Global China: Internal And External Reaches

Internal and External Reaches

Pak Nung Wong, Yu-shek Joseph Cheng

• Publisher: WSPC
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9789814596749
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Science General
• Index: Biological Sciences

After two decades since the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991, the largest and the most populist socialist state — the People's Republic of China — does not only manage to stay intact, but has also emerged as the second largest economy in the world. Moreover, its political, diplomatic, military and cultural reaches have been extended to various parts of the world. There have been many factual and fictional discussions and debates in the public domains, on China's apparent rise either as a threat or an opportunity. This book will take on these discussions and debates to provide theory-informed empirical studies regarding a few research questions:

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• How does the People's Republic of China manage to rise and achieve global reaches?
• How can we effectively conceptualize China's global reaches?
• What internal and external strategic and security measures have Chinese state adopted in order to maintain such vast and far-reaching constellations of domestic-external nexuses?

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We consider that the idea and concept of "Global China" is perhaps the most viable analytical instrument to capture such increasingly complex phenomena in association with the rise of China.

Contents:

• Globalization: China's Challenges (Joseph Y S Cheng)
• Urbanization: Earning Money but Losing Ethnic Identity? (Yuen Fun So)
• Changing Faces of Chinese Labor Regimes: Case Studies in Beijing and Shenzhen (Ting Wang and Chris King-Chi Chan)
• Power and Surveillance in Everyday Life (Flora Sapio)
• Globalization and the Development of Civil Society in China (Joseph Y S Cheng)
• New Citizens in Urban China: From Exclusion to Inclusion (Xiaoqing Tang and Raymond K H Chan)
• Re-Inventing Confucianism: Return, Contradictions, and Possibilities (Anne Cheng)
• Resisting Global China: Local Resistance to China's Resource-Led Diplomacy in the Philippines and Beyond (Pak Nung Wong, Kathlene Aquino, Kristinne Lara de Leon and Yuen Fun So)
• China in Myanmar: Naypyidaw's New Great Game (Ricky Yue)
• China's Maritime Power Play in Indian Ocean since 1962: India's Assessment and Response (Commodore Seshadri Vasan)
• Dragon in the Tear Drop: Regional Dynamics of Growing Chinese Influence in Sri Lanka (S I Keethaponcalan)
• China in Africa: A Reflection on the Reconfiguration and Cross-Continental Implications of its Power and Political Economy (Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo)
• Conclusion: Whither 'Global China'? (Pak Nung Wong)

Academics, professionals, undergraduate and graduate students interested in China's politics, China's governance, China's internal and external strategies, and security measures. Key Features:

• First book on the idea of "Global China"
• In-depth analyses of African and Asian states by leading scholars

Chapter 1

Globalization: China’s Challenges

Joseph Y. S. Cheng

City University of Hong Kong

Introduction: Embracing Globalization

When China first applied to join the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), the Chinese leadership was probably not fully aware of the implications. The application was then shelved for some years because the Bill Clinton administration demanded that China should join as a developed country, which meant relinquishing the benefits for developing countries. The renewal of its negotiations with the US in early 1999 symbolized its embrace of globalization. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji largely accepted the US conditions and the negotiations were not even derailed by the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

China decided to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor of the GATT, because Chinese leaders realized that China had to open its doors and accept international competition in order to join the ranks of the most advanced countries of the world. Refusal to embrace globalization would mean that China could never become a leading power, i.e., the ultimate nationalist objective of the Chinese leadership and the Chinese people (see for example, Ching and Yee 2003). While the economic success at the end of the previous century gave China much confidence in international competition, Chinese leaders were sober enough to realize the severe economic and political challenges of globalization. Premier Zhu Rongji, for example, was very concerned about the impact of importing grain on the livelihood of the vast peasantry in China.

At the turn of the century, in anticipation of the formal entry of China into the WTO, almost every major bookstore in China had a section on the issue and globalization. This enthusiasm among the intelligentsia in China continued unabated after the 11 September incident in 2001. In contrast, many Western scholars argue that the ideology or discourse of globalism was rapidly receding in the face of the resurgence of nationalism, ethnicity, religious fundamentalism and geopolitics (see, for example, Saul 2005). They consider that, in the wake of the 11 September incident, the rapidity of the return of “normality” and a significantly deglobalized world reveal the intellectual bankruptcy of “globalization” as a description, explanation, and ideology of the world order. In sum, they believe that globalization scholarship has exaggerated its historical and theoretical significance since the world principally remains one of discreet and competitive nation states (see Hirst and Thompson 2000; Hay 2004, 312–344; Gilpin 2002; Rugman 2000).

Chinese leaders have been upholding the classical view of state sovereignty, and are not concerned with the disintegration and demise of globalism, as perceived by the above Western scholars. They tend to believe that the “deep drivers” of contemporary globalization would continue to function and China must overcome the challenges that they pose in order to emerge as a major power in the decades to come. They probably agree with David Held and Anthony McGrew that these drivers include: (a) the changing infrastructure of global communications linked to the information technology revolution; (b) the development of global markets in goods and services, connected to the worldwide distribution of information; (c) the new global division of labor driven by multinational corporations; (d) the end of the Cold War and the diffusion of democratic and consumer values across many regions in the world; and (e) the growth of migration and the movement of people, which are linked to pattern shifts of economic demand, demography and environmental degradation (Held and McGrew 2007a, 4).

