Multilateral Approach in China's Foreign Policy

Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng

• Publisher: WSPC
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9789813221123
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica asiatica

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Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese authorities have gradually come to embrace multilateralism to realize their basic foreign policy objectives in maintaining a peaceful international environment and enhancing China's international status and influence. This embrace is largely based on pragmatic considerations. There is no denial, however, that elements of liberalism and constructivism gradually enter into the considerations of Chinese leaders. They accept, for example, that non-traditional security issues can only be tackled through genuine multilateralism. This volume carefully examines China's increased participation in multilateral organizations and mechanisms and its efforts to initiate and develop its own discourses on global affairs straddling Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Latin American continents. China's presence in international multilateral organizations has been providing developing countries a better chance to maintain a balance of power. Since China has no ambitious plan to transform the existing international order, its increasing enthusiastic engagement of multilateralism is likely to be accepted by the international community.

--> Contents:

• Preface
• About the Author
• List of Tables
• Acronyms and Abbreviations
• Multilateralism — Theoretical Issues and China's Approach in Foreign Policy
• China in Asia:
  • China's Asian Policy in the Early Twenty-First Century: Adjusting to its Increasing Strength
  • China's Regional Strategy and Challenges in East Asia
  • China's ASEAN Policy in the 1990s: Pushing for Regional Multi-polarity
  • The Path of Least Resistance: China's Way of Engagement in Southeast Asia
  • The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area — Success or Failure? A Preliminary Evaluation Based on Econometric Evidence
  • China-ASEAN Economic Co-Operation and the Role of Provinces
• China and the World:
  • The Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation: China's Initiative in Regional Institutional Building
  • China's Approach to Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: Institutional Building, Economic Co-operation and the Challenge from Afghanistan
  • China's Relations with the Gulf Co-operation Council States: Multi-level Diplomacy in a Divided Arab World
  • China's Approach to BRICS
  • Latin America in China's Contemporary Foreign Policy
  • China's African Policy in the Post-Cold War Era
• Bibliography
• Index

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--> Readership: Policymakers, academics, professionals, undergraduate and graduate students interested in China's foreign policy. -->
Keywords:Multilateralism;China;Foreign Policy;International RelationsReview: Key Features:

• It is a valuable reference book for undergraduate students, postgraduate students and scholars in the fields of China's foreign policy and international relations in the Asia-Pacific
• It is a most up-to-date account of China's approaches to its most significant multilateral regional organizations and forums
• In view of China's importance in international politics and economy, it is important to understand its policy

Chapter 1

Multilateralism — Theoretical Issues and China’s Approach in Foreign Policy

Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng

Introduction

John Ruggie and colleagues argued that multilateralism mattered in 1993 or so,¹ and that was around the time when the Chinese leadership indicated its agreement and decided to participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. It probably led to a more active approach along the line articulated by Robert Cox that “Multilateralism is not just a passive, dependent activity. It can appear in another aspect as an active force shaping world order”.² In 2001, China took the initiative and formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Robert O. Keohane defines multilateralism as “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions”.³ John Ruggie demanded more and emphasized a “qualitative dimension”; and he chose to consider that multilateralism meant “co-ordinating relations among three or more states … in accordance with certain principles” that ordered relations among them. It therefore involved a “generic institutional form”.⁴ James Caporaso sets even higher standards, and he perceives multilateral cooperation as being regulated by certain general norms and indivisibility of values.⁵ Finally, John Duffield observes that the highest level of multilateral institutionalization involves clear rules, compliance, commitment and an institutionalized third-party mediator.⁶

Liberal institutionalists believe that multilateralism brings stability, reciprocity in relationships and regularity in behavior. It is seen to be essential because all states encounter mutual vulnerabilities in an increasingly interdependent world, and they all intend to share public goods. Multilateralism can become a source of both international and domestic legitimacy. A government which attempts to work together with other governments is naturally in a better position to argue that it is not in pursuit of particularistic national interests but common interests. At the same time, leadership and status in multilateral institutions may also enable a government to enhance its domestic appeal and support.⁷

