China's Foreign Policy: Challenges And Prospects

Challenges and Prospects

Joseph Yu-shek Cheng

• Publisher: WSPC
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9789814719049
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Relaciones internacionales

This volume examines the Chinese foreign policy framework today and traces its evolution since the post-Mao era. Through the consideration of China's relations with the major powers and its management of various challenges ranging from territorial disputes to energy security, it investigates China's pursuit of major power status and influence in peaceful international scenarios.

The author critically analyzes China's foreign policy from Chinese leaders' evolving worldview of the changing international environment. As China emerges as a major power and the second largest economy in the world, anyone interested in international politics and scenarios as well as China's foreign policy needs a basic, insightful reference book like this.

Contents:

• China's Foreign Policy: Coping with the Challenge of Power
• Overall Framework:
  • The Evolution of China's Foreign Policy in the Post-Mao Era: From Anti-Hegemony to Modernization Diplomacy
  • China's Foreign Policy in the Mid–1990s
  • China's Foreign Policy Since the Seventeenth Party Congress
  • Convincing the World of China's Tradition to Pursue Universal Harmony
• China's Significant Bilateral Relations:
  • China's Peaceful Rise and the.U.S — Mutual Perceptions, Mutual Trust and Planning for Future Scenarios
  • Chinese Perceptions of Russian Foreign Policy During the Two Putin Administration: U.S.–Russia Relations and "Strategic Triangle" Considerations
  • China's Japan Policy: Seeking Stability and Improvement in Uncertainties and Conflicts
  • China's India Policy: Balancing Global and Bilateral Issues
  • Sino–Vietnamese Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century: Economics in Command?
  • China's Iran Policy: Balancing Interests and Managing Expectations
• China's Management of Various Challenges:
  • A Chinese View of China's Energy Security
  • Battle Ready? Developing a Blue-water Navy: China's Strategic Dilemma
  • China's Ocean Development Strategy and Its Handling of the Territorial Conflicts in the South China Sea
  • From Non-interference to a Responsible Major Power: China's Engagement in Darfur
  • China's Approach to Intervention in the Syrian Crisis: The Challenge of Working through the United Nations System

Readership: Academics, undergraduate and graduates students, professionals and policy makers interested in China's Foreign Policy.
China;Foreign Policy;Major Power;Peaceful International Environment;Regional Cooperation;Comprehensive National Power Key Features:

• The most updated and comprehensive book on Chinese foreign policy
• Analyzes the Chinese perspective critically and objectively
• Studies China's relations with key countries and its various significant global challenges

Chapter 1

China’s Foreign Policy: Coping with the Challenge of Power

Plan of the Book

This book intends to examine China’s foreign policy since the beginning of the era of economic reforms and opening to the external world, with an emphasis on the recent years. It considers the gradual evolution of China’s foreign policy program in response to Chinese leaders’ perceptions of the changing international environment and the domestic demands for maintaining the legitimacy of the Communist Party regime. An examination of this evolution process is expected to provide the background for a better understanding of China’s foreign policy today.

This volume is divided into three parts. The first part consists of four chapters. Chapter 2 considers China’s foreign policy in the first dozen years or so of the Post-Mao economic reform era since 1978. At this stage, Chinese leaders began to re-define their foreign policy from one based on Mao Zedong’s theory of the three worlds to the adoption of an independent foreign policy line of peace. Chapter 3 covers the 1990s. In this decade, China gradually overcame the difficulties of diplomatic sanctions as a result of the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, and began to accept deeper integration with the international community symbolized by its decision to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). It also cautiously embraced multilateralism, as demonstrated by its participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and its initiative of launching the Shanghai Five process in 1996.

Chapter 4 analyzes China’s foreign policy program in the twenty-first century, focusing on the continuities and changes, with the previous two chapters providing the historical background. Chinese leaders still believe that China needs a peaceful international environment for its modernization, and they are aware of the substantial gaps between China and the advanced countries. But they are certain of China’s rise as a major power, and the fourth-generation leaders, i.e., Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, appeared to have developed a comprehensive foreign policy framework with a harmonious world perspective as its central idea. This perspective is in turn premised on two important concepts: a new security concept and the democratization of international relations.

Chapter 5 concentrates on the Chinese authorities’ efforts in recent years to reduce the “China threat” perception, through their development of a discourse articulating the themes of peace and harmony, and attempts to convince the world of China’s tradition and the present objective of pursuing universal harmony. In both Chapters 4 and 5, China’s foreign policy under the Xi Jinping administration is considered in detail.