The 11 September incident was a blessing to the foreign policy of China in some ways. When President George W. Bush assumed office in January 2001, he made it clear that he viewed China as a “strategic competitor” rather than a “strategic partner.” Sino-American relations were further damaged by the spy plane incident near Taiwan Island on 1 April and the arms sales to Taiwan. However, the 11 September incident provided a good opportunity to improve the bilateral relationship because the Bush administration had to enlist the support of China to combat global terrorism so as to present a truly international united front. Chinese leaders readily responded because the maintenance of a peaceful international environment for the modernization of China requires a cordial Sino-American relationship.

President Bush attended the informal Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shanghai in October 2001 and then returned to Beijing in the following February for a work visit. The two governments reached a consensus on the establishment of cooperative mechanisms to combat terrorism on an intermediate and long-term basis, and this strengthened the relationship (see Cheng 2008a, 242–243). The two governments were able to emphasize their constructive and cooperative relationship. When then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick encouraged China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international community in September 2005,¹ the Chinese leadership accepted his note for China and often emphasizes its “responsible position” on global issues and that this is in line with the “peaceful development road” of China.²

Similarly, for the first time in almost a decade, the growth of trade, capital flows and foreign investment was reversed in the wake of the 11 September incident. World trade fell 4% in 2002, capital flows declined by 19% in 2001 and a further 67% in 2002 and foreign direct investment (FDI) dropped by 41% in 2001 and a further 21% in 2002.³ However, the Chinese economy had not been affected; its formal entry into the WTO in November 2001 boosted its confidence.

Chinese leaders also anticipated that WTO membership would provide domestic momentum for economic reforms. Economic reforms in China had reached the “hard core” and each set of new reforms would encounter considerable resistance from vested interests. Reference to the obligations of Beijing as a WTO member would greatly strengthen the hand of the central government in dealing with the lobbying efforts of local governments, as well as in dealing with the phenomenon of “policies from above, counter-measures from below. For example, many provinces had listed the automobile industry as one of their pillar industries, but most automobile plants had production capacities of less than 100,000 vehicles per annum. Following the drops in tariffs that would accompany WTO membership, these enterprises obviously would not be able to compete. Their options were to form joint ventures with foreign partners or engage in mergers and acquisitions. They had to technologically upgrade and achieve economies of scale to survive. The WTO membership thus released the central government from its previous responsibilities of guidance and persuasion.

The Chinese WTO membership and the anticipation of global competition also had a significant influence on opening to the world in other respects. In November 2001, a training course began in Beijing to teach provincial-level cadres about WTO rules as well as the policies, laws and regulations that are related to foreign investment. The ninety members who attended the course were in their mid-forties, had a good command of foreign languages and held the ranks of deputy ministers and deputy provincial governors. These cadres would soon become central ministers and provincial governors and it was considered that a satisfactory grasp of these issues would be essential for their work in the future.⁴ In other words, senior officials were expected to develop new modes of thinking based on international norms. The training course reflected the determination of the Chinese leadership to meet the challenges of globalization and revealed the inadequacy of the Chinese cadre corps in facing these challenges.

Political Challenges

Chinese leaders undeniably have been worrying about how globalization would affect political stability and the monopoly of political power by the Communist Party. In mid-2001, then President Jiang Zemin openly called for “a reinforcement of legislation against information on the Internet,” on the pretext that such information would contribute to the rise of “superstition, pornography, violence and pernicious information.” Jiang, however, also suggested that the Chinese government should make full use of the Internet to enhance transparency and facilitate greater public participation in politics.⁵

The role of the Western world in engineering “peaceful evolution” remains a serious concern of the Chinese leadership. In an interview with David Shambaugh in 2003, the director of the former Soviet-Eastern Europe Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Li Jingjie, indicated that the breakup of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Soviet Communist Party regime “had haunted the Chinese leadership ever since.” Li said that Chinese leaders tried “to understand the implications and lessons, so that they do not make the same mistakes of Gorbachev…” (Shambaugh 2006, 76–77).

A research report of the Central Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in early 2001 indicated that two important lessons were to be drawn from the heavy loss of the Socialist Party in the presidential election in Yugoslavia of the previous year. The subsequent arrest of former President Slobodan Milošević, an ardent ally of Beijing, caused considerable uneasiness amongst Chinese leaders. They believed that control over the armed forces and the media had to be strengthened. Suggestions of “nationalization of the military” would only weaken the control of the CPC over the gun as a result, such suggestions were severely criticized by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a conspiracy of the Western countries to subvert China. Freedom of information and liberalization of the mass media were also perceived to have placed the propaganda work of the governing party at a disadvantage.⁶