Realism and neo-realism international relations theorists tend to believe that international institutions have little influence on world politics, even on “low politics” issues such as human rights and the economy. John Mearsheimer bluntly states: “My central conclusion is that institutions have minimal influence on stated behavior, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world”.⁸ In contrast, Amitav Acharya argues that multilateralism assumes five important roles in the promotion of normative changes in international politics: increased global and economic interdependence; emergence of new transnational challenges; changes in the global distribution of power, generation of opportunities for new roles for multilateral institutions; global spread of democracy, offering a more conducive climate for multilateral organizations to initiate changes in member countries; and the global spread of civil society among leading international norm entrepreneurs.⁹

It is therefore important to raise the issue of effective governance. Jochen Prantl attempts to analyze the problem of international cooperation through the analytical framework of governance — formal and informal processes and institutions — that generates authority to promote collective action, enforce specific lines of collective action outcomes and make those outcomes acceptable to a wider international community.¹⁰

In the 1990s, when multilateralism began to spread in the Asia-Pacific region (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was formed in 1989, and China participated in it in 1991), the international community shared a sense of acceptance of liberalism, and the U.S. was seen as the sole superpower which would work hard to establish a “liberal global order”. With the benefit of hindsight, however, it was a decade of huge normative ambition generating relatively weak institutionalization. The emerging states and rising powers too wanted to challenge the basic norms of the system or to revise its foundational principles.¹¹

From a pragmatic point of view, governments do not want to choose between bilateralism and multilateralism, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Brendan Taylor analyzes the options available. According to him, there is the “bilateral or multilateral” approach which treats either of them as mutually exclusive modes of international cooperation, and this line of thinking has a tendency to assume a dichotomous and zero-sum attitude toward the bilateral–multilateral nexus. Taylor thinks that the pronouncements of Chinese leaders are good examples. The “bilateral–multilateral” approach, however, accepts the potential synergies between the bilateral and multilateral modes of international cooperation and attempts to strengthen bilateral cooperation through the multilateral route. The annual Shangri-La Dialogue is given as an illustration. The “multilateral–bilateral” approach considers multilateralism as the final objective and believes that bilateralism is a constructive “stepping stone” or “building block” for realizing the ultimate goal. Finally, the fourth approach suggests that these two modes can coexist peacefully.¹²

Most governments at this stage probably accept the fourth approach without studying Brendan Taylor’s framework and accord a distinct priority to bilateralism. Kishan Rana, a former Indian diplomat, observed that in 1999 the “great majority of ambassadors on full-time assignments resident abroad engage in classic diplomacy, at bilateral posts”; he further stated that in the same year, there were about 7,700 resident ambassadors, “an average of 41 ambassadors in each of the world’s capitals”.¹³

In recent years, research on multilateralism has spread to cover the issues of global governance and regional cooperation. Climate change has often been selected as an important case study. Framing climate change as a global governance issue is an attempt to consider the significance of inclusive and flexible decision-making, involving the roles of leadership and institutions, as well as the locus of authority and the issues of equity and justice. It is commonly recognized that states alone cannot resolve the immense question of climate change which is fragmented and highly politicized.¹⁴ In relation to multilateralism, Frank Bierman has adopted the term “global governance architecture”, which is defined as “the overarching system of public and private institutions that are valid or active in a given area of world politics. This system comprises organizations, regimes and other forms of principles, norms, regulations and decision-making procedures”.¹⁵

Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific Region

Some international relations scholars have argued that future developments in Asia may well be seriously affected by the region’s ability to construct effective multilateral institutions for integration and cooperation.¹⁶ Bates Gill and Michael J. Green observe that since the late 1990s, multilateralism in Asia has been increasingly characterized by its “Asianization” and the pursuit of an “East Asian community”. Further, it has also witnessed the growth of “ad hoc” multilateralism and the so-called minilaterals.¹⁷

