For Kin or Country

Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War

Stephen Saideman, R. William Ayres

• Publisher: Columbia University Press
• Year: 2008
• ISBN:
  9780231514491
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Nationalism & Patriotism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The collapse of an empire can result in the division of families and the redrawing of geographical boundaries. New leaders promise the return of people and territories that may have been lost in the past, often advocating aggressive foreign policies that can result in costly and devastating wars. The final years of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, the end of European colonization in Africa and Asia, and the demise of the Soviet Union were all accompanied by war and atrocity.

These efforts to reunite lost kin are known as irredentism—territorial claims based on shared ethnic ties made by one state to a minority population residing within another state. For Kin or Country explores this phenomenon, investigating why the collapse of communism prompted more violence in some instances and less violence in others. Despite the tremendous political and economic difficulties facing all former communist states during their transition to a market democracy, only Armenia, Croatia, and Serbia tried to upset existing boundaries. Hungary, Romania, and Russia practiced much more restraint.

The authors examine various explanations for the causes of irredentism and for the pursuit of less antagonistic policies, including the efforts by Western Europe to tame Eastern Europe. Ultimately, the authors find that internal forces drive irredentist policy even at the risk of a country's self-destruction and that xenophobia may have actually worked to stabilize many postcommunist states in Eastern Europe.

Events in Russia and Eastern Europe in 2014 have again brought irredentism into the headlines. In a new Introduction, the authors address some of the events and dynamics that have developed since the original version of the book was published. By focusing on how nationalist identity interact with the interests of politicians, For Kin or Country explains why some states engage in aggressive irredentism and when others forgo those opportunities that is as relevant to Russia and Ukraine in 2014 as it was for Serbia, Croatia, and Armenia in the 1990s.

1

Irredentism and Its Absence

International Pressures Versus Domestic Dynamics

In politics it is necessary either to betray one’s country or the electorate. I prefer to betray the electorate.

—CHARLES DE GAULLE

CLEARLY, AN IRREDENTIST POLICY IS LIKELY TO be costly. Irredentism risks war with one’s neighbors, and war is always a costly process, regardless of outcome. Any effort to (re)unify territories inhabited by ethnic kin will certainly antagonize neighboring states whose lands are sought. Further, such foreign policies are likely to alienate the neighbor’s allies, and perhaps even other countries facing similar threats. As we will explore in subsequent chapters, irredentism has brought substantial costs—in deaths, damage, and economic hardship—to states that have pursued it. Our starting point, therefore, is this basic question: why would states do such an apparently irrational thing?

Several analyses of irredentism (MacMahon 1998; Ambrosio 2001) emphasize international constraints, so we need to consider the importance of external forces, particularly boundary norms (Zacher 2001) and the pressures of the international community. Similarly, there has been an outpouring of scholarly work asserting that efforts by the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to “condition” the behavior of the Eastern European states through their admission procedures are responsible for keeping peace in Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism.¹ However, one basic observation driving this project is that countries sometimes engage in policies that are counterproductive to the point of self-destruction.² That is, the international costs may be steep, but politicians pursuing their own individual interests—those that make the policy decisions—may be willing to have their country pay them. In some cases, the population may be quite willing to bear that burden. Armenia, Croatia, and Serbia pursued irredentism at tremendous costs, while Hungary, Romania, and Russia refrained.

Leaders frequently face a trade-off between what is best for the ethnic group and what is best for the country. The answers are often not the same, and, indeed, are frequently contradictory. We assume that politicians are most concerned with gaining and maintaining political office, as this is usually the prerequisite for attaining other goals via the political system (Mayhew 1974). Scholars of international relations have increasingly built their work on this assumption (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Chiozza and Goemans argue that war is not necessarily bad for politicians, since “the societal costs of war generally do not translate into political costs for leaders” (2004a, 605). We concur in the sense that the costs and benefits of war are borne unequally, so the key question turns on whose voice matters—those who pay or those who benefit.

Our second assumption is that a domestic audience is the primary actor in determining who governs and who loses office. Thus, we need to determine which members of the polity matter politically, since institutions and past patterns give more power and influence to some citizens than to others. In authoritarian regimes, individuals who matter most, the selectorate (Roeder 1993), reside in the coercive arms of the state—the secret police, the army, the party, and the like. In democracies, the key constituencies are the bodies of relevant voters for each party. For such systems, it is important to know which parties are in power, from which they receive support, and what their constituents’ interests are. The greatest difficulty is understanding regimes in transition from authoritarianism to democracy, as the rules are not fixed, and it is not clear whether institutions really bind behavior. Still, leaders in such systems have relatively short tenures (Chiozza and Goemans 2004) so they must focus on the domestic scene as they scramble to remain in power.

