China's 19th Party Congress

Start of a New Era

Kerry Brown

• Publisher: WSPC (EUROPE)
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781786345936
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica pubblica

This book gives an overview of key themes domestically and internationally from the 19th Communist Party Congress held in Beijing in October 2017, setting out the main policy priorities for the Xi government in China as the country moves towards fulfillment of the first Centenary Goal, the hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party of China in 2021.

Written as the first full length analysis by an international group of authors of different aspects of the Congress, making it perfect for graduate students and researchers, as well as individuals interested in China Studies.

Contents:

• About the Editor
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress (Kerry Brown)
• The Belt and Road Initiative Before and Beyond the 19th Party Congress (Igor Rogelja)
• Sharpening 'Swords' and Strengthening 'Cages': Anticorruption Under Xi (Konstantinos Tsimonis)
• China's Evolving Relationship with the United States: The Impact of the 19th Party Congress and Xi's Second Term in Power (Meghan Iverson)
• From Initiatives to a 'New Era'? China's Economic Policies at the Time of the 19th Party Congress (Jan Knoerich and Qing Xu)
• China and the Challenges of its Environment (Isabel Hilton and Benjamin Barratt)
• Land Institution Reform Under Xi: Policy Changes and Implications (Xin Sun and Yifan Cheng)
• Chinese Wisdom: New Norms for Development and Global Governance (Yang Jiang)
• The China–Taiwan Relationship Before and After 19th Congress (Chun-Yi Lee)
• Index

Readership: Graduate students, researchers and individuals interested in China Studies.
Key Features:

• A multi-disciplinary approach, and by an international set of authors based in China, Europe, and the US
• Accessible, clearly written and presented, and directed at policy makers in government and business and all those seeking to understand more about contemporary China
• Contains fresh research on China's economy, the Belt and Road Initiative, China's land reform and the Taiwan issue

Chapter 1

Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress

Kerry Brown

The Curious Case of Consent in Contemporary Chinese

One of the puzzles in contemporary China is the ways in which the Xi Jinping leadership has at least been perceived to have created unity and consensus in a country undergoing huge changes, where this achievement might have been viewed as very difficult. Not only this; in the Hu Jintao period, society was regarded as riven by divisions and contentiousness. This was manifested in the ways in which this era ended in 2012, with one member of the Politburo (Bo Xilai) removed from his position due to corruption, and another two, Ling Jihua and, from the Standing Committee under Hu, Zhou Yongkang, under a shadow.¹ The elite themselves seemed to be going into meltdown. If this was the case at their lofty level, how much more divided was it likely to be in the rest of society?

From this unpromising start, the Xi leadership emerged with increasingly surprising stability. This was despite it starting, quite soon after its beginning, what might have been regarded as a high risk anti-corruption purge, targeting thousands of officials, and spreading from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other entities. It was also against falling growth, with the annual GDP dipping down from 2012 to around 7%, and then to 6.5% (In the first quarter of 2018, it was stabilised at 6.8%). As economic growth had been seen as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chief claim to legitimacy after 1978 when reforms started, this also supported the expectation that the head winds for the Xi leadership would be against it. Party discipline after 10 years of breakneck growth was poor; cadres seemed increasingly divorced from the rest of society, or too deeply integrated into its commercial operations and implicated by issues and problems there; the language of elite leaders seemed ossified and outdated, and the CCP generally looked like it was in the midst of a crisis of relevance, responding nervously and defensively against the Jasmine Revolutions and the so-called Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East as they occurred from 2010 onwards.

Despite these aspects which were some of the most important influences around the start of the Xi leadership, it became clear quite quickly that the dominant tone of the new era was one of confidence, that the focus of the CCP was initially to straighten its own affairs out, and that much of this gained it wide public support. Seen as increasingly autocratic, conservative and hardline outside of China, and being labelled a new kind of Mao, Xi Jinping despite all the muscular, forceful things his government proposed, from clampdowns on rights lawyers, to harsh treatment of any kind of dissent inside and outside the Party, faced almost no overt, visible opposition. A letter by some critics appeared in 2016, but barely left a mark (Bland and Yang, 2016). Within the Party super elite, at the Central Committee and Politburo, it seemed that no one spoke out of turn. The unity of the message, and the messaging, in this era where there is so much complexity and so many challenges is something that needs an explanation.