Hatoyama Yukio, the first Prime Minister of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led government elected in August 2009, articulated his vision of an East Asian community soon after his election. He declared that the era of U.S. unipolarity was coming to an end and that the age of Asian multipolarity had arrived.¹⁸ Earlier in 2008, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd also articulated the idea of an “Asia-Pacific Community” which would embrace “the entire Asia-Pacific region — including the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and other states of the region”. Rudd believed that there was a strong need for a multilateral Asia-Pacific institution to “underpin an open, peaceful, stable, prosperous and sustainable region”.¹⁹

These two proposals, however, did not attract a favorable response; they were largely criticized as impractical. Critics tended to treat the proposals as repetition of the “ASEAN way”, i.e., informal, discussion-club approach that seldom leads to concrete results. They wanted to see a European Union approach to Asia-Pacific multilateralism, which was obviously not possible at this stage. The U.S. has substantial reservations concerning Asian community building, and it wants to promote an inclusive multilateral approach to ensure its major role in the region. Though it has not openly opposed the establishment of organizations like the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and SCO, it would presumably closely monitor their activities to ensure that its interests would not be compromised.

The ad hoc or minilateral approach may well be illustrated by the mechanisms aroused by the North Korean crisis. In 1995, the U.S., Japan, South Korea and the European Union formed the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization to offer Pyongyang fuel oil and light^-water reactors so as to persuade it to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Subsequently Beijing initiated the four-party talks involving the U.S., South Korea and North Korea in negotiations to tackle the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula between December 1997 and August 1999. The negotiations were expanded in August 2003 to include Russia and Japan as well.

In the early years of twenty-first century, the U.S., in response to the exclusionary tendencies in Asian multilateralism, started to form “coalitions of the willing” — examples included the Container Security Initiative and the Proliferation Security Initiative as part of its counterterrorism strategy in the first years of this century.

As reflected by the joint statements from the APEC forum and the East Asia Summit (EAS), Asia-Pacific countries tend to embrace an “open and inclusive” regional architecture. The U.S. would like to strengthen this Asia-Pacific or trans-Pacific orientation and contain the Asian regionalism approach. While engaging in the promotion of ad hoc multilateralism, it has to consider its balance versus institutionalization too. Finally, the future role of its traditional bilateral alliances in Asia needs to be reassessed in the context of developing multilateralism. The keen competition between the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) promoted by the U.S. Obama administration and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) articulated by China in recent years seems to suggest that the U.S. has given up its previous “wait and see” attitude and has been engaging in more active competition with China.

Japan has the ambition of assuming a leadership role in multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region too. Fukushima Akiko argues that Japan is not interested in a top-down, institutionalized integration; it prefers a continuous process of de facto regionalization supported by deepening interdependence. Expansion of intraregional trade is perceived to be a significant factor. It considers that the future regional architecture should promote healthy cooperation and competition.²⁰

Japanese officials interviewed by Fukushima considered that it is wise for Japan to let ASEAN assume leadership in East Asian regionalism so as to avoid rivalry with China and that Japan has been promoting ASEAN’s governorship of regionalism at the EAS.²¹ In fact, all major powers in the region realize that it is difficult for anyone of them to secure strong leadership in the region, and they all accept ASEAN leadership as the best arrangement or a compromise. This position is probably stronger for China and Japan.

Mutual distrust or rivalry between China and Japan has probably been the most serious obstacle in regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. In view of rising nationalism in both countries and the deteriorating territorial dispute, it is not expected that the bilateral relationship will improve in any significant way in the foreseeable future, which means that neither regional cooperation nor community building in the Asia-Pacific can achieve any significant breakthrough. Worse still, in the summer of 2014, there was a certain tendency for Japan not only to strengthen its alliance with the U.S., but also to improve ties with North Korea, while China and South Korea both became closer partly because of their further alienation from Japan.

While trying to be more active in its leadership role in regional cooperation and institutionalization, ASEAN attempts to avoid the dominance of Southeast A...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Preface
• About the Author
• Contents
• Chapter 1 Multilateralism — Theoretical Issues and China’s Approach in Foreign Policy
• Part I China in Asia
• Part II China and the World
• Bibliography
• Index