State Behavior and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

William Keller, Scott Jones, Jeffrey Fields

• Publisher: University of Georgia Press
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9780820347882
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Arms Control
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This is the first book-length study of why states sometimes ignore, oppose, or undermine elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime—even as they formally support it. Anchored by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear nonproliferation regime is the constellation of agreements, initiatives, and norms that work in concert to regulate nuclear material and technology. The essays gathered here show that attitudes on nonproliferation depend on a "complex, contingent decision calculus," as states continually gauge how their actions within the regime will affect trade, regional standing, and other interests vital to any nation.

The first four essays take theoretical approaches to such topics as a framework for understanding challenges to collective action; clandestine proliferation under the Bush and Obama administrations and its impact on regime legitimacy; threat construction as a lens through which to view resistance to nonproliferation measures; and the debate over the relationship between nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Essays comprising the second part of the book use regional and state-specific case studies to look at how U.S. security guarantees affect the willingness of states to support the regime; question the perceived spoiler role of a "vocal minority" within the Non-Aligned Movement; challenge notions that Russia is using the regime to build a coalition hostile to the United States; contrast nonproliferation strategies among Latin American countries; and explain the lag in adoption of an Additional Protocol by some Middle East and North African countries.

Getting countries to cooperate on nonproliferation efforts is an ongoing challenge. These essays show that success must be measured not only by how many states join the effort but also by how they participate once they join.

Country and Regional Explorations

CHAPTER 5

How Supportive of the Nonproliferation Regime Are the United States and Its Allies?

U.S. Security Guarantees and the Free Rider Problem

Lowell H. Schwartz

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE INDICATES that the protection offered by a U.S. security guarantee often formalized in a bilateral or multilateral treaty is one of the most effective measures in controlling nuclear proliferation.¹ In numerous cases once states were offered U.S. security guarantees, they ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and adherents to the precepts of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Even an implicit understanding of protection such as the relationship between Sweden, a formally neutral country during the Cold War, and the United States was enough to convince them not to acquire nuclear weapons.² In some cases the United States placed a great deal of pressure on states to shelve their nuclear ambitions, such as South Korea and Taiwan, while in other cases, such as Australia, a relatively benign security environment and U.S. security guarantees were enough to close off the nuclear option.³

The question this essay explores is how U.S. security guarantees impact states’ willingness to support, sustain, and strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Does the confidence of U.S. protection provide them with a justification for inaction or lacked enforcement of the measures necessary to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons? Or is the opposite true—once a state makes the decision not to acquire nuclear weapons, does it actively and strictly enforce the non-proliferation regime in order to ensure neighboring states remain nonnuclear as well?

DEFINING KEY TERMS

Academic literature and government policy documents discuss several types of security assurances. This chapter focuses on positive security assurances, which are promises by a nuclear state to come to the aid of a nonnuclear state if it is threatened or attacked by nuclear weapons. During the Cold War both superpowers offered these types of security guarantees to their allies. For example, North Korea in 1961 signed a treaty with the Soviet Union that included a mutual defense clause that committed one party to aid the other if it was attacked. The Soviet Union entered into similar agreements with members of the Warsaw Pact.

Negative security assurances are promises not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has consistently sought political commitments from nuclear weapons states never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons states. Despite NAM states’ demands, negative security assurances were not contained in the NPT, and this has consistently been an issue at subsequent review conferences.⁴

U.S. government reports have occasionally referred to “30 plus countries being covered by the American nuclear commitments.”⁵ The most famous of these is the Article V commitment of the NATO founding treaty, which states that an armed attack against any member state will be considered an attack against all other NATO states. This is generally interpreted as implying the possible use of nuclear weapons in case of an attack upon NATO states. The United States also has defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan.

One of the complicating factors is determining whether there is a difference between a nuclear and a nonnuclear security guarantee. During the Cold War when the main threat was a nuclear-armed Soviet Union, extending the umbrella of nuclear deterrence over U.S. allies was viewed as an essential component of U.S. policy. It played an integral role in building alliances, keeping them together in the face of serious military threats, and encouraging allies to forego developing their own nuclear arsenals. Because the United States and its European allies at least initially were conventionally inferior to Soviet forces in Europe, the United States sought to tightly link nuclear and nonnuclear security guarantees. The United States wanted the Soviet Union to believe that a conventional attack on Europe or Asia might lead to a nuclear response.

The United States took many steps to assure its NATO allies of its commitment to their security in the face of Soviet attack, including a wide range of diplomatic measures and consultations, forward-based and dedicated nuclear forces, and joint planning and exercises. In Asia, efforts to assure allies about the U.S. nuclear commitment were not as fully developed as they were in Europe. But the United States took those commitments seriously enough that it based conventional forces and even tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea and Japan. Deployments of conventional forces continue today, but tactical weapons were removed in the 1990s.

The demise of the Soviet Union has significantly diminished the conventional and nuclear threat to Europe from Russia. As a result, the prominence of the U.S. nuclear deterrent has receded as a component of European security. This has led to questions about the continuing relevance of the relatively small number of nuclear forces still stationed in Europe. However, the emerging nuclear threat from Iran and the Russian-Georgia conflict may cause the U.S. extended deterrent to become a feature once again in the European security planning. In Asia, the Soviet threat has also receded, but new threats have emerged that are concerning to U.S. allies. China’s massive conventional modernization, particularly of its conventional ballistic missile forces, has raised concerns in Taiwan and Japan. North Korea’s recent nuclear tests and missile deployments also have raised red flags in Japan and South Korea. These concerns have prompted both Japan and South Korea to raise pointed questions about U.S. policies and deployments, questions that they would not have asked even a few years ago.

