Munich, 1938

Appeasement and World War II

David Faber

• Publisher: Simon & Schuster
• Year: 2009
• ISBN:
  9781439149928
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

On September 30, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew back to London from his meeting in Munich with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler. As he disembarked from the aircraft, he held aloft a piece of paper, which contained the promise that Britain and Germany would never go to war with one another again. He had returned bringing "Peace with honour—Peace for our time."Drawing on a wealth of archival material, acclaimed historian David Faber delivers a sweeping reassessment of the extraordinary events of 1938, tracing the key incidents leading up to the Munich Conference and its immediate aftermath: Lord Halifax's ill-fated meeting with Hitler; Chamberlain's secret discussions with Mussolini; and the Berlin scandal that rocked Hitler's regime. He takes us to Vienna, to the Sudentenland, and to Prague. In Berlin, we witness Hitler inexorably preparing for war, even in the face of opposition from his own generals; in London, we watch as Chamberlain makes one supreme effort after another to appease Hitler.Resonating with an insider's feel for the political infighting Faber uncovers, Munich, 1938 transports us to the war rooms and bunkers, revealing the covert negotiations and scandals upon which the world's fate would rest. It is modern history writing at its best.

1

Hitler Sees His Chance

The question for Germany ran: where could she achieve the greatest gain at the lowest cost. … Germany’s problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never without attendant risk. … It was [his] unalterable resolve to solve Germany’s problem of space at the latest by 1943–45. … The descent upon the Czechs would have to be made with “lightning speed” … even as early as 1938.

Adolf Hitler, Reich Chancellery, November 5, 1937

In England, for instance, far too many people have an entirely erroneous conception of what the National Socialist régime really stands for. Otherwise they would lay less stress on Nazi dictatorship and much more emphasis on the great social experiment which was being tried out in Germany.

Sir Nevile Henderson at a dinner of the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, June 1, 1937

There was some talk about the Führer; of his qualities, artistic, romantic, sensitive. It was all very cheery and light-hearted.

Lord Halifax, Berlin, November 17, 1937

In Berlin, Friday, November 5, 1937, was a characteristically cold, dull, early-winter’s day. Unusually, however, Adolf Hitler was in town. As André François-Poncet, the French ambassador and senior overseas diplomat, had complained to his own Foreign Minister that summer, Hitler was increasingly “devoting less and less time to public affairs.” He preferred instead “to spend more of his time at his house at Obersalzberg and much less in the capital city.” By and large he was happy to leave the principal areas of domestic policy to those “who had seized them for themselves,” while he “concerns himself, insofar as he does, with foreign policy [and] primarily occupies himself in new and grandiose construction projects, especially for the beautification of Berlin, which haunts his imagination.”¹ There seemed that day to be nothing to break the calm that hung over the district of the city known locally as the Diplomatstrasse.

At midday the Propaganda Minister, Dr. Joseph Goebbels, as he did frequently, made the short trip across the Wilhelmstrasse from the Propaganda Ministry to the Reich Chancellery for lunch with Hitler, and returned to work that afternoon, reflecting on the wide range of topics they had discussed. In recent weeks Goebbels had noticed that Hitler had begun increasingly to turn his eyes toward Czechoslovakia, but at lunch that day they had agreed that Germany was not yet in a position to take action, although the Czechs were now facing pressure from all sides. They had also agreed on the position of Hjalmar Schacht, the Economics Minister, whose long-running opposition to Hitler was now to lead to his enforced resignation. Finally, noted Goebbels, the Führer was to have “General Staff talks” later that afternoon.²

Accordingly, as dusk fell, the chiefs of the army, the navy and the Luftwaffe, together with the War Minister, made their way to the Reich Chancellery for what they too thought was to be a routine meeting. Over recent weeks the commander-in-chief of the navy, Admiral Erich Raeder, had expressed growing concern at what he believed to be the inequitable allocation of raw steel supplies to the armed forces, to the advantage of the Luftwaffe, and the detriment of the navy. Raeder had strongly pressed his case with the War Minister, Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, arguing that much needed naval expansion was being seriously hampered by the lack of supplies. Blomberg had in turn urged Hitler to call a meeting to arbitrate on the dispute, and when Hitler reluctantly agreed, it was Blomberg who had issued the invitations to the three service chiefs. When Raeder arrived, a suspiciously friendly Hermann Göring, the commander of the Luftwaffe, took him to one side, and reassured him that he had already discussed the matter with Hitler that afternoon. The primary purpose of the meeting was to speed up armament development, and in particular “to put pressure on [the commander-in-chief of the army] General Werner Freiherr von Fritsch, since [Hitler] was dissatisfied with the rearmament of the Army.”

