Chapter 1
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The American Ideology
The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the American people, just now, are much in want of one. We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing.
âAbraham Lincoln, 1864
Had Alexis de Tocqueville, miraculously, been able to revisit France and America a scant thirty years after his death in 1859, he might have been tempted to dramatically invert his principal judgments on the two nations. For Tocqueville, self-constituted civic organizations (associations in his vocabulary) figured centrally in distinguishing a buoyant democracy from the twinned specters of suffocating absolutism and excessive individualism. On the one hand, the ubiquity of such agents, commonly labeled the âspirit of volunteerism,â provided for Tocqueville in Democracy in America (1835, 1840) the lodestone of Americaâs social promise. 1 On the other hand, as he argued in The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856), an all-powerful, centralized stateâreflected in the LeChapelier Law of 1791 banning guilds and other intermediary bodiesâsnuffed out the lifeblood of liberal democracy in France. âFor Tocqueville,â as historian Richard Swedberg summarizes, âthe tragedy of the French Revolution was that it inspired freedom but that people had no idea how to go about creating a free society.â 2
And yet, by the late nineteenth century, the French state, while never abandoning its characteristic long reach, had moved markedly away from the suffocating control characteristic of both its absolutist and revolutionary heritage. By the time of the February 1848 Revolution, conservative republicans like Tocqueville were already beginning to positively reappraise worker associations as a possible brace against socialist statism. Over the ensuing decades, a combination of republican and labor/socialist reformers did, in fact, restore an associative dynamic to the body politic. Among the key departures affecting working people were the 1864 law abolishing the crime of âcoalition,â the 1884 law legalizing trade unions and associations, an 1892 law facilitating conciliation and arbitration, and the Labor Code of 1910 that officially recognized a legal realm for collective bargaining and trade union action. 3
Still in place today, Franceâs institutional recognition of Tocquevilleâs vaunted intermediary bodies has no parallel in American democracy. Except for business combination through the agency of incorporation, Americans in the industrial era found it more and more difficult under the prevailing laws to âjoin togetherâ to advance their common economic interest. In particular this was the case for organized workers. Although union membership was generally recognized in principle after Massachusetts Judge Lemuel Shawâs Commonwealth v. Hunt decision of 1842, in practice such bodies experienced multiple, often crippling, obstacles. By the late nineteenth century, the American national state had yet to adopt the socially interventionist powers of its tricolor counterpart, but neither was it any longer directed by the balance of civic interests that had once impressed Tocqueville. To be sure, Tocqueville himself had early on warned Americans of the inequalities sure to develop within a âmanufacturing aristocracy,â but the warning had fallen largely on deaf ears. 4 By 1900, few observers would have doubted which country had more succumbed to extreme individualism. 5
How and why had the âfree societyâ that enjoyed such a head start come up so short so soon? The question begs further inquiry. This chapter examines the issue through the gap between formal political ideals and lived experience, as centered on working people and their characteristic institutional voice, the labor union. With a continuing nod to the European, and especially the French contrast, it seeks to identify, in a cultural as well as legal-institutional sense, the obstacles that working people have encountered in securing and expanding their share of the American promise.
When asked what he thought about Western civilization, Gandhi reportedly quipped, âit would be a good idea.â A late nineteenth-century American trade unionist might have said the same thing about âfree labor.â Initially associated with positive images of opportunity, progress, and liberation, the concept had since become identified with arbitrary dismissals, anti-strike injunctions, and a general loss of control at work that for many workers amounted to what they called âwage slavery.â A common-core conviction, it turned out, only awkwardly covered a developing industrial landscape. How to balance the inheritance of the free-labor ideal with the reality of capitalist economic development at the end of the nineteenth century posed a special challenge to the American labor movement.
Workers in Gilded Age America confronted what we might call the free-labor âdouble paradox.â The first paradox spoke to the ambivalence of the republican heritage. On the one hand, a legacy of freedoms and rights stemming from the Revolutionary era, an economy of relative labor scarcity, and the Civil Warâs extirpation of slavery surrounded the nation-state and its history in a positive or at least hopeful hue for most working people. Much earlier than in Europe, both physically coerced entry into labor and criminal sanctions for leaving it were eradicated among the nominally âfreeâ population. 6 The Civil War itself confirmed the free-labor order. Beginning with Lincolnâs rejection of the terms of the Dred Scott case of 1857, a new, national definition of freedom (encapsulated in the Civil War amendments to the Constitution) replaced a patchwork of regional variations, each with its own set of limitations on the basis of age and citizenship status as well as gender and race.
