Singapore's Foreign Policy

The Search for Regional Order

Amitav Acharya

• Publisher: WSPC
• Year: 2007
• ISBN:
  9789814474733
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Science General
• Index: Biological Sciences

The conventional understanding of Singapore's foreign policy can be summarized in three main propositions: first, it is dictated by the imperatives of being a small state; second, its primary purpose is to ensure Singapore's survival, given its small size; and third, this logic of survival dictates a realpolitik approach to foreign policy and national security.

This book argues that an exclusively realist view of Singapore's foreign policy is inadequate. Singapore's foreign policy is also shaped by the positive effects of economic interdependence and regional institution-building — instruments that realists tend to dismiss, but which Singapore has self-consciously tried to promote as instruments of regional order. The book first looks at the evolution of Singapore's foreign policy, before analyzing Singapore's international relations and national security in the context of economic growth and terrorism. It concludes with an interesting chapter on the impact of the rise of China and India on the regional landscape.

Contents:

• Introduction: Rethinking Singapore's Foreign Policy
• Part I: Foundations:
  • The Evolution of Singapore's Foreign Policy: Challenges of Change
  • The Economic Foundations of Singapore's Security: From Globalism to Regionalism?
• Part II: Adaptations:
  • Diplomacy in Hard Times: Singapore Confronts Global Terrorism and Regional Regression
  • Waging the War on Terror: Singapore's Responses and Dilemmas
  • Singapore and Southeast Asia in a Fast-changing Landscape: Coping with the Rise of China and India

Readership: Undergraduates, graduates and academics in foreign policy and international relations; government ministries; general readers interested in Singapore issues.
Keywords:Singapore's Foreign Policy;Realism;Liberal Institutionalism;Social Constructivism;Terrorism;ASEAN;Regionalism;China;IndiaReview:

“This is an insightful book. By highlighting Singapore's emphasis on ideas and cooperation rather than confrontation and conflict, Acharya sheds new light on the city-state's emerging key role in the region and its leaders' continuing influence in world affairs. Singapore's Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order reaffirms that Acharya is always worth reading.”

Richard Stubbs
McMaster University, Canada

“This book of original essays challenges dominant explanations of Singapore's foreign policy, offering a nuanced portrait of the core ideas underpinning its policy strategies. I recommend it as required reading for all those interested in both Singapore as well as the wider Southeast Asian region.”

Rosemary Foot
University of Oxford, UK

“Acharya systematically exposes the limitations of the dominant realist approach for understanding Singapore's foreign policy, challenging some influential foundational myths in the process. In rendering historical conjuncture, international structures and regional institutions integral to the analysis, Acharya sheds new light on the forces and dynamics behind Singapore's foreign policy.”

Garry Rodan
Murdoch University, Australia
Key Features:

• Challenges the conventional realist understanding of Singapore's foreign policy in favor of a liberal institutionalist and social constructivist approach
• Contains a collection of essays written between 1992 and 2005, thus providing a picture of the evolution of Singapore's foreign policy
• Covers topics such as the linkage between economics and national security; globalization versus regionalization; terrorism; regional, inter-regional and bilateral cooperation; and the impact of the rise of China and India
• Includes past speeches by Lee Kuan Yew, S Rajaratnam, S Dhanabalan and Tommy Koh on foreign policy

Part I

FOUNDATIONS

1

The Evolution of Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Challenges of Change¹

Introduction

The foreign policy of Singapore, an island- and city-state with an area of 660 square kilometers and population of 3.1 million, is said to be governed by the imperatives of a small state.² Dynamism, change and constant adjustment are qualities usually associated with the foreign policy behavior of small states. The contemporary international system has gone through a major upheaval as the result of events associated largely, but not exclusively, with the end of the Cold War. These changes have altered the political, strategic and economic context of foreign policy-making for states, both at the systemic and regional levels. Singapore is no exception. But what exactly has been Singapore’s response to the challenges of change?

This paper attempts to address this question in four parts. The first looks at the basic and enduring features of Singapore’s foreign policy and the impact of the Cold War in shaping them. This is followed by an examination of national power elements as well as the foreign policy decision-making apparatus that have helped Singapore manage its vulnerabilities. The third part analyzes the challenges that Singapore’s foreign policy-makers face in adjusting to post-Cold War realities. The fourth part examines foreign policy output, i.e., Singapore’s responses to the issues arising in the post-Cold War environment.

