Princeton Monographs in Philosophy

Robert J. Fogelin

• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Year: 2010
• ISBN:
  9781400825776
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Since its publication in the mid-eighteenth century, Hume's discussion of miracles has been the target of severe and often ill-tempered attacks. In this book, one of our leading historians of philosophy offers a systematic response to these attacks.
Arguing that these criticisms have--from the very start--rested on misreadings, Robert Fogelin begins by providing a narrative of the way Hume's argument actually unfolds. What Hume's critics (and even some of his defenders) have failed to see is that Hume's primary argument depends on fixing the appropriate standards of evaluating testimony presented on behalf of a miracle. Given the definition of a miracle, Hume quite reasonably argues that the standards for evaluating such testimony must be extremely high. Hume then argues that, as a matter of fact, no testimony on behalf of a religious miracle has even come close to meeting the appropriate standards for acceptance. Fogelin illustrates that Hume's critics have consistently misunderstood the structure of this argument--and have saddled Hume with perfectly awful arguments not found in the text. He responds first to some early critics of Hume's argument and then to two recent critics, David Johnson and John Earman. Fogelin's goal, however, is not to "bash the bashers, " but rather to show that Hume's treatment of miracles has a coherence, depth, and power that makes it still the best work on the subject.

1

The Structure of Hume’s Argument

Standards for evaluating testimony. Hume opens his examination of miracles with a general discussion of beliefs founded on testimony.² He then moves quickly to apply these reflections to the special case of miracles. Perhaps Hume moves too quickly, for many commentators pay insufficient attention to these opening general reflections. Here we will proceed more slowly.

Hume begins his argument by reminding his readers of the complexity and fallibility of causal reasoning.

Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. . . . All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence. (EHU, 10.3)

Because of this variability, Hume tells us, “A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence” (EHU, 10.4). Then, summarizing an earlier discussion of the probability of causes in section 6, Hume tells us, in broad strokes, how this proportioning is to be done.

In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations; where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. . . . In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence. (EHU, 10.4)

These remarks provide the general framework for Hume’s treatment of testimony in general and, more specifically, his treatment of testimony in behalf of miracles.

Turning to testimony, Hume begins by acknowledging its importance as a source of well-founded belief:

We may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. (EHU, 10.5)

He then goes on to claim that the evaluation of testimony, though perhaps not strictly speaking the same as the evaluation of a causal claim, is at least very much like it.

This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. (EHU, 10.5)

That is, in deciding whether a body of testimony is reliable, we should ask whether it is of a kind that usually yields conformity between facts and what are reported as facts.³

Hume goes on to specify two ways (or two directions) in which the evaluation of testimony can proceed. On the first approach, we focus on the quality of the reports themselves and on the qualifications of those who have offered them:

We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument, derived from human testimony. (EHU, 10.7)

Here we examine the testimony for the standard marks of unreliability that Hume lists. When such marks of unreliability are present, we rightly become suspicious concerning the quality of the testimony. We will call this the direct test for evaluating testimony.

Hume suggests a second method for evaluating testimony, this time concentrating on the nature of the event attested to.

Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason, why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.

I should not believe such a story were it told me by CATO; was a proverbial saying in ROME, even during the lifetime of that philosophical patriot. The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate so great an authority. (EHU, 10.8

–

9)

Here we proceed in the opposite way from that used in the direct test. We start by considering the probability that a reported event could have occurred without taking into account the testimony given in its behalf. If an event is extraordinary or marvelous, then, to repeat Hume’s exact words, “the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual.” Here the improbability of the event’s occurring gives us some (though perhaps not decisive) grounds for challenging the force of the testimony. We will call this the reverse method of evaluating testimony.

