Contemporary Political Agency

Bice Maiguashca, Raffaele Marchetti

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135044329
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica

This book explores and critically reflects on the theory and practice of political agency in contemporary global politics. In light of the changing relationship between the state, the market and the society, it seeks to map both theoretically and empirically contemporary forms of global political agency.

This book reflects on the theory and practice of political agency in contemporary global politics. More specifically, it empirically analyses a range of different forms of political agency and explores their significance for understanding and enacting global politics. Reflecting the efforts of scholars from a variety of disciplines from political theory and Sociology to Geography and International Relations, it brings into conversation a wide spectrum of theoretical approaches including Marxism, feminism, post-structuralism and historical institutionalism. The contributors compare a range of forms of political agency; exploring their significance for the theory and practice of global politics; and reflect on the tensions and synergies generated by recent efforts to conceptualise them.

Demonstrating an innovative and interdisciplinary approach Contemporary Political Agency will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, sociology, political economy and political theory.

1

Political agency and subjectivity in the crisis of modernity

Debora Spini

Introduction

In this chapter I examine how political agency is changing, the challenges it faces, and its opportunities for development in the present context, which is recognized almost universally as a ‘crisis of modernity’. Modernity is defined here as being characterized first, by the affirmation of rationality (Blumenberg 1985) and consequently of science as the principal means of interpreting and controlling the world and of understanding the place of human beings within it; and second, by the dominance of capitalism as the primary socioeconomic model. I will look at political agency and subjectivity in relation to these two key characteristics and ask whether, given the present crisis, political autonomy –defined as the ability of individuals to consider themselves ‘free’ while living in a political society – is still possible within the modern political and institutional framework of the national–territorial state. In reviewing various models of political subjectivity and agency, I focus on those which emphasize autonomy and sovereignty, as it is these aspects which face the greatest challenges in the crisis of modernity.

Likewise, whilst there are differing accounts of the crisis of modernity, in analysing this crisis here I favour, for reasons explained below, the concept of ‘second’ modernity over that of ‘post’ modernity, second modernity being characterized by the unintended, unpredicted and undesired consequences of modern processes. I look at how economic globalization (which is a consequence of the evolution of capitalism) and global risks (which are a consequence of scientific and technological progress) have both profoundly changed the scope and spaces of political agency. I then look at the potential loss of a clear frame of reference for political agency in the changing interaction between politics, society and economy in our ‘globalizing’ world, and at the risk of political agency becoming powerless in the situation in which humanity finds itself (namely, facing the possibility of self-destruction), and consider how these two factors undermine the sovereignty and autonomy of the modern political subject.

As the task of social theory is not merely to review the past but also to look to the future, I will not only trace the development of the crisis of political agency and subjectivity; I will also consider the emerging spaces and subjects which indicate a future for political agency, despite the many challenges it faces. My aim is to show that there are reasons for hope in the very causes of the crisis of modernity, as they make necessary the adoption of new political frameworks, moving beyond, for example, the national–territorial state, and they call for a new type of subject, which can relinquish the claim to sovereignty and discover itself capable of vulnerability and dependence.

1 Political agency and subjectivity in modernity

‘Modernity’ has been defined in a number of different ways. As well as being characterized by the affirmation of rationality, it has also been seen as an age of disenchantment (Weber 1946), as a time in which crisis becomes a value (Baudrillard 1979), and as the age of the ‘conquest of space’ (Sloterdijk 1998, 1999, 2004).¹ Although political agency predates modernity, it has found new spaces within it due to the nature of the modern relationship between human beings and the world. The modern world is open to discovery, and therefore also to conquest; the typical modern notion of the world no longer includes the possibility of empty, unknown and unclaimed spaces. The modern self can therefore be seen as a ‘conqueror’ (Sloterdijk 2005), and the ‘conquest of space’ can be seen to have brought about the establishment of a geopolitical order and thus the emergence of the national–territorial state, as well as the spread of one socioeconomic model – capitalism.

The capacity to ‘discover the world’ is a key development in the evolution of the modern subject, characterized foremost by his individuality (Wagner 2001). Descartes’ res cogitans, unafraid to reject all accepted knowledge and submit the entire world to the test of doubt² and the power of rational inquiry, is one important example of this new subject. In spite of his refusal to engage in any kind of political speculation, Descartes’ self represents an important step in the development of the modern political subject, conceived of as an individual who is by nature free and rational, equal to his fellow men, and naturally endowed with an array of original rights – a model that evolves throughout modern political theory. Hobbes’ subject particularly illustrates the interplay between political agency and conceptions of self, being, like Descartes’ subject, free and rational by nature, but also motivated by self-preservation as well as by the capacity to cause death. All men share this same condition, but this equality does not foster a bond of natural affection (philia); rather, it creates a spiral of fear. Political agency, as noted above, has acquired a wider scope of expression in modernity, but it also displays a dark side, a deep insecurity. Although this insecurity may mean a life that is ‘nasty, brutish and short’ (Hobbes 2003: 183), the Hobbesian subject is nonetheless capable of articulating a response. Human – political –agency responds to the need to make sense of an otherwise senseless world, simultaneously posing a threat and offering an opportunity. Political agency rescues from conflict a space, however limited, in which society can flourish in the shade of Leviathan: politics are the means of controlling the world – which would otherwise remain an unknown, hostile labyrinth – and of neutralizing its dangers.

