Part 1
HONG KONG ECONOMICS
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DOMESTIC INNOVATION PARTNERSHIPS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF HONG KONG AND SINGAPORE
Zhengqi PAN
Introduction
Since the 1960s, East Asiaās economic development has been the marvel of many policy makers and academicians worldwide. Beginning with Japan in the postwar era, the other Asian economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan ā dubbed the āFour Asian Tigersā ā all experienced phenomenal growth rates from the 1960s to the 1990s. Economic success in East Asia has largely relied on export-oriented industrialisation (EOI), which entails the access to and capture of overseas markets through the export of competitive products. Under the EOI development model, domestic firms are exposed to foreign competition and are geared towards foreign markets. However, with the proliferation of complex global value chains (GVCs) and production networks in the late 1990s and especially the 2000s, markets have become much more interdependent and exposed, leading to intense competition among firms globally. In addition, as the East Asian economies move up the value chain, they can no longer rely solely on labour and physical capital accumulation to sustain economic growth. Innovation has become a critical component for these East Asian economies to stay competitive and relevant.
With the rapid advancement of information and communication technology (ICT), and the increasing use of robotics in manufacturing and services, the most competitive economies are knowledge-based economies (KBEs). As Powell and Snellman (2004) note, the ākey components of a knowledge economy include a greater reliance on intellectual capabilities than on physical inputs or natural resources, combined with efforts to integrate improvements in every stage of the production process, from the research and development (R&D) lab to the factory floor to the interface with customersā.1 Indeed, KBEs are highly versatile economies that rely heavily on R&D, as well as skills upgrading to advance industrial and service-related processes and products. Positioned high on the GVC, the advanced East Asian economies of Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan thus need to constantly engage in the latest research and development to stay ahead of the curve.
The broader context of national innovation spans beyond the private sector. For highly innovative KBEs, the innovation environment encompasses the collaborative relationship between three major actors: the government, the industry and the academy (or universities). Importantly, Pan (2016) notes that one key feature of KBEs is that āthese economies harness the resources of multiple actors, from the government to the industry to the academy, forging a trilateral synergistic relationship between the actors and sustaining a virtuous cycle of economic innovationā.2 Theorised as the Triple Helix Model of innovation by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1995), university-industry-government relations in national innovation systems signify the growing importance of triadic linkages and the shift away from the traditional industry-government dyadic model. Indeed, the authors of the Triple Helix Model expect the university to play an increasing role in KBEs, with universities transforming from being merely academic to more entrepreneurial in nature, responsible for the training, nurturing and development of young entrepreneurs through entrepreneurship and incubation programmes.
Among the developed Asian economies, Hong Kong and Singapore face the most pressure to climb up the value chain and become robust KBEs due to their relatively small geographical sizes and populations. Indeed, small land areas place a natural limit on both the accommodation of talent and the development of economic zones. On the other hand, the small geographical size of the two economies also makes it relatively easier for economic structural shifts to occur on a national scale. In addition, with a strong dependence on high-tech manufacturing and high-end services for economic growth, both Hong Kong and Singapore find it imperative to transform themselves into KBEs. As former British colonies which depended heavily on external trade and international finance, these two economies thus serve as meaningful case studies for comparison.
A stark difference in innovation systems between Hong Kong and Singapore is the role of the government. Hong Kong is generally regarded as a laissez-faire economy, with minimum intervention and planning done by the government, while Singapore practices a hybrid capitalism model, which involves much more state-directed economic strategies and planning. Consequently, in the context of innovation systems, conventional wisdom would posit that the private sector is the primary driver for innovation in Hong Kong, while the government is the dominant innovation driver for Singapore.
Taking a comparative perspective, this chapter examines the role of the government in driving domestic innovation partnerships in Hong Kong and Singapore. In particular, how and to what extent is the government significant in forging trilateral partnerships among the major actors of innovation? Does Hong Kong indeed follow a laissez-faire model of innovation while Singapore follows a state-directed developmental model? What is the trend like? This chapter posits a counter-intuitive argument: I argue that Hong Kongās development model is becoming increasingly interventionist, due to stiff global economic competition as well as Hong Kongās domestic political economy. Moreover, Singaporeās development will continue to stay firmly state-directed due to path dependence and the existence of robust institutions. Thus, short of drastic economic and political shocks, Singapore will retain a state-led model of national innovation system. Overall, this chapter contributes to the current political economy literature in two major ways:
ā¢to examine the evolution of innovation systems of two important and comparable economies ā Hong Kong and Singapore ā in Asia, proposing a counter-intuitive argument that considers the complexity of domestic and international dynamics; and
ā¢to draw on the developmental state theory from political science and the Triple Helix Model of innovation from business to investigate Hong Kongās and Singaporeās economic development from a multidisciplinary perspective.
