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Introduction: Why Performing Indigeneity Matters
The Afro-Caribbean philosopher Frantz Fanon describes the challenge he faced during his interaction with the white world, in which he felt that he was expected to âbehave like a black man or at least like a niggerâ, in contrast to his own expectation of behaving like a âmanâ â like a normal human being (Fanon ([1952] 1967: 114). This resulted in a secreting of race, in what he calls âsecreting blacknessâ, because he had to hide that which he was and perform that which he was not, only to suit the expectation of another âmanâ, in this case, a white observer. This is an example of the performance of indigeneity, which is the focus of this book. In these pages, I explore the construction and performance of indigeneity, which can take various forms, some overt (as in performances for tourists), and others more subtle, and the role that such performances of indigeneity play in the perpetuation or dismantling of power structure(s) of âmodernity/colonialityâ1 today.
Performances of indigeneity can be characterized in terms of representations of what Blaut (1993) describes as âthe colonizerâs model of the worldâ. Thus, as impositions of the colonizerâs imagination of the self and the âOtherâ, performances of indigeneity are imbued with arrays of expectations that lead to the phenomenon that Gordon (2013: 66) views as akin to âsecreting indigeneityâ, an idea that he borrows from Fanonâs âsecreting blacknessâ as another form of indigeneity. This description is in line with most performances of indigeneity, where the âfront stageâ displays of indigeneity in many tourist sites are presented as though they are âback stagesâ of the quotidian experiences of culture, with a view to meeting the expectations of powerful tourists. What is hidden, secreted, in such tourism spaces where the âfront stagesâ are presented as âback stagesâ is the humanity of the oppressed subjects, which is embodied in their genuine sense of alterity â an alterity that does not negate their humanness as history-making subjects.
To deal adequately with the role of performing indigeneity in either sustaining or transcending the power structure(s) of modernity/ coloniality, I begin by examining why performing indigeneity matters in the first place. There is no single answer to this question, since the meanings of performing indigeneity are multitudinous and depend on a variety of reasons. Hence, the question of performing indigeneity, particularly why it matters, is not a stand-alone question. It must be examined along with other related questions such as to whom it matters, and when it matters. In other words, the motivations behind the phenomenon of the performance of indigeneity across time and space are not just varied and compounded, but are also mediated by specific intervening variables, which include interest groups and the power dynamics between them.
In this introductory chapter, I have deliberately collapsed the time element, which is one of the determining factors in clarifying the meanings of performing indigeneity, into something that decolonial scholars have characterized as the moment of modernity/coloniality (Grosfoguel 2007; Maldonado-Torres 2007; Mignolo 2009). I have also found it useful to divide the interest groups involved in performing indigeneity into two broad categories, namely the colonizer and the colonized. This is in line with the purpose of this book, which is to contribute to a liberation discourse â a discourse that highlights behavioural tendencies among the oppressed that can lead to an amelioration of the condition of oppression, instead of aggravating the âcolonial woundâ.
As a subject who is a member of the communities that survive on the oppressed side of the âcolonial power differentialâ (Mignolo 2005), in what Gordon (2007) calls the âhellish zone of non-beingâ, I believe that it is fitting for me to contribute to a greater understanding of what may influence and assist oppressed subjects to wage a successful struggle against colonial domination, and to address that which may worsen the condition of oppression. As will be seen later in the book, the manner in which oppressed subjects exercise their agency can either shorten or prolong their condition of suffering, depending on whether they can distinguish between revolutionary and non-revolutionary actions in the modernity/coloniality structure. Thus, I am concerned with urging the oppressed subjects to engage in resistance that will have a diachronic effect on the power structures of modernity/coloniality, instead of engaging in actions that contribute synchronically to those structures, thereby prolonging our suffering on the dominated side of the colonial power differential.
In my pursuit of answers to the question of why performing indigeneity matters in this age of modernity/coloniality, I discovered that this phenomenon mattered first to the colonizer during the institution and in the maintenance of the modernity/coloniality project, and continues to matter more to the colonizer than to the colonized subjects who enact these performances. It seems that the colonial powers believed that they would not be successful in subjugating their victims without also engaging in a process that would discredit the histories of the colonized â histories that embody their sense of being human. Fanon explains this process as follows:
colonialism is not simply content to impose its rule upon the present and the future of a dominated country. Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the nativeâs brain of all form and content. By kind of a perverse logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts it, disfigures and destroys it. This work of devastating precolonial history takes on a dialectical significance today. (Fanon 1961: 37)
What we can glean from the above observation is that from the onset of colonialism, the colonizer was insecure with the past of the colonized subject, since this past proved the humanity of the victims, while the colonizer sought to justify the colonial project on the basis of the perceived lack of human qualities of those same victims. In other words, performing indigeneity mattered to the colonizer, because indigeneity did not exist as a pre-given ontological state of being; indigeneity was something the colonizer wished for, in order to justify the project of modernity/coloniality. However, the fact that the indigeneity which the colonizer fought so desperately to construct during the institution of the modernity/coloniality project did not exist as a pre-given ontological state of being does not therefore mean that, at this moment in history, there are no subjects and objects that are identifiable as âindigenousâ. It simply means that indigeneity emerged as a colonial construct with a purpose of giving credence to the colonial idea of radical difference between the qualities of being human in the colonizer and in the colonized subject â a difference that would justify the modernity-cum-coloniality project in the eyes of those who wished to raise voices of dissent. Thus, even though there is nothing pre-given about the indigenousness of the people and things that eventually came to be identified or classified as âindigenousâ, there is now a socially constructed ârealityâ of indigeneity whose roots are colonial.