Part II examines a set of China’s significant bilateral relationships, including its relations with the U.S., Russia, Japan, India, Vietnam and Iran. These are in a way case studies illustrating how the Chinese foreign policy program operates, and at the same time they are important constituents of the program. The U.S., Russia, Japan and India are significant powers in themselves, and their relations with China have a global impact affecting the international and regional order. Vietnam is also selected as a case study here because it has territorial disputes with China, and shares a similar ideology and political system with China. In many ways, it follows China’s path of economic reforms and opening to the external world, while it is even ahead of China in some aspects of political reforms. Iran offers another interesting case study: it is an important oil supplier and a significant regional power, yet China needs to maintain good relations with Iran’s rivals in the region, from Saudi Arabia to Israel. It is a test of China’s pragmatism and the balance of conflicting interests.

Part III offers a sample of how China manages its various challenges. The five chapters cover the issues of energy security, naval development, ocean development strategy and the related territorial conflicts, engagement in Darfur and the Syrian crisis. The Chinese authorities understood that there were no easy solutions. Regarding the first three issues, Chinese leaders needed long-term comprehensive strategies while taking into consideration the responses of the affected parties. Regarding the engagement in Darfur and the Syrian crisis, the Chinese authorities had to come up with practical policies to deal with concrete questions. They had to respond to the various pressures of the international community. This sample of challenges reveals how Chinese leaders actually execute their foreign policy programs.

Changing Ideologies and Values of China’s Foreign Policy

The ideological content of Chinese leaders’ world views has been evolving. In the wake of the Eleventh Party Congress held in August 1977, Chinese leaders still attempted to embrace Mao Zedong’s theory of the three worlds. On 1 November 1977, the editorial department of Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) published a lengthy article entitled “Chairman Mao’s Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism–Leninism”. It reaffirmed that the two superpowers were the common enemy of mankind that the Third World was the main force against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism, and that the Second World was a force that could be united within the broadest possible international united front against superpower hegemony. The article advocated the exploitation of the contradiction between the two superpowers. What was noteworthy was that the article provided an explanation for the first time, on a theoretical basis, about why the Soviet Union was more dangerous than the U.S. relations as a threat to world peace.¹

It was in this context that on 12 August 1978 that the Chinese government concluded a Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty, 1978 with the Fukuda government that included an anti-hegemony clause.² On 16 December in the same year, China and the U.S. established formal diplomatic relations, and, in the joint communiqué released, both sides reaffirmed the principle of anti-hegemony.³ Then came the limited war to “punish” Vietnam in early 1979. In view of such developments many observers believed that, in soliciting the support of the West and Japan in checking Soviet global expansion, China had entered into an alliance, or a pseudo-alliance, with the U.S. and Japan.

In 1982–1983, there were indications that the theory of the three worlds had been downgraded, or even abandoned. In the report of Hu Yaobang, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to the twelfth CPC Congress in September 1982 and in that of the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang to the Sixth National People’s Congress (NPC) in the following June,⁴ both leaders emphasized that China had been adhering to an independent foreign policy and that China’s modernization would require a peaceful international environment. The struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism was still a main theme, but a broad united front against hegemonism and the theory of the three worlds were no longer mentioned.

In 1982–1983, Chinese commentaries and analyses, through its mass media and major publications, revealed a changing perception of Soviet-American balance. They tended to judge that Soviet influence had hit its peak in the middle and late 1970s, and had begun to decline since the end of the 1970s. The Chinese leadership’s assessment was that the Soviet-American military balance would remain unchanged for some time.

China’s modernization also demands its acceptance of, and adaptation to, the existing international system, especially the international financial and trade institutional framework dominated by Western countries. China joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the 1980s, and it also planned to seek to participate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.⁵

Writing in World Politics in April 1974, Professor Tsou Tang suggested two preconditions for the de-radicalization of the foreign policy of a revolutionary state such as China. First, it would have to come to perceive the existing international order as strong and enduring; and second, it would have to believe that it had acquired a “fair stake and a proper place” in that order.⁶ These two preconditions seemed to exist in the case of China in the 1980s.