It is clear that Hume does not invoke either of these methods in support of a general skepticism concerning testimony; indeed, in this discussion his radical skeptical arguments are kept securely on the shelf. Adopting what he takes to be common standards, Hume raises no objections to testimony in behalf of events of an ordinary kind, offered by competent witnesses having no motives to deceive. Here Hume’s discussion of testimony closely parallels one found in John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding. There Locke remarks that “in things that happen indifferently, as that a bird should fly this or that way; that it should thunder on a man’s right or left hand, &c. when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses, there our assent is . . . unavoidable” (Locke 1979, bk. 4, chap. 16, sec. 8). Locke then adds this cautionary note:

The difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactness are required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing; which rises and falls, according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. common observation in like cases, and particular testimonies in that particular instance, favour or contradict it. (Ibid., sec. 9)⁴

What I have called Hume’s direct and reverse methods for establishing the evidential strength of testimony are precisely the same as Locke’s “two foundations of credibility.”

For reasons that will become evident, it will be useful to have a positive statement of the first—the direct—method for establishing the evidential force of testimony. We can do this by replacing testimonial weaknesses with testimonial strengths:

1. The witnesses concur with one another, rather than contradict one another.

2. The witnesses are many, not few.

3. They are of unimpeachable, rather than of doubtful, character.

4. They are disinterested, not interested, parties.

5. They present their testimony in measured tones of confidence, rather than with hesitation or too violent asseveration.

To these marks of excellence we might add that these witnesses have special expertise relevant to the matter at hand; they are not gullible; they are not visually impaired; and so on. When criteria of this kind are satisfied, the evidence provided by the testimony increases, perhaps amounting to what Hume is willing to call a proof.

Similarly, the decision rendered through the use of the reverse method can also, according to Hume, amount to a proof. This occurs when the event attested to runs counter, in Locke’s phrase, to “common observation in like cases.” Common observation in like cases may provide a proof that events of a certain kind could not have taken place. So, just as unimpeachable testimony can supply strong support for the occurrence of an improbable event, the very high antecedent improbability of an event’s occurring can supply strong support for asserting the non occurrence of that event. This sets the stage for the possibility of a clash of proof against proof—one a proof based on the direct method that an event did take place, the other a proof based on the reverse method that it did not. In such a circumstance, to repeat Locke’s words, “diligence, attention, and exactness are required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing.”

The dynamics of this conflict of proof against proof underlies the argumentative structure of Hume’s treatment of miracles. Roughly, in part 1 Hume grants, for the sake of argument, that a circumstance could arise where testimony evaluated by the direct method amounts to a proof that a certain miraculous event has occurred, while, at the same time, the reverse method provides a proof that it could not have occurred. This contest between competing proofs is the organizing theme of part 1. Contrary to what many commentators seem to have thought, Hume does not attempt to settle this contest in part 1. Though Hume’s tone leaves no doubt concerning how he thinks the contest will ultimately be settled, still, in part 1, no decision is officially declared—certainly not a tie. Stated broadly, the task of part 1 is to establish the appropriate standards for evaluating testimony in behalf of a miracle of any kind; the task of part 2 is to show that reports of religious miracles have not in the past met these standards. Taking experience as his guide, Hume further concludes that there is no likelihood that they will ever do so.

The reverse method for evaluating testimony. An important implication of the possibility of a conflict between the direct and the reverse methods for evaluating testimony is that the evidential force of testimony can vary with context. If a person we take to be reliable tells us that a common sort of event has occurred, trusting to his reliability, we usually accept his report without hesitation. If, however, the very same person tells us that a perfectly fantastic event has occurred, we may then move in the other direction and reconsider our belief in his reliability. Conversely, we may resist accepting reports of quite common events if we take the person reporting them to be notoriously unreliable. It is in these ways, among others, that the evaluation of testimony is deeply context-bound.

To see how these methods function in an ordinary, nonphilosophical, context, consider a report from a “normally reliable source” that President George W. Bush has been observed walking a tightrope over his swimming pool. Most people’s initial reaction would be justified disbelief. The sheer bizarreness and improbability of such an event’s taking place cast immediate doubt on the force of the testimony offered in its behalf. It seems more reasonable to treat the report as a hoax or perhaps as a misunderstanding of a political metaphor. This is a simple and I believe uncontroversial example of t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• CHAPTER 1. The Structure of Hume’s Argument
• CHAPTER 2. Two Recent Critics
• CHAPTER 3. The Place of “Of Miracles” in Hume’s Philosophy
• Appendix 1
• Appendix 2
• Notes
• References
• Index