Out of the Cold

The Cold War and Its Legacy

Michael R. Fitzgerald, Allen Packwood

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781623569983
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Relazioni internazionali

Featuring first hand accounts by international politicians and diplomats along with analyses by leading scholars, this unique collection of essays provides insights from multiple perspectives to foster better understanding of international relations during and after the Cold War. Experts from both sides of the "iron curtain" shed light on the origins, struggles, ending, and legacy of the conflict that dominated the second half of the twentieth century and that still affects current East-West relations, the securing and dismantling of weapons of mass destruction, and the instability of many regions. With a particular focus on diplomatic relations, the book looks at the origins of the conflict from Yalta to Korea, the prelude to Détente from Cuba to Vietnam, followed by the move from Détente to dialogue. It then addresses such issues as strategic weapons, the impact of the war on scientific research, intelligence, and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Lastly, it examines the legacy of the Cold War across regions of the world, including Europe, Japan, India, China, and the lessons to be drawn for today's diplomatic relations and intelligence. With contributions from Howard Baker, Jr., Sir Anthony Brenton, Susan Eisenhower, Grigoryi Karasin, Alexander Likhotal, Kishan Rana, Ying Rong, and more, the volume presents a truly international treatment of a subject of global dimensions and importance. Students of politics and international relations will find it invaluable as will Foreign Service practitioners, and instructors teaching the Cold War and foreign affairs.

CHAPTER ONE

Setting the context

A plethora of complex issues surrounded the origins of the Cold War. Grigoriy Karasin and Susan Eisenhower address these issues and explain how post-World War II attitudes shaped global politics and international relations well into the 1950s. Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin’s standpoint is that of a career Soviet and Russian diplomat and politician. Eisenhower offers a unique perspective on the people and events of the Cold War, as she witnessed many of them as the granddaughter of President Dwight Eisenhower, and later in her life as an expert visitor to the Soviet Union and Russia. Thus, from strikingly different points of view, Karasin and Eisenhower examine the deleterious effect of political ideology as a feature of the Cold War and its aftermath. Despite their differences, both express deep concern for the unresolved problem of integrating the Russian Federation into the social, economic, and security framework of Europe.

The ideological confrontation between East and West had a life of its own

Grigoriy Karasin

We live now in a world radically different from the Cold War era. Still, the period of bipolar confrontation continues to affect the ideology and practical policies of many countries in such a way that we continue to feel the Cold War’s repercussions. What is needed at present is a clear and fair assessment of the Cold War and its legacy on contemporary international affairs.

It is obvious that there are no simple, unambiguous answers to the question as to who was responsible for starting the Cold War, or the nature of its conduct and outcome. Detailed historical research does not corroborate the popular belief that the Cold War was unleashed as a Western response to the Soviet Union’s refusal to cooperate with its World War II allies due to the return to prewar communist expansion. Historical records show that slipping into the Cold War was at least a bilateral process. The United States and Great Britain for their part must bear a great deal of responsibility for initiating their roles. It was, in fact, a revival of policies toward Soviet Russia that existed in the period between the two World Wars. It was adjusted to accommodate the greatly enhanced capabilities of the Soviet Union.

In 1946, Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri and George Kennan’s famous long telegram¹ did not set any course of predetermined events. Rather, they contributed to an ideological choice that had yet to be sold to Western public opinion. The inevitable conclusion is that our wartime Western Allies simply returned to the same old track of ideologically charged foreign policy that was an underlying cause of World War II. The ideological extremes of European thinking during the interwar period explains why ruling elites in leading Western democracies were so enthusiastic in supporting Hitler’s Germany as a stronghold against Bolshevism. Neither Nazism nor anti-Semitism could dissuade them from supporting Hitler as doing so seemingly led to success. As soon as the Allies’ common goal of defeating fascism was achieved, Western countries returned to many of their prewar attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, in performing its monumental role in defeating Nazi Germany, had overstretched its capacities by the end of the war. Moscow was simply unable to initiate any confrontation with its former anti-Hitler coalition allies. It is natural to suppose that the USSR, in having paid such a dreadful price to achieve victory, was willing to play by the rules and to compromise with its former allies. Henry Kissinger has admitted that the United States through its own actions, gave the Soviet Union the impression that it was trying to put the USSR in a permanent no win situation. Kissinger observed that Washington failed to fully realize that the security needs of a continental power were significantly different from those of the powers surrounded, like the United States, by oceans.² At the end of World War II George Kennan, who later authored the containment concept, advocated a compromise agreement between the United States, the UK, and the USSR based on a final delimitation of spheres of influence in Europe.³ Therefore, it is difficult to understand what in 1945–6, apart from ideological preferences, and perhaps the ephemeral hope of preserving the US nuclear monopoly, prevented the implementation of the principles that provided the basis for détente in the 1970s. The postwar militarization of Western economies and foreign policies were factors in starting the Cold War. The Anglo-American concept of containment envisaged not only blocking Moscow’s expansion, but also the demolition of the Soviet system itself as the final objective of the Cold War. It therefore is simplistic to say that the Cold War was started by the Soviet Union, or that the actions of the Soviet Union were the real reason for such a tough line by the West.