PRELIMINARY HYPOTHESES

One of the greatest difficulties in analyzing the impact of the U.S. security guarantee is disentangling it from other explanatory factors. The states to which the United States offers security guarantees have many common characteristics. Almost all of them are industrialized nations with high levels of economic development. Their government structures tend to be democratic rather than authoritarian. Finally, they tend to be status quo powers that are supportive of the current international architecture set up in 1945.⁶ All of these factors apart from whether the United States has offered these states security guarantees are likely to impact states’ willingness to support, sustain, and strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

This essay does not attempt to untangle these factors. Instead it assesses the degree of support for the nonproliferation regime among states with a security guarantee from the United States and what factors might lie behind this support or lack thereof. Given the expectation that states similar to the United States will support the nonproliferation regime, this essay spends more time on the negative side of the equation. Namely, why have U.S. allies occasionally undermined global nonproliferation efforts?

This perspective produces several hypotheses derived from the introductory chapter, which are posed in question format and are explored throughout this chapter.

Hypothesis 1. Threat Perception: Does a state’s perception of the direct threat of proliferation influence its willingness to implement or vigorously support nonproliferation measures?

Hypothesis 2. The Free Rider/Security Guarantee Problem: Do states offered a security guarantee shirk their nonproliferation regime responsibilities because of a feeling of relative security?

Hypothesis 3. Discrimination: Does the discriminatory nature of the treaty, which at its core provides international legitimacy for some powers to possess nuclear weapons and outlaws it for others, contribute to states’ willingness to adhere to the nonproliferation regime? More broadly, is adherence connected to the general support or opposition to the international political order?

Hypothesis 4. Political or Economic Interests: Are there circumstances when the economic and political benefits of exporting nuclear technological materials outweigh the proliferation security concerns?

FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING STATES’ LEVEL OF SUPPORT FOR SUSTAINING AND STRENGTHENING THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

An important initial analytical step is determining what actively supporting or impeding the nuclear nonproliferation regime means. In their essay “The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Jeffrey Fields and Jason Enia provide a helpful framework to analyze the nonproliferation regime.⁷ They see two guiding principles behind the regime: the spread of nuclear weapons harms prospects for peace and security; and nuclear-armed states should not assist nonnuclear weapons states in the development of nuclear weapons.⁸ The health of the regime according to Fields and Enia should be judged on whether these principles remain in the interest of states and the regime evolves to deal with new challenges to the core principles. To provide a comprehensive and accurate assessment of the regime, Fields and Enia utilized a multidimensional framework. This framework can be applied to individual states to judge how supportive they are of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The first element of the regime is normative. Does a state through its behavior and policies reinforce or undermine the normative values of the non-proliferation regime: that the spread of nuclear weapons is harmful to international security and that nuclear-armed and nuclear-capable states should not assist nonnuclear states in developing nuclear weapons. Some states might add an additional normative element that the nuclear weapons states move toward disarmament as articulated in Article VI of the NPT. However, the notion that this underlies the nonproliferation regime is hotly disputed.⁹

The second element is scope. Does a state seek to increase membership in the regime? Does a state encourage states outside the regime to join the regime and to ratify the NPT? How willing is a state to expand the scope of the issues covered by the regime when new factors threaten the health of the regime? For example, since the attacks of September 11 concerns about nuclear terrorism have grown. A state’s willingness to expand the scope of the regime to confront this new challenge would indicate a supportive position.

The third element is strength. Does a state support measures to ensure compliance with the rules and expectations of the regime? Or is it willing to sacrifice compliance if it clashes with other national priorities? This would include support for antismuggling efforts and multilateral sanctions against actors violating the rules of the regime.

The final element is organization. Does a state actively participate in and support the organizational underpinning of the nonproliferation regime? This would include providing staff and inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and participating in the NPT Review Conferences.

ASSESSING THE UNITED STATES

Before assessing states that have an explicit or implicit U.S. security guarantee, it is worth considering how well the United States performs against the standard laid out in the section above. Is the United States a full-fledged supporter of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, or has it been willing to sacrifice the principles of the regime when they conflicted with higher national security priorities?

On the first element of the nonproliferation regime, the normative, for the most part the United States has a good record. The United States was the driving force behind the establishment of the NPT, seeking to move its nonproliferation activities from a bilateral to a multilateral process. The nation diplomatically reached across the Iron Curtain, convincing the Soviet Union that curtailing the proliferation was in the interests of both superpowers. The United States sees the spread of nuclear proliferation as harmful, and since the end of the Cold War nonproliferation has been a central pillar of U.S. foreign and security policy. In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama indicated that dealing with the threat of further nuclear weapons proliferation would be the utmost security priority for the United States.¹⁰

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) lays out the official U.S. nuclear policies. In the ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations and Acronyms
• Introduction
• Theoretical Approaches
• Country and Regional Explorations
• Bibliography
• Contributors
• Index