CHAPTER ONE
EASTERN ORTHODOX VIEW
ANDREW LOUTH
One problem faced by Orthodox seeking to participate in almost any discussion of theological topics with fellow Christians of Western traditions is that what one might call the linguistic and conceptual geography appears strange. Terms are used that are difficult to translate into Greek, the originary language of Eastern Orthodoxy, something made even more difficult when one is considering the way these theological terms or concepts relate to one another: the theological terrain, mapped out by the concepts expressed in (ultimately, for the West, generally Latin), often seems quite unfamiliar. To ask what Orthodox theology makes of original sin, or the atonement, is to ask first for an effort of translation of an unfamiliar concept into something recognizable on the terrain of Orthodox theology. Of course, it was the other way around in the formative years of the church; then the terminology of theology was primarily Greekâone might indeed argue that the aboriginal language of Christianity, once it realized its mission to the nations, is Greek; indeed, Latin was late to emerge. So it was that Latin thinkers struggled to represent Greek terms and distinctions in Latin, something that was often very difficult. Latin theologians were aware of this: Augustine is quite conscious that the terminology of Greek Trinitarian theology, involving the distinction between hypostasis, the word that came to be used for the members of the Trinity, and ousia (âbeingâ or âessenceâ) or physis (ânatureâ), used for the divine unity, was poorly expressed by the traditional language of Latin Trinitarian theology, which distinguished between persona and substantia. Indeed the confusion was in danger of being further confounded by the fact that substantia in Latin, representing the unity of the Godhead, corresponded most closely toâwhat linguists call a âcalqueâ ofâthe Greek hypostasis, used in Greek theology to represent the three members of the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
The case of the atonement represents a further problem, for atonement is one of the few theological terms that is aboriginally English. The earliest use of the word, in a theological context, seems to occur in Tyndaleâs translation of the New Testament, where it was used to translate 2 Corinthians 5:18 (ÏᜎΜ ÎŽÎčαÎșÎżÎœÎŻÎ±Îœ ÏáżÏ ÎșαÏαλλαγáżÏ: âministry of atonementâ). This use of atonement did not survive in the later English translations of the Bible. In the King James Version, atonement is only used once in the New Testament, in Romans 5:11; generally, the word reconciliation is used to render ÎșαÏαλλαγΟ (katallagÄ). In the KJV atonement is used much more widely in translating the Old Testament, especially in connexion with the sacrificial ceremonies laid out in the Pentateuch. The regular use of the word in English theology seems much later (according to the online Oxford English Dictionary), in the mid-nineteenth century, to which belongs the spelling out of its meaning as at-one-ment. The word âatonementâ looks as if it is derived from the verb âto atone,â but the evidence of use does not support this (our expectations are often undermined by the lexicographersâ craft). The early uses of âatonementâ and âatoneâ were not religious and often very general: bringing together estranged parties into unity, reconciliation, and so forth. However, the Oxford English Dictionary reveals that the older, more general meanings become obsolete; it is the fourth meaning, listed, as usual, chronologically in terms of attestation, that became normal: making amends, satisfaction, expiation. In other words, the meaning of atonement, once close to what the etymology of the word suggests, that is, âbringing into one, to unify,â fairly quickly gravitated towards a forensic meaning.
Atone is not, however, the only verb related to atonement. In Middle English there is another etymologically close word: the verb to oneâthat is, the noun one used as a verb. Its provenance is interesting. The first example given in the Oxford English Dictionary comes from a treatise called AÈenbite of Inwit dated to about 1340.1 More familiar examples can be found. For example, in the long version of Julian of Norwichâs Revelations of Divine Love (c. 1395), she says that âthan shall our blissid saviour perfectly helyn us and one us to him.â2 The Cloud of Unknowing (late fourteenth century) also speaks of the soul as âonyd Ăus to God in spirit.â3 To think of atonement as related to this use of the verb to one suggests a very different linguistic career for the word atonementâbeing drawn less into the forensic orbit, as actually happened, and instead coming to belong to the language of the spiritual (âmysticalâ) experience of union with God, of âoningâ to God, envisaged by the Middle English mystics. âAtonement,â at-one-ment, would in this case suggest deification (ΞÎÏÏÎčÏ). Thisâin what must seem like aâflight of linguistic fancy is not irrelevant to this essay, but I shall leave its relevance to emerge in what follows.
Atonement, then, set out on its linguistic path with a forensic meaning of making amends, satisfaction, something that could be demanded and supervised by legal process and the courts. In its eventual theological use, it picked up the tendency of Western theology, present arguably since Tertullian, to frame our relationship with God, and especially its restoration, in legal terms. This is hardly a surprising development: the prophetic tradition of the Old Testament makes much of the Day of Judgment of the Lord, when all will appear before Godâs judgment seat. Forensic language of being found guilty or acquitted becomes commonplace and enters deeply into devotional language; it is frequently found in the Psalmsââblessed is the one whose unrighteousness is forgiven, and whose sin is coveredâ (Ps. 31/32:1).4 The forensic language merges with ritual language, as in the verse just quoted: âcoveringâ of sin belongs to the Hebrew language of sacrifice.5 That the language of atonement attracted such forensic connotations is scarcely surprising if one thinks that the development of this term belongs to the later Middle Ages, which, under the influence of the covenant theology of that period and fostered jointly by the popularity of nominalism in philosophy and the âtwo-powersâ doctrine in theology, discouraged ontological and metaphysical ways of understanding the relationship of the creature to God and laid all the emphasis on the covenant, established by Godâs will, as determining the creatureâs relationship to God. The focus of theology in this late phase of scholasticism shifted from metaphysics, as with Aquinas (analogia entis), to canon law, understood as exploring how Godâs will for his creatures is set forth. In this context, forensic concepts, such as justification, came to the fore and were finally confirmed in the centrality of the doctrine of justification by faith for the Reformers, especially Luther. The language of atonement is part of this way of understanding the relationship between the human and God.
