Religion Within Reason

Steven Cahn

• Publisher: Columbia University Press
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9780231543668
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Philosophy of Religion

In the views of most believers and critics, religion is essentially connected to the existence of a supernatural deity. If supernaturalism is not reasonable, the argument goes, religion cannot be reasonable—or if supernaturalism is reasonable, religion must be as well. Are faith and reason, religion and science, doomed to a constant struggle for the heart of humanity? Steven M. Cahn believes that they are not, that even if God exists, religion may not be justified and that even if religion is justified, belief in God may not be.

In Religion Within Reason, Cahn argues that the common understanding of the relationship between religion and supernaturalism is flawed and that while supernaturalism is not reasonable, religious commitment may well be. Writing not as a theist but as one who finds much to admire in a religious life, he examines faith and reason, miracles, heaven and hell, religious diversity, and the problem of evil, using a variety of examples taken from religious thought, literature, and popular culture. Lucidly written in a nonpolemical spirit, Religion Within Reason offers an exciting new approach to the reconciliation of science and religion.

1

PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD?

WE begin with a familiar question: Does God exist? A theist believes that God exists, while an atheist believes that God does not exist. An agnostic believes the matter as yet undecidable. Which of these positions is the most reasonable? The first step is to determine what is meant by the term “God.” The word has been used in various ways, ranging from the Greek concept of the Olympian gods to the proposal by the prominent American philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952) that the divine is the “active relation between ideal and actual.”¹ Let us adopt the more usual view, common to many religious believers, that “God” refers to an all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing, everlasting creator of the world. The question, then, is whether a being of that description exists.

Throughout the centuries, various philosophical arguments have been presented to prove the existence of God. Each can be formulated and defended in a variety of ways, but I shall bypass innumerable complexities to focus on a straightforward version of each.

We begin with the “cosmological argument,” which rests on the assumption that everything that exists depends for its existence on something else. For example, a house results from the actions of its builder, and rain results from certain meteorological conditions. But if everything that exists depends for its existence on something else, then the world itself depends for its existence on something else, and this “something else” is God.

Although the cosmological argument may seem initially plausible, it has a major difficulty. If everything that exists depends for its existence on something else, then whatever the world’s existence depends on is itself dependent for existence on something else. In that case the world’s existence would not depend on God, for God is an all-powerful being, not depending for existence on anything else.

A defender of the cosmological argument might try to surmount this difficulty by claiming that whatever the world’s existence depends on does not depend on something else but is self-explanatory, that is, the reason for its existence lies within itself. If, however, we admit the possibility that something is self-explanatory, the cosmological argument crumbles, for if the world’s existence depends on something that can be self-explanatory, why cannot the world itself be self-explanatory? In that case, no need would arise to postulate something on which the existence of the world depends, because the existence of the world would be self-explanatory.

In an attempt to salvage the cosmological argument, a defender might argue simply that something must be responsible for everything, and this “something” is God. Yet even if we grant that something is responsible for everything (and this supposition could be contested by appeal to the mathematical notion of an infinite series), the “something” may not be all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing, or everlasting. Perhaps the “something” is evil or ceased to exist after a brief life. No such possibilities are excluded by the cosmological argument, and thus it appears not to be successful.

A second classic proof for the existence of God is the “ontological argument.” It makes no appeal to empirical evidence but purports to demonstrate that God’s essence implies God’s existence.

In its simplest form the argument takes God to possess all perfections. Then assuming that a being who exists is more perfect than one who doesn’t, the conclusion reached is that God must exist.

Although this argument has been defended in subtle ways, it is open to the crucial criticism, stated succinctly by the influential German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), that existence is not an attribute. In other words, the definition of anything remains the same regardless of whether that thing exists. For example, the definition of a unicorn would not be altered if we discovered a living unicorn, just as our definition of a whooping crane would not be altered if whooping cranes became extinct. In short, whether unicorns or whooping cranes exist does not affect the meaning of the terms “unicorn” and “whooping crane.”

To clarify this point, imagine a ferocious tiger. Now imagine a ferocious tiger that exists. What more is imagined in the second case than the first? Our concept of a ferocious tiger remains the same whether any ferocious tigers exist.

