BP Blowout

Inside the Gulf Oil Disaster

Daniel Jacobs

• Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9780815729099
• Topic: Commerce
• Subtopic: Industrie de l'extraction des ressources naturelles

The story of the worst environmental disaster in American history and its enduring consequences BP Blowout is the first comprehensive account of the legal, economic, and environmental consequences of the disaster that resulted from the April 2010 blowout at a BP well in the Gulf of Mexico. The accident, which destroyed the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, killed 11 people. The ensuing oil discharge–the largest ever in U.S. waters—polluted much of the Gulf for months, wreaking havoc on its inhabitants and the environment.A management professor and former award-winning Justice Department lawyer responsible for enforcing environmental laws, Daniel Jacobs tells the story that neither BP nor the federal government wants heard: how the company and the government fell short, both in terms of preventing and responding to the disaster.Critical details about the cause and aftermath of the disaster have emerged through court proceedings and with time. The key finding of the federal judge who presided over the civil litigation was that the blowout resulted from BP’s gross negligence.BP has paid tens of billions of dollars to settle claims and lawsuits. The company also has pled guilty to manslaughter in a separate criminal case, but no one responsible for the tragedy is going to prison. BP Blowout provides new and disturbing details in a definitive narrative that takes the reader inside BP, the White House, Congress and the courthouse. This is an important book for readers interested in the environment, sustainability, public policy, leadership, and risk management.

1

MAYDAY IN THE GULF

At 9:53 P.M. on April 20, 2010, Andrea Fleytas sent a “Mayday” signal from the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile oil rig sitting some 50 miles off the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. The rig was connected to a BP oil well a mile down on the ocean’s floor. The well had suffered a blowout. When a well blows out, it can mean total loss of control, just like when a tire blows out on a car traveling at high speed. Fluids and natural gas shot up from the well, causing an explosion on board the rig, which became engulfed in flames. Disaster had struck.

Fleytas, a 23-year-old junior bridge officer, was a 2008 graduate of the California Maritime Academy. This was her first job on a vessel. She later reported that when she told the rig’s captain about the distress call, he turned to her and cursed, asking: “Did I give you authority to do that?”¹

Given the dire circumstances on the Deepwater Horizon, Fleytas did not jump the gun in sending for help. The Mayday signal was relayed to the U.S. Coast Guard. It sent two vessels, a rescue plane, and four helicopters. By the time they arrived at the scene, their rescue effort was futile. Eleven people were dead, most likely as a result of the explosion itself. The remaining 115 crew members, some seriously injured, survived. Two of the survivors were high-level BP executives. In an ironic coincidence, they were on board the Deepwater Horizon to give its crew an award for safety.

Two days later, Earth Day, the Deepwater Horizon sank. In the process, the pipe connecting it to the well snapped. Oil from the well started to spout uncontrollably into the Gulf’s waters. For days, then weeks, then months.

Nearly two months later, President Barack Obama gave his first Oval Office address ever, calling the incident the nation’s “worst environmental disaster.”² By then, June 15, the discharge of oil already far exceeded the 11 million gallon total that flowed from the Exxon Valdez tanker after it hit a reef in Alaskan waters in 1989. By the time the BP well was finally capped on July 15, 2010, 134 million gallons (3.19 million barrels) of oil had spewed into the ocean, nearly surpassing the world record of 147 million gallons from the Ixtoc well in Mexican waters in the Gulf in 1979.

What happened was also the nation’s worst sustainability disaster. Sustainability typically includes three pillars: social, environmental, and economic. The consequences of the accident were devastating from all three perspectives. In addition to taking the lives of 11 people, the disaster affected the lives, livelihoods, and health of millions more. The oil also caused severe environmental damage. Depending on how the total cost of the disaster is calculated, it could approach a far higher number than the $62 billion BP is expected to pay out.

This is the story of that disaster. The word “disaster” is used here instead of “spill” because spill is much too mild a term for what happened. Bob Bea, a disaster expert, a distinguished professor emeritus at the University of California Berkeley School of Engineering (who once worked on oil rigs and also as a BP consultant), has used much more graphic language: “I call it a massive cluster f___.”³

Whatever it is called, with the passage of time, we now know more than ever before about the disaster—what caused it and its social, environmental, and economic ramifications. We now have the benefit of extensive evidence from a lengthy federal court trial, as well as scientific and medical studies and financial data. And there is new information from people who want the story told as completely as possible, including those who worked for BP and the federal government. It is an important story for anyone concerned with sustainability, whether in their day-to-day life, the classroom, or the boardroom.

WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY?

What caused the worst sustainability disaster in American history? Human error. Lots of it. Enough to constitute “gross negligence,” according to the federal judge who presided over the civil trial and wrote a lengthy decision explaining BP’s mistakes.⁴ One of the world’s largest oil companies and multinational corporations badly mismanaged an offshore oil venture.

Deepwater drilling can be highly lucrative but also very dangerous. As any scuba diver knows, pressure increases with depth. Deep water therefore brings higher risk. And this wasn’t just deep water, it was ultra-deep water. The wellhead was one mile below the surface of the ocean, and the bottom of the well was another two miles down. Most wells in the Gulf are located in much more shallow water (1,000 feet or less).

Despite the inherent danger of this type of offshore drilling, BP repeatedly made decisions that made the project substantially riskier:

—BP cut safety corners in drilling the well, violating federal regulations in the process;

—After completing the drilling, BP rushed to close the well, making many mistakes in the process;

—BP ignored final test results showing that the well had been improperly plugged.