Nobody, however, could understand why the Foreign Minister, Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, had also been invited, including, so it would seem, Neurath himself. Göring later claimed that Hitler had explained to him that it was because he “did not want the thing to look too military,” and hoped that Neurath’s presence would emphasize, to Fritsch in particular, the importance of rearmament to the “foreign political situation.”³ It is more likely that Hitler knew of the Foreign Ministry’s general opposition to what he was going to say, and that the meeting afforded him an ideal opportunity to deliver an explicit warning to his Foreign Minister. The meeting began at 4:15 P.M. The only other participant was Colonel Friedrich Hossbach, the senior armed forces’ adjutant on Hitler’s staff, who took his place opposite his chief at the table in Hitler’s study. It soon became clear to the select gathering that this was to be no ordinary get-together. The subject to be discussed, began the Führer, was of such importance that in any other country it would necessitate a full Cabinet meeting, but he had rejected that idea precisely because of the gravity of the matter and the necessary secrecy. What he was to tell them, he intoned solemnly, “was the fruit of thorough deliberation and the experiences of his 4½ years of power.” In the event of his death, his words should be treated as his last will and testament, his “testamentarische Hinterlassenschaft.”⁴

Around the table there was a sharp intake of breath, as all eyes were fixed on Hitler—“even Göring was tense.” Hossbach, realizing that what was to follow was clearly of importance, hurriedly got out his diary and began to take down notes.⁵ The young adjutant was a close confidant and admirer of General Ludwig Beck, the Chief of the General Staff, who had not been invited to the meeting. However, Beck’s critical view of the broad thrust of Hitler’s foreign policy, and in particular his anxiety that German military action in central Europe would set off a general war which Germany was bound to lose, was a theme with which Hossbach was already familiar. A written record of such a portentous statement would clearly be of great interest to him.

It quickly became clear that Hitler was to pursue a topic that was already familiar to his inner circle. On June 24, Blomberg had issued a “Top Secret” directive to the three commanders-in-chief. Only four copies had been circulated, and it had been immediately obvious to the recipients that it had been inspired by Hitler himself. Blomberg had begun by emphasizing that in theory Germany had no need to fear immediate attack from any quarter.

Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on the part of the German armed forces … to make possible the military exploitation of politically favourable opportunities should they occur. Preparations of the armed forces for a possible war in the mobilization period 1937–38 must be made with this in mind.

Furthermore, there were two distinct eventualities for war, for both of which plans were already well advanced. First, war on two fronts, with the main theater in the west, probably as a result of a sudden attack by France: to be code-named Fall Rot, or “Case Red.” The second possibility might also involve war on two fronts, but the principal struggle would be to the south-east, code-named Fall Grün, or “Case Green.” This option was considerably more aggressive in nature.

The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify such an action politically and in the eyes of international law must be created beforehand.

Czechoslovakia was to be “eliminated from the very beginning,” and occupied. In addition, a number of “special case” scenarios were to be catered for, including “Case Otto,” which would initiate armed intervention in Austria in the event of any attempt to restore to the throne there the young exiled pretender, Otto of Habsburg.

Making use of the domestic political dissension of the Austrian people, there will be a march to this end in the general direction of Vienna, and any resistance will be broken.⁶

Thus in the Reich Chancellery on November 5, Hitler began, unusually for him, to read from a prepared text and to expand on his theme.

The aim of German policy was to make secure and to preserve the racial community [Volksmasse] and to enlarge it. It was therefore a question of space [Lebensraum].

The German racial community comprised over 85 million people and, because of their number and the narrow limits of habitable space in Europe, constituted a tightly packed racial core such as was not to be met in any other country and such as implied the right to a greater living space than in the case of other peoples. Germany’s future was therefore wholly conditional upon the solving of the need for space.

The political climate in Europe posed the greatest threat yet to the German race, both in terms of arresting its decline in Austria and Czechoslovakia, and indeed of maintaining its very existence within Germany itself. In the absence of any expansion of living space, “sterility was setting in, and in its train disorders of a social character.” Hitler went on to raise, and subsequently to dismiss, a number of possible alternatives. Autarchy, or self-sufficiency, would only be achievable in a limited form in respect of raw materials, and would be quite impossible in terms of food supplies. Similarly, it was hopeless to anticipate German economic growth by relying solely on an increased share in the world economy, even if there were to be a boom on the back of worldwide rearmament. Nor could sufficient living space, raw materials or food be found in some far-flung colonies, not even those to which Germany had a valid claim. The sea routes which served them were controlled by Britain, and he rejected in principle the “liberalistisch-kapitalistischen” view that space could be found not in Europe, but in the exploitation of Germany’s pre–First World War colonies.