The Distinction Between Neoliberalism and Developmentalism
Economic neoliberalism advocates market forces over state intervention in the economy (Hayek, 1973); (Friedman, 1962). Closely related to the neoclassical economics mantra of free market competition, neoliberalism is an ideology that believes in the unfettered workings of the market, unhindered by the state except in cases of public goods provision. Moreover, Harvey (2005) notes that ā[neoliberalism] is a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms with skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free tradeā.3 According to Harvey, the stateās role is limited to creating and preserving the overall political, economic, and social institutional framework, and the state only intervenes in areas of public goods provision, where markets do not exist. Drawing from Adam Smithās concept of the āinvisible handā, neoliberals believe that the market functions best without interference, allocating scarce resources efficiently according to the broad and unrestrained forces of demand and supply.
Neoliberals are highly skeptical of state power. As Milton Friedman famously writes, āWhen government ā in pursuit of good intentions tries to rearrange the economy, legislate morality, or help special interests, the cost come in inefficiency, lack of motivation and loss of freedom. Government should be a referee, not an active playerā (Friedman, 1962). Indeed, neoliberals argue that state intervention in the economy invariably distorts price mechanisms, which are important information cues to gauge market behaviour and consumer sentiments. Moreover, Corrales (2012) notes that āthe price mechanism ā or the opportunity to make a profit by finding the right price that a given market can afford ā creates a powerful incentive for suppliers to take the risk of making large investments, adopt cost-cutting measures, incorporate new technologies, and develop new products and servicesā.4 The distortion of price mechanisms due to state intervention thus results in lower economic efficiency, lack of seller motivation and the loss of economic freedom.5 In addition, given that the state is prone to be captured by particularistic interests of politicians, interest groups, unions and rent-seeking lobbyists, neoliberals view industrial policy with disdain.
As Corrales (2012) further writes, āTop state leaders will reward top bureaucrats for the political service they fulfill or the political problems that they solve, rather than the public goods such as efficiency that they deliverā.6 Consequently, neoliberals believe that the government should keep its hands off the market as much as possible, intervening only in areas where the market is absent.
On the other hand, the developmental state model is antithetical to the core principles of neoliberalism. Advocating the selective use of industrial policy to drive the economy, the developmental state model goes directly against the neoliberal paradigm of free market competition. Nonetheless, the developmental state model arguably consists of some characteristics of neoliberalism in that the model embraces active participation in economic globalisation and world trade, where domestic ānational championsā or high potential firms selected by the government to boost the countryās economy are ultimately exposed to intense competition. To note, national champions are first shielded by the government while in their developing stages and then gradually exposed to competition domestically and abroad. As Yeung (2016) notes, developmental states intentionally distort the market by āgetting the prices wrongā, instead of following the market-based price mechanism, in order to āinduce private entrepreneurs to participate in the state-led industrialisation programmeā.7 Indeed, politics ā not economics ā plays a dominant role in developmental states.
From existing research, the key characteristics of the developmental state are:
ā¢a political leadership that is geared towards economic development and has the political will to do so;
ā¢an autonomous and meritocratic bureaucracy that is embedded in business network; and
ā¢active use of industrial policy to promote and sustain economic growth.8 As Chalmers Johnson famously remarked, āpoliticians reign and the state bureaucrats ruleā in developmental states (Johnson, 1982).
Consequently, the inextricable link between politics and economics as well as the dominance of politics in developmental states, makes it markedly different from the neoliberal model.
The developmental state model is most visible in East Asia. In fact, Chalmers Johnson first conceptualised the model to explain the meteoric rise of Japan in the 1960s and 1970s. Soon after, the model was used to analyse similar developments in three of the Asian tiger economies, notably South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.9 Indeed, scholars used the developmental state theory to examine how these countries had deftly managed industrial development and economic policies to shore up economic growth and improve the standard of living for their citizens. On the other hand, Hong Kong was excluded from the list as it was deemed to have followed the neoliberal model. Without doubt, the developmental state model challenges the Western paradigm of neoliberalism, and argues against the idea that neoliberalism provides the only way to achieve economic progress.
The Triple Helix Model of Innovation
National innovation systems operate differently in neoliberal and developmental economies. This section discusses the different models of national innovation systems using an analytical framework called the āTriple Helix Modelā, as theorised in Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1995), and Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000). The triple helix framework focusses on the organisation of and dynamics between innovation actors, and posits a shift from a dyadic innovation collaboration between the indu...