Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously

Matthew R. X. Dentith

• Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield International
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781786608307
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Epistemology in Philosophy

The contributors to this volume argue that whilst there is a commonplace superstition conspiracy theories are examples of bad beliefs (and that the kind of people who believe conspiracy theories are typically irrational), many conspiracy theories are rational to believe: the members of the Dewey Commission were right to say that the Moscow Trials of the 1930s were a sham; Woodward and Bernstein were correct to think that Nixon was complicit in the conspiracy to deny any wrongdoing in the Watergate Hotel break in; and if we either accept the terrorist events of 9/11 were committed by Al-Qaeda, or that the Bush Administration was responsible, then it seems we are endorsing some theory about a conspiracy to commit an act of terror on American soil. As such, there is no reason to reject conspiracy theories sui generis. This volume challenges the prima facie that conspiracy theories are irrational beliefs, arguing that we should treat conspiracy theories and the phenomena of conspiracy theories seriously. It presents fresh perspectives from the wider philosophical, sociological and psychological community on what is becoming an issue of increasing relevance in our time.

3Chapter 1

When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might
Be the Best Explanation1

M R. X. Dentith

1. Introduction

While philosophers have been late in coming to the analysis of these things we call “conspiracy theories,” it seems that—as a discipline—many of us analyze them with much more sympathy than our peers in the social sciences. In a raft of papers and books, starting with Charles Pigden’s “Popper Revisited, or What Is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?” (1995), philosophers like Brian L. Keeley (1999), Juha Räikkä (2009a), Joel Buenting and Jason Taylor (2010), Lee Basham (2011), David Coady (2012), and myself (2014) have argued that as conspiracies occur—and that theories about conspiracies sometimes turn out to be warranted—conspiracy theories cannot automatically be dismissed just because they are called “conspiracy theories.”2

This does not mean that philosophers consider belief in conspiracy theories to be the exemplar of rational thinking; the current findings in the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories (to coin a new discipline) simply show that belief in conspiracy theories is not prima facie irrational. Rather, the kind of issues often held up as being a problem for belief in conspiracy theories tend to also be examples of issues common to a great many other beliefs that we do not typically think of as prima facie suspicious.

However, there still remains the view among some philosophers—and a great many thinkers in other disciplines—that even if explanations of events citing conspiracies can be warranted, conspiracy theories themselves are still unlikely. For sure, many of the complaints such conspiracy theory theorists (to coin another name) have about belief in conspiracy theories get phrased in terms of conspiracy theorists seeing conspiracies where none exist, or being prone to making bad inferences. Yet at the heart of these complaints—as we will see—are claims either about the unlikeliness of conspiracies or 4conspiracy theories. These claims of unlikeliness are then meant to explain why most ordinary people (and a large number of academics) are justified in treating conspiracy theories as a kind of suspicious belief. Yet, as we shall see, it is not obvious that conspiracy theories are unlikely. Indeed, when we understand what this supposed unlikeliness means, it throws an interesting light on how we sometimes avoid talking about just how much conspiratorial activity might be going on around us. Not just that: as we will also see, our judgments about the likeliness of conspiracies and conspiracy theories, in turn, affect our judgments as to when some theory about a conspiracy might just qualify as an inference to the best explanation.

1.1 Philosophers and the Unlikeliness of Conspiracy Theories

Let us start with the philosophers. Karl Popper, in The Open Society and Its Enemies, considers conspiracy theories to be unlikely. Why? Because such theories take it that history is largely the result of a succession of successful conspiracies. However, Popper believes that as most of us accept conspiracies are both rare and seldom successful, conspiracy theories are just unlikely (1969). While Popper accepts that conspiracies occur, belief in what he calls the “conspiracy theory of society” is irrational because conspiracy theories are rarely warranted. Popper’s most modern echo is Quassim Cassam, who argues that conspiracy theorists suffer from the epistemic vice of gullibility.3 As such, while he—like Popper before him—admits conspiracies occur, conspiracy theories—being the kind of thing gullible conspiracy theorists believe—simply turn out to be so unlikely as to be untrue (2015).