The four modernizations⁷ became the most important goal of the Chinese leadership after economic reforms had been launched. The top priority assigned to this goal reflected the understanding on its part that the goal of revolution was to improve the people’s livelihood, and that the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist regime would henceforth depend on its ability to raise the living standard of the Chinese people. In terms of foreign policy, the Chinese leaders would strive for a peaceful international environment to modernize China. In his speech at the Canadian Parliament in January 1984, Premier Zhao Ziyang placed the Chinese foreign policy objective of the development of relations with all countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence before the opposition of hegemonism.⁸

In this period, the demand for modernization and improving people’s living standards became the most important factor guiding China’s foreign policy. In terms of economic reforms, China first tried to learn from Yugoslavia, then from Hungary, and then from the “four little dragons of Asia”. The impact on foreign policy was that China had to accept the international economic order whose rules had been defined by the Western countries. The Western countries and Japan, however, were ready to offer China friendly support for its modernization efforts. The independent foreign policy of peace line was able to consolidate.

Significant changes took place in the international system in 1989 when China’s foreign relations, especially those with the Western world, suffered severe setbacks in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident. In the following two to three years, Germany reunified; the former East European satellites of the Soviet Union abandoned socialism and opted for independence; and, finally, the Soviet Union disintegrated. These developments, plus the impressive victory of the Western countries in the Gulf War, seemed to indicate that the U.S. had become the sole superpower in the world. There was a view in China in these years that as the remaining major socialist country, China would become the next main target for the “peaceful evolution” strategy of the West.

Deng Xiaoping toured southern China in early 1992 to generate new impetus for further reforms and opening to the outside world. Chinese leaders appreciated that the legitimacy of the Communist regime would depend on its ability to deliver the goods. This would be the most important guarantee against a repetition of what had happened in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In contrast to their counterparts in these countries, Chinese leaders concentrated on economic reforms first and were able to significantly improve the people’s living standards. Hence, they were able to restore political stability soon after the Tiananmen incident.

China’s foreign relations were probably back in full swing by 1992–1993. The Chinese government worked hard at building or restoring its perceived rightful place in the world;⁹ and the leadership was then in a better position to redefine its world view. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fading away of bipolarity, Chinese leaders believed that a new pattern of international relations was in the process of emerging. But, this power configuration of “one superpower, a number of major powers” was only transitional. Unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese leaders’ authoritative statements on foreign policy did not comment on the danger of a world war. Silence on this topic might be construed as treating this as a nonpressing issue. Instead, in its view, China should concentrate on the intermediate and long-term competition in building “comprehensive national power”, and it should not allow itself to fall behind in this fierce competition. At the same time, the view that China had become the major target of the American “peaceful evolution” strategy was largely discredited, though it appeared to have secured the endorsement of Chinese leaders in mid-1991. This kind of perception lingers on until today, and often reemerges when Sino-American relations deteriorate or face a crisis. A slightly different version of this perception which has a much wider market is that the U.S. does not want to see China strong.

Chinese leaders then were highly critical of the Bush administration’s statements and efforts to spread Western systems of liberal democracy and market economy throughout the world. This position was seen to be reflecting the new arrogance and self-confidence of the U.S. as the only superpower in the world. Obviously, if the Bush administration was serious in imposing Western values on other countries, China would be a major target. Again, this theme remains a line of criticism against the U.S., though a toned-down version has been the principle often articulated by Chinese leaders in the Third World that every country should choose its own path of development taking into consideration such factors as its history and culture.

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, Deng Xiaoping released a number of guidelines for Chinese foreign policy. It appears that these guidelines are still respected by Chinese leaders, and they are often quoted by Chinese foreign policy researchers in the official think tanks. In a talk with leading members of the Party Central Committee on 4 September 1989, Deng stated: “In short, my views about the international situation can be summed up in three sentences. First, we should observe the situation coolly. Second, we should hold our ground. Third, we should act calmly. Don’t be impatient, it is no good to be impatient”.¹⁰

Deng recommended caution and a low profile too. Later, in another talk with leading members of the Party Central Committee, Deng further stated: “Some developing countries would like China to become the leader of the Third World. But we absolutely cannot do that, this is one of our basic state policies. We can’t afford to do it and besides, we aren’t strong enough. There is nothing to be gained by playing that role; we would only lose most of our initiative.”¹¹ Similarly, China had no intention of assuming leadership of the socialist camp after the abandonment of Marxism–Leninism by Mikhail Gorbachev and...

Table of contents

• Cover page
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• About the Author
• Chapter 1 China’s Foreign Policy: Coping with the Challenge of Power
• Part I Overall Framework
• Part II China’s Significant Bilateral Relations
• Part III China’s Management of Various Challenges
• Bibliography
• Index