Applying this insight to the ontological argument, we see a major difficulty. Because the definition of something remains the same whether it exists, the definition of “God” remains the same whether God exists. Thus existence cannot be part of the definition of God. God may be understood to possess every perfection, but existence does not render something more perfect, because existence is no attribute at all. To assert that something exists is not to ascribe perfection to the thing but to state a fact about the world. What we mean by “God” is one matter; whether God exists is another. The ontological argument conflates the two and thereby seems to goes awry.

The third argument we shall consider, the “teleological argument,” is much less abstruse. Its defenders point out that the world possesses a highly ordered structure, just like an extraordinarily complex machine. Each part is adjusted to the other parts with wondrous precision. For instance, the human eye, which so many of us take for granted, is a mechanism of such intricacy that its design is breathtaking. But doesn’t a design require a designer? The magnificent order of our world cannot be a result of chance but must be the work of a supreme mind responsible for the order. That supreme mind is God.

Although this argument has persuasive power, it suffers from several critical difficulties. To begin with, any world would exhibit some kind of order. Were you to drop at random ten coins on the floor, they would exhibit an order. An order, therefore, does not imply an orderer. If we use the term “design” to mean “a consciously established order,” then a design implies a designer. But the crucial question is: Does our world exhibit mere order or a design?

If the world were just like a machine, as the teleological argument claims, then because a machine has a design and a designer, so would the world. But is the world just like a machine? The ingenious Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776), in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, suggests that our experience is too limited to accept such an analogy. Philo, the skeptic in the Dialogues, notes that although the world bears some slight resemblance to a machine, the world is also similar to an animal: “A continuous circulation of matter in it produces no disorder: A continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired. The closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system; and each part or member, in performing its proper office, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole.”² Hume also suggests that the world is somewhat like a vegetable, because neither has sense organs or brains, although both exhibit life and movement.

The key point is that whereas any machine requires a designer, animals and vegetables come into being differently from machines. Hume is not suggesting that the world came into being as does an animal or vegetable, but he wishes to demonstrate that the world is not sufficiently like an animal, a vegetable, or a machine to permit us to draw reasonable conclusions from such weak analogies. Lacking them, the teleological argument collapses, for we have no reason to believe that the world exhibits a design rather than mere order.

As Philo points out, however, even if we were to accept the analogy of world and machine, the argument still fails. Let us grant, he says, that like effects prove like causes. Then if the world is like a machine, the cause of the world is like the cause of a machine. Remember, however, that machines are usually built after many trials; so the world was probably built after many attempts. Machines are usually built by many workers; thus the world was probably built by many deities. Those who build machines are often inexperienced, careless, or foolish; so the gods, too, may be inexperienced, careless, or foolish. Perhaps this world “was only the first rude essay of some infant deity who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance.” Or perhaps “It is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors.” The world might even be “the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him.”³ By suggesting such possibilities Hume demonstrates that even if we grant an analogy between the world and a machine, and further agree that both were designed, we are not thereby committed to believing that the world’s design is the work of one all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing everlasting designer.

What, then, is the source of order? The world may have gone through innumerable structural changes until a stable pattern was reached, and the existence of such complex phenomena as the human eye may be a result of the process of natural selection whereby surviving forms of life are those that can adjust. Such an explanation of the world’s order not only requires no recourse to the hypothesis of a supreme designer but has also been confirmed by biological research since the time of Charles Darwin.

I conclude, then, that none of the three best-known arguments for the existence of God is successful. Might some version of one of the arguments be rendered more plausible than I have suggested? Perhaps, but rather than adding to the immense philosophical literature devoted to attacking or defending proposed arguments for God’s existence, let me consider a different question: Are religious believers deeply concerned with whether the existence of God can be proved by a philosophical argument? The evidence suggests they are not, and I want to explain why their attitude is reasonable.

