Philosophy of Psychology: Causality and Psychological Subject

New Reflections on James Woodward's Contribution

Wenceslao J. Gonzalez

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9783110573985
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Epistemology in Philosophy

Contemporary philosophy of science analyzes psychology as a science with special features, because this discipline includes some specific philosophical problems – descriptive and normative, structural and dynamic. Some of these are particularly relevant both theoretically (casual explanation) and practically (the configuration of the psychological subject and its relations with psychiatry).

Two central aspects in this book are the role of causality, especially conceived as intervention or manipulation, and the characterization of the psychological subject. This requires a clarification of scientific explanations in terms of causality in psychology, because characterizations of causality are quite different in epistemological and ontological terms. One of the most influential views is James Woodward's approach to causality as intervention, which entails an analysis of its characteristics, new elements and limits. This means taking into account the structural and dynamic aspects included in causal cognition and psychological explanations.

Psychology seen as special science also requires us to consider the scientific status of psychology and the psychological subject, which leads to limits of naturalism in psychology.

Part I:Causal Reasoning in the Context of Normative and Descriptive Psychology

Wenceslao J. Gonzalez

Configuration of Causality and Philosophy of Psychology: An Analysis of Causality as Intervention and Its Repercussion for Psychology

Abstract: Within the context of contemporary philosophy of science, this paper offers a configuration of causality and its place in philosophy of psychology as special science. The analysis focuses on the very influential conception developed by James Woodward, with alternatives given in those aspects that require more attention (diversity of explanations, prediction, historicity, pluralism, etc.). Thus, this paper considers his preference for causal explanations and his interest in psychological cases. This chapter points out that his naturalism is combined with elements of anti-naturalism, insofar as is open to hypothetical explanations and ideal interventions. In addition, his vision of naturalism (epistemological, methodological, and ontological) is embedded with components of pragmatism.

The analysis of scientific explanation goes from the types of scientific explanation to the kinds of causal explanation. In this regard, among the varieties of causality in contemporary philosophy of science, Woodward develops a manipulative or interventionist approach. Meanwhile, the paper proposes a broader perspective of causality, which includes three levels of scientific research (basic, applied, and of application) as a framework for causality in psychology and human affairs. Overall, the main strength of his approach is in the criticism of other theories of scientific explanation. But his positive alternative to them, insofar as it involves a special insistence on hypothetical experiments and ideal components, seems to me less persuasive for a characterization of causality, in general, and causal explanations, in particular. The philosophical analysis is then followed by an outline of his academic trajectory, the references of this chapter, the full set of Woodward’s publications, and a bibliography on his philosophy.

Keywords: causality, philosophy, psychology, Woodward, naturalism, pragmatism, explanation, trajectory, bibliography.

Recent decades of philosophy of science, in general, and philosophy of psychology, in particular, have seen a renewed interest in causality.18 Thus, causal explanations and reflections on their consequences for psychology as a science have been emphasized. Both aspects can be connected in many ways, due to the relevance of the topics surrounding causality for many events concerning individuals, groups, and society as a whole. Hence, the problems regarding causality are pertinent to philosophical discussions as well as to the research made in sciences such as psychology. But they are also crucial for other realms, such as law, where causal relationship is commonly taken into account in some legal spheres (especially regarding a possible sanction).19

Among the conceptions of causal explanation, the analysis made by James Francis Woodward (Chicago, 17 September 1946) on causality as an intervention has been influential worldwide. Since his book Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (2003a),20 there has been an outpour of publications using his ideas in epistemological and methodological debates, both regarding science in general (mainly natural sciences, but also social sciences) and concerning special sciences such as psychology. This is the reason this paper is focused on his philosophical approach.

1Preference for Causal Explanations and Interest in Psychological Cases

Actually, Woodward has worked on causality and causal explanations since his first publication (Woodward 1979). In addition, he has shown frequent interest in psychological events, considering experiences of folk psychology as well as contributions of scientific psychology. His focus of attention is commonly on causal explanations, and psychological events are among the cases that he analyzes regarding causal relationships.21 Their explanations, either of types or singular cases, are seen from the perspective of an interventionist conception of causality (see Woodward 2007b), although he also pays attention to counterfactual interpretations of causal relationships (cf. Woodward 2011).

Natural phenomena as well as social events are considered by Woodward according to a naturalist conception of causal explanation. In his philosophical approach, there is a continuity between ordinary phenomena and events and the scientific research on them, which is one of the leads of his book on the theory of causal explanation (2003a). Thus, he puts effort into

showing how the apparatus of direct graphs and a manipulationist approach to causation can be used to reconstruct commonsense judgments about token-causal relationships (Woodward 2003a, p. 85).22

But his style of thought includes a relevant second step, which has more of a Kantian methodological flavor,23 insofar as – for Woodward –

to the extent that commonsense causal judgments are unclear, equivocal, or disputed, it is better to focus directly on the patterns of counterfactual dependence that lie behind them – the patterns of counterfactual dependence are, as it were, the “objective core” that lies behind our particular causal judgments, and it is such patterns that are the real objects of scientific and particular interest (Woodward 2003a, p. 85).

