Conflict Dynamics

Civil Wars, Armed Actors, and Their Tactics

Alethia Cook, Marie Olson Lounsbery, Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Scott Jones

• Publisher: University of Georgia Press
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9780820351063
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Relaciones internacionales

Conflict Dynamics presents case studies of six nation-states: Sierra Leone, the Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Indonesia, and Peru. In the book, Alethia H. Cook and Marie Olson Lounsbery examine the evolving nature of violence in intrastate conflicts, as well as the governments and groups involved, by focusing on the context of the relationships involved, the capacities of the conflict's participants, and the actors' goals. The authors first present a theoretical framework through which the changeable mix of relative group capacities and the resulting tactical decisions can be examined systematically and as conflicts evolve over time. They then apply that framework to the six case studies to show its usefulness in better understand­ing conflicts individually and in comparison.

While previous research on civil wars has tended to focus on causes and outcomes, Conflict Dynamics takes a more comprehensive approach to understanding conflict behavior. The shifting nature of relative group capacity (measured in many different ways), coupled with dynamic group goals, determines the tactical decisions of civil war actors and the paths a rebellion will take. The case studies illustrate the relevance of third parties to this process and how their interventions can influence tactics.

The progression of violence in conflicts is inextricably linked to the decisions made in their midst. These influence future iterations of the conflictual relationship. Complex groups on both sides both drive and are driven by the decisions made. Understanding conflicts requires that these reciprocal impacts be considered. The comparative frame­work demonstrated in this book allows one to flesh out this complexity.

CHAPTER 1
Conflict Dynamics

A Comparative Framework

Civil conflicts are incredibly complex. While there may be similar factors that influence relationships, tactics, strategies, and patterns of violence, each situation is also unique because of the way in which those factors interact. Two conflicts may seem very similar at first glance but end up with entirely different outcomes. As they evolve, unique aspects of the participants, geography, group goals, resources, and relative capacities can result in dramatic changes. These realities make examining patterns of violence problematic. Frequently, the nuances of each case are what matters.

Some intrastate conflicts are enduring in nature. They tend to ebb and flow, involving periods of armed struggle intermixed with times of little to no violence. Efforts to address underlying grievances and bring about conflict termination may occur, but in such cases resolution attempts are frequently unsuccessful, leading some to label them as “intractable” or as enduring rivalries (Kriesberg 1998).¹ Other conflicts, however, may be episodic, or short-term affairs involving a brief period of armed struggle that terminates and never reemerges. Intrastate conflicts can vary in intensity as well. Some, although lasting for decades, may involve low-level violence and displacement, whereas others may experience extremely high levels of violence and occur at various times throughout the conflict history or over a short period of time. The intensity of episodic conflicts can vary in similar ways. Further, intrastate conflicts can vary dramatically in terms of the tactics employed by the actors involved. In some cases, innocent bystanders are targeted, sometimes on a massive scale, while in others, guerrilla warfare dominates or negotiations are prevalent. What accounts for these divergent experiences? By taking a closer look at the actions and reactions occurring within intrastate conflicts over time, one can get a better sense of how and under what conditions conflicts unfold and how more enduring rivalries evolve as compared to their more episodic counterparts. This book examines both specific rivalries that have evolved between actors over time and the more general context of the conflicts.

Examining the dynamic interactions of actors engaged in intrastate conflicts is challenging. Nonstate actors tend to be secretive. This may be necessary in order to survive against their typically more powerful opponent. Rebels may exaggerate their numbers or their support in order to achieve legitimacy. Although such actors may have access to weaponry, it is often unclear what the acquisition channels are or the types of weapons they possess until they are used on the battlefield. Governments in the midst of armed conflict also may not be forthcoming with information about their actions. Repressive approaches to dealing with such opposition may be frowned upon by international actors. As a result, it is not always immediately clear what a government has done when it engages with its nonstate opponent. Of course, over time, its actions, along with those of its opponents, typically become a part of the historical record, which is examined in the form of a series of conflict case studies. Although it may not always be clear what exactly transpired, which actors and how many were involved and under what conditions, through the use of historical and archival accounts a general sense of how intrastate conflict actors interacted and the tactics they employed can be developed. Patterns of violence can also be recognized and analyzed to determine what contributed to changes.

