1 | Extending Analysis in Effective Management |
The Legacy of the Sixties
I believe the approach I have adopted in this book can be seen as the true inheritance of the oft-maligned Foundation Reports1, both produced in 1959 and both highly critical of the quality of students and faculty in many US business schools at the time, as well as the nature of the underlying pedagogy which often relied on descriptive âwar storiesâ from seasoned campaigners. The Foundation Reports not only recommended a substantial improvement in the quality of both students and faculty but also the development of a pedagogic approach which encouraged the twin application of sound theory and robust empirical evidence. In the later case, the reports clearly assumed that a more analytical approach would be completely compatible with a significant improvement in the nature and impact of management practice. Although the reports themselves have often been identified as a key influence in a shift towards a form of academic study which is seen as unworldly and of little use to practising managers, this was clearly not their intention. This book is an attempt to put the more analytical aspects of management back on the course which was originally charted for them by the two Foundation Reports: to play a key role in enhancing and developing the practice of management.
To do this, however, we need to recognise the essential flaw in the previous approach which was very much of its time. The sixties were a time of optimism â at least in Europe and North America â about not only the beneficial impact of technology but also of the burgeoning fields generally described as the social sciences. There was great optimism that many complex social and societal issue would succumb to effective policy initiatives based on a range of theoretical and empirical investigations.
However, it was some considerable time after the war before the SSRC was actually established. After various âfalse startsâ the Heyworth Committee was set up in 1963 and was a key committee in recommending the establishment of the SSRC in 1965:
However, the net result was nicely summarised later and very much after the event by the notion of the âMoon Ghetto Paradoxâ â on the one hand the ability of a developed human society to succeed in achieving the complex technical task of landing a man, or more strictly men, on the moon, yet on the other hand singularly failing to overcome the social challenges inherent in the urban ghetto (Nelson 1974).
The underlying principle therefore of this book is that our forms of analysis should start from two assumptions that were almost always missing from or at best marginalised in the analytical treatments that informed developments in the sixties. These two assumptions are: first, the nature of the phenomena we study is such that in a broad sense appropriate analysis and action is inevitably context dependent in a way which cannot be captured adequately by any form of simple or indeed complex contingency framework; and, second, that useful forms of analysis and analytical insights are much more likely if they start from current management practices and understandings. A nice illustration of the problems of adopting the opposite approach â starting by redefining the problem so it becomes more amenable to our preferred forms of analysis â is to be found in the short fable on teaching the prince how to play chess (Petersen 1965).
Extended Analysis: Both Analysis and Synthesis
Analysts should therefore set rather more realistic objectives for their analytical investigations. Whilst they should still be true to the essential etymology of the word and develop understandings based on a closer look at constituent parts of the issue and the use of appropriate theory and empirical evidence, they should expect to arrive at insights rather than general prescriptions and at further questions rather than answers. Perhaps yet again it is worth recalling that one of the key elements in the Toyota Production System (TPS) is the notion of âasking the five whysâ. Invented in the 1930s by Toyota founder Kiichiro Toyodaâs father Sakichi and made popular in the 1970s by the Toyota Production System, the five whys strategy involves looking at any problem and asking: âWhy?â and âWhat caused this problem?â The idea is simple. By asking the question âWhyâ one can separate the symptoms from the causes of a problem. This is critical as symptoms often mask the causes of problems. In this way one should also ensure that analysis is combined with synthesis: achieving benefits from analysis requires recognising the equal need for some form of synthesis.
Meta-Analysis and Systematic Review
Such a synthesis should in general involve balancing analysis from different perspectives but also relying on differing forms of empirical evidence â both qualitative and quantitative. I have a number of techniques and processes to facilitate doing this and I will review and contrast them in more detail later in this book. In general, two challenges often get intertwined: incorporating different analytical perspectives on the nature of the âproblemâ situation alongside introducing evidence from public or private sources which relate to previous analogous situations. Here it is convenient to follow the terminology used by the Cochrane Collaboration, developed in the field of medical research, and use âmeta-analysisâ to refer to statistical methods of combining evidence, leaving other aspects of âresearch synthesisâ or âevidence synthesisâ, such as combining information from qualitative studies, for the more general context of systematic reviews. In the latter case, I reserve the term âsystematic reviewâ for the wider integration of differing sources of data as well as differing analytical frameworks. Hence, meta-analyses are often, but not always, important components of an overall systematic review procedure.