The Central Propaganda Department report observed that in the final years of the Communist rule in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, the liberalization of the mass media prompted many leaders and their family members to leak secrets to the media, the revelation of which generated serious popular dissatisfaction and adverse publicity for the communist regimes. The report was followed by a policy document of the Central Propaganda Department and the State Press and Publications Administration in June 2001 aimed to tighten censorship in preparation for the Sixteenth Party Congress in the autumn of 2002.⁷

Another focus with regards to the concern of the Chinese leadership towards the survival of the Chinese Communist regime in the context of globalization is the “color revolutions” in the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union in the early years of this century, i.e., the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia in 2003, “Orange Revolution” in the Ukraine in 2004 and “(Yellow) Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. David Shambaugh believed that the Chinese leadership is very worried about the causes and implications of the “color revolutions” for the Chinese Communist regime. He identified six major aspects of the Chinese analyses of the “color revolutions” in his survey: The nature of the “revolutions,” roles of the US and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), potential for more “color revolutions” in Central Asia, the implications for Russia and those for China (Shambaugh 2006, 88).

In response to the “color revolutions,” the Chinese authorities adopted certain measures to limit their potential impact. In general, the Chinese media did not report these events. The Chinese government also suspended a plan to allow foreign newspapers to be printed in China. When George Soros visited China in October 2005, the local media did not cover the event, and his scheduled lectures and meetings were all cancelled (Shambaugh 2006, 91). It was also said that President Vladimir Putin warned President Hu Jintao at a 2005 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting about the subversive potential of the international NGOs. Partly as a result of this warning, the Chinese authorities began to scrutinize NGOs that were operating in China (Shambaugh 2006, 91).

The Arab Spring which brought about regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in 2011 was probably the most recent challenge to China. Zhang Zhijun, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, was on a panel with US Senator John McCain at a security conference in Munich in February 2012. Senator McCain told Zhang that the “Arab Spring is coming to China,” and Zhang responded that an Arab Spring-style uprising in China was “no more than fantasy.”⁸ Chinese leaders as usual are concerned with the demonstration effect of globalization. In view of the ethnic riots in Tibet in 2008 and Xinjiang in 2009, the labor strikes in 2010 and the spread of mass incidents in recent years, political controls have spread like lightening.

The situation in China differs from those in the Middle East and North Africa. In the first decade of this century, the per capita GDP of China, in real terms, rose two and a half times, the per capita GDP of Egypt increased about 30%, that of Syria a bit over 22% and Yemen, only 12%. The unemployment rate in China was about 4% in 2010, that of Egypt was more than 9%, the rate in Jordan stood at 12.5% and Tunisia, at 13%. A 2011 report from a consulting firm, McKinsey & Company, indicated that the Middle East suffered from the highest unemployment rate in the world, at 25% (Schuman 2011).

Chinese leaders have no intentions of giving up the CPC monopoly of political power. A statement by Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, at the NPC annual session in March 2011, is representative of such. Wu rejected the ideas of a multiparty system, pluralism in the guiding ideology, separation of powers and a bicameral legislative, a federal system and full implementation of a system of private ownership. The formula of the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao administration for the maintenance of the legitimacy of the CPC regime and political stability was economic growth plus a basic social security net that covers the entire population plus good governance without democracy. There were no significant political reforms during the Hu–Wen administration, reforms tended to focus on the administrative level, which made all levels of governments and cadres more responsive to the demands and grievances of the people and within the CPC because such reforms would not affect its monopoly of political power (Cheng 2012, 10–26).

This formula seems to be sufficient at this stage. A vast majority of the population has experienced significant improvements in living standards in the past three decades and a half and there are expectations of further improvements in the years to come. At the same time, there appears to be no alternative to the CPC regime and the people fear chaos. Hence, although grievances and dissatisfaction have been accumulating, the Chinese people show no inclination to seek regime changes and tend to vent their anger against corrupt officials at the local level.

There are others political challenges from globalization. The modern state is increasingly embedded in highly inter-connected regional and global networks supranational, inter-governmental and transnational forces limit th...

Table of contents

• Cover page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• About the Editors
• About the Contributors
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Chapter 1 Globalization: China’s Challenges
• Chapter 2 Urbanization: Earning Money but Losing Ethnic Identity?
• Chapter 3 Changing Faces of Chinese Labor Regimes: Case Studies in Beijing and Shenzhen
• Chapter 4 Power and Surveillance in Everyday Life
• Chapter 5 Globalization and the Development of Civil Society in China
• Chapter 6 New Citizens in Urban China: From Exclusion to Inclusion
• Chapter 7 Re-Inventing Confucianism: Return, Contradictions, and Possibilities
• Chapter 8 Resisting Global China: Local Resistance to China’s Resource-Led Diplomacy in the Philippines and Beyond
• Chapter 9 China in Myanmar: Naypyidaw’s New Great Game
• Chapter 10 China’s Maritime Power Play in Indian Ocean since 1962: India’s Assessment and Response
• Chapter 11 Dragon in the Tear Drop: Regional Dynamics of Growing Chinese Influence in Sri Lanka
• Chapter 12 China in Africa: A Reflection on the Reconfiguration and Cross-Continental Implications of its Power and Political Economy
• Chapter 13 Conclusion: Whither ‘Global China’?
• Index