Although BP should have done better, the same can be said of the federal government, which regulates offshore drilling. The Interior Department, the primary agency responsible for oversight of the oil industry, simply was not equipped for the job, politically or practically.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN IMPACT

The BP well blowout took a terrible toll on the environment. Flowing profusely and for great distances, the oil had devastating ecological effects on- and offshore. Ocean currents took the oil hundreds of miles away from the well site, and over a huge surface area of water. Ocean oil slicks reached more than 43,300 square miles, comparable to the total land area of Louisiana. Oil was also found on more than 400 square miles of the sea floor.⁵

Once it surfaced, oil worked its way in one direction to Texas, and in the other direction to Florida, hitting a total of some 1,300 miles of shoreline in the five Gulf states (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas). Louisiana incurred the worst damage.⁶

Beaches and wetlands were contaminated with oil, as was wildlife. The effect on living organisms was toxic and often deadly, with estimates of dead animals ranging in the tens of thousands. Containment and cleanup efforts caused further (“collateral”) damage. For example, the decision to use chemical dispersants involved a balance between breaking up the oil in the ocean and risking harm from exposing humans and marine wildlife to the chemicals. Similarly, boats entering wetlands to clean up the oil and retrieve boom that had flowed into them caused harm to the fragile marshes themselves.

The impact of the disaster on humans also was devastating. The fear of economic ruin was very real to hundreds of thousands of Gulf residents, many of whom were still recovering from the effects of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. As the oil gushed out into the water and up on the beaches, fishing and tourism suffered in a part of the country that relies heavily on both. The federal government closed down large areas of the Gulf waters to fishing. Tourists cancelled their trips to the region, not just to beach areas that had been hit with oil, but also to areas they thought might be hit. Given their lost income, Gulf residents were fearful about how they would pay rent; make payments on their homes, cars, or boats; and put food on the table for their families. Residents also feared the effects of the oil—and the tons of chemical dispersants used on it—on their health and the health of their children.

Clean-up workers especially had reason to be concerned about their health. Who were these “first responders?” Just about anyone who was willing to help. Offshore, they included fishermen who had been idled by the oil. Onshore, they included people from a variety of occupations who lost work due to the oil, but also many others, including the unemployed, homeless, and reportedly even inmates. Many were poor. Many were minorities.

By any measure, the response to the disaster was a major effort, involving nearly 50,000 workers at its peak. Many of the first responders were poorly trained, protected, and treated. Some became sick from exposure to the oil, the chemical dispersants, or the heat.

WELL CONTROL AND DAMAGE CONTROL IN THE GULF

There were two immediate tasks after the oil started spewing into the Gulf. First, stopping the oil from coming out of the well. Second, containing the oil that did. The U.S. Coast Guard was in charge of both missions, and it committed vast resources to them. The Coast Guard mobilized thousands of active duty and reserve personnel. At first, many Coast Guard personnel were put on standby in New Orleans area motels until their superiors figured out what they should do. Most had not been trained for this type of work. As a practical matter, neither the Coast Guard nor any other federal agency had the skills or equipment to respond to such a catastrophe. The staff of the Presidential Commission set up to study the disaster later observed: “When responders looked around in the government for specific expertise on well blow-outs, including in the military and in the scientific agencies, they found little to none.”⁷

As a result, the federal government called in a little-known team of elite scientists known as the “Jasons,” who often work on secret defense projects. President Obama turned to Steven Chu, his Nobel Prize–winning secretary of energy, to oversee the scientific effort. These acknowledged geniuses probably could solve just about any problem given enough time—even outside their normal areas of expertise—but time was one thing they did not have.

Although technically in charge, out of necessity, the federal government wound up relying heavily on BP. The awkwardness of this symbiotic relationship was on full display at an April 29 White House press conference when a Coast Guard admiral called BP a “partner.” She was quickly corrected by Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, who interrupted to say, “They are not our partner.”⁸

In the end, the two entities did wind up working closely together on a number of fronts, ranging from technical issues to public relations. They established a Joint Information Center at the Unified Area Command Post in Robert, Louisiana, about 50 miles north of New Orleans across Lake Pontchartrain. There, they shared space in a Shell training facility leased by BP.

With all the amazing brainpower available, it still took nearly three months to come up with a workable solution to stop the oil flow.⁹ It involved using the same type of cap that is usually applied to such wells—stacked on top of the existing one that hadn’t worked. It took time to custom-build the cap, and there was fear that it might actually make things worse. Ultimately, the scientists decided that the risk was worth taking.

The cap worked, and the oil finally stopped flowing on July 15, 2010, 87 days after the blowout.

SPIN CONTROL IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON

The Mayday sounded in the Gulf was also heard in Washington and London. According to an official White House blog, President Obama was alerted that evening.¹⁰ According to various reports, BP CEO Tony Hayward received the news at 7:24 A.M. London time (1:24 A.M. local time in the Gulf).¹¹

The pressure on the president to stop the oil did not just strike close to home, but in his home. While he was shaving one morning, he recounted, his 10-year-old daughter Malia had asked, “Did you plug the hole yet, Daddy?¹²

The federal government and BP shared not only the goal of stemming the seemingly unending tide of oil, but also of repelling the impression that they were essentially impotent to do so. Sensitivities to image were especially high because both Hayward and President Obama were competing with the ghos...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontispiece
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1. Mayday in the Gulf
• 2. The Blowout
• 3. The Environmental and Human Toll
• 4. Behind the Scenes in Washington
• 5. The Claims and the Controversies
• 6. The Legal Battles with the Feds
• 7. The Environmental Trial of the Century
• 8. The Cost
• 9. The Spin Games
• 10. Myth v. Reality
• 11. The Mother of All Restorations
• 12. Have We Learned or Only Failed?
• Notes
• Index