Among the most important aspects of civil conflicts are the decision-making processes that occur on both sides about whether to attempt to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations or to resort to violence, and if one or both sides choose to employ violence, do they also include campaigns of terror? According to Coker (2002), one of the consequences of globalization has been a shift from instrumental violence (between states or communities) to expressive violence (carried out as a form of communication or ritual, or for a symbolic purpose). Factors that contribute to this decision-making process include politics, economics, military considerations, ideologies, and cultures. Another important influence is the role elites and leaders play as compared to that of rank and file members of groups (Cronin 2002/2003).

What follows is a framework that seeks to explain patterns of violence and group dynamics in intrastate conflicts by examining rebel group actions, their tactic selection processes, and the addition or subtraction of additional players. Each of these factors influences and is influenced by the others; the various combinations of factors determine to a large extent the direction any particular conflict will take. This focus is a particularly neglected aspect of conflict dynamics that involves factors related to the rebel group and its conflict with the government. This is not to say that government capabilities, actions, and other characteristics are not important. In fact, they are. But they are presented here as an intertwined relationship of the group, its characteristics, and its capabilities.

FACTORS INFLUENCING SELECTION OF TACTIC

Actors engaged in civil conflict make tactical choices in order to achieve their political goals. Their choice in tactic will influence subsequent decisions by conflict opponents as each set of actors makes revised assessments of their position in the conflict relative to their opponent. These actions and reactions are the factors that influence the direction that a conflict will take and how long it will ultimately endure (Olson Lounsbery and Pearson 2009). Tactical decisions and the impact subsequent actions have on the patterns of violence in a conflict are important in understanding their progression. There are a large number of factors that have been identified in the literature that have the potential to influence the tactics of nonstate actors.² However, these characteristics alone do not provide a sufficient understanding of conflict dynamics. What is necessary is that researchers gain insight into the interaction of the variables as the conflict evolves.

Group and government decisions to employ one set of tactics over another at any point is likely influenced by two sets of factors. The first is thought to be static in nature involving the context of the conflict, while the second set of factors is more dynamic in nature and evolves over time.

Conflict actors are impacted by the environment in which they operate. The characteristics of the conflict environment are primarily static or slow to change. A country’s terrain, for instance, is unlikely to experience significant alteration due to ongoing strife but would likely influence tactical decisions made by rebels and government actors as each pursues their goals. Available mountainous or jungle terrain may allow insurgents to evade governmental pursuit more effectively than those operating in urban settings, for example (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Conflict occurring with such terrain advantages would be expected to endure longer than others.

Conflicts and rivalries unfold in the context of the nation’s political, social, and cultural history as well. Factors such as colonial legacies (Henderson and Singer 2002) and group identity hierarchies (Gurr 1993) lay the foundation for the types of conflicts that may emerge, but they also are likely to influence tactical choices, and therefore conflict progression. A conflict that emerges out of a history of unfair treatment during a country’s colonial history, which itself becomes embedded in the nation’s culture, may make the targeting of civilians, particularly of opposing identities, more acceptable than those emerging under a different historical and cultural context, for example.

A third static factor of the conflict environment thought to influence tactical decisions has to do with the nature of the group itself. Groups that tend to be defined by their ethnic, religious, or cultural identity have a tendency toward more secessionist goals (see Gurr 1993), whereas ideological groups are typically more focused on regime change or political revolution (see Licklider 1995 and Regan 2000a for further discussion of this conflict dichotomy). Groups, and therefore rivals, that define themselves in ethnic, religious, or cultural terms that they view are different than the identity of their government may also find terrorist tactics more acceptable than ideological groups that wish to change the nature of the political regime but do not necessarily see themselves as a distinct identity relative to the rest of the population. As a result, the nature of the group engaged in the conflict will likely influence what sorts of tactics will be acceptable in order to achieve conflict goals.

Although conflict progression may be influenced by these static factors, the action-reaction sequences that unfold over time are dynamic in nature. Understanding the changing environment that influences tactical decisions is the next topic for discussion.