Although indigenous people today apply the label âindigenousâ to themselves, this does not mean that their state of indigeneity is an inherent quality of being human. It only proves that âbeing humanâ is itself reliant on a set of cultural and biological constructs. The difference between these two aspects of being human is that the cultural dimension can easily be tampered with from âwithoutâ, while the biological dimension is more resistant to human interference. It is therefore not surprising that when the colonizers sought to discredit the human qualities of the colonized subjects, they began by attempting to misrepresent their culture. Thus, it was through culture that the colonizers could begin to question the biological aspect of their victims, a development that may well explain why cultural racism preceded scientific racism. In other words, to the colonizers, culture served as an entry point to a more sinister version of colonialism and racism that would later question the non-Western subjectâs inherent ability to think, resulting in the development of the deficit theories in colonial psychology about the biological make-up of the minds of the indigenous subjects of the non-Western world.
In general, just as it is true that all cultural identities are socially constructed, it is also true that some are constructed more from âwithoutâ than from âwithinâ their societal structures. Indigeneity is one such identity that has been influenced from without. The influence of this construct has been enormous, in terms of how both human beings and non-human beings are today labelled as âindigenousâ, ranging from people and their languages to plants and animals.
In the history of modernity/coloniality, performing indigeneity has always been a constitutive part of the colonization process. Hence, most of the identities now labelled âindigenousâ can be considered colonial artefacts. Thus, the people who became indigenous subjects were also those who either became, or were already, victims of the colonial project. In other words, there cannot be an indigenous subject and object outside a colonial-type of relationship, since the idea of indigeneity is already co-constitutive of that which is perceived not to be indigenous. In the context of the colonial encounter, the idea of indigeneity therefore emerged as co-constitutive of the identity of the colonizer or settler, and many other terms that make such an identitarian concept possible. As a co-constituent of its opposite, the meaning of indigeneity can be deduced from an unpacking of the psychological state of the very subject who sees him/herself as not indigenous or labels the âOtherâ as indigenous.
As I noted above, the identities of both people and things were reinvented under modernity/coloniality as indigenous, in opposition to the non-indigeneity of colonial invaders, but it was the identities of people that colonizers worked very hard to reproduce as indigenous. This was partly because people labelled as indigenous, unlike plants and animals, could resist this identification, and partly because their behaviour was not always in harmony with the interpretations of indigeneity that their colonizers accorded them. Since the victimsâ ontological state of being was not always suitable for interpretations that justified colonialism, the colonizers took it upon themselves to teach the colonized subject to perform indigeneity in a way that justified the colonial project â a project predicated on claims that there was a need to âcivilizeâ all those people that lacked the acceptable qualities of being human.
Ever since the advent of modernity/coloniality about 500 years ago, colonizers have invested in performances of indigeneity by subjects who exist on the dominated side of the colonial power differential in order to institute and sustain colonial domination. However, this does not mean that performing indigeneity has always mattered only to the colonizer, and not to the victims of colonial domination. It simply means that in the atmosphere of modernity/coloniality, performances of indigeneity have been predominantly conditioned by the urge to dominate and not by a sense of genuine intercultural exchange between the colonizer and the colonized. Thus, it was the colonized who were coerced to perform their indigeneity in ways that suited the views of the colonizers, in order for the colonizers to claim that colonialism was a process of civilization. In this way, indigeneity became a sign of a lack of civilization â a void that the colonizers were ready to fill as their salvationist duty. This then created the illusion, through performances of indigeneity, that colonialism was a âgiftâ to the colonized (see CĂ©saire 1972). Such an understanding of why indigeneity matters to the colonizer provides us with an impetus to explore ways in which we can make performances of indigeneity serve as sites of genuine intercultural dialogue, rather than what scholars such as Tamasese and Waldegrave (1994) described as ârituals of dominationâ.
