The U.S. Constitution and Other Writings

,

• Publisher: Canterbury Classics
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781684121069
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: North American History
• Index: History

"We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union... " — The U.S Constitution The U.S. Constitution and Other Writings is a collection of the crucial documents, speeches, and other writingsthat shaped the United States. In addition to the Constitution, readers can reviewthe Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Federalist Papers, important presidential speeches, and many others.Both famous and lesser-known, but equally important, Americans are represented, including Benjamin Franklin, Victoria Woodhull, Frederick Douglass, Susan B. Anthony, and even the creators of the rules of baseball. The founders' inspirational and revolutionary ideals are all here, and this is a perfect volume for anyone who finds the history of America to be a fascinating and enlightening journey.

THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
(1787–88)

To encourage New York to ratify the U.S. Constitution, Founding Fathers Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote The Federalist Papers, eighty-five essays and articles that explained the need for a Constitution and discussed many other political issues. At the time, the essays were published anonymously under the pseudonym “Publius,” a popular Latin name in ancient Rome that also gave us the word “populous.” The Federalist Papers became the premier companion to the U.S. Constitution and are still used by federal courts today, including the U.S. Supreme Court, to interpret that document. Several of the most important papers are included here.

FEDERALIST NO. 1.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

For the Independent Journal. Saturday, October 27, 1787

ALEXANDER HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting Federal Government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the Union, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars:

The utility of the Union to your political prosperity—the insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve that Union—the necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the attainment of this object—the conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true principles of republican government—its analogy to your own State Constitution—and lastly, the additional security which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of government, to liberty, and to prosperity.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the Union, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.* This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST NO. 9.
THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC FACTION AND INSURRECTION

For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 21, 1787

ALEXANDER HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated.

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their errors.

But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of republican government were too just copies of the originals from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I mean the enlargement of the orbit within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended to in another place.

The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence.

When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America.

Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the size of the more considerable members of the Union, but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.

“It is very probable,” (says he*) “that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a Confederate Republic.”

“This form of government is a convention by which several smaller states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body.”

“A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.”

“If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.”

“Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.”

“As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of large monarchies.”

I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a confederacy and a consolidation of the States. The essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course of this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the government.

The definition of a Confederate Republic seems simply to be “an assemblage of soc...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Halftitle Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Introduction
• The Mayflower Compact (1620)
• The Silence Dogood Letters (1722)
• An Edict by the King of Prussia (1773)
• Rules by which a Great Empire May Be Reduced to a Small One (1773)
• “Give Me Liberty, or Give Me Death!” (1775)
• The Declaration of Independence (1776)
• Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union (Passed 1777; Ratified 1781)
• The Treaty of Paris (1783)
• The Virginia Plan (1787)
• The Northwest Ordinance (1787)
• The Constitution of the United States of America (1787)
• The Federalist Papers (1787–88)
• George Washington’s First Inaugural Address April 30, 1789
• The Bill of Rights (Passed 1789; Ratified 1791)
• Thomas Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address March 4, 1801
• The Louisiana Purchase Treaty (1803)
• “The Star-Spangled Banner” (1814)
• The Monroe Doctrine (1823)
• On Indian Removal (1830)
• George W. Harkins’s Letter to the American People (1832)
• Rules and Regulations of the Knickerbocker Base Ball Club (1845)
• Sojourner Truth’s “Ain’t I a Woman?” (1851)
• Frederick Douglass’s Speech on the Dred Scott Decision (1857)
• “A House Divided” (1858)
• The Emancipation Proclamation (1862–63)
• The Homestead Act (1862)
• Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address (1863)
• Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address March 4, 1865
• 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: The Abolition of Slavery (1865)
• The Purchase of Alaska (1867)
• Victoria C. Woodhull’s Address to the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives (1871)
• Act Establishing Yellowstone National Park (1872)
• Susan B. Anthony on Women’s Suffrage (1873)
• Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce Surrenders (1877)
• The Dawes Act (1887)
• Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States (1898)
• Letter of Protest from Queen Lili’uokalani of Hawaii to the House of Representatives (1898)
• Theodore Roosevelt’s Inaugural Address March 4, 1905
• 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Federal Income Tax (Passed 1909, Ratified 1913)
• Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points (1918)
• 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Women’s Right to Vote (1920)
• FDR Proposes The New Deal (1932)
• Franklin D. Roosevelt’s First Inaugural Address March 4, 1933
• The Social Security Act (1935)
• Albert Einstein’s Letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt About the Atomic Bomb (1939)
• Franklin D. Roosevelt’s State of the Union Address (January 6, 1941)
• Executive Order 9066: The Relocation of the Japanese (1942)
• Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Speech Upon Signing the G.I. Bill of Rights (1944)
• The United Nations Charter (1945)
• President Harry S. Truman Introduces the Truman Doctrine (1947)
• The Marshall Plan Speech (1947)
• Harry S. Truman’s Inaugural Address (January 20, 1949)
• The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)
• Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
• Senate Resolution 301: Censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy (1954)
• Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Farewell Address (January 17, 1961)
• John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address (January 20, 1961)
• The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963)
• The Civil Rights Act (1964)
• Ronald Reagan: “A Time for Choosing” (1964)
• Lyndon B. Johnson’s Special Message to Congress: The American Promise (1965)
• Ronald Reagan’s First Inaugural Address (January 20, 1981)
• Geraldine Ferraro Accepts the Vice Presidential Nomination (1984)
• Ronald Reagan’s Remarks on East–West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin (1987)
• Bill Clinton Announces the Military Policy “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (1993)
• George W. Bush Addresses the Nation After the September 11 Attacks (2001)
• Barack Obama’s First Inaugural Address (January 20, 2009)
• Barack Obama Announces the Death of Osama bin Laden (2011)
• Hillary Clinton Accepts the Democratic Presidential Nomination (2016)