In contrast to the static variables, those that are dynamic are more likely to shift over the course of the conflicts in reaction to other factors. Each set of actors engaged in a conflict may be affected by the actions of the others or by societal reactions. These variables influence the future decisions and actions of both nonstate actors and their government. They are expected to behave similarly regardless of which takes action.

The tactics that each actor employs will likely have an impact on the selection of tactics by others involved. Today’s actions can be expected to influence tomorrow’s decision making and subsequent actions taken. Government repression, for instance, may result in increased support for a nonstate group, or it could cause an opponent to engage in more violent actions. In fact, some groups may engage in violence in the hopes of driving their government to become increasingly repressive (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Bueno de Mesquita 2005).³ This could increase the support for nonstate actors both domestically and internationally, as these communities unite in rejection of the government’s use of violence. This demonstrates that groups and governments understand that their actions will provoke reactions from the other and emphasizes the importance of studying the dynamic interactions of the combatants. Tactical decisions, and therefore conflict progression, are thought to be influenced by the relative nature of group and government capacity, as well as group goals.

Group size, its leadership, and its cohesion are determinants of capacity. When one actor in a conflict has a significant numerical disadvantage, it may feel compelled to resort to nontraditional tactics (terrorism or guerilla warfare) in order to cope with the asymmetry (Olson Lounsbery and Pearson 2009). An increasing disadvantage with respect to size may also drive a group toward increasing levels of violence. As the size of a group or number of government troops devoted to a conflict increases, one would expect the engagements to move away from terrorism and toward other tactics. One of government’s advantages in intrastate conflict is that it not only usually enjoys a numerical advantage in the number of troops but also often has the ability to determine the proportion of its troops that it will commit at any given time. Governments may therefore have a surge capacity that is not enjoyed by the nonstate combatants. Confidence emerging from the size of one’s group relative to its opponent is likely to deter that group from engaging in good faith negotiations, choosing instead to pursue uncompromising military victory. Leadership and cohesion are also important factors and are discussed in greater detail below.

FIGURE 1.1 Characteristics of Tactical Choice

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As indicated, civil war and rivalry research tends to view rebel groups, as well as their opposing governments, as both static and singular. Simplifying conflict to a set of bilateral interactions helps with systematic analysis but does little to capture the realities of the relationships. As conflicts evolve, participants may be altered in a number of different ways. One of the more common intragroup changes in the midst of civil war involves group cohesiveness. What may have originally started as a bilateral set of interactions between the government and one rebel group may become multilateral, involving several groups. Governments may experience internal divisions as well. For the most part, governments are more likely to present a united front toward rebellion, but members within the government may disagree over the approach or on issues unrelated to the rebellion. Segments of the government’s military could potentially revolt and join the rebellion. Internal divisions tend to weaken all parties, and divided governments are no different.

There are many different issues that could lead to a division among rebels. Cunningham (2006) argues that there are three reasons for splinters to form: differing policy preferences, leadership disputes, or disagreements within the group over the strategy to pursue. It is suggested here that policy preferences may involve differences over group goals. Leadership disputes may emerge simply because of clashing egos or serious differences of opinion over how best to pursue group goals, or what those goals ought to be. Leadership differences may also emerge over group strategy.

One might also expect that success, or lack thereof, on the battlefield might bring to light differences within groups. If a group is doing well in its military campaign, there is probably less of a chance that disagreements over policy or strategy will occur. Potential leadership rivals are also likely to be held at bay. When, however, battlefield losses accumulate or earlier successes cannot be repeated, members may begin to reevaluate leadership, strategy, or policy (i.e., group goals), thus creating conditions conducive to splintering. Battlefield losses and a general lack of success in a military campaign tend to force groups and governments to reassess a military approach (i.e., policy preferences or choice of strategy). In such situations, negotiations are possible, which can have significant implications for intragroup cohesiveness.