Yet, the very regime that destroyed the Southâs slavocracy also enhanced individual rights at the expense of community norms long vouchsafed by resort to common law precedent. Historian William J. Novak thus speaks of the very âinvention of American constitutional lawâ tied to a âlegal centralization of state powerâ that ultimately defined âa wholly new political philosophyâ focused on a âradical reconstruction of individual rights.â 7 In particular, the newly-created constitutional protections of âdue process,â âequal protection,â and ârights of citizens of the United Statesâ would buttress one aspect of free-labor doctrineâthe employerâs âfreedom of contractââwhile simultaneously threatening organized workersâ collective field of action. The upshot was that nearly every attempt by unions to organize or mobilize workers in the era appealed back to nationalist, âfree-laborâ principles, while at the same time declaiming against immediate conditions that had grown out of the soil nurtured by those very same principles. As historian Christopher Tomlins suggests, the Civil War toppled one âconstellation of un/freedomâ only to replace it with a new one. 8
There was a second layer of irony and complexity to the Gilded Age discourse of free labor. The workers who made the claim on the national free-labor heritage included many who were not even American citizensâand many more only recently so. Herbert Gutman first highlighted this point, noting in one of his influential essays how two Scottish American immigrantsârailroad detective Allan Pinkerton and Braidwood, Illinois miners leader Daniel MâLachlanâmade different uses of the same political inheritance. As Gutman noted about another immigrant, New Jersey labor editor Joseph P. McDonnell, who had served as Irish secretary of the Marxist First International before emigrating in the early 1870s, âhis rhetoric was bathed in working-class republican ideology[,] saturated by it.â 9 On at least two counts, then, we are left to wonder about the hold, and meaning, of free labor ideology in the culture at large.
One colorful, yet not untypical, story illustrates the simultaneously unifying yet divisive nature of free-labor borrowings in the Gilded Age. As Thomas G. Andrews documents in Killing for Coal, the original promise of the West was signaled by the path-breaking railroad engineer and coal owner Williiam J. Palmer, who in the early 1870s identified the mountain regions as a refuge from the âforeign swarmsâ on the Eastern seaboard, who could be filtered out and prepared âby a gradual process for coming to the inner temple of Americanism out in Colorado, where Republican institutions will be maintained in pristine purity.â By the 1890s, however, the coal miners themselves had tailored Palmerâs message to their own immediate and increasingly desperate situation. Facing wage cuts and the overwhelming power of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company amid a bitter national strike in 1894, some two thousand miners marched âbehind American flags and brass bands.â In the same spirit, a state United Mine Workers organizer rebuked operators for âhaving taken from [the colliers] their best blood and their American privilege of earning an honest livelihood.â The strikers, he insisted, âstood by the Declaration of Independenceâ and its guarantee of âlife, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.â At a moment of extreme peril, a workersâ community comprising twenty-nine nationality groups thus found common cause in rights they attributed to the American Revolution. Explained one anonymous orator, âPatriots assembled on the Boston Commons ⌠and dared [the British] to oppress them longer, and I say to you that they were men from every civilized land ⌠and they raised that flag and said âunder that flag we will be free men or under that flag you may bury our dead bodies.â That flag, gentlemen, waves still.â â When their strike was ultimately defeated by a combination of injunctions and strikebreakers, union leaders proclaimed that âLiberty crushed to earth will rise again.â 10
How did it come to pass that the same discursive system of political and economic âlibertyâ could at once unite the post-Civil War nation and also bitterly divide it on class lines? Historian Eric Foner offers a convincing explanation. Business, economists, and leading newspapers, he suggests, jumped on an âemergent market definition of economic freedom,â emphasizing the benefits of marketplace logic, the laborerâs âjuridical freedomâ and the âidea of contract.â 11 Already by the mid-nineteenth century, employment relations, as regulated by the states, were regularly subsumed into the hierarchical discourse of master-and-servant relationships 12 The trend took on enhanced meaning beginning with Stephen J. Fieldâs famous dissent in the Slaughter-House cases in 1873, which identified the Fourteenth Amendment as a guarantor of individual freedom of contract, calling it a basic âright of free labor.â Infringements on just this ârightâ soon became the basis for the manifold legal injunctions against strikes and boycotts. As if âcontract rightsâ were not enough, moreover, business-friendly exponents of the âscienceâ of social Darwinism like William Graham Sumner equally helped to explain social inequality and sanction the success of the successful. 13
