Migration Crises and the Structure of International Cooperation

Jeannette Money, Sarah Lockhart

• Publisher: University of Georgia Press
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780820354064
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Emigration & Immigration
• Index: Social Sciences

Although international cooperation on migration is often promoted, scholars have been unable to arrive at a consensus about the extent of cooperation in the current system. Under what conditions does international cooperation on migration arise, and what shape does it take? These questions are important because migrants are often vulnerable to human rights abuses during their journeys as well as in the country of destination, and international cooperation represents one mechanism for reducing this vulnerability.

Jeannette Money and Sarah P. Lockhart ask these questions as they examine the patterns of migration flows during the post– World War II period, with particular attention to crises or shocks to the international system, as in the case of migration following the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria. Their analysis makes several important contributions to this debate. First, they explain how the broad pattern of migration in the contemporary era—generally from poorer, less stable countries to wealthier, more stable countries—fosters cooperation that is predominantly bilateral, when cooperation does in fact occur. Second, they argue that cooperation is unlikely under most circumstances, because countries of destination prefer the current system, which privileges their sovereignty over migration flows. Finally, they posit that cooperation may arise under three conditions: when the costs of maintaining the status quo increase, when countries of origin locate a venue where their numbers allow them to control the bargaining agenda, or when migrant flows tend toward reciprocity.

CHAPTER 1

Migration Patterns and the Prevalence of Bilateralism

The Empirical Puzzle

DOES INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION on migration exist? The fable of the blind men and the elephant is well known—each blind man examines one part of the elephant and projects this knowledge onto the whole, thereby drawing an inaccurate picture of the empirical reality. The scholars who study international cooperation in migration are similar to the blind men. There is a bewildering number of scholarly efforts to describe, explain, and promote collaboration in the international system among states on issues surrounding the flow of individuals across borders. Yet there is little agreement among scholars about whether there is no regime at all (Hollifield 2000; UNDP 2009), or whether efforts to manage international migration privilege wealthy and powerful countries in the international system (Lindley 2011), or whether there exists a “tapestry” of different kinds of cooperation depending on the type of collective action problem that arises (Betts 2011). Moreover, there is a new terminology that incorporates a broader set of actors in the international system, labeled “global governance.” Migration cooperation, from this perspective, is not just the action of states but the action of both state and nonstate actors in the international system (Held and McGrew 2002; Woods 2002).¹ Yet these scholars are presumably all looking at the same empirical reality. How do we make sense of these different visions of cooperation?

We take this scholarly disagreement as a point of departure. It is useful to reexamine the parable of the elephant and the blind men in light of the literature that explores international cooperation on migration. Although one might draw a number of lessons from this parable, we emphasize that we cannot understand international cooperation on migration without understanding that the various components of cooperation are systematically connected into a larger whole. A single theoretical framework can account for the varying patterns of international cooperation on voluntary migration. We present this framework in two chapters. In this chapter, we argue that the dominant form of cooperation on voluntary migration is bilateral, because the dominant pattern of migration flows are unidirectional and unique to each state. In chapter 2, we provide a bargaining framework that employs the status quo and state preferences, along with exogenous shocks, to locate the timing and content of international agreements on migration.

We begin by addressing some definitional issues that help clarify the scope of our research: the definition of voluntary migration, the role of the state as the central actor in international cooperation, and the distinctiveness of migration as an international economic flow. We then outline a central theoretical lens, how the possibilities for cooperation are shaped by the unidirectional and unique patterns of voluntary migration. These patterns limit cooperation because the lack of reciprocity reduces an important element of cooperative behavior in the international system and because the pattern of flows generates externalities or market failures that are dyadic rather than regional or global in scope. In chapter 2, we introduce a bargaining framework that allows us to hypothesize about the conditions under which states may cooperate on migration issues.

