Predication and Ontology

Studies and Texts on Avicennian and Post-Avicennian Readings of Aristotle's ›Categories‹

Alexander Kalbarczyk

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9783110591705
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ancient & Classical Philosophy

In Predication and Ontology A. Kalbarczyk provides the first monograph-length study of the Arabic reception of Aristotle's Categories. At the center of attention is the critical reappraisal of that treatise by Ibn S?n? (d. 428 AH/1037 AD), better known in the Latin West as Avicenna. Ibn S?n?'s reading of the Categories is examined in the context of his wider project of rearranging the transmitted body of philosophical knowledge. Against the background of the late ancient commentary tradition and subsequent exegetical efforts, Ibn S?n?'s Kit?b al-Maq?l?t of the Šif?? is interpreted as a milestone in the gradual reshuffle of the relationship between logic proper and ontology. In order to assess the philosophical impact of this realignment, some of the subsequent developments in Ibn S?n?'s writings and in the emerging post-Avicennian tradition are also taken into account. The thematic focus lies on the two fundamental classification schemes which Aristotle introduces in the treatise: the fourfold division of Cat. 2 (" of a subject"/" in a subject") and the tenfold scheme of Cat. 4 (i.e., substance and the nine genera of accidents). They both pose the question of whether and how the manner in which an expression is predicated relates to extra-linguistic reality. As the study intends to show, this question is one of the driving forces of Ibn S?n?'s momentous reform of the Aristotelian curriculum.

This monograph has been awarded the Iran World Award for Book of the Year (2020).

1. Varying Approaches of Determining the Scope of the Categories

A. STUDY

1.1. Pre-Avicennian Justifications for Including the Categories in the Logic Curriculum

Among the six (or more) main points of inquiry (κεφάλαια) which, according to the Neoplatonic commentators, need to be clarified prior to reading the Categories,16 the question of the σκοπός, i.e., what the ‘aim’ or ‘scope’ of the treatise is, has remained subject to intense debates up to the present day.17 Since among Aristotle’s ancient readers there appears to have been a broad consensus on the view that the Categories, in one way or another, aims at outlining ten genera, the investigation of its σκοπός usually amounts to the question of what the ten categories are genera of.

In drawing on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ complex account of which linguistic and extra-linguistic entities are covered by Aristotle’s descriptive formula “those which are said without combination” (τὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα), the Ammonian commentators unanimously discard three one-dimensional positions that may be taken on this issue: As John Philoponus, inter alios, emphasizes, the scope of the Categories may neither be limited to “concepts only” (νοήματα μόνα), nor to “expressions only” (φωναί μοναί), nor to “things only” (πράγματα μόνα).18 In the same vein, Simplicius reports and rejects three one-dimensional readings of the Categories on the grounds that they would thwart an epistemologically sound inclusion of the treatise in the logic curriculum: Concepts qua concepts are studied in psychology, expressions qua expressions in grammar, and beings qua beings in metaphysics.19

According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, as quoted by Simplicius, the scope of the Categories must be seen in a combination of the linguistic, ontological and psychological dimensions. Thus, the ten categories are understood as “the simple and most generic parts of speech (τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ γενικώτατα τοῦ λόγου μόρια) which signify the simple things (τὰ ἁπλᾶ πράγματα σημαίνοντα) and [which signify] the simple concepts pertaining to these simple things (τὰ περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν πραγμάτων ἁπλᾶ νοήματα).”20 According to this formula, Alexander merely juxtaposes ‘beings’ and ‘concepts’ as two types of significata of the ‘most generic simple expressions,’ without clarifying the relations which hold between all three dimensions. Such a systematization effort can subsequently be found in Ammonius and John Philoponus who, with reference to Iamblichus, invoke the following formula: The Categories deals with “expressions (φωναί) which signify things through mediating concepts” (σημαίνουσαι πράγματα διὰ μέσων νοημάτων).21 Thus, against the background of the semiotic triangle sketched in De Interpretatione 16a3–8, the Ammonian formula of the scope of the Categories understands each of the ten categories as a simple generic expression which signifies an extra-linguistic and extra-mental reality via the conceptualization process taking place in the human soul.

In contrast to this three-dimensional account of the scope of the Categories, Porphyry’s formula “simple significant expressions inasmuch as they signify things” (φωναί σημαντικαί ἁπλαῖ καθὸ σημαντικαί εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων)22 omits the level of the νοήματα. It is not at random that Plotinus’ most prominent disciple put such a particular emphasis on the semantic aspect of the treatise: rather than touching on the contested issue of the status of intelligible universals, Porphyry treats the Categories as a propaedeutic work which – as Steven Strange has argued – provides the student with an investigation of “the semantics of terms that apply primarily to sensibles.”23 Thus, by narrowing its scope to the semantics of our pre-philosophical everyday language, Porphyry – as a reaction to his teacher’s critique of the faulty metaphysical outline given in the Categories – greatly minimizes the ontological significance of the treatise and, in doing so, succeeds in corroborating its role as the fundamental introductory textbook of logic.24 Simplicius, who – as we have seen – was well-aware of the three-dimensional approach of formulating the scope of the Categories, deliberately follows Porphyry in stressing the semantic aspect of the treatise: “The scope concerns the simple (ἁπλαῖ) expressions (λέξεις), inasmuch as they are significative (καθὸ σημαντικαί εἰσιν).”25