The ideological confrontation between East and West assumed a life of its own during the Cold War; a life having nothing to do with common sense, which continues to shape our political relationships. A recent American report, prepared at the request of the Pentagon, demonstrates that US administrations intentionally and persistently overestimated the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. It shows, for example, that the USSR never in fact based its military strategies on the concept of the preemptive strike.⁴

The Yalta and Potsdam Conferences did not determine postwar developments in the Central and East European countries. It was the sudden shift of American and British policy-makers toward a posture of noncooperation and confrontation that played the key role in shaping their future. The Western powers cast aside previous understandings about the Soviet sphere of influence. Instead, they sought to control postwar events and government in this Central and Eastern Europe. This Cold War policy left no incentive for Stalin to pursue a more creative and moderate policy in that region, and is confirmed by the events that took place at end of the 1946 through the beginning of 1948. It is a subject that should be seriously explored by scholars. The United States and Britain need to open their archives, which would shed light on the initial period of the Cold War.

The beginning of the Cold War had a negative impact on the internal development of the Soviet Union, as it prevented whatever reforms might have been contemplated. The renewal of the USSR that might have been generated by the tragic experience of the war was thwarted and delayed for many years after. Social, economic, and political reform was necessary in the USSR immediately following World War II due to the widespread destruction and suffering caused by the war. If the West had taken a more constructive line of engagement with the Soviet Union in 1946, things might have turned out differently in the Soviet Union. This probably would have given Stalin no choice but to proceed with social and political reform. It would have removed his excuse for refusing reform and developing a system centered on his own person—his cult of personality.⁵

Engagement is a brilliant human invention. When you engage issues you achieve much more than confronting each other. That is why the Soviet Party Congress in 1956 is so important. At that meeting “peaceful coexistence” was first proposed to the senior levels of the Soviet government as an alternative to the vicious confrontation with the West. Before that, peaceful coexistence was contrary to the line of the ruling party in the Soviet Union. This made possible the subsequent Soviet proposal on collective security in Europe. This draft treaty was aimed at preventing the establishment of the European defense community and the remilitarization of West Germany. The Cold War, however, was already in force and had gained its own momentum. This analysis of events persuades us that the Cold War, with its drastic shift from the Allied policy of cooperation to ideological confrontation, rather than being historically predetermined, represents an aberration in international relations.

The Cold War provides common lessons for all of us. These lessons include: the inevitable harm that results from national infallibility complexes, the futility of efforts to impose social and political systems against a people’s own will, the danger of militarizing international relations, and the fallaciousness of using military force to solve problems instead of settling them through political and diplomatic means. We should realize that attempts to answer the questions of who “won” and who “lost” the Cold War are doomed to failure. For many unbiased analysts, it is clear that Russia simply withdrew from the Cold War by renouncing the ideology that pushed the Soviet Union into it. This was the choice made by the Russian political elite, the Russian people, and by the other republics of the former USSR. Russia managed to avail itself of its potential in order to produce this extremely difficult change in the intellectual and spiritual sphere. At the same time, the realpolitik of the West was engulfed by a euphoria that had little to do with meaningful, long-term analysis. During the two decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall, our partners, primarily the United States, have pursued the “nothing has changed” course driven by the spirit of triumphalism and a desire to move into the geopolitical space that was left by the Soviet Union. The recent interview with former US Secretary of State James Baker in Der Spiegel, together with many other materials on the subject, cast a new light on the double game played by Western leaders in persuading Gorbachev not to oppose reunification of Germany.⁶ Furthermore, many of us were shocked when Lech Walesa recently said in Berlin “We were lucky that the Soviet Union at that time had such a weak leader.”⁷ These triumphalist attitudes are unhelpful.