In general, th ere are better-defined procedures for conducting a meta-analysis on quantitative data but when it comes to qualitative studies, although at some higher level the need to compare, contrast and evaluate is similarly important, there is less consensus about the most appropriate forms to adopt. This is at least partly a function of the wider range of forms of empirical data. Barnett-Page and Thomas (2009), in reviewing the various methods, partly focus on the underlying assumptions of the researcher2:
⢠Subjective idealism: there is no shared reality independent of multiple alternative human constructions.
⢠Objective idealism: there is a world of collectively shared understandings.
⢠Critical realism: knowledge of reality is mediated by our perceptions and beliefs.
⢠Scientific realism: it is possible for knowledge to approximate closely an external reality.
⢠Naive realism: reality exists independently of human constructions and can be known directly.
They then note that such differences influence the choice of analytical tools for synthesis:
Unfortunately whilst their distinctions along the individual dimensions are useful, their labels are confusing: in their earlier analysis they have already recognised that in this context the terms âidealistâ and ârealistâ can cover a range of research methods when it comes to interpreting the nature of a particular context.
Hence, whilst in overall terms realism reflects a belief that reality exists independently of any observer, whilst idealism in essence maintains that experience is ultimately based on mental activity, the different forms of both these frames of reference are more to be seen as differing assumptions within the framework of two conflicting philosophies as to the extent to which, in the case of idealism, there are or are not shared understandings and, in the case of realism, our understanding of the real is achieved directly or more mediated by our perceptions and beliefs. The distinction is further complicated by the fact that in the philosophy of mind, idealism is more the opposite of materialism, in which the ultimate nature of reality is based on physical substances but we should not assume that materialism and realism are strict synonyms.
Table 1.1 Summary table
N.B.: In terms of the above dimensions, it is generally a question of degree rather than of absolute distinctions.
(Copyright Š 2009 Barnett-Page and Thomas. Reproduced with permission)
As so often in these situations we encounter the issue of incommensurability: the degree to which particular theories can or cannot be compared to determine which is more accurate. In this sense most would argue that it is not possible to conduct a direct comparison between idealism and realism but it is possible at least to some extent to conduct such comparisons between different âvariantsâ of each.
This helps to explain the rather confusing nature of Table 1.1 in that it is implied that each dimension is continuous and at least implicitly correlated but in practice the issues are more complex:
⢠At a philosophical level any dispute between idealism and realism cannot be resolved by pure empirical means. Again, in practice this may be less of a problem than in theory since both distinct views might support rather similar choices and actions in a particular context.
⢠The comments above apply most strongly to what might be termed naive realism and naive or subjective idealism but there becomes a form of partial convergence when we consider in the former case a shift towards critical realism and in the latter a shift towards objective idealism. For instance Byrne (2002) provides a constructive critique from a critical realist perspective on the issue of interpreting quantitative data.
⢠When it comes to the issue of the product of any research exercise, it is true that a form of naive realism helps to generate clear answers for policy makers and practitioners and in many ways this is linked to the real or apparent positivism of much policy research. On the other hand, as I will argue later in this book, if we look more for better questions rather than answers we may be able to avoid some of the traps of naive realism whilst still being seen as of genuine value to both policy makers and practitioners.
Beyond Naive Realism
Moving away from a perspective of naive realism also means moving away from the positioning of all five dimensions on the right-hand side of Table 1.1. However, it would be very misleading to suggest that the further one move towards naive idealism the more one shifts along all of these dimensions. It is more appropriate to see the critical realist or the objective idealist in a world which tends to have the dimensions of:
⢠iterative search;
⢠quality assessment based on content rather than method;
⢠a critical evaluation of prior literature;
⢠exploratory questioning;
⢠heterogeneity and complexity.
If this is most likely to be the output from an analytical and systematic review, where does it lead us in informing choice and action?
The basic analytical approach presented in this book is that of a further two-stage process as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
The final process to resolve remaining differences has to be based on judgement, experience and rhetoric. We also need to recognise that such an extensive and extended process is often unrealistic in terms of normal management practice and indeed even in policy contexts. As a necessarily anonymous example, I was in discussion with a group of civil servants about the evidence background for a new policy paper for UK ministers. As th...