VOLUNTARY MIGRATION

Our focus is on voluntary migration. As noted in our introduction, this focus presumes a clear distinction between “voluntary” and “forced” migration, yet we know that migrants often have multiple motives for moving and that the legal definition of “refugee,” found in the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, is so narrow as to leave many migrants unprotected from violence and other threats to their existence.² Thus, there is an ethical definition of “forced” migration that differs significantly from the legal definition. However, this legal fiction is actually important in practice, and migrants are classified according to the legal criterion every day. A case in point is the 2015 European crisis, which has been labeled a migrant rather than refugee crisis, despite significant migrant flows from war-torn countries, as our three stories of migrants within that flow illustrate. Although the door clearly has been more open to Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans whose countries are experiencing civil conflict, even these migrants usually gain temporary protected status rather than refugee status as defined in the UN convention (European Commission 2016). The remainder are treated as voluntary economic migrants whom the receiving state can accept or reject, depending on state preferences on immigration. Moreover, there is a specific constellation of treaties and organizations that deal with forced migration, as distinct from “voluntary” migration. So we employ the legal distinction to set apart a group of migrants not governed by the refugee regime with the purpose of examining whether there is a (voluntary) migration regime and how that regime works.

This question is important in part because the vast majority of individuals living outside their country of birth are defined as voluntary migrants. The UNDP reports that in 2008, of the approximately two hundred million migrants—those living for more than one year outside their country of origin—only around fifteen million were classified as refugees (UNDP 2009). Most of the individuals caught up in “migration crises” are classified as migrants rather than as refugees. If migrant rights activists and the international community more broadly hope to reduce the human tragedies involved in many migration flows, understanding the prospects for cooperation on voluntary migration is central.³

In order to make sense of the underlying structure of international cooperation, we focus our lens on the regime for voluntary migration. However, the entire picture of “global migration governance,” according to Rey Koslowski (2011a), can be divided into three subregimes: the travel or mobility regime, the voluntary migration regime, and the forced migration or refugee regime. The travel or mobility regime deals with individuals who cross international borders and includes those who stay for short periods, such as tourists, family visitors, business travelers, and students, as well as voluntary and forced migrants. The refugee regime is defined by the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and subsequent protocol (1967) and is monitored by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In the conclusions, we point to characteristics of refugee and travel flows that are distinctive from voluntary migration and suggest modifications to our theoretical framework to account for different patterns of international cooperation in these migration subregimes, particularly the refugee regime.

MIGRATION AS A UNIQUE INTERNATIONAL FLOW

International cooperation forms a generic research agenda for scholars of international relations. There is a substantial amount of theoretical research that explores the conditions under which states in the international system find it beneficial to cooperate or coordinate their activities that we should be able to apply to a specific international economic flow. However, we agree with most scholars that migration is somehow distinctive from other international economic flows. The question, then, revolves around how migration might differ from flows of goods, services, or capital in ways that affect the prospects for global governance.

Migration and Identity Politics. Although migration and other international economic flows share a number of commonalities, migration has several distinct dimensions as well. One distinctive element may be related to the fact that migrants are individuals with their own cultures, customs, and languages, so the politics of migration often involve identity. In addition to societal concerns over economic issues, political organization arises in the form of anti-immigrant movements or political parties that adopt electoral platforms focusing on preserving a national identity and a cherished way of life.⁴ Identity issues may generate greater opposition to migration than to other international economic flows, and the political backlash might be sufficient to discourage cooperation among states on migration issues.

It is difficult to disagree with the observation that vociferous political opposition has arisen in response to migration, and that anti-immigrant parties are common in many immigrant-receiving societies. It is also true that some migrants disrupt some members of the society in which they choose to live and work. Yet societal disruption is also a common feature of trade and capital flows. Trade can displace and decimate industries that were once a major source of employment and wealth—in wealthy as well as poor countries. Shifting patterns of comparative advantage can uproot a local population and set in motion vast internal migrations. Consumption patterns may change as well, sometimes for the worse, as the Nestlé infant formula scandal well illustrates.⁵ Foreign direct investment may bring changes in social mores as well as increasing inequality, among other things (Alderson and Nielsen 1999; Choi 2006). So, although migration can be disruptive to the host society, it is certainly not the only international economic flow that is disruptive, and may not even be the most disruptive.⁶ If the backlash to migration plays a crucial role in blocking international cooperation, one might expect the political backlash from international trade and foreign direct investment to prevent cooperation in those arenas. Yet we tend to see many instances of global cooperation for these international economic flows, such as encompassed in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2011).⁷

Human Rights and Migration. One dimension that may well be distinctive, especially in the post–World War II era, and that has seen the acceptance of human rights as a central tenet of the international system is that migrants are human beings first and labor only second. Max Frisch, a Swiss playwright, famously noted that “we asked for workers. We got people instead.” This insight might provide the key to understanding why the politics of international cooperation on migration are different than those of other economic flows in the most recent era. Prior to World War II, states unceremoniously expelled nonnationals when it suited their interests. This was true in democratic as well as autocratic regimes.⁸ The advent of human rights regimes granted citizens as well as residents, documented and undocumented, some basic protections. Beginning with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has created nine core human rights instruments that reduce the distinction between citizens and residents of any state.⁹ This contrasts with flows of goods or capital, where no human rights are involved.

