National Service in Singapore

Shu Huang Ho, Graham Ong-Webb

• Publisher: WSPC
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9789813149236
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique militaire

National Service (NS) is one of Singapore's foundational public policies. First implemented by the British in 1954, amended in 1967 to provide a means to defend a fledgling independent nation, and codified into its present form in 1970, NS is a key pillar of Singapore's defence. Its significance, however, goes beyond defence. With over 1 million male Singapore citizens and permanent residents having served NS, and consequently involving many more — family members, friends, employers and colleagues — in different ways, NS is deeply woven into Singapore's political and social fabric. This volume brings together a range of scholarly perspectives on NS which explore its past, present and future in four sections: The history of NS, NS in practice, debates on NS and an international perspective. Comprising chapters by individuals from varied backgrounds, National Service in Singapore offers a broad account of one of Singapore's oldest public policies.

Contents:

• About the Contributors
• Introduction
• The History of NS:
  • National Service and Citizen Soldiers: The Singapore Experience of Military Conscription (Albert Lau)
  • Goh Keng Swee and the Policy of Conscription (Bernard Fook Weng Loo)
  • In the Service of the Nation Too: An Early History of National Service Outside the Singapore Armed Forces (Ho Shu Huang)
• NS in Practice:
  • Conscripting the Audience: Singapore's Successful Securitisation of Vulnerability (Chang Jun Yan)
  • Numbers Matter and Number Matters: National Service and Singapore's Quest for Military Deterrence (Samuel L W Chan)
  • National Service and Nation-Building: Successes and Limitations of the Singaporean Experiences (Kai Ostwald)
  • Re-imagining National Service in the Era of Hyperculturalism (Leung Chan-Hoong)
• Debates:
  • Dual Citizenship and National Service in Singapore (Terri-Anne Teo and Priscilla Cabuyao)
  • The Maligned Malays and National Service (Norman Vasu ad Nur Diyamah Binte Anwar)
• An International Perspective:
  • Conscription in Taiwan: A Problematic Evolution (Wu Shang-Su and Ho Shu Huang)

Readership: Undergraduate and graduate students, military professionals and those who are interested in Singapore's defence policies and their impacts.
Key Features:

• First academic work on National Service in Singapore
• Comprehensive analysis of National Service in Singapore from multiple perspectives
• Enriching discussion from contributors with different backgrounds

Part 1

The History of NS

Chapter 1

National Service and Citizen Soldiers: The Singapore Experience of Military Conscription

Albert Lau

When Singapore was suddenly thrust out of Malaysia in 1965, the betting odds were heavily stacked against its survival as a newly sovereign state. The island-state’s diminutive size, small population, lack of natural resources, its location in a tough neighbourhood — a “region of revolt”¹ — and inability to defend itself did not augur well for a future on its own. Fifty years on, in 2015, Singapore celebrated its Golden Jubilee — in style. The once fledging state had not only defied the odds against its survival but had prospered economically in the process. Underpinning the Singapore Economic Miracle is the physical security of its sovereignty and territorial integrity provided by the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), created from scratch after independence and built upon the bedrock of military conscription that was first introduced — albeit amid much controversy and opposition — when Singapore was still a British colony in 1954. Foisted once again in 1967, this time on a grander scale and on a post-independent citizenry unaccustomed to soldiering, National Service (NS) has come a long way since then. Today, NS is not only the backbone of Singapore’s defence; it has become a deeply embedded aspect of the nation’s psyche and a non-negotiable requirement of citizenship — a “way of life” and a “rite of passage” for its male citizens on whose shoulders the burden and responsibility of national defence disproportionately rested. This chapter surveys the historical evolution and administration of NS in Singapore between 1954 and 2017. It focuses on not only the rationale for NS and its undergirding principles but also shows how the post-independent city-state grappled with the burdens and the challenges of foisting common defence responsibilities on its male citizenry. In particular, the story of conscription in Singapore reveals how the continual engagement of its citizenry is necessary to win the hearts and minds of each generation of Singaporeans and get them to embrace the concept of life-long NS.

The Colonial Legacy

Though military service was not unknown to Singapore,² the island state’s first experience of NS began only in the 1950s as part of the British response to the outbreak in June 1948 of the armed communist insurgency, dubbed the “Emergency”, in both Malaya and Singapore. Forced to deal with the deteriorating security situation, the British in 1952 introduced the National Service Bill requiring the part-time conscription of all eligible male British subjects and Federal citizens. The bill was passed by the Legislative Council in December 1953, which also approved the bill to set up the Singapore Military Forces (SMF). But NS was not strenuously enforced beyond the middle of 1954 as it incited violent riots by Chinese Middle School students who equated it as devise to defend a colonial system benefiting only the British and the English-educated elite.³

While the NS ordinance remained very much in force, conscription soon gave way to a preference for regular forces as Singapore marched towards self-government under the Labour Front government from 1955. After the People’s Action Party (PAP) won the 1959 Singapore elections and formed the government, it continued the policy of building Singapore’s regular forces, which by 1963 saw the raising of two full-strength regular battalions of the Singapore Infantry Regiment (SIR). Arguing that an independent Singapore on its own was not economically, politically, or militarily viable, the PAP government pushed for independence through merger with the Federation of Malaya. With the formation of Malaysia, comprising the former British territories of Malaya, Singapore and the North Borneo and Sarawak, on 16 September 1963, defence and internal security became a Federal responsibility and the need to boost the recruitment of local forces was no longer considered a priority.⁴