Political agency in modernity originates from conflict, and rests on the ability to use violence, as Weber acknowledges, thus defining politics as the struggle to influence the state’s ‘right’ to use physical force.³ Political power is intertwined with physical power; the possibility of using violence, legitimately or illegitimately, is the ultimate authority for political agency. The modern concept of sovereignty relies upon the possibility of establishing one dominant power, capable – through the use of force, if necessary – of eradicating conflict and establishing peace. Democratic sovereignty as it emerges in modernity does not render the use of violence irrelevant, only constrains it within democratic legitimacy. This is the basis for a third model of interaction between modern subjectivity and political agency, following those of Descartes and Hobbes.

This third type of the modern subject has its two main points of reference in Rousseau and Kant. Central to it is the ability to formulate ethical judgements in the absence of a metaphysical basis for morality, and, if necessary, in contrast to the traditional ethos. This moral autonomy is seen as absolutely essential to political agency for two main reasons. First, it is a prerequisite of the political actor par excellence, the citizen: being morally autonomous, men can also act politically. Second, moral and political autonomy provides legitimacy for the national–territorial state, the main framework for political agency in modernity. The modern subject’s capacity to ‘decide for oneself’ is the very basis of political power: the sovereignty of the magnus homo, the great artificial man – i.e. the modern state – rests upon the sovereignty of the homunculi, the individual men that compose its body: it is not by chance that the state is often represented by anthropomorphic metaphors, as in Rousseau’s moi commun (common self). This fundamental ‘contract’ both justifies the exercise of political power and safeguards individual autonomy. It is thus possible for the modern subject to consider himself ‘autonomous’ even when bound by the laws of political society, wherein natural liberty is exchanged for political liberty.⁴ Political agency seems capable of a miraculous multiplication of power, as in Arendt’s definition of politics as the art of living in common (Arendt 1958), a definition quite close to that of political agency given by Charles Heller and Branwen Gruffydd Jones in Chapter 8 of this book, as ‘the capacity to take part in the struggle to define the modalities of life in common’.

It is important to point out that the modern national–territorial state provided the institutional framework that permitted the concrete exercise of autonomy, albeit mediated by political representation (Urbinati 2009). The reference to the state is indeed crucial for modern political agency, as the state helped to delineate its distinctive sphere, separate and independent from those of ‘society’ and ‘economy’. The difference between the political and the social lies in the type of power that is exercised. Weberian power is based upon the legitimate use of force, and Arendtian/republican power upon communication.

The modern distinction between the spheres of politics, society and economy originated from the wider distinction between public and private. I will here consider only two of Western political theory’s many models of interaction between these spheres. The first, in common with liberal political theory, conceptualizes society as a breeding ground for claims, demands and issues that are politically relevant but not political per se, and that therefore must be re-elaborated by exclusively political actors. In contrast, Hegel, Marx and Gramsci show more awareness of the transformations that occur in the transition from first to second modernity, as they do not exclude from the sphere of ‘society’ interest-driven agency, based on the satisfaction of needs and the production of the material conditions of life (Cox 2002). These differing theories of the relationship between politics, society and economy have found a sort of conciliation in actual praxis, at least in Western democracies throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when national–territorial states did provide a counterbalance to capitalism. The liberal Rechstaat made it possible for the working class to voice its claims. In a long series of struggles, both social and political, it won a set of rights that guaranteed access to citizenship. Political agency within the solid framework of democratic states became deeply entwined with ‘work’. Being a ‘worker’ gave one a passport to citizenship, whilst belonging to a ‘class’ (i.e. sharing the same place in the production system) was crucial for the formation of individual as well as collective identities. Social rights, by removing the obstacles to the exercise of personal and political autonomy, made possible the effective exercise of political rights, thus opening the field of political agency to a new set of subjects, the ‘workers’. Once again, national–territorial states played a key part.