It is a theological development that has little resonance with the theological development of the Orthodox East. This is manifest from Alister McGrathâs early work Iustitia Dei.6 In the first volume, which leads up to the Reformation, McGrath skips from Latin theologian to Latin theologian and only begins to settle down to the development of justification in the later Middle Ages. The Greek Fathers are passed over in a few pages. The second volume, which starts with the Reformation, finds itself pursuing a proper subject, led by the Reformers and their successors, with Catholic theology responding to what Catholics perceived to be errors in this essentially juridical notion. Lutherâs point of viewânurtured in this to a degree by his reception of late medieval theology, but inspired by the analogy he perceived between his protest against the medieval Catholic Church and the apostle Paulâs polemic against the place of the law in the thought of the Pharisees, from whose ranks he had comeâmade justification by faith central and read Saint Paulâs letters in the light of this doctrine. This led to making Romans and Galatians the core of the Pauline corpus, the other epistles being treated as satellites in this theological constellation. Once put like that, it is evident that other ways of conceiving of the Pauline corpus are possible: focusing on the epistles to the Corinthians, for example, would hardly lead to justification being regarded as centralâthe Eucharist would assume a more central place, along with Paulâs reflection on his own transforming experience of Godâs grace, leading from glory to glory, and working out a dialectic of death and resurrection, of human dying to the âfleshâ enabling human resurrection and transformation by grace and by the Holy Spirit (see 2 Cor. 3â4; 12; and esp. 3:18; 4:7â12; 12:1â10).
Another more systematic and less historical way of locating the place of atonement in the theological landscape would be to observe that the Scriptures and, following and interpreting them, theology use a wide range of metaphors in interpreting Godâs action in Christ. One of these metaphors is judgment and acquittal, which is inhabited by the language of atonement and justification. But there are others: Christ as victor, on the cross engaging in a mortal struggle with death, manifest as victorious in the resurrection (mors et vita duello / conflixere mirando / dux vitae mortuus / regnat vivus); Christ as a sacrificial victim, making expiation for the sins of humanity but also as priest offering sacrifice (Victimae paschali laudes / immolent Christiani. / Agnus redemit oves. / Christus innocens Patri / reconciliavit / peccatores);7 Christ as healer (cf. Julian, quoted above: âthan shall our blissid saviour perfectly helyn us and one us to himâ);8 Christ as teacher; Christ as perfect example of what it is to be human (these last two examples rarely appear alone, at least in the Fathers).
There is a further point to be made about these images for interpreting Godâs action in Christ. They are all, in different ways, paradoxical. The cross was an instrument of painful and prolonged execution; no one would naturally think of it as an altar, nor an emblem of victory. The death of a man on a cross does not suggest, in itself, victory over death; it looks all too like subjection to death, the fate of all mortals. To see Christ on the cross as âriding the Axile Treeâ9 is a heroic bringing together of metaphors, fusing Yggdrasilâthe cosmic tree of Nordic mythâwith a cruel instrument of Roman execution. Even what might seem such a straightforward metaphor of Christ as the healer insists on paradox. When Eusebius of Caesarea, in his festal oration at Tyre, compares Christ to âa devoted physician [who], to save the lives of the sick, sees the horrible danger yet touches the infected place, and in treating anotherâs troubles brings suffering on himselfâ10 âanticipating T. S. Eliotâs âwounded surgeon,â whose âsteel . . . questions the distempered part.â11 The indirectness of the metaphor, the way in which it invites other metaphors that conflict or set it off, is important to note. There is danger in limiting the range of imagery in interpreting Christâs saving work, as one of the great Orthodox theologian of the last century, Vladimir Lossky, warned:
Nevertheless, when the dogma of the redemption is treated in isolation from the general body of Christian teaching, there is always the risk of limiting the tradition by interpreting it exclusively in terms of the work of the Redeemer. Then theological thought develops along three lines: original sin, its reparation on the cross, and the appropriation of the saving results of the work of Christ to Christians. In these constricting perspectives of a theology dominated by the idea of redemption, the patristic sentence, âGod made Himself man that man might become God,â seems to be strange and abnormal. The thought of union with God is forgotten because of our preoccupation solely with our own salvation; or rather, union with God is seen only negatively, in contrast with our present wretchedness.12
That Lossky has in mind Western theology (and maybe the impact of such Western theology in the kind of textbooks traditionally used in Orthodox theological faculties and seminaries) becomes apparent in the following section, which traces this narrowing of theology to Anselm of Canterbury and his Cur Deus homo.
Anselm does seem to mark a watershed in Western theology of the atonement (and in other areas, notably the question of the filioque). In the case of the atoneme...