The creation of Malaysia, however, precipitated the onset of Konfrontasi (Confrontation), as Indonesia sought to assert its influence over the former British territories.⁵ In April 1964, the Federal government invoked the NS ordinance once more, and some 30,000 men registered for NS by May. Of the 100 who were called up, only 82 reported for service. They were sent for two months’ training at Port Dickson. By mid-1965, some five batches were trained.⁶ By then, however, Singapore’s relationship with Kuala Lumpur had deteriorated to the point where separation seemed the only viable option. On 9 August 1965, after 23 months in Malaysia, Singapore found itself suddenly out of the Federation. When the last batch of NS conscripts returned from Port Dickson on 6 October, Singapore was already an independent state.⁷ The need to build up its own military forces took on an added urgency as the young republic struggled to find its own footing during a time of great uncertainty for Singapore and the region.

National Service: Reloaded

Singapore’s departure from Malaysia made its physical survival a pressing concern. Surrounded by the territorial waters of Indonesia and Malaysia, the small, trading island’s confined location at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula meant that its access to the high seas was possible only through its neighbours’ waters. Any serious disruption of its physical links to the outside world would seriously threaten its economic well-being and physical survival as a young state. With Indonesia just a few kilometres away, and the fires of Konfrontasi still smouldering, Singapore’s threat environment did not improve. Its dependence on Malaysia for its water supply afforded yet another source of vulnerability.⁸ At the time of independence, Singapore was in no position to defend itself. Its total defence capability consisted of the following: two understrength battalions (nearly all the officers in command were British and two-thirds of the soldiers were non-citizens hailing mainly from Malaysia); a 5,000-men police force; an ageing gunboat (called the RSS Panglima) to guard its territorial waters; and not a single aircraft to safeguard its national airspace. While the presence of British troops during Konfrontasi helped to cushion Singapore’s vulnerability, the island’s leaders knew that they could not expect the United Kingdom to continue to extend its security umbrella over the island once Britain’s security interests no longer coincided with Singapore’s. Now a sovereign state, there was no escaping the hard reality that Singapore would have to be responsible for its own defence.⁹

A small team led by newly appointed defence minister, Dr Goh Keng Swee, was hastily assembled to form the nucleus of the new Ministry of Interior and Defence (MID), which was set up in October 1965. An economist by training, Dr Goh sought help from other countries to build Singapore’s own defence force from scratch. He ruled out the British as he felt that, going by their record of training the Indian army, the British would want to “continue to provide the officers for a long time.”¹⁰ Several non-aligned Asian and African countries, including India and Egypt, were discreetly approached, but many of these states had reservations about assisting a then unknown state in a sensitive subject like defence. Only Israel responded positively and an agreement was reached for Israel to help train and build up the SAF.¹¹

Several options were considered — and just as readily dropped. Raising a small, highly trained, regular military force was financially feasible but it was also, by reason of its size, militarily impotent. Singapore also could not depend on volunteers to supplement its small regular force as there was no assurance of getting an adequate supply of volunteers: Singapore had no tradition of soldiering and the majority race, Chinese, despised soldiering as a profession.¹² Building a large regular force, on the other hand, would be the most effective means of ensuring Singapore’s security — but it came with high cost. With only a small population of less than 2 million, creating such a sufficiently large standing military force to meet Singapore’s defence needs would also invariably divert scarce manpower resources to military use. On the recommendation of the Israeli advisors, the decision was taken to create a citizen’s army of conscripts built around the nucleus of regulars serving in the two SIRs as the most cost- and manpower-effective solution to build a credible SAF. A detailed and systematic programme of build-up was worked out with the Israeli advisors.¹³ The Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (SAFTI) was quickly set up in February 1966 to train officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and, from June 1966, the first batch of 140 officer cadets was selected from more than 2,000 applicants to undergo training and form the nucleus of the regular officer corps needed to train national servicemen. In July 1967, 117 of the 140 received their commissions.¹⁴ A Central Manpower Base (CPMB) was also established to register conscripts.¹⁵

With the military infrastructure in place, the government moved the National Service (Amendment) Bill in parliament on 27 February 1967. Under the bill, all 18-year-old Singapore citizens and permanent residents were required to be enlisted for part-time service in the volunteers-reliant People’s Defence Force (PDF), Vigilante Corps, and the Special Constabulary for 12 years. As facilities and trainers were limited, only about 10%, mainly from the better educated, would be conscripted for full-time NS, spending two to three years with the army and thereafter 10 years in the reserves until reaching 40 years of age. In moving the second reading of the NS bill in parliament on 13 March 1967, Dr Goh justified its necessity on wider security and nation-building grounds. The “logical” effect of a strategically important but poorly defended Singapore, he argued, must mean that it would “revert to a colony or satellite of whoever wishes to afford it protection” — an outcome that would not only spell trouble for the region but also pose a threat to the security and peace of the w...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Series Title
• Title
• Copyright
• About the Contributors
• Contents
• Introduction
• Part 1 The History of NS
• Part 2 NS in Practice
• Part 3 Debates
• Part 4 An International Perspective
• Index