This brief discussion of political subjectivity and agency in modernity is admittedly incomplete, favouring a model of subjectivity and a conception of agency based on autonomy and sovereignty, and considering them in relation only to the national–territorial state. Obviously, there are other models of subjectivity and conceptions of political agency in modernity, and the present scenario cannot be adequately represented solely by concepts corresponding to ‘modernity’, but these are particularly representative of mainstream modernity and therefore are useful in looking at the possible changes that lie ahead for political agency. The first of these is the potential for capitalism to subvert the modern relationship between politics, society and economy, a principal frame of reference for political agency in modernity. The second is the potential for scientific rationality to ‘paralyse’ political agency, or at least greatly reduce its relevance.

2 Politics, society and economy in second modernity

The numerous and profound changes in the morphology of modernity have been explained by social scientists and theorists using a wide range of narratives. As stated in the introduction, it is more appropriate here to think in terms of ‘second’ modernity rather than ‘post’ modernity, as ‘post’ connotes discontinuity, suggesting that the specific set of political, social and economic factors that constituted modernity has come to an end (Harvey 1990; Lyotard 1984; Braidotti 1996, 2002; Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004). Moreover, the term ‘postmodernity’ expresses an intention to ‘[seek] liberation from the past forms of rule and their legacies in the present’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 137). Albrow’s (1996) term ‘global age’ points in more or less the same direction. In contrast, the term ‘second modernity’ allows us to understand the present age, in all its contradictions and ambiguities, as one marked by the unintended and undesired consequences of processes initiated in modernity. Second modernity can thus be defined as a ‘radicalized modernization [that] undermines the foundations of the first modernity and changes its frame of reference, often in a way that is neither desired nor anticipated’ (Beck 1998: 2): consequently, it is a condition of reflexivity, as it arose as part of a pattern of unintended effects (ibid.: 73).

Capitalism, as the predominant socioeconomic system, is indisputably a driving force of modernity. Contemporary capitalism has been defined as ‘post’ industrial and ‘post’ Fordist, and is often described as fluid and flexible. The image of a ‘clean’ capitalism, based on creativity, information and knowledge rather than on ‘work’, as depicted in the most favourable accounts of capitalism (e.g. Rifkin 1995), captures only part of the reality. The morphology of contemporary capitalism reveals a sort of global division of labour (Beck 1998: 138–40). Cognitive capitalism in the First World is matched in the Third World by the vast (although hidden) network of ‘sweatshops’ in which workers are exploited as a ‘labour force’, in the most basic bodily sense, in ways that, far from suggesting a ‘post’ industrial and ‘post’ Fordist scenario, instead evoke Dickensian imagery from the early nineteenth century. This ‘division of labour’ is seen on a smaller scale within the so-called developed societies, in the growing gap between knowledge workers and unskilled labour.

Many seminal analyses have described the impact of this new kind of capitalism upon political subjectivity. Sennett’s flexible man – and, even more so, woman – and Bauman’s homo consumens portray an isolated individual who cannot find hope in collective and political action and therefore looks for solutions in an obsessively and suffocatingly private dimension (Sennett 1998: 135; Bauman 2005). These individuals are incapable of political agency because they are enclosed in their solitude and paralysed by the apparently endless range of possibilities open to them: the freedom to consume replaces every aspiration to freedom and autonomy themselves. The loss of a shared language or common practices that can help contemporary individuals to make sense of their own life stories, or to realize what is happening around them (Touraine 2005), is undoubtedly one of the key consequences of contemporary capitalism. The collective subjects capable of exercising political agency in modernity are being replaced by ‘flexible’ political actors. Metaphors of fluidity or speed are frequently used to describe this new type of political agent, who operates in networks and flashmobs. ‘Networking’ has been hailed not only as the prevailing form of political agency, but also as the appropriate ‘way of being’ in the fast-paced post-industrial world – less constrictive than the traditional, ‘rigid’ collective subjectivity (Castells 1997: 155–6). The extent to which this ‘politics just-in-time’ can promote a political agency that can produce modalities capable of orienting ‘life in common’ is hard to assess. Even harder to assess are the chances of constructing individual and/or collective subjectivities that are fully open to all those who find themselves either outside the so-called post-industrial so...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: political agency in the age of globalization
• 1. Political agency and subjectivity in the crisis of modernity
• 2. Political agency between urban and transnational spaces
• 3. Judicial agency in the building of the European Union: a comparison of the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court
• 4. Political agency in the economy: cooperatives, solidarity and territory in Euskadi and Aquitaine
• 5. Political agency and the responsibility paradox: multinationals and corporate social responsibility
• 6. Exploring the conditions of possibility for political agency: rethinking politicization from a feminist perspective
• 7. Radical political agency: affective politics in the case of the Zapatistas of Chiapas
• 8. Social infrastructures of political agency: the political mobilization of the women of the market in Lomé
• Index