An enduring, early twentieth-century addition to the employersâ lexicon of free labor arrived with the concept of the âright-to-work.â In one of the first uses of the phrase, muckraking journalist Ray Stannard Baker took up the cudgels for the estimated 17,000 men who defied union orders and threats to continue work during the 1902 anthracite strike (see Chapter 2). As Baker quoted a nonstriking mining engineer: âI have a right to work when I like, for what I like, and for whom I like.â It was an attitude, quickly surrounded by legal restrictions on picketing, that helped turn back laborâs first great industrial surge, and it was soon re-outfitted as the âAmerican Planâ to safeguard the open shop post-World War I and regularly redeployed thereafter. 14
Workers, as Foner (like Herbert Gutman before him) recognized, equally âspoke the language of free labor.â Yet, it is perhaps more exact to say that Labor spoke multiple dialects of that language. As late as the 1860s, a self-consciously free-labor advocate like President Abraham Lincoln could imagine the industrial system as one where a âprudent, penniless beginner in the world labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land for himself; then labors on his own account another while, and at length hires another new beginner to help him.â Yet, within a decade, the unmistakable evidence of industrial hierarchyâmost evident in the expansion of mines and railroadsâbelied such optimistic scenarios. Already by 1870, as confirmed by the census enumeration, two-thirds of those engaged in the marketplace were hirelings. 15 Many critics saw the dawning system of industrial capitalism as one of systemic, liberty-denying oppression. Their central argument, repeatedly made by leaders and publicists within the late nineteenth-century labor movement, closely aligned a budding working-class identity with the strident free-labor versus slavery theme of the Civil War. Precisely because of the âimmediate realityâ of slavery, the economic dependence of wage earners lent âspecial powerâ to a sense that wage work was less than free. 16
Perhaps the clearest exposition of the wage-system-as-slavery critique in America came from Boston machinist and eight-hour reformer Ira Steward. How much, he rhetorically asked, was âthe anti-slavery ideaâ worth, âwithout the power to exercise itâ? Given the conditions of industrial employment, there was little âfreeâ about free labor. âThe laborerâs commodity,â he elaborated, âperishes every day beyond the possibility of recovery. He must sell todayâs labor today, or never.â Only by interrupting the social and political power of the employer (in Stewardâs mind via the legislated shorter day) could freedom be restored to the individual laborer. 17
The wage-slavery argument, linking as it did the legacies of yeoman democracy and abolitionist thought, demanded social alternatives. So it was that the mass movements of the late nineteenth century slid easily (as in the case of the Knights of Labor) into talk of the âabolition of the wages system,â or (as in the case of the Peopleâs Party) a demand for âindustrial freedomâ that required the structural dismantling of a society of âtramps and millionaires.â 18 Sounding a stark contradiction between individual political liberty and industrial employment, Knights leader George E. McNeill proclaimed, âWe declare an inevitable and irresistible conflict between the wage-system of labor and the republican system of government.â 19 In each case these radical reformers looked to a combination of group self-activity (whether through labor unions, farmersâ alliances, and/or producer cooperatives) and ameliorative legislation to create, as the preamble to the Knightsâ constitution put it in 1885, a necessary âcheck ⌠upon unjust accumulation, and the power for evil of aggregated wealth.â 20 Committed to a republican commonwealth in which self-governing citizens would, through the power of the franchise, keep monopoly power and exploitation at bay, the Knights of Labor and their allies disdained individual liberty of contract doctrine as a tool of âwage slavery.â 21
Despite such rhetorical swagger, in practice the nineteenth-century labor movement regularly jockeyed between conciliatory and even individual strategies of advancement within the wage system versus more systemic attacks on the putative source of their oppression. Partly it was a matter of varied and evolving calculations of group interest. For decades many of the most skilled workers, for example, as represented by self-styled ârespectableâ craft unions, continued to subscribe to the tenets of what others now viewed as free-labor mythology. The railroad brotherhoods were perhaps the quintessential representatives of this perspective. âSobriety, Benevolence, and Industryâ proclaimed the masthead of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen. Even in the aftermath of the great railroad riots of 1877 in which he took no part, the young Eugene V. Debs, editor of the Locomotive Firemenâs Magazine, could still describe the railroad corporation as âthe architect of progressâ and anticipate a harmonious relationship with local banker and regional railroad owner William Riley McKeen. 22
Soon, economic concentration and deteriorating conditions of work forced railwa...