Six Years at Sea... and Counting

Gulf of Aden Anti-Piracy and China's Maritime Commons Presence

Andrew S. Erickson, Austin M. Strange

• Publisher: The Jamestown Foundation
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9780615588414
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Every wave has its genesis some distance from shore. In this regard, China’s historic anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 have offered governments, researchers and pundits a rare window into Beijing’s nascent global maritime strategy. This study is one of the first attempts to comprehensively document and clarify the precise nature of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s maritime anti-piracy experience. It begins with an analysis of the internal drivers behind Beijing’s turn to taking on piracy beginning nearly a decade ago. Through a thorough reading of official and academic Chinese- and English-language sources, we explore geostrategic, domestic and international economic, and civilian and military institutional dynamics that drove China’s initial decision to contribute to anti-piracy off the coast of Somalia.The book then inspects the nature and scope of the PLAN’s anti-piracy efforts, extensively cataloguing more than a score of anti-piracy escort flotillas in terms of the types of ships used, the identities of ship commanders and political leaders, foreign ports called upon, days at sea, and various other metrics. This allows us to track the operational evolution of PLAN anti-piracy operations over time, both with regard to Chinese naval and logistical lessons learned as well as trends in China’s naval diplomatic efforts attached to its anti-piracy mission.Finally, we take stock of the broader implications of Beijing’s anti-piracy operations and find reason for measured optimism with regard to China’s role in future global maritime governance. While Beijing remains embroiled in testy military and political standoffs in East Asian waters, the atmosphere further afield is ripe for greater Chinese collaboration with the United States and other important maritime actors. If anything, China’s naval behavior further afield reflected by its anti-piracy missions remains relatively cautious and conservative, and other stakeholders would benefit from even deeper Chinese contributions in the future.

VI. Six Years of Anti-Piracy and Broader PLAN Growth

China’s naval anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden provide the first major insights concerning China’s approach to protracted Far Seas operations. The PLAN has discovered over the past half-decade that the most important lesson instilled through anti-piracy is the value of real experience. That is, China’s Navy must learn by doing, and the insights it has gained from the Gulf of Aden mission would not have been available elsewhere. Broadly speaking, several major breakthroughs help explain why the PLAN initially undertook and continues to conduct anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden:

1. Creativity and inter-agency cooperation

2. Incorporating advanced equipment

3. Cultivating experienced personnel

4. Military diplomacy

Major changes in the organizational structure of China’s armed forces are reflective of the ascendance of China’s Navy as a pillar of national security, in both Near and Far Seas. In order to place these changes in context, this section will begin with an overview of military reform plans under Xi.

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Military Reform in the Xi Era

The Gulf of Aden deployment is particularly interesting in the context of Chinese military and security reforms under Xi Jinping and China’s new cohort of civilian and military leaders. While the precise outcome of these reforms is not yet clear in the public domain, it seems plausible that the PLAN will carry on the legacies of Jiang and Hu by further broadening its mission scope under the leadership of Xi. China’s new leadership has, in its first three years, demonstrated an active interest in reforming Chinese security institutions that have important implication for Chinese naval development. While most accounts are highly speculative, Xi purportedly enjoys considerable legitimacy and acceptance among elite Chinese leaders.

Given Xi’s apparently tight grip on the Party and military, it is possible that he may be planning to issue broad, doctrinal military guidance that would deeply impact the PLAN’s development trajectory. Xi has not yet issued any specific guidance on this scale, but he likely has another seven years until his term ends in 2022 with the closing of the 20^th Party Congress. However, for now specific guidance that would substantively alter the growing role of the PLAN in global maritime security, such as anti-piracy operations, seems unlikely to emerge, and China’s naval role in global nontraditional missions is likely to continue its gradual increase under the new leadership.¹⁰⁴

Xi has already made it abundantly clear that his administration is placing more emphasis on preparing to be able to fight and win wars. His policies are highly focused and apparently emphasize meeting specific objectives cost-effectively. It is thus possible that Xi may place more direct focus on “traditional” capabilities such as state-to-state war fighting, which could result in a de-prioritization of anti-piracy and other nontraditional maritime security activities. Arguably, the ambivalence of China’s response to disaster relief in the Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan in late 2013 is an early sign of the PLA/PLAN’s “reading the tea leaves” in this regard. However, a more nuanced approach could emerge if Xi and his comrades seek to balance more active traditional military policies in the Near Seas that harm China’s international image with an increase in goodwill missions in the Far Seas.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, growing Chinese resources and capacity may convince that China can “do more of everything,” including anti-piracy-type missions.

Signs are beginning to emerge that China’s military will undergo major organizational changes under Xi. It was reported in late December 2013 that China is planning to condense the PLA’s seven ground ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Table of Contents
• List of Exhibits
• Advance Evaluations
• I. Executive Summary
• II. Key Judgments
• III. Introduction
• IV. Why China’s Navy Has Entered and Remained in the Gulf of Aden
• V. From Recognition to Response: Institutional Processes and Preparations for Deployments
• VI. Six Years of Anti-Piracy and Broader PLAN Growth
• VII. Gulf of Aden Operations and China’s Future Far Seas Presence
• VIII. Conclusion: A New Approach to Maritime Commons Security?
• About the Authors