Realism and Survival

Singapore’s foreign policy-makers have articulated an essentially realist conception of international politics. As former Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan argued:

The international system comprises sovereign states each admitting to no authority except its own. International relations therefore resembles a Hobbesian state of nature, where each is pitted against all. In such a potentially anarchic situation, order is the prime value. In international politics, as in national politics, order is prior to justice, to morality, to economic prosperity, to any other value that you can think of simply because, in the absence of order, no other value can be realised. In the absence of order the life of states would be as in the life of men in the state of nature — “Nasty, Brutish and Short.”³

In more recent times, this severe realpolitik view has been moderated somewhat. There is greater recognition of the impact of interdependence in constraining the use of force in international relations. The role of regional and global institutions in promoting cooperation is viewed as constituting an important basis for foreign policy action. This is not to say that Singapore’s leaders have converted to a more idealistic conception of international politics. The essence of twentieth-century Idealism, the doctrine of collective security, does not enjoy much credibility in the minds of Singapore’s leaders in relation to the realist conception of balance of power.

In an anarchic international system, survival and security are the highest goals for states. For a small state like Singapore, ensuring survival, both in a physical and economic sense, has been especially crucial.⁴ The emphasis on survival in foreign policy reflects major vulnerabilities of the city-state in the domestic and external arena. Singapore’s predicament as a country without any natural resources and a small domestic market creates inherent obstacles to economic development. Similarly, a multiethnic social fabric makes the task of ensuring national integration, and hence national security, a difficult challenge. In addition, managing domestic political order and continuity has also been an important aspect of vulnerability and survival. As Chan Heng Chee writes, “survival” was “a political theme adopted by the PAP leaders to justify their domestic and international policies and to mobilise the island population to greater efforts”.⁵ In this sense, pursuit of survival in foreign policy would contribute not only to the security of the state, but also to the security of the regime as well. In Rajaratnam’s own words: “our approach has always been to shape the kind of foreign policy that will consolidate our domestic position, resolve some of our domestic problems and enhance our security, and our economic and political strength”.⁶

In the external sphere, Singapore’s vulnerability is rooted in both geostrategic and historical factors. Singapore’s location as a small Chinese-majority state in close proximity to large Malay neighbors contributes to a deep-rooted insecurity vis-à-vis the two immediately adjacent neighbors. This insecurity was compounded by the circumstances of Singapore’s separation from the Malaysian federation in 1965 and the hostility shown towards Singapore by Indonesia during and in the immediate aftermath of “Konfrontasi”.⁷ As a historical event, Konfrontasi remains entrenched in the minds of Singapore’s leadership as an example of what might happen if regional neighbors are to be ruled by nationalistic regimes. In general, vulnerability remains a key theme of Singapore’s foreign policy; as recently as in 1988, Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng issued a reminder that:

The vulnerability of small states is a fact of life. Singapore’s independent existence is today widely recognised. But to assure our basic security, we can never allow tests to our sovereignty and internal affairs, even when well-intentioned, to go unchallenged. Even today, we have had occasionally to remind other countries to leave us alone to be ourselves.⁸

The Cold War superpower rivalry aggravated Singapore’s vulnerabilities as a small state. But “Realism in international politics consists not only of acknowledging limits, but also recognizing opportunities”.⁹ Thus, Singapore not only recognized, but also deftly exploited, opportunities in both the geopolitical as well as economic arena created by the Cold War. Geopolitically, the Cold War was marked by a regional balance of power which favored Singapore’s survival and well-being. As Singapore saw it, “a multiplicity of external Great Powers involved in the region, balancing each other” would not only ensure regional stability, but “allow small states to survive in the interstices between them”. Such a situation would be preferable to “less manageable small power rivalries”.¹⁰ The Cold War in Asia also contributed to Singapore’s economic prosperity. Singapore’s success in securing a steady flow of foreign investments and access to Western markets was helped by the Republic’s essentially anti-communist and pro-Western foreign policy outlook. By fashioning itself as a “global city” — i.e., by rapidly integrating itself into the international market economy and according a very hospitable welcome to Western multinationals at a time when much of the Third World was suspicious of them — Singapore was able to create a stake of the West in its survival and prosperity.¹¹

In general, the Cold War and bipolar international system was a period of relative stability for Singapore. Superpower rivalry, despite its role in fueling regional conflict, was marked by some “rules of the game”. A certain degree of predictability in Great Power action provided small states with opportunities to enhance the conditions of their survival.

National Capacity and Foreign Policy Decision-Making

As the foregoing discussion suggests, survival, national security and economic well-being would rank among the major objectives of Singapore foreign policy. In pursuing these goals, Singapore’s foreign policy-makers have been helped by a number of factors, of which four are especially noteworthy: economic capacity, military strength, bureaucratic apparatus and the nature of the political system as it affects foreign policy formulation.

