Lecture I
THE ACCIDENTAL NATION
LECTURE I
This lecture series is based on the theme, “Can Singapore Fall?”, but you will realise in the course of my speech that the real question that I want to ask is, “Will Singapore Fall?” — except that, if I were to set it as such, it might sound a little pre-deterministic and a little too pessimistic for everyone. So, “Can Singapore Fall?” is a more neutral question, but obviously, when you ask a question like that, the answer must be, “Of course it can, if you make the conditions as bad as you can possibly imagine.” Let us get to it, and hopefully along the way, we can learn from one another, and gather ideas from one another on how we can act in a way to minimise the possibility or likelihood of Singapore falling.
The Melian Dialogue
The Peloponnesian War was a war fought between Athens, leading the Peloponnesian League, and Sparta, leading the Delian League. It stretched from 431 to 404 B.C., and included what has come to be known as the famous Siege of Melos.
Melos is an island in the Aegean Sea more than 100 kilometres to the east of mainland Greece. It was a prosperous island. The Melians were of the same ethnic group as the Spartans, but they chose to remain neutral in the war. Athens invaded Melos and asked Melos to pay tribute to Athens. The Melians had never paid tribute to Athens before, and refused to do so now.
Thucydides, the Athenian historian, wrote about what has come to be known as the Melian Dialogue. It describes the negotiations between Athens and Melos. The Athenians’ approach was to appeal to the Melians’ sense of pragmatism, pointing to the Athenian army’s overwhelming strength and their “reasonable” terms for surrender. The Melians, on the other hand, appealed to the Athenians’ “sense of decency”. Whether or not Melos was truly neutral, ships could freely resupply there; this made Melos strategically important for Athens and subduing Melos would reduce the reach of Sparta’s navy.
In substance, the Melian Dialogue went as follows:
ATHENS
Surrender and pay tribute to Athens, or be destroyed.
Refusing to argue with the Melians on questions of morality, the Athenians simply assert, “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”
MELOS
We are a neutral city, not an enemy. There is no need to conquer us in your war with Sparta.
ATHENS
If we accept your neutrality and independence, we would look weak. Our people would think that we have left you alone because we are not strong enough to conquer you.
MELOS
If you invade us, it will alarm the other neutral Greek states, who will then turn against you lest the same fate befalls them.
ATHENS
The Greek states on the mainland are unlikely to act this way.
MELOS
It would be shameful and cowardly for us to submit without a fight.
ATHENS
It is only shameful if there is a reasonable chance of defeating the attacker. There is no shame to submit to a superior opponent.
MELOS
Although you are much stronger, we would regret not trying to fight as there could still be a chance to win.
ATHENS
This is a foolish hope. It does not come from rational analysis and is just an emotional response.
MELOS
The gods will help us because our position is morally just.
ATHENS
The gods will not intervene. It is natural that the strong dominate the weak.
MELOS
Sparta will help defend us.
ATHENS
The Spartans are a practical people. They will not put themselves at risk when their interests are not at stake. Besides, we have the stronger navy. There is no shame in submitting to a stronger enemy offering reasonable terms. What makes sense is to submit to superiors, stand firm against equals, and be moderate to inferiors.1
The Melians stuck to their position. Athens mounted a siege and finally captured the city in 416 B.C., executing the men, and enslaving the women and children. Some modern historians look at it as an act of genocide, a wiping off the face of the earth of an entire nation, culture, and civilisation.
The Melian Dialogue is often quoted as a classic case study in political realism, where power is assumed to be the primary goal of political acts.
Don’t Be Weak
I asked a foreign friend whether the Melian Dialogue carried a lesson for Singapore. His response was immediate and direct. “The lesson for Singapore is straightforward. Don’t be weak. Don’t be weak in how you are perceived externally by others. Don’t be weak internally.”
I start my series of IPS-Nathan Lectures with this reference to the Melian Dialogue because “Don’t be weak” explains so much of Singapore. The continuous existential question for Singapore is how to respond to the argument that “What makes sense is to submit to superiors, stand firm against equals, and be moderate to inferiors”, and especially on how Singapore can live under the observation that “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”
Singapore’s quest for survival and self-determination has been with us from at least 1959, when Singapore attained internal self-government. Our struggle for independence and sovereignty will continue for all our years ahead.
Singapore, to my mind, is “The Accidental Nation”, a nation unplanned in its creation and unexpected in its survival. My lecture today will survey how we came to be, and how we should think of the future. How does “Don’t be weak” explain our past, and how must “Don’t be weak” make our future?
My next lecture will be on “The Fourth Generation” of Singaporeans since independence. It is the generation whose days will include SG100. And my third and final lecture will be on “The Way of Hope”, discussing my beliefs on how we can best secure a future for our generations to come.
The “Accident” of Independence
The founding political leadership of Singapore led by Mr Lee Kuan Yew had not believed that Singapore could be on its own or should be on its own. This was the real world that the rational pragmatist could not escape from.
Singapore was a British colony and had been part of the Straits Settlements comprising Penang, Melaka and Singapore. Singapore was geographically part of the Malay Peninsula, keeping it separate from the Federation of Malaya was to go against the facts of geography and history, even from the days before Sir Stamford Raffles founded modern Singapore in 1819.
Yet, the British had carved Singapore out of Malaya while integrating Penang and Melaka into the Federation of Malaya because Singapore hosted the largest British military establishment east of Suez. Singapore was critical for the sustenance of the British Empire.
Thus, the British granted the Federation of Malaya independence on 31 August 1957, while only granting Singapore full internal self-government in 1959, where the colonial administration controlled external relations and security, including internal security.
The People’s Action Party led by Mr Lee Kuan Yew had, as a prime feature of its election manifesto for the General Elections that brought it to power in 1959, the aim of seeking to be reunited with Malaya. The principle of “Don’t be weak” drove Singapore to find strength in the bigger political entity. Malaya did not welcome the idea of merger with Singapore. Singapore’s predominantly Chinese population would have tilted the overall racial balance in an unwelcome way.
The continuous existential question for Singapore is how to respond to the argument that “What makes sense is to submit to superiors, stand firm against equals, and be moderate to inferiors”, and especially on how Singapore can live under the observation that “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”
That Malayan politics was very much built upon ethnic lines did not make merger with Singapore an attractive proposition. On the other hand, the possibility of Singapore turning communist under the tutelage of Mao’s China was a most unpleasant prospect. A communist Singapore at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula would have perhaps been a worse nightmare to the Malayans than a communist Cuba would have been to the Americans.
In 1963, the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was persuaded that he had to consider the idea of merger as something that would be good for Malaya. The prospect of Kuala Lumpur being the Washington, D.C. of the merged entity, the political centre, with Singapore as the New York, the commercial centre, had its attractiveness. The challenge of ethnic distribution was ameliorated by including Sabah and Sarawak in the merger while offering the British a way out for granting independence not just to Singapore, but also its Borneo colonies.
I can clearly recall the strains of songs, which spoke of the hopes of being in Malaysia, in particular:
Let’s get together,
Sing a happy song,
Malaysia forever,
Ten million strong.
Land of the free,
Marching as one.
Ready to share in every way,
So let’s get it done — get it done, get
it done.
We’re all in the same boat,
Steady as you go.
Let’s pull together,
Everybody row — row, row, row.
It’s right, it’s the answer,
There’s no other way,
To be good neighbours everyday
Malaysia forever, evermore,
United for liberty,
Home of the happy people,
Just you wait and see — wait and
see, wait and see, wait and see.
Let’s get together,
Sing a happy song,
Malaysia forever,
Ten million str...