It seems counterintuitive that attempts to negotiate a peace could contribute to escalation of violence and the splintering of groups. The fact is, however, that negotiated settlements rarely result in lasting peace. As Licklider’s (1995) study demonstrated, while military victory tends to be a relatively stable outcome for civil conflict (regardless of the desirability of such an outcome), less than 13 per cent of negotiated settlements were able to sustain peace after five years. Part of the reason for this may be that one side or the other enters into the negotiations in bad faith. They may be bowing to international pressure to engage in the negotiations or trying to gain some strategic advantage through participation. However, they may have no intention of following through on whatever agreement is struck. One might expect such a scenario when one group appears to be losing the military struggle and another winning.

FIGURE 1.2 Negotiation Processes Cause Factions within a Group to Splinter

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A contributing factor could also be that groups and governments are not unitary actors, as has been indicated. Both sides tend to involve a range of members, from those who can be considered more moderate to those who are more extreme, each of which will have its own motivations to negotiate or not. When they splinter, a more moderate faction is likely to emerge along with a more extreme faction. Multiple splinters will similarly result in a range of factions from moderate to extreme (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007). Even if the leaders on each side engage in negotiations in good faith and have every intention of honoring the agreement, their followers or other elites could disagree with the settlement or the negotiation process. “Despite the successful negotiated outcomes that can result between major parties, a common effect of political processes is the splintering of groups into factions that support the negotiations (or their outcome) and those that do not” (Cronin 2006, 25). This dynamic is captured in Figures 1.2 and 1.3. If the leadership of either side lacks the capacity to enforce the agreement among their own members, violence can reemerge.

Of course, splintering may occur before negotiations emerge. Such splintering is still going to produce more and less extreme factions. This can work to the government’s advantage. If the government seeks to come to terms with the moderate faction(s) (i.e., negotiate), it can potentially isolate the more extreme members by co-opting selected group members. In diminished numbers, extremist factions could potentially be defeated more easily. By negotiating with one faction, that relationship de-escalates, while at the same time the government is likely to escalate its campaign against the more extreme group or groups (Driscoll 2012). Splintering, in turn, can lead to increased violence in one conflict dyad as the extremists who objected to the negotiations vow to continue the fight, and a de-escalation in another if an agreement is reached with more moderate factions. This divide-and-rule dynamic is depicted in Figure 1.3. The increased intensity on the negotiation-resistant dyad could potentially be short lived, however. The capacity of the splinter faction will be significantly diminished. In order to survive, a shift in tactics may be necessary.

FIGURE 1.3 Government Uses Negotiations with the Intention of Splintering a Group

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When a civil war government indicates its willingness to engage in negotiations to end a conflict, the possibility of groups emerging that wish to “spoil” negotiations becomes problematic. “Peace creates spoilers because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even if all parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often strongly disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace” (Stedman 1997, 7). A spoiler can be either a party to the conflict or external to the process. A spoiler will always be an actor who does not find peace to be in his or her interest. In some cases, the existence of a portion of the group could be threatened by the conflict’s termination (Bueno de Mesquita 2005). If individuals have based their identities on group membership, settlement may be an unbearable threat. As a result, splinter factions tend to prolong civil wars (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Driscoll 2012).

In addition to the presence of a spoiler, there are other factors that may have an impact on group splintering. Previous research has demonstrated that there are specific conflict characteristics that statistical analysis shows predispose groups to splintering (Olson Lounsbery and Cook 2010). Group splintering may be more likely early or late in the conflict as compared to the times in between. Early on the group has yet to establish strong leadership and group cohesion. Later in the conflict fatigue and disagreements may be more likely, and groups tend to be more likely to engage in negotiations (Cronin 2010). The intensity of the violence, as measured in casualties, also tends...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Chapter 1. Conflict Dynamics: A Comparative Framework
• Chapter 2. Resources and Conflict: Sierra Leone
• Chapter 3. Elite-Led Episodic Rivalry: Republic of the Congo
• Chapter 4. Ethnic Conflict over Time: Sri Lanka
• Chapter 5. A Case of Enduring Rivalries: Myanmar
• Chapter 6. Challenges of a Heterogeneous Population: Indonesia
• Chapter 7. Rivals, Conflict, and Ideology: Peru
• Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index