Singapore’s economic success is well-known and documented. Singapore today ranks as the world’s 18th richest nation, with a per capita GDP of US$13,500 in 1991. Economic success, to the extent that it owes to development of global trade and investment linkages, also shapes foreign policy capabilities and goals. In 1991, Singapore’s total trade amounted to $216 billion. Singapore was the world’s seventh largest exporter and fifteenth largest importer. Singapore is also the world’s most trade-dependent nation, and has the highest trade to GDP ratio, trade being 3 times the GDP. Thus, economic issues including development of new trade opportunities and preservation of market access have an unusual salience among foreign policy objectives. In addition, Singapore’s economic power and potential also enables it, at least in theory, to pursue foreign policy goals quite out of proportion to its physical size or population.

Secondly, economic success has contributed to the development of a powerful military deterrent. In 1992, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) consisted of some 50,000 regulars and 250,000 reservists. Combining the best features of Swiss-style citizen’s army and Israeli-style forward defense, Singapore’s Armed Forces complement foreign policy not only by securing its basic objectives of national security and survival, but also in providing the basis of a more assured and confident position on vital international issues. Although “military defense” is only one of the five aspects of Singapore’s “Total Defense” policy (the others being psychological, social, civil and economic defense), the military sector absorbs considerable resources. Singapore’s defense spending is pegged at 6 percent of its GDP, which in FY1992 amounted to $4 billion.¹² A recent Asian Development Bank report has put Singapore as the leading country in Asia in defense spending measured in per capita terms as well as percentage of total government spending.¹³ Not surprisingly, Singapore can afford to field the most modern military hardware in Southeast Asia.

Third, Singapore’s foreign policy capacity also rests on a growing and sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus dedicated to ensuring the country’s “security, prosperity and international standing and influence”.¹⁴ Singapore’s Foreign Ministry was established in August 1965 and an exclusive Foreign Service was constituted in 1972. The number of foreign missions has increased from only five in 1966 to 26 in 1992. Changes in the organizational structure of the foreign ministry are also indicative of new policy directions to deal with developments in the regional and international arena. The growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region is reflected in the creation of a new directorate covering East Asia, Australia and New Zealand. A technical training directorate has been set up to facilitate collaboration with developing countries and international organizations. Moreover, between 1989 and 1992, three new missions were opened, all of them being in the Asia-Pacific region: Korea (1989), Beijing (1990) and Hanoi (1992).

Fourth, Singapore’s foreign policy decision-making process remains unencumbered by any domestic political constraints.¹⁵ The opposition parties have not been critical of the government’s handling of foreign affairs. The parliamentary consultative process on foreign affairs and defense was somewhat downgraded after the 1991 general elections in an apparent bid by the government to shore up PAP unity and central control. Foreign policy decisions in Singapore are usually made at the highest level. The former Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, remains an articulate spokesman of Singapore’s international concerns and policies as a sort of elder statesman and “official mascot” of the Republic.

Neither is Singapore’s foreign policy responsive to domestic pressure groups, simply because such groups do not exist. Nor, unlike many developing countries, has the Singapore government felt the need to mobilize its population in support of specific foreign policy goals. It has been concerned, however, that foreign policy decisions do not endanger domestic stability. This is especially true of foreign policy decisions that have a bearing on ethnic relations, with a major example being the government’s position that Singapore’s diplomatic relations with China should await normalization of Sino-Indonesian ties.

Viewed in terms of its basic objectives, Singapore’s foreign policy has been remarkably successful. Not only has Singapore preserved its sovereign statehood, but it has also achieved spectacular economic success and firmly established the means of defending its prosperity. Thus, Singapore’s foreign policy managers should be well-placed to face the changes ushered by the end of the Cold War. But the fact that no such complacency is evident in their thinking owes to a belief that the end of the Cold War has given way to a much more complex and fluid regional and international environment within which foreign policy must be framed. This has given rise to a number of specific concerns which must be addressed to ensure the realization of foreign policy goals in the post-Cold War era.

The Changing Context

While the end of the Cold War generated a great deal of optimism about the future of the international system, none was more so than the vision of a “New World Order” outlined by the Bush administration in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Although the term remains extremely vague a...

Table of contents

• Cover page
• Title page
• Copyright
• Preface
• Contents
• Introduction: Rethinking Singapore’s Foreign Policy
• Part I: FOUNDATIONS
• Part II: ADAPTATIONS
• Appendix
• Bibliography
• Index