Having discarded such alternatives, Hitler turned to the core of his argument.

The history of all ages—the Roman Empire and the British Empire—had proved that expansion could only be carried out by breaking down resistance and taking risks; setbacks were inevitable. There had never in former times been spaces without a master, and there were none today; the attacker always comes up against a possessor. The question for Germany ran: where could she achieve the greatest gain at the lowest cost?

It was clear where he believed that the opposition would lie. Germany “had to reckon with two hate-inspired antagonists, Britain and France, to whom a German colossus in the centre of Europe was a thorn in the flesh.” But Britain was in a state of decadent decline and could only defend her colonial empire with the help of others. And France, although in a stronger position in terms of her empire and the military strength that it brought her, had internal political difficulties that greatly weakened her. In conclusion:

Germany’s problem could be solved only by means of force and this was never without attendant risk. … If one accepts as the basis of the following exposition the resort to force with its attendant risks, then there remained still to be answered the questions “when” and “how.”⁷

At this point Hitler, who never felt at ease speaking from behind a desk, stood up, paced about the room, and finally came to a standstill, his legs astride. He now began to outline three possible scenarios in which new territory could be acquired by force. His opening argument was typical of his style, that “time was not on Germany’s side, that it would be imperative to act by 1943–5 at the latest.” Thereafter, it would be too late to benefit from Germany’s massive rearmament program and the relative superiority it had brought about. Certain weapons would no longer be secret, reservists called up by draft would be older, and a food crisis might well become a reality as a result of a lack of foreign exchange. At the same time, the Nazi movement’s leaders were aging, the birth rate was falling, and the standard of living might decline—all in all, there was a very real prospect of a potential “weakening-point of the regime.” If he were still alive, “it was his unalterable resolve to solve the German problem of space by 1943–5 at the latest.”⁸

There were two further possible scenarios which might oblige him to take action even sooner. If France was to become so severely wracked by internal strife, or so embroiled in a war with another power that the French army was rendered useless for war against Germany, then “the time for action against the Czechs had come.”

Our first objective, in the event of our being embroiled in war, must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove the threat to our flank in any possible operation against the West. … Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question would be cleared up in due course by Germany.

He made this assumption on the basis of likely difficulties for Britain within the empire, principally in Ireland and India, and a reluctance again to become involved in a lengthy European war. In the meantime, French involvement in a foreign war, possibly allied to Britain and almost certainly against Italy, was “coming definitely nearer” given the continuing tension in the Mediterranean over the civil war in Spain. He was therefore “resolved to take advantage of it whenever it happened, even as early as 1938,” while “the time for our attack on the Czechs and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Anglo-French-Italian war.” In conclusion, he warned his audience, an attack against Czechoslovakia would “have to be carried out with ‘lightning speed’ [blitzartig schnell].”⁹

In recent months, Hitler had grown increasingly disillusioned with Britain, his attitude that of a spurned lover. His dream that the two countries might enter into an alliance to carve up the world between them, inspired by a war between Britain and Italy over Abyssinia, had by now all but evaporated. It was all too clear that Britain had little or no intention of standing up to the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, as Hitler had hoped. He had therefore reached the conclusion “both that Britain’s ostensible willingness to appease Germany with concessions was a sham intended only to separate Germany from Italy and also that despite its deep-rooted hostility to Germany, Britain was too weak to fight.”¹⁰ By contrast he had come increasingly to admire Italian strength in successfully defying both Britain and the League of Nations over the invasion of Abyssinia.

After two hours on his feet Hitler brought his speech to an end. He was under no illusion as to the shock his remarks would cause, and he was not to be disappointed. His audience was stunned. As Hossbach noted, “there was a heavy silence in the Führer’s gi...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents
• Prologue: Heston
• Chapter 1: Hitler Sees His Chance
• Chapter 2: Scandal in Berlin
• Chapter 3: The Last Frail Chance
• Chapter 4: The Loaded Pause
• Chapter 5: A Spring Storm
• Chapter 6: Crisis in May
• Chapter 7: A Faraway Country
• Chapter 8: Czechoslovakia Stands Alone
• Chapter 9: In Full War Cry
• Chapter 10: On the Razor’s Edge
• Chapter 11: A New and Sharper Sword
• Chapter 12: On the Banks of the Rhine
• Chapter 13: Keep Calm and Dig
• Chapter 14: The Flying Messenger of Peace
• Photo Insert
• Epilogue: Drawing the Sword
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Acknowledgments
• Index