2

PHILOSOPHICAL PROOFS AND RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT

WE might suppose that religious believers would be vitally interested in philosophical proofs for the existence of God, that when a proof of God’s existence is persuasively defended, believers would be most enthusiastic and when a proof is refuted, they would be seriously disappointed. Such, however, is not the case. Indeed, religious believers seem remarkably uninterested in the subject. They apparently consider discussion of such proofs to be an intellectual game with no relevance to religious belief or activity. As the Danish existential philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) remarked, “Whoever therefore attempts to demonstrate the existence of God…[is] an excellent subject for a comedy of the higher lunacy.”¹

In what follows I wish to explain why religious believers have so little interest in philosophical proofs for the existence of God. I believe this lack of concern is reasonable, and that whatever the philosophical significance of such proofs, they have little relevance to religion.

Suppose we assume, contrary to what most philosophers believe, that the three classic proofs for the existence of God are all sound. Let us grant the existence of the most perfect conceivable being who is the designer of the universe. What implications of this supposition would be relevant to our lives?

Some people would feel more secure in the knowledge that the world had been planned by an all-good being. Others would feel insecure, realizing the extent to which their existence depended on a decision of this being. In any case, most people, out of either fear or respect, would wish to act in accord with God’s will.

Belief in God by itself, however, provides no hint whatsoever of which actions God wishes us to perform, or what we ought to do to please or obey God. We may affirm that God is all-good, yet have no way of knowing the highest moral standards. All we may presume is that, whatever these standards, God always acts in accordance with them. We might expect God to have implanted the correct moral standards in our minds, but this supposition is doubtful in view of the conflicts among people’s intuitions. Furthermore, even if consensus prevailed, it might be only a means by which God tests us to see whether we have the courage to dissent from popular opinion.

Some would argue that if God exists, then murder is immoral, because it destroys what God with infinite wisdom created. This argument, however, fails on several grounds. First, God also created germs, viruses, and disease-carrying rats. Because God created these things, ought they not be eliminated? Second, if God arranged for us to live, God also arranged for us to die. By killing, are we thereby assisting the work of God? Third, God provided us with the mental and physical potential to commit murder. Does God wish us to fulfill this potential?

Thus God’s existence alone does not imply any particular moral precepts. We may hope our actions are in accord with God’s standards, but no test is available to check whether what we do is best in God’s eyes. Some seemingly good people suffer great ills, whereas some seemingly evil people achieve happiness. Perhaps in a future life these outcomes will be reversed, but we have no way of ascertaining who, if anyone, is ultimately punished and who ultimately rewarded.

Over the course of history, those who believed in God’s existence typically were eager to learn God’s will and tended to rely on those individuals who claimed to possess such insight. Diviners, seers, and priests were given positions of great influence. Competition among them was severe, however, for no one could be sure which oracle to believe.

In any case, prophets died, and their supposedly revelatory powers disappeared with them. For practical purposes what was needed was a permanent record of God’s will. This requirement was met by the writing of holy books in which God’s will was revealed to all.

But even though many such books were supposed to embody the will of God, they conflicted with one another. Which was to be accepted? Belief in the existence of God by itself yields no answer.

The only direct, unmistakable avenue to the divine will is an experience in which one senses the presence of God and apprehends which, if any, of the putative holy books is genuine. To be certain, however, that you are experiencing God’s presence and apprehending God’s will, the experience cannot be open to error, for only then can it provide an unshakeable foundation for religious commitment.

If one undergoes such an incorrigible experience, it guarantees which holy book is genuine and consequently which rituals, prayers, and actions God authorizes. Note, most importantly, that such an experience by itself validates the existence of God, for unless God’s presence has been experienced, the message may not be true. Thus any further proof of God’s existence is unnecessary.

For someone who does not undergo what is believed to be a genuine experience of the divine, several poss...

Table of contents

• Cover 
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents 
• Preface
• 1. Proving the Existence of God?
• 2. Philosophical Proofs and Religious Commitment
• 3. The Problem of Evil
• 4. The Problem of Goodness
• 5. The Moriarty Hypothesis
• 6. Dummy Hypotheses
• 7. The Appeal to Faith
• 8. Skepticism About Faith
• 9. The Theodicy Trap
• 10. The Problem of Meaning
• 11. Miracles
• 12. God Without Religion
• 13. Playing the Odds
• 14. Why Worship God?
• 15. Religions
• 16. Religion Without God
• 17. Heaven and Hell
• 18. Life Without God
• 19. A Religious Life
• About the Author
• Notes
• Index