As the Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt by Ibn Sīnā’s contemporary Abū l-Faraǧ b. aṭ-Ṭayyib (d. 1043 AD) attests, the fact that the Ammonian formula – in contrast to the Porphyrian formula – included the dimension of the νοήματα helped generate the misperception that Ammonius had intended to restrict the realm of the ten categories to “the forms realized in the intellect” (aṣ-ṣuwar al-ḥāṣila fī l-ʿaql).26 Curiously enough, John Philoponus – with reference to his teacher Ammonius – attributes the position which limits the Categories to the conceptual level to Porphyry.27 Moreover, Abū l-Faraǧ b. aṭ-Ṭayyib – possibly against the background of the fact that Alexander’s account stresses the linguistic signification and mental conceptualization of the ἁπλᾶ πράγματα – characterizes al-Iskandar al-Afrūdisī as the “head” (raʾīs) of those scholars who claimed that the classification offered by the ten categories remains confined to the dimension of “existing things” (al-umūr al-mawǧūda).28 It should be noted that none of the extant commentaries on the Categories, whether in the Greek or Arabic tradition, actually embraces a one-dimensional view of the scope of the treatise. However, the frequent misattributions of these three one-dimensional positions to some prominent forerunners suggest that for the exegetical tradition these fiercely debated views were not merely three theoretically possible answers to the question of what the ten categories are genera of.

Porphyry’s well-attested stress on the semantic aspect of the scope of the treatise gave rise to the following interpretation: Abū l-Ḫayr al-Ḥasan b. Suwār b. al-Ḫammār (d. after 1017 AD) and his pupil Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib both report that according to Porphyry a category is nothing but “the simple expression (al-lafẓa al-basīṭa) which signifies a certain thing (ad-dāllatu ʿalā amrin mā), inasmuch as it is significative (min ḥayṯu hiya dāllatun),” devoid of any additional qualifications;29 and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib claims that to this end Porphyry provided the etymological explanation that the Greek expression qāṭīġūriyās means “nothing more than ‘an expression signifying anything from among the things’” (laysat akṯara min lafẓatin dāllatin ʿalā amrin mina l-umūr).30 Ibn Suwār contrasts this broad semantic approach with the narrower view that only those “simple expressions which signify the high genera (ad-dāllatu ʿalā l-aǧnāsi l-ʿāliya)” are eligible to be Aristotelian categories.31 Moreover, he stresses the fact that these must be expressions “in the first imposition” (fī l-waḍʿ al-awwal),32 that is to say, expressions of an object-language referring to ‘existents’ in contrast to expressions of a grammatical or logical meta-language which would be ‘in the second imposition.’ He further qualifies them as being “significative through the mediation of the traces of them in the soul” (dāllatun bi-tawassuṭi l-aṯāri llatī fī n-nafsi minhā),33 thus introducing the conceptual level by means of a direct reference to the παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς (De Interpretatione 16a6–7) which Isḥāq rendered into Arabic as al-aṯār allatī fī n-nafs and aṯār an-nafs.34 At the same time, Ibn Suwār also includes an inversion of the Porphyrian formula in his account of the “scope” (ġaraḍ): The treatise is not only about significative expressions, inasmuch as they signify things, but also about “things (umūr), inasmuch as they are signified by a linguistic expression (bi-l-lafẓ).”35

Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib in his Tafsīr K. al-Maqūlāt closely follows his teacher’s formulation, with the notable difference that in his version the simple expressions, rather than signifying the summa genera through a conceptualization process in the soul, directly signify universals which are summa genera:

His aim (ġaraḍuhū) in this book lies precisely in giving an account of the simple expressions (al-alfāẓ al-basīṭa) signifying the universal things (ad-dālla ʿalā l-umūr alkulliyya) which are the highest genera (allatī hiya l-aǧnās al-ʿāliya) which are in the primary imposition, and of corresponding things (al-umūr bi-ḥasabihā).36

Even though both Ibn Suwār and...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Preface
• Contents
• INTRODUCTION
• KEY ISSUES IN IBN SĪNĀ’S RECEPTION OF THE CATEGORIES AND IN THE ENSUING PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES
• 1. Varying Approaches of Determining the Scope of the Categories
• 2. Ibn Sīnā’s Reception of the Two Aristotelian Criteria for Dividing “Beings” (ὄντα): “Being Said of a Subject” and “Existing in a Subject”
• 3. Attempts at Providing a Systematization of the Scheme of Ten Categories
• 4. Disputes about the Conceptual Unity and Generic Predicability of Accident and Substance
• SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
• APPENDICES
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDICES