South Korea In The United Nations: Global Governance, Inter-korean Relations And Peace Building

Global Governance, Inter-Korean Relations and Peace Building

Gabriel Jonsson

• Publisher: WSPC (EUROPE)
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781786341938
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

-->

In 1991 South Korea, along with North Korea, was made an official member of the UN. Using international relations theory, this book begins by looking at the struggle and eventual impact of the membership on the two countries post division in 1948. It investigates the predicted outcomes prior to joining, and whether these outcomes have come to fruition nationally and on a global scale. Following this, there is focus on South Korea's ability to exert an influence on international decision making in world-politics, and how this affected inter-Korean relations. Importantly, analysis looks at how participation in the Security Council (1996–1997 and 2013–2014) further extended the country's capabilities to adopt resolutions, including those affecting North Korea's missile and nuclear programmes and human rights record. South Korea's participation in peacekeeping operations, Koreans appointed to high positions within the UN system and payments of the UN budget are also investigated. The study concludes with discussion of the role of the UN as a forum for international contacts and for providing knowledge otherwise unavailable to non-members.

South Korea in the United Nations is unique in its analysis of South Korea's relations with the UN prior to and, above all, after 1991, thereby enhancing understanding of the significance of its UN membership as well as the importance of being a UN member. Suitable for scholars in Korean studies, international relations and East Asian politics, it can also be used as a reference work by policy-makers in the region, and for students and professionals working within the UN system.

-->
Contents: Introduction;The Two Koreas' Struggle for UN Membership 1948–1991;The Impact of UN Membership on Inter-Korean Relations;Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, Appointments of Koreans and Budget Contributions;General Conclusions; --> -->
Readership: Scholars in Korean studies, international relations and East-Asian politics, East-Asian policy-makers, students and professionals working within the UN system.
-->South Korea, North Korea, UN Membership, United Nations, IR Theory, Inter-Korean Relations, Nuclear, Human Rights, Security Council, Peacekeeping0

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1Purpose

What does it mean for South Korea to be a UN member? In order to answer this complex question, the size, the origins of, and, above all, the tasks of the UN need to be considered. When the UN was founded in 1945, it had 51 members, but in 2013, the membership had risen to 193. In 2013, the UN had around 50,000 employees worldwide. Having experienced two devastating world wars, the founders wanted to create an organization that would prevent breaking out of a third global conflict.¹ The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France that had the largest militaries and had fought together during World War II would lend their military might to the UN to fight any new aggressors. The name “United Nations” was chosen since the founders hoped that the countries that had united to fight the Axis powers Germany, Japan, Italy, and Spain would remain united to prevent future aggression and preserve peace. All “peace-loving” states were eligible for membership.

The UN was founded on the basis of three core tasks: (i) to maintain international peace and security, (ii) to encourage development, and (iii) to promote respect for human rights. The UN Charter is the founding legal document of the UN. The Charter’s Chapter VII: Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 39 states: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Coercion to fight any would-be aggressors would include military force, economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation. Since member states are bound by resolutions adopted by the Council to dispatch troops to implement its decisions, it is the center of power within the UN system. The Council has the authority to commit all members to take enforcement measures such as sanctions. Other UN bodies such as the General Assembly that comprises all member states and is the central forum for global dialogue can only make “recommendations.”

The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France were given permanent seats and veto power in the Security Council. Since 1965, the Council has altogether 15 members (originally 11). Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would have accepted UN membership without veto power. The veto also reflected a realistic acceptance by others that the UN could not undertake enforcement action against its strongest members or without their concurrence. The nonpermanent members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms after nomination by one of the five regional groups consisting of Africa, Asia, Latin America, Western and Eastern Europe.²

The UN would serve as a forum for dialogue in which negotiation and diplomatic solutions might replace the resort to war to settle disputes. According to the UN Charter, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2(3): “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means.” Article 2(4) states: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Members also accept the legal obligation to support enforcement actions such as economic sanctions and to refrain from giving assistance to states that are the objects of UN preventive or enforcement action. Another key principle is the obligation of member states to fulfill all the obligations assumed by them under the Charter.

The most fundamental principle of the UN is the sovereign equality of member states, which means that they do not recognize any higher governing authority. Equality refers to states’ legal status, not their size, military power, or wealth. On this basis, each state has one vote in the General Assembly. Inequality is also part of the UN framework, embodied in the permanent membership and veto power of five states in the Security Council. Since the UN is based on the membership principle of universality, full membership in the UN is a key indicator of international status. The UN, particularly the General Assembly, is therefore the central forum for claims to international status. International support can be quantitatively measured by such indices as the number of full diplomatic partners, memberships in international or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and attendance at important international conferences or meetings. It can be qualitatively assessed by interpreting the pattern and content of participation in international institutions. Institutions can be defined “… as the norms, rules, conventions and codes of behaviour that provide a framework for human interaction.” Notably, the American scholar Jean E. Krasno (2004) writes that “The UN can only become what its Member States want it to become.” Thus, the UN is completely dependent on the support of the member states to implement its mission.³

With this background, the purpose of this book is (a) to investigate what the predictions of membership were at the time of South Korea’s UN admission in 1991 and (b) to analyze whether these predictions have been fulfilled or not. A few assessments of membership made by Korean scholars and diplomats are recorded. The most systematic assessments of UN membership from 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016 are recorded in Section 4.5. However, the author has found no work investigating what the predictions at the time of admission were and analyzing whether they have been fulfilled or not. This book aims to fill this conspicuous gap 25 years after South Korea became a UN member.

First, the study investigates main characteristics of the two Koreas’ UN policies and the global context in which they pursued the policies prior to becoming members in 1991. Second, it analyzes post-1991 developments in far more detail by first investigating what the predictions of South Korea’s membership were and then analyzing on the basis of six standards of evaluation selected on the basis of the referred literature whether the predictions have been fulfilled or not.

The six standards are membership in UN agencies, membership in the Security Council, the Council’s resolutions on North Korea, participation in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs), appointments of Koreans to high posts within the UN system, and contributions to the UN budget. The standards are all related to exerting power within the UN system in order to affect the outcome of the organization’s work and thereby raise South Korea’s global position. A seventh standard added is the General Assembly’s resolutions on the North Korean human rights issue. Otherwise, the account would have been incomplete. In recent years, the issue has received increasing attention within the UN and it is contested between the two Koreas. Also, this standard concerns exerting power to affect the UN’s work. Owing to simultaneous UN membership in 1991 and resolutions adopted on North Korea, the study involves both Koreas in Sections 3.2–3.7 but only South Korea in Section 4.5. Developments in each area are whenever possible analyzed on the basis of concrete examples that are investigated based on the predictions of membership and the theoretical framework.

1.2Theoretical Framework

Two relevant terms for this study are globalization and global governance since they very much form the context in which multilateralism is evolving. Globalization can be defined as a “historical process, which transforms the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental and interregional networks of interaction and the exercise of power.” Global governance is one of the most recent theories on how the international system operates and includes “those procedures and practices that exist at the world or regional level for the management of political, economic and social affairs.” This definition is in line with that in 1995 of the Commission on Global Governance, an independent group of prominent international figures, stating that governance is

The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal … as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.⁴

Global governance is not global government, not a single world order and not a top-down, hierarchical structure of authority. “It is the multi-level collection of governance-related activities, rules and mechanisms, formal and informal, public and private, existing in the world today.” States and other actors work with cooperative problem-solving arrangements and activities to deal with various issues and problems. Pieces of global governance include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), multilateral agreements, and framework agreements, including select UN resolutions. IGOs are recognized subjects of international law with separate standing from their member states. They are instrumental in helping states form stable habits of cooperation through regular meetings, information gathering and analysis, dispute settlement, and operational activities. They enhance individual and collective welfare. IGOs affect member states by setting international and national agendas and forcing governments to take a position on issues. In this context, power relations are important by affecting participation and influence. The important issues are: Who is responsible for decision making in global governance? Is it states or other actors who really control the agenda?

Since World War II, the UN has been the central piece of global governance. It is the only IGO with global scope and its agenda encompasses the broadest range of governance issues. The UN is a complex system with many pieces. Besides the six principal organs — the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat — specified by the UN Charter, the UN in 2013 had 16 specialized agencies, two independent bodies, and 37 associated organizations.

The specialized agencies operate with autonomous legal status and independent budgets, but are functionally connected to the UN via formally contracted relationships between their own memberships and the coordinating machinery of the ECOSOC. The ECOSOC addresses such international economic and social issues as promoting higher standards of living, identifying solutions to economic, social, and health problems, and encouraging universal respect for human rights and basic freedoms. The main power of the ECOSOC lies in its ability to create or initiate studies and reports on the issues of economic and social progress and its facilitation and organization of international conferences in the economic and social and related fields. It now (2015) consumes over 70 percent of the entire UN system’s human and financial resources and oversees 36 agencies, funds and programs that comprise the UN’s development activities. The Secretariat is the administrative organ of the UN and is led by its chief administrative officer, the Secretary-General. The UN is the central site for multilateral diplomacy with the General Assembly as its center stage. One of the UN’s main functions is to provide needed expertise or intelligence and physical and human resources through its specialized agencies to the benefit of member states.⁵

The UN Security Council is the core of the global security system and is the primary legitimizer of actions dealing with threats to peace and security. At the same time, it is extremely difficult to ensure compliance with global governance. There are simply no ways to enforce decisions and no mechanisms to compel states to comply with decisions in the area of international peace and security. In fact, one of the key criticisms of global governance derives from the lack of institutions suitable to enforce compliance with international agreements. Notably, the UN Charter, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2(7) states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”

The American and British scholars Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal (2010) argue that states join IGOs such as the UN since they allow for the centralization of collective activities through a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus. These raise the efficiency of collective activities and enhance the organization’s ability to affect the understandings, environment, and interests of states. Membership in IGOs enables states to participate in a stable negotiating forum, pursue self-interest, provide mechanisms for dispute resolution, and create advantages in terms of centralized organization to implement collective tasks. By participating, member states agree to shape international debate on important issues and forge critical norms of behavior. Yet, states still maintain their sovereignty and varying degrees of independence of action.⁶

Another functional characteristic that leads states to prefer IGOs to alternate forms of institutionalization is independence meaning “… the ability to act with a degree of autonomy within defined spheres. It often entails the capacity to operate as a neutral in managing interstates disputes and conflicts.” Although the independence of IGOs is highly constrained since especially the powerful member states can limit their autonomy, interfere with their operations, ignore their dictates, or restructure and dissolve them, participation by even a partially autonomous, neutral actor can raise efficiency and affect the legitimacy of individual and collective actions. Such a situation gives even powerful states incentives to grant IGOs substantial independence. Opinions on the usefulness of IGOs differ. Abbott and Snidal (2010) quote the opinion that “realists believe states would never cede to supranational institutions the strong enforcement capacities necessary to overcome international anarchy.” Consequently, IGOs are of little interest since they merely reflect national interests and power and do not constrain powerful states. Although Abbott and Snidal accept realists’ view that states are jealous of the power of IGOs and deeply concerned with the distributive consequences of their interactions, they claim that realists underestimate the utility of IGOs, even to the powerful.

Realist theory assumes that international politics is characterized by the continuous quest for power by all states. Since IGOs cannot change the nature of human beings as striving for power, they are of little help in challenging this perpetual struggle. Nor can they change the anarchical structure of the international system, characterized by the absence of an overarching monopoly of force in form of a world government, which further accentuates this struggle for power. Since the ability to use organizations to pursue national interests is determined by a country’s strength, IGOs are formed and used by the powerful states to implement their power politics more effectively and to pursue their self-interest. The design of IGOs will primarily reflect their interests. Thus, states are selfcentered rational actors.

Consequently, decision-making procedures of IGOs will be set up in a way that systematically privileges the most powerful member states, as in the case of the UN Security Council, making them intergovernmental rather than supranational organizations. Skewed decision-making procedures institutionalize power imbalances. On the other hand, IGOs also create opportunities for their member states by, for instance, encouraging the development of specialized decision-making and implementation processes to facilitate and coordinate IGO participation. Most countries perceive that there are benefits to participating in IGOs even when it is costly. For instance, Iraq did not withdraw from the UN when it was subject to more than a decade of stringent sanctions.⁷ The significance of power will be tested particularly with regard to South Korea’s participation in the Security Council and the Council’s adoption of resolutions on North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests.

Liberals place importance on international institutions for collective problem solving and have a more positive view of IGOs than realists. Liberals believe that cooperation is possible and will expand over time for two reasons. First, the international system is a context within which multiple interactions occur and where the various actors “learn” from their interactions, rather than a structure of relationships based on the distribution of power among states and a fixed concept of state sovereignty. The system i...

Table of contents

• Cover page
• Title page
• Copyright
• About the Author
• Acknowledgments
• Contents
• Acronyms
• List of Tables
• Chapter 1 Introduction
• Chapter 2 The Two Koreas’ Struggle for UN Membership 1948–1991
• Chapter 3 The Impact of UN Membership on Inter-Korean Relations
• Chapter 4 Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, Appointments of Koreans, and Budget Contributions
• Chapter 5 General Conclusions
• Appendixes
• Appendix II: Questionnaire on the Outcome of UN Membership Since 1991
• Bibliography
• Index