Ultimately, this focus leads to two questions. Does one have to be a nationalist to gain and maintain power? And what does it take to be a good nationalist? Answering the first question will require specifying the interests of key constituencies in the relevant countries. To preview, we consider two sets of interests to be paramount: preferences concerning integration with the international economy, particularly regional organizations, and attitudes toward kin in neighboring countries. To answer the second question, we consider the treatment of the kin abroad and the content of the nationalist identities in play. Irredentism is far more likely if the “lost territories” are inhabited by ethnic brethren who are relevant politically in the homeland—and if the content of nationalism focuses on those kin. Irredentism will be much less likely if the kin are politically irrelevant and if national identity marginalizes the lost kin or includes them in a category separate from the domestic “us.” The treatment of those kin—and how happy they are with that treatment—also matters. In other words, the key factors are not just where kin are located (Toft 2003) but also how much influence they have, how they view the status quo, and how their ethnic brethren in the “homeland” view them. For the purposes of addressing the foreign policy question of irredentism, we argue, with the exception of the treatment of the kin, that these are largely domestic dynamics that drive politicians in some cases to follow policies that harm their country even in the face of significant international incentives to do otherwise.

Still, we take seriously the arguments about external constraints. MacMahon (1998), Ambrosio (2001), Kelley (2004a, 2004b), Linden (2000, 2002), Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), Vachudova (2005), and others have used different arguments to assert international constraints as the key to understanding moderate behavior. These arguments suggest that international norms and/or organizations played key roles in inhibiting states from engaging in irredentism. They also suggest that the transitions in Europe took place at a key point in history, as international norms limiting aggression gained strength via the Helsinki Accords and as regional organizations, especially NATO and the EU, had particularly strong leverage via their membership procedures.

In the next sections of this chapter, we address the impact of norms—especially boundary norms codified by the Helsinki Accords—and the influence of international institutions. Since both the academic literature and policymakers tend to stress the membership procedures of NATO and the EU, we dedicate much of the following sections to addressing that argument and raising several criticisms. We then consider concerns about military advantage and the balance of power. One might expect weaker states to refrain from aggressive irredentism aimed against their stronger neighbors, and stronger ones to be more willing to consider it, but we find this logic problematic. We also consider one additional set of arguments, focusing on history and the lessons learned from past aggression. We then move on to delineate our own argument, stressing the imperatives of political competition and the content of the nationalisms in play.

International Borders Matter, Intrastate Borders Do Not

The first and most obvious difference between the irredentist wars that occurred in the 1990s and the potential ones that did not is in their boundaries. Countries signing the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 recognized the existing boundaries of the time as the legitimate borders, regardless of their origins, including those separating Hungary from Romania and Romania from Moldova.³ On the other hand, the Helsinki Final Act did not sanctify intrastate boundaries, and the boundaries within the collapsing states of Yugoslavia (including Serbia and Croatia) and the Soviet Union including Russia and Armenia) had less legitimacy attached to them. Therefore, one could argue that the difference between the silent dogs and the cases of irredentism is one of respected international borders and controversial intrastate boundaries.

Hypothesis 1: Irredentism will only occur over disputed formerly intrastate boundaries.

While this account might explain the lack of Hungarian irredentism and Romanian aggression, it does not explain why Russia has not altered the boundaries within the former Soviet Union.⁴ Given the twenty-five million Russians outside of Russia, including concentrations near Russian borders in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, we could have expected more aggression. Indeed, in the early 1990s, many analysts feared that Russia would engage in efforts to make its Near Abroad part of Russia again.⁵

The second difficulty this argument faces is that irredentism is and has been pursued by states elsewhere, aiming at territories beyond established international boundaries. Somalia repeatedly pursued a Greater Somali project, despite the legitimacy of its borders with Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya (Saideman 1998). Pakistan’s conflict with India now largely centers on its irredentist efforts aimed at Kashmir. While Pakistan has contested this boundary over time, it has lasted as long as many of the boundaries in Europe. Longevity, therefore, is not a sufficient explanation.

Third, the strength of international boundary norms cannot account for why some nationalist parties have performed better than others. How have international boundaries, legitimate or contested, been able to deter the rise of extreme groups? Romania and Russia have seen nationalist parties with irredentist programs gain significant numbers of votes and seats, while Hungary has not (Milkenberg 2002, 350–352). Irredentists dominated Armenia, Croatia, and Serbia for much of the 1990s. The causal mechanism between the existence of legitimate boundaries and extremist political success is not clear. It may be that collapsing empires facilitate the rise of nationalists, but again that does not account for why Slobodan Milosevic was successful for so long in Serbia while Vladimir Zhirinovsky and others fell short in Russia.