This is especially so because the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 can be seen as the culmination of this process of tightening and enforcement of discipline and unity. It itself was conducted with a procedural smoothness that had been signally lacking in the 18th Party Congress in 2012, with its late date (it slipped from the usual October into November) and the intense speculation beforehand about who would get what slot, and what Xi Jinping’s role in this would prove to be. In 2017, there was no question of Xi’s centrality. Nor was there any issue over the event’s date, or any unexpected happenings in the build up to it. The only unexpected thing was the abrupt removal of Chongqing Party Secretary Sun Zhengcai, accused of corruption in the autumn but before then figuring in most lists of potential candidates for entry to the Standing Committee, the ultimate group of elite political leadership in contemporary China.

While there were plenty of questions about how many might be in this Standing Committee (seven, as was the case from 2012, or the larger nine, which had been the norm from 2002 onwards), how many would actually retire and observe the informal age limit of 68, whether there would be an obvious successor to Xi in the next appointees, and whether a figure like the immensely respected Wang Qishan, head of the anti-corruption struggle, would go, in terms of the general atmosphere in China and the sense of stability and following of process, the Congress build up was undramatic. That in itself was an achievement.

It was also further evidence of this unexpectedly high level of elite and public support for Xi’s administration. What lay at the heart of this? Why is it that a political elite, many with personal memories of the late Maoist era and the truly cataclysmic results of this period of mass mobilisation and violently committed pursuit of idealistic outcomes, were willing to embrace a much more person-centred, charismatic leadership than had been the case at any time since the 1970s? Why the eerie lack of dissenting voices, even in the most subliminal and cautious fashion?

Of course, continuing to produce economic results that at least mobilised and gained the material allegiance of people was important. But this had been the case since the Deng era from 1978, and in any case, as mentioned above, was becoming weaker, not stronger, under Xi because of the falling growth rate. The Xi leadership from 2012 simply didn’t talk in the remorselessly unitary way about its most important function being to support economic development as the Hu one had. It was promoting a more hybrid, complex message. Nor was it wholly about use of repression and fear. There certainly was plenty of that under Xi (witness the July 2016 clampdown on lawyers for instance, and the treatment meted out to the journalist who was claimed to have leaked the Document No. 9 in early 2014). But informal and more formal investigation showed that Xi was a genuinely popular leader, rather than one who was simply feared. This lay behind the fond nickname for him from 2013, Xi Dada (Uncle Xi). And heavy use of repression usually gives evidence of the extent of dissent underneath the surface of society. In Xi’s China, targeted groups got rough treatment. But the emerging middle class, the key group for Xi, working in cities, in service sectors, were largely onside by consent, not force. For them, they had not been forced to like Xi. They did it willingly.

Telling the China Story

How is it that Xi has managed to create this level of consent among groups that are key for him? One thing is clear: whatever else he has done, from the first period of his time as Party Secretary Xi Jinping has been a teller of stories. And this ability to capture the complexity and ambition of what China is going perhaps gives a clue to the success of his leadership so far in terms of stability, confidence and unity. A book, published in 2017 by the state-owned Xinhua agency, was simply titled ‘Xi Jinping Tells Stories’ (Xi, 2017). A meeting of the Politburo in early 2013 reportedly involved Xi telling his Politburo colleagues that they needed to tell the China story to the outside world. China had been too passive, too marginalised, and now had the right, as the world’s second largest economy, to put its story out there. This was about more than its economic success. It was about it describing its world view, its distinctive cultural values, and the ways in which it was more confidently contesting the notion of a Universalist Western discourse of political and ethical values. It wanted neither economic nor geopolitical space, but intellectual and cultural space.

That involved validation of ideas like the China Dream, and narratives of China’s engagement in the rest of the world like the Belt and Road Initiative, the new Silk road (covered in Chapters 2 and 8), which were more dynamic, more centred on China, and more communicative. These stories accepted the ways in which China was intrinsically global and integrated into the global system. But they also stressed that China wanted parity, and in many cases, greater international status in this new era. It felt it had the right to be seen as equal to the US, rather than contesting and competing with it. Its rise was an inevitable and peaceful one, and one it had the right to. This strand of historic destiny thinking, and of the Xi leadership occurring at a particular time in the country’s attainment of modernity on its own terms, and in its own unique way, was striking, and evidenced in the way that all elite leaders, not just Xi, spoke. It was supplemented by a strong sense that this moment, driving towards the delivery of the first Centenary Goal in 2021 (celebrating the 100th anniversary of the CCP) was not just one where, as had been the case in the Hu period, China would achieve middle income status. Above and beyond this, the Xi era would be culminating in a country which was having justice restored to it. The Communist Party, which had come to power in 1949 on the back of this vow that it would redeem Chinese people and restore justice to them after the century of humiliation at the hands of the west, and the injustices of the long imperial feudal period, was for the first time in reach of a modernity on its own terms, restoring the country’s status to it, and allowing it redemption and resurrection from a past full of sacrifice, humiliation and suffering. Jubilation at this achievement, guided and steered by the Party, was the great source of consent and consensus. The Party’s message under Xi is strongly patriotic, and one that to dissent from politically would lay people open to the deadly criticism of being disloyal and traitorous.