Neil Levy argues that conspiracy theories which conflict with official theories—theories that have been endorsed by some authority—are prima facie unwarranted. As such, they turn out to be unlikely compared to their non-conspiratorial rivals (2007).

Pete Mandik takes a slightly different tack, and argues that when there is conflict between an official theory of the type “shit happens”4 and a conspiracy theory, then we have no good reason to prefer the conspiracy theory (2007). Conspiracy theories are, for Mandik, no more likely than their non-conspiratorial rivals. Indeed, because conspiracy theories often portray a world of complex causation—which might be better understood as the result of the law of unintended consequences—we are justified in thinking conspiracy theories are prima facie unlikely. This, in turn, justifies our preference for the hypothesis that “shit just happens.”

Mandik’s view echoes an argument put forward by Steve Clarke. Clarke argues that conspiracy theories are examples of dispositional explanations (explanations which rely on some central claim of someone intending for an event to happen). He argues that we should prefer situational explanations 5(explanations which rely on some central claim about the context or situation under which a series of events occurred), because situational explanations are better than claiming some event was the result of intentional activity. Given that most of the rival explanations to conspiracy theories—so Clarke claims—are situational in character, we should think conspiracy theories—as dispositional explanations—are unlikely, at least compared to their situational rivals (2002).5

Peter Lipton—in what is admittedly only a passing reference in his book Inference to the Best Explanation—thinks that conspiracy theories may very well be unlikely, using such theories to illustrate how to disambiguate what it is we mean by “best” when parsing talk of inference to the best explanation.

By showing that many apparently unrelated events flow from a single source and many apparent coincidences are really related, such a [conspiracy] theory may have considerable explanatory power. If only it were true, it would provide a very good explanation. That is, it is lovely. At the same time, such an explanation may be very unlikely, accepted only by those whose ability to weigh evidence has been compromised by paranoia. (2004, 59–60)

Lipton distinguishes two notions of “best”: the most likely explanation, and the one that provides the most understanding (with respect to some account of the explanatory virtues), which he calls the “loveliest explanation.” Lipton considers conspiracy theories to be problematic because, while they have some lovely features (if they were true they really would provide a very good explanation as to why some event occurred) they are unlikely compared to their rivals. This is because Lipton assumes that conspiracy theories only seem likely because conspiracy theorists suffer from paranoia.6 For Lipton, it is evidence (or the lack thereof) that makes conspiracy theories unlikely because conspiracy theorists are paranoid, and thus see evidence of conspiracies where none exist.

1.2 Non-philosophers and the Unlikeliness of Conspiracy Theories

These philosophers who think that conspiracy theories are unlikely are in good company. For example, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule (foreshadowing Cassam) claim conspiracy theorists suffer from a “crippled epistemology.” Conspiracy theories are unlikely because the:

[A]cceptance of such [conspiracy] theories may not be irrational or unjustified from the standpoint of...

Table of contents

• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• SECTION ONE: THE PARTICULARIST TURN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES
• 1 When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation
• 2 Conspiracy Theory and the Perils of Pure Particularism
• 3 Conspiracy Theory Particularism, both Epistemic and Moral, Versus Generalism
• 4 What Particularism about Conspiracy Theories Entails
• SECTION TWO: DIAGNOSING CONSPIRACY THEORY THEORISTS
• 5 The Conspiracy Theory Theorists and Their Attitude to Conspiracy Theory—Introduction to Section Two
• 6 The Psychologists’ Conspiracy Panic: They Seek to Cure Everyone
• 7 Social Scientists and Pathologizing Conspiracy Theorizing
• 8 Governing with Feeling: Conspiracy Theories, Contempt, and Affective Governmentality
• 9 Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists
• 10 Clearing Up Some Conceptual Confusions about Conspiracy Theory Theorizing
• 11 To Measure or Not to Measure? Psychometrics and Conspiracy Theories
• 12 Anti-Rumor Campaigns and Conspiracy-Baiting as Propaganda
• 13 On Some Moral Costs of Conspiracy Theory
• 14 Conspiracy Theories, Deplorables, and Defectibility: A Reply to Patrick Stokes
• 15 Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously and Investigating Them
• Bibliography
• Index
• About the Contributors