Ruhs and Chang (2004) bring this distinction to bear when they argue that migrants enter the host state with a bundle of rights.¹⁰ While it is true that the size of the bundle may vary, Ruhs and Chang make a convincing argument that migration is distinctive from other international economic flows because these rights change the equation of costs and benefits of migration. Although we believe this observation is accurate, we do not believe that this distinction is crucial to the prospects for international cooperation. Like trade in goods and services, the costs and benefits of migration are borne differently by different groups in society. This helps establish the interested actors who enter the political arena—and thus affect domestic politics—but there is no systematic link between the costs associated with migrant rights and prospects for international cooperation.

Migration Externalities. Alexander Betts (2011) has pointed out that migration generates externalities in the international system, as have Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uçarer (2002). Externalities are defined as costs and/or benefits that accrue to individuals or groups who did not choose to incur them. Robert Keohane (1984), in After Hegemony, employs the concept of externalities to construct a neofunctionalist model of international cooperation. In essence, externalities generate problems of collective action for those subject to the externality, prompting cooperation among states to overcome the costs through bargaining with the generator of the externality. His is a provocative use of the economic literature on transaction costs to underpin the construction of international regimes or organizations that allow states to achieve better collective outcomes. However, he relies on the notion that externalities affect more than a single actor, creating problems of collective action. In the original work on externalities, Ronald Coase (1960) clearly distinguishes between an externality affecting a single actor and an externality affecting multiple actors. Unless the externality affects multiple actors, there is no need to organize to bargain over the costs of the externality. Otherwise, a situation of bilateral bargaining is generated by the externality—not multiple actors in need of multilateral cooperation. We argue that the patterns of migration in the postwar period have not, for the most part, generated collective externalities (also see Lockhart and Money 2011).

MIGRATION PATTERNS BETWEEN SENDING AND RECEIVING STATES

So, what are the barriers to international cooperation in international migration? We argue that migration patterns in the post–World War II era are characterized by both nonreciprocity and unique receiving country patterns (UNDP 2009; Hatton 2007). Both of these characteristics affect the degree and shape of cooperation.¹¹

The first dimension is characterized by the labeling of states as either “sending” or source states, “receiving” or host states.¹² Some countries, such as Spain and Italy, have made a transition from sending to receiving state in the recent past, but even transition states normally do not experience reciprocal flows. Reciprocal flows are defined by the exchange of migrants between two countries. Those that experience both inflows and outflows during the transition from sending state to receiving state generally send their emigrants to one set of countries and receive their immigrants from another set. Italy, for example, sent its emigrants to wealthier Western democracies in Europe and the Americas while receiving immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa.

There are complex reasons why individuals choose to migrate (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). However, barring state barriers to egress and entry, the general pattern in the contemporary era is from poorer and less stable states to wealthier and more stable states (UNDP 2009). Wealth and stability are relative so that some states in the Global South are receiving states and about half of all voluntary migrant flows are among countries of the Global South. This characteristic is unique to migration in the depth and breadth of international economic flows. It is characterized by predominantly one-way flows, hence the division of states into sending and receiving states (Hatton 2007; Sykes 2013).¹³ The UNDP (2009)...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• List of Tables and Figures
• List of Abbreviations
• INTRODUCTION: Migration Crises as a Lens into International Cooperation
• CHAPTER 1: Migration Patterns and the Prevalence of Bilateralism: The Empirical Puzzle
• CHAPTER 2: A Bargaining Framework for Understanding Cooperation
• CHAPTER 3: Controlling Immigration: Migrant Crises as a Key Driver of Cooperation
• CHAPTER 4: Labor Recruitment: Market Forces and Market Failures
• CHAPTER 5: Freedom of Movement: Reciprocal Flows and Facilitating Immigration
• CHAPTER 6: Criminality in Migration: Successful Multilateral Cooperation
• CHAPTER 7: Migrant Rights: The Failure of Multilateral Cooperation
• CHAPTER 8: Theoretical and Policy Lessons
• Notes
• References
• Index