This focus on achieving the imminent moment of national rejuvenation and renaissance (terms that have appeared heavily in the last few years in official discourse in the People’s Republic) is a clear underlying theme in the political and ideological content of Xi’s lengthy speech at the opening of the 19th Party Congress, delivered on 18th October 2017 in Beijing. The sheer size of this talk alone is symbolic of the expansiveness and ambition of the Xi era. But it is also indicative of a political vision which is comprehensive in ways that previous leaders since the era of Deng have not been so willing to engage in. Under Jiang Zemin, Party Secretary from 1989 to 2002, and Hu (2002–2012) their main mode of communication was to use statistics to promote the idea of how fast and successful China’s material development was. Theirs was a predominantly technocratic, and sometimes quite parochial, mode of address. China was achieving measurable outcomes and doing things in a way unique to itself, just asking for space, rather than trying to impose on anyone else. But under Xi, the bounds of the Chinese understanding of its status and role have started to flow outwards, to a legitimate global place. It is no longer in the position of explain itself and excusing. Under Xi, it is explaining to others, and making demands of them (Xi, 2017a).

The grand narrative that Xi’s October 2017 address is obedient to is stated right at the start — mission. The country has an historic mission, and that mission is coming to a moment of major dénouement. There is urgency, this is when the sacrifice and toil of Chinese people throughout the modern era reaches its climax.

Never forget why you started, and you can accomplish your mission. The original aspiration and the mission of Chinese Communists is to seek happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation. This original aspiration, this mission, is what inspires Chinese Communists to advance. In our Party, each and every one of us must always breathe the same breath as the people, share the same future, and stay truly connected to them. The aspirations of the people to live a better life must always be the focus of our efforts. We must keep on striving with endless energy toward the great goal of national rejuvenation (Xi, 2017a).

The objective is the final realisation of a rich, strong and powerful country (fuqiang guojia). The CCP is integral to the achievement of this. This explains the frequent reference to mission — in Xi’s speech — the mission being achievement of great country status.

The Congress report admits current challenges — those arising from ecological issues, inequalities and the lack of innovation in the country. But it sees these as areas requiring attention and focus in order for China to have the right structure to achieve its narrative goal. Five years of ideological training creating elite political strategic clarity, and anti-corruption struggle creating administrative discipline means that the CCP now is in a good position to implement a holistic vision. At its heart is hybridity. The market will exist alongside the state. Rule by law (rather than rule of law) will exist and protect middle class commercial and property rights, but not allow the legal system and its activists to contest with the rights of the CCP and its monopoly on power. SOEs will integrate and co-operate with non-state ones. Chinese values will harmoniously work alongside western ones. This is the sort of vision of the great unity given by early modernisers like Kang Youwei in the late 19th century. Everything comes together in the overriding commitment to the nation, contributing to its strength and power.

This is the grand Xi vision. In a sense, if we wish to search for a dictator or autocrat in contemporary China, it is not so much in the form of an individual person with their limitations, but more in the story they serve and link into. The mission to create a strong nation dictates to all those that serve this, within the CCP and society — and that includes Xi. Xi is as much the prisoner of this narrative, as the shaper and teller of it. He inherited it, from the earliest generations of elite Chinese leadership, and at very most he can adapt parts of it and refine or clarify it. But he cannot change it (Brown, 2017).

2017 and the Issue of Personnel

That helps to explain the kind of elite leaders that emerged in 2017. First, the rumours about a reduction in the size of the Standing Committee were proved wrong. There was maintenance of the previous number, and therefore a commitment at least here to continuity. There was also an observance of the unwritten retirement rule. Despite some reports of Xi and others stating that the CCP tying its hands by imposing irrevocable retirement limits on leading cadres was self-limiting, the five members of the Standing Committee from 2012 to 2017 who were over the age of 68 in 2017 retired (Hornby, 2016). Again, this showed observance of the established norms of the CCP, and stuck to the notion that it was keen to institutionalise its power processes. All of this did not support the idea that Xi was an autocrat. He was still working within the standard contemporary rules and procedures.