Performances of indigeneity, which have always mattered more to the colonizers than the colonized subjects who performed them, mostly under duress, have now become a norm throughout the Western and non-Western world, ânormalizingâ colonial power relations even where they are no longer mediated by official colonial structures such as colonial-settler governments. The absence of official colonial authority may give the erroneous impression that most performances of indigeneity today no longer serve any colonial purpose in a world order that is deemed to be postcolonial. As I will show later in this book, there is more continuity than change in how performances of indigeneity continue to serve to preserve the modernity/coloniality project, suggesting that claims of a postcolonial order are fallacious.
In the context of modernity/coloniality, the idea of indigeneity was produced through three processes of colonization that happened simultaneously. These were the colonization of time, space and people. In respect of time, the colonization process positioned indigenous people out of time; hence, indigeneity is conceivable as a âfunction of temporal impositionâ (Gordon 2013: 60), whereby indigenous cultures are imagined as relics of the past. These cultures are presented as cultures of a particular people in particular spaces that required colonization in order to âfast trackâ them into âcatching upâ with the cultural orientation of the colonizer â a cultural orientation that is presumed to be up-to-date or âmodernâ in the Western space in which it is produced. This, however, creates a problem for the colonized subject, akin to the âzombification of cultureâ which Fanon ([1952] 1967) read as an attempt to deny indigenous people the right to live a proper open-ended life of intersubjective relations and contemporaneity. Thus, the idea that their cultures are âbackwardâ and âprimitiveâ has compelled colonized and racialized indigenous subjects to invest in systems of modern assimilation. This investment, as Du Bois (1898, 1903) pointed out, has culminated in a sense of self-alienation, and therefore marks the first stage of a double consciousness.
As I observed at the start of the chapter, performances of indigeneity represent âthe colonizerâs model of the worldâ (Blaut 1993: 1), adopting the colonizerâs imposed imagination of the self and the âOtherâ, to enact arrays of expectations and âsecreting indigeneityâ (Gordon 2013: 66) or âsecreting blacknessâ (Fanon [1952] 1967: 114). These âfront stageâ performances of indigeneity, especially in tourist sites, presented as though they are âback stagesâ of the quotidian experiences of culture, may meet the expectations of powerful tourists, but secrete the humanity of the oppressed subject. That humanity needs instead to be embodied in their genuine sense of alterity â an alterity that does not negate their humanness as history-making subjects. In other words, what we need is a decolonial praxis, in which cultural difference is not equivalent to degeneracy as it is in colonial praxis.
With specific reference to the construction and imagination of indi-geneity in Africa, there is ample evidence that the identity of the African indigenous subject, like that of indigenous people of the non-Western world in general, is an identity of people that has suffered its own share of over-determination by a Western-centric colonial perspective. The negativity that comes with the idea of Africa, an idea of Western origin, is so overwhelming that, in the words of Mbembe (2015: 1), âspeaking rationally about Africa is not something that has ever come naturallyâ, because âAfrica is never seen as possessing things and attributes properly part of âhuman natureââ. As I will argue in Chapter 3 of this book, the negative portrayal of Africa and its indigenous subject, particularly the black people of the region derogatorily called âsub-Saharan Africaâ, has a long history, which includes iconographic representations of Africans as animal-like in Europe, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The Colonial Symbolic World as a Crime Scene
My writing of Performing Indigeneity: Spectacles of Culture and Identity in Coloniality was primarily inspired by my engagement with the question of the role of performing indigeneity in both sustaining and transcending the moment of modernity/coloniality, but there are other recent developments in my social locale that made the writing of this book urgent. These events can be broadly categorized as the eruption of the decolonial currents in South Africa that have made the subject of indigeneity one of the most popular âgrammars of changeâ in the much broader agenda of seeking to achieve a genuinely decolonized world order.
The question of the role of performing indigeneity in a world system predicated on the logic(s) of modernity/coloniality as two sides of the same coin is neither new, nor confined to the South African context. However, recent events highlighting the dominance of âcolonial symbolsâ in the landscape of âpost-apartheidâ South Africa has given a new impetus to discussions around the topic of indigeneity. In particular, student movements such as the #RhodesMustFall and the #FeesMustFall protests have reminded us once again that there is a symbiotic relationship between the world of the âsymbolicâ and the âlife worldâ which we experience in our daily lives, as the world of the symbolic normalizes our life world. In other words, the symbolic world has a practical bearing for the lived experience of a people, since colonial symbols serve as tools of social control and, therefore, create a âpathos of inequalityâ.
The most recent challenge to the symbolic world in South Africa began on 9 March 2015, when South Africans woke up to a rare student protest at the University of Cape Town. The students were calling for the removal of the statue of Cecil John Rhodes mounted on campus. Rhodes was a British colonist and businessperson who was in charge of one of the most brutal series of atrocities, lootings and genocides against the indigenous people of southern Africa through his British South Africa Company in the heyday of the colonial encounter. It is not surprising that the students who resented the presence of this âcolonialâ statue at the University of Cape Town were predominantly from black c...