The problem of European integration could easily have been solved much earlier than it was. It could have occurred, without dissolving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), by making the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) a full-fledged regional organization in accordance with Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. This would have enabled Europe to deal with the whole range of Euro-Atlantic issues. It could have produced a collective security system in the region that was open, understandable, and guaranteed unity. Our Western partners, unfortunately, took a different path and expanded NATO. It seems appropriate again to cite George Kennan, who viewed NATO enlargement as “The greatest mistake of the West in the last 50 years.”⁸

The world is undergoing one of the turning points of history. The current financial and economic crisis demonstrates the failure of attempts to return to a so-called pure liberal capitalism. At the same time the elusive hope of creating a unipolar world adds a special acuteness to this situation. There is an ongoing radical and irreversible transformation of the world’s landscape. We are witnessing the emergence of a new polycentric world in all levels of politics, economics, and finance.

The West originally drew basically incorrect conclusions about social and economic development at the conclusion of the Cold War. Many, for example, considered the socially oriented economies of Western Europe a vestige of the Cold War and not its positive byproduct. There were attempts to destroy this economic model, such as through the unsuccessful Lisbon Agenda of the European Union (EU) promulgated in 2000.⁹ These unsuccessful efforts produced the current global financial and economic crisis.

The scale of global challenges makes it necessary to adopt an integrated agenda in international relations today. During the general debate in the UN General Assembly in September 2009, this was the opinion of practically everyone, including President Obama. There is a growing understanding that today the main priority of world politics is the harmonization of international relations based on the rapprochement and understanding of different economies and cultures. The activities of the G-20 aimed at overcoming the global crisis most vividly demonstrate that the international community is increasingly aware that there are no alternatives to coordinated actions. This is illustrated by modernization and economic development, which is the goal of Russian foreign policy.

So, not for the first time, there opens a window of opportunity for developing relations of open partnership in the Euro-Atlantic region. The partnership could be based on collaboration between Russia, the EU, and the United States. President Medvedev repeatedly has expressed his belief that such collaboration should become a backbone of political unity in the Euro-Atlantic area. We hope that the process of resetting the Russian-American relationship and a renewal of cooperation between Russia and NATO will contribute to a new beginning for Euro-Atlantic politics.

Certainly, the momentum of the past is still strong. This is evidenced by the desire of certain nations to act based on zero sum thinking, which assumes that the security and economic interests of some states are insured at the expense of others. There are those who would like to draw a new ideological dividing line in Europe. For example, during a recent hearing of the US Helsinki Commission, US Senator Sam Brownback insisted that the Obama administration should expedite the entry of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO so as to protect them from Russian military aggression. Such messianic enthusiasm is a shortcut to repeating the mistakes made in European affairs in the 1990s, and earlier in the mid-1940s. This is misguided because the bonds between Russia and the countries of the former USSR, like those with Central and Eastern Europe, are so strong and long-lasting that any attempt to make these countries choose between joining a strong NATO or weak Russia can cause a profound destabilizing effect.

The crisis in the Caucasus in 2008, provoked by the irresponsible policy of the Saakasvhili regime in Georgia, demonstrates that the use of force in today’s world is usually counterproductive. In this instance Georgia lost its territorial integrity through the fault of its leaders. Nevertheless, today there is an increasing awareness of the new realities in global affairs. Network diplomacy is the logical alternative to outmoded, hierarchical security structures. We welcome the proposal for building a global security network recently offered by the former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.¹⁰ In this context, the construction of an indivisible security network from Vancouver to Vladivostok is an increasingly urgent task. It can only occur when Cold War era, bloc-based confrontational approaches to security are abandoned.

I hope that no nation will resort to militarizing their economies as a means to recover from the current global economic crisis, as was the case after the Great Depression. It is beyond doubt that security can be insured only with the involvement of all states, as well as the relevant organizations in the Euro-...

Table of contents

• List of photographs
• Foreword Professor Sir David Wallace
• Preface Allen Packwood
• Acknowledgments Michael R. Fitzgerald
• Acronyms and abbreviations
• Chronology
• Contributors
• 1 Setting the context
• 2 Origins and preliminaries
• 3 Prelude to détente
• 4 From détente to dialogue
• 5 In the shadow of the bomb: The technology of the Cold War
• 6 Coming in from the cold: Intelligence in the Cold War
• 7 Ending the Cold War: Uncertainties and breakthroughs in Europe
• 8 The European legacy
• 9 The Asian legacy
• 10 Reflections on the lessons of the Cold War
• Bibliography
• Index