. Essentially, counterterrorism – either through legal, police or military means – is presented as the best and indeed natural response to terrorism, coupled at times by long-term policies to address the “root causes” of the conflict. Most of all, conflict resolution/transformation responses such as engaging in talks with terrorist groups were until recently almost entirely ruled out. Indeed, “if terrorists are assumed to be inherently evil . . . then eradicating them appears apposite while negotiating with them appears absurd” (Jackson, 2005: 9). I will begin by examining how counterterrorism and conflict prevention are put forward as the most natural responses to terrorism. The main objections to conflict resolution/transformation responses to terrorism will be discussed in Chapter 2 which investigates talking in conflicts characterized by terrorist violence.

Counterterrorism, and in particular violent counterterrorism, is presented as the most self-evident response to terrorism (Hocking, 1993; Jackson, 2005, 2009). “Counter-terrorism, rather than being considered as a discrete phenomenon worthy of analysis in its own right, has commonly been defined only in terms of its apparently reactive relationship to ‘terrorism’” (Hocking, 1993: 17). This acceptance of violence as a legitimate and necessary response to terrorism is pervasive (Jackson, 2005: 3), and it is often not only accepted but advocated. Jan Narveson, for example, argues that:

The thought that might occur to us, then, is to propose to the current terrorist that unless he releases his hostages, we will begin shooting the presently imprisoned terrorists, one by one; or at a minimum, that for any hostage killed by the terrorists, we will kill one of the prisoners. [. . .] ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• PART I Building a critical approach
• PART II Case studies
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index