Fourth, if precedents and norms truly matter, then we should take seriously the implications of German unification. This event, which cemented the end of the Cold War, was also the greatest feat of European irredentism since the Anschluss—the unification of Germany and Austria before World War II. Potential European irredentists might have considered their unification efforts to be legitimate since Germany was allowed to become one state, despite the erasing of a Helsinki-era recognized international border.

Finally, it may be the case that strong boundaries surrounding weak states only breed more conflict. Atzili (2006, 145–146) argues that borders have four pernicious effects: perpetuating weakness; fostering intrastate violence; creating the conditions for spillover; and fostering “opportunities for neighbors to exploit weak states.” Thus, while borders might seem to create stability, there are arguments that they may have unexpectedly nasty consequences.⁶

The differences between international and intrastate boundaries are significant and may be part of the causal story, but are not sufficient explanations, as they do not address the significant variation among irredentist efforts. Perhaps international boundaries matter more today than they did for Greece and Turkey thirty years ago (or today) or than they do for Pakistan, India, and China because of NATO and the EU, the institutions that currently shape European relations. On the other hand, as we will discover in the cases, boundaries may matter by shaping the meaning, the content, of nationalisms—who is “us” and who is “them.”

The Lure of Europe: Conditionality and Integration

The Helsinki Final Act does not stand alone, but was part of a series of international institutions dominating the European scene. The Act led to the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) after the Cold War. These organizations monitored compliance with the Helsinki Act, which included human rights and boundary norms. More importantly, both NATO and the EU have tied accession to compliance with European standards of good behavior, including respect for existing boundaries and resolving all outstanding territorial disputes. For instance, membership required bilateral treaties with neighbors, particularly between Hungary and Romania and between Hungary and Slovakia. Because these countries desperately desired to join NATO and the EU, they refrained from challenging international boundaries. Or so the argument goes.

The leaders of the newly democratic states of Eastern Europe desired membership in these organizations for both their intrinsic benefits and the grander implications of joining Europe. NATO membership significantly increases one’s security, since outsiders such as Russia are less likely to challenge allies of the United States and Western Europe. Joining the EU is viewed as necessary for economic success, particularly as those left outside face significant barriers to trading with members (Vachudova 2005). Further, membership in these organizations may also be important for national identities (that one’s country is European,⁷ not Balkan, not second or third world), for domestic politics (leaders of successful applicants can claim the mantle of serious leadership), and the like. Indeed, given the demands made by the two organizations and the tremendous efforts made by applicants, one can only determine that membership means a great deal.

Binnedjik and Simon (1996, 1) assert that “enlargement has been successful in establishing incentives for aspiring members to resolve border and ethnic minority issues.” Conditionality may matter both directly and indirectly (Zellner 2001). First, countries may constrain their foreign policies because they do not want to hurt their chances of joining European institutions, particularly NATO and the EU. Second, host countries may be treating their minorities better due to conditionality, making their plight less salient in their mother countries.⁸

Efforts by International Institutions

The most significant institutions involved in this region have been NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe.⁹ Each has played an important role, with the expansion processes of the first two making the latter two much more significant. Ironically, the OSCE had the least leverage because all the relevant states were already members, but it came to play the lead anyway, as it coordinated with the other organizations and sought to uphold the original Helsinki principles.

The OSCE created the office of the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) as Yugoslavia was disintegrating in 1992. Its role was to prevent conflict at its “earliest possible stage.”¹⁰ Former Dutch foreign minister Max van Der Stoel was the first HCNM, holding the office from 1993 until 2001, and emphasized early action, not just early warning (Zellner 2001, 271). Three instruments were most important—letters to state foreign ministries to recommend changes in laws or practices; “recommendations for the practical interpretation of OSCE norms”; and extraordinary efforts including roundtables, suppo...

Table of contents

• Cover 
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents 
• Acknowledgments
• List of Tables and Figures
• Introduction to the 2015 Edition
• Introduction
• 1. Irredentism and Its Absence: International Pressures Versus Domestic Dynamics
• 2. Dueling Irredentisms: Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia
• 3. Reunification at Any Price: Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
• 4. Pushing the Envelope: Hungary’s Assertive Attention to Kin
• 5. Romania’s Restraint? Avoiding the Worst Through Domestic Scapegoating
• 6. Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Russia and Its Kin in the Near Abroad
• 7. War and Peace in Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, and Beyond
• 8. Findings and Implications
• Reference
• Index