The main point of divergence with what had happened before was the lack of any obvious successor amongst those elevated in 2017. All but one of the newly appointed Standing Committee members (Zhao Leji was the exception) were of ages which would mean at the next Congress, in 2022, they would also be over retirement age. In the era of Jiang and of Hu, in their second Standing Committees, there had been obvious successors. In 2017, there no longer is. Some argue that within the full 24 strong Politburo, there are plenty of aspiring future leaders. Maybe the ploy will be to see them prove themselves in the coming years, and then be elevated in 2022. It might be that with the removal of time limits to the position of presidency, which happened in the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2018, Xi will in fact relinquish his Party post and power will gravitate to the role of president which he will remain in. But this sort of new arrangement and configuration of power, along with helicoptering figures into the elite, might be regarded as destabilising — a source of unwanted uncertainty. The idea therefore that the Xi leadership has aspirations to continue in some form beyond the 2022–2023 current timeframe is more possible now than it was before the Congress.

In terms of the vexed question of Xi having a specific group of people that have now been promoted and can help him with his political programme, the 2017 Congress outcome is illuminating because of the clear lack of any factional framework to see it in. At the heart of this is questions over the coherency of ‘factional’ models of political allegiance in the elite in the CCP. In the past, the factional model has proved useful, with talk of Shanghai cliques, princelings, those linked with the China Youth League, etc. The China Youth League was often referred to in the Hu era, because of the importance of this organisation in his early career. It is the group most closely related to Li Keqiang, current Premier, and to figures like Hu Chunhua, the young, and highly regarded Party Secretary of Guangdong province. But Hu’s failure to get promoted this time, and the lack of any clear member of this faction alongside Li was taken as a sign that this particular group was now declining. The Shanghai-Jiang Zemin faction seemed to have representation with Wang Huning and Han Zheng, both natives of the city, and both active there in parts of their careers, the latter as Mayor and Party Secretary for over a decade in the 2000s.

Adherence to a factionalist model is as often a sign of lack of information and understanding as of Chinese leadership dynamics. The complex links and networks between politicians in China are things that it is hard to get good quality proof for from outside, not least because of the efforts by the CCP to demonstrate and manufacture unity to the outside world no matter what fractiousness there might be within it. Figures like Xi often have identities that stretch across different institutional and factional boundaries. He himself served in the military, is a princeling, has links to Shanghai through briefly being Party Secretary there in 2007, and is also linked to groups in Fujian and Zhejiang province where he was active for much of his career. He has been linked to a so-called Shaanxi group, a province where he lived as an adolescent in the late 1960s and early 1970s. What this all means in terms of quantifiable impact on policy and political coherence is hard to say. Factional allegiances give the veneer of an explanatory framework. But once interrogated, all they do is prove the unexciting fact that those who have worked quite well with each other through being in similar organisations or in the same region in the past are likelier to work well together in new situations in the future. This is not a particularly Chinese phenomenon too. It happens everywhere (Cheng, 2012; Miller, 2015).

There being a complex set of challenges that the Chinese government is facing now, and limited time to resolve these, it is likely that ability or at least recognition of ability and a similar understanding of how to face these challenges is more important than factional allegiances which, while observant of the importance of networks in Chinese society, underprivilege ideas and the generic importance of practical experience. The figures promoted to the Standing Committee in 2017 did not include people like Liu He, or Ding Xuexiang, who only managed to get on to the full politburo, despite there having been closely linke...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• About the Editor
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Contents
• Chapter 1 Contexts: The Xi Jinping Consolidation at the 19th Party Congress
• Chapter 2 The Belt and Road Initiative Before and Beyond the 19th Party Congress
• Chapter 3 Sharpening ‘Swords’ and Strengthening ‘Cages’: Anticorruption Under Xi
• Chapter 4 China’s Evolving Relationship with the United States: The Impact of the 19th Party Congress and Xi’s Second Term in Power
• Chapter 5 From Initiatives to a ‘New Era’? China’s Economic Policies at the Time of the 19th Party Congress
• Chapter 6 China and the Challenges of its Environment
• Chapter 7 Land Institution Reform Under Xi: Policy Changes and Implications
• Chapter 8 Chinese Wisdom: New Norms for Development and Global Governance
• Chapter 9 The China–Taiwan Relationship Before and After 19th Congress
• Index