These contents can be in the realm of psychology, which Woodward sees as one of the “special sciences” (i. e., sciences considered as less consolidated than physics and chemistry, where particular epistemological and methodological problems arise due to the kind of phenomena studied in them). Although he thinks of psychology as a special science, he looks for a methodological continuity between natural sciences and social sciences in terms of a naturalist approach. The characteristic topics of what Merrilee Salmon calls “interpretivism” or the “interpretative point of view” of the social sciences (1992, pp. 408–401, and 2002) have serious difficulties in going into Woodward’s conception of psychology. Thus, within the framework of the Erklären-Verstehen methodological controversy,24 his position is clearly closer to the first than to the second option.

As a consequence, the attention of this paper goes initially to naturalism as a crucial component of his philosophical approach. This analysis is accompanied by a set of specific features in his vision. Thereafter, the research goes to cause and scientific explanation as seen from a structural perspective, the varieties of causality in contemporary philosophy of science, and the manipulative or interventionist conception (as the viewpoint endorsed by Woodward). After these analyses, there are more considerations regarding causality in science, in general, and causality in psychology and human affairs, in particular. They are followed by the bibliographical information concerning his work and the topics discussed here.

2A Naturalism Open to Hypothetical Explanations and Ideal Interventions

Following Woodward’s approach, causality requires taking into account the concept of “causation” and the features of causal explanations. Initially, their study belong to the general approach to philosophy of science and, in principle, causation and causal explanations can reach any of the empirical sciences (either natural, social, or artificial).25 In addition, it is assumed that they do not have a role within formal sciences, at least insofar as cause connects with intervention and “the notion of an intervention has not a role in mathematical proofs” (Woodward 2003a, p. 221). Thus, the explanations in logic and mathematics follow a different path from natural sciences26 (this is the case even in strict finitist approaches, where mathematics is above all a human activity).27

Although Woodward is interested in how we use causal and explanatory claims, he recognizes that his project also has a significant revisionary component, which goes beyond such a descriptive attempt regarding the actual use of causal and explanatory claims (cf. Woodward 2003a, p. 7). On the one hand, it is revisionary in how causality is sometimes thought of in ordinary life and in certain scientific practices; and, on the other, it is also revisionary insofar as his approach offers guidance on how causality should be thought of, which underlines the role of hypothetical experiments and accepts ideal interventions.

Within this twofold philosophical project – descriptive as well as revisionary – there is a frequent intertwining of two kinds of elements: (i) some very detailed descriptions of causal relationships (e. g., in order to criticize the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation),28 and (ii) a frequent insistence on “hypothetical interventions” (cf.Woodward 2003a, pp. 57, 102, 146, et passim), including “hypothetical experiments” (see Woodward 2003a, pp. 49, 114–117, 129, et passim), in order to characterize causal relationships. Thus, the role of the realm of the ideal in Woodward’s analysis is explicitly highlighted:

My aim is to give an account of the content or meaning of various locutions, such as X causes Y, X is a direct cause of Y, and so on, in terms of the response of Y to a hypothetical idealized experimental manipulation or intervention on X (Woodward 2003a, p. 38, emphasis added).

Descriptive as well as revisionary aspects of the psychological issues appear when Woodward discusses psychology under the label of “special sciences.” The descriptive component is available when causal relationships in the psychological field are in empirical studies – usually experiments – concerning “with how subjects (adults, but also small children and nonhuman animals) learn and reason about causal relationships” (Woodward 2012, p. 961). Meanwhile he accepts a second branch – “theoretical” – where the question at stake is “to explain how people ought to learn, reason, and judge regarding causal relations” (Woodward 2012, p. 961). This second branch, which he labels “normative,” is where the revisionary has a lead.

These issues on what psychology actually is and what it ought to be need to take into account the philosophico-methodological status of this scientific discipline. In this regard, I think that there are reasons to consider that psychology is scientifically dual, insofar as it has a direct relation with epistemological and methodological problems of the natural sciences (e. g., in areas such as psychobiology, and specifically, in psychophysiology) and it also has an undeniable link to epistemological and methodological problems of the social sciences (e. g., in social psychology and psycho-pedagogy). In addition, psychology has a role regarding the sciences of the artificial, especially when discussing artificial intelligence and the similarities and differences between designed machines and human minds.29

When Woodward discusses psychological issues from the perspective of causal explanations, on the one hand, he aims to stress that theoretical and empirical approaches can be combined, since he sees them as complementary (which seems in tune with a naturalist continuity between science and philosophy). But, on the other hand, besides the “descriptive” level, he wants to add a philosophical reflection regarding the ought to be (i. e., the “revisionary” or “prescriptive” way), where the “traditional” conceptions on causation (such as, regularity, process theory, counterfactual, etc.) are replace...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Table of Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• New Contributions to Psychology as a Special Science: Causality and Psychological Subject
• Part I: Causal Reasoning in the Context of Normative and Descriptive Psychology
• Part II: Causal Cognition and Psychological Explanations: Structural and Dynamic Aspects
• Part III: Scientific Status of Psychology and the Psychological Subject
• Part IV: From Psychology to Psychiatry: Limits of Computational Psychology and the Role of Causes as Interventions in Psychiatry
• Index of Names
• Subject Index