Asia in the New Millennium

A Rational Blueprint for Developing Societies

HeeMin Kim

• Publisher: The University Press of Kentucky
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9780813140261
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Asian American Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

As Asian countries emerge as global economic powers, many undergo fundamental political transformations. In Korean Democracy in Transition: A Rational Blueprint for Developing Societies, HeeMin Kim evaluates the past thirty years of political change in South Korea, including the decision of the authoritarian government to open up the political process in 1987 and the presidential impeachment of 2004.

Kim uses rational choice theory -- which holds that individuals choose to act in ways that they think will give them the most benefit for the least cost -- to explain events central to South Korea's democratization process. Kim's theoretical and quantitative analysis provides a context for South Korea's remarkable transformation and offers predictions of what the future may hold for developing nations undergoing similar transitions.

Although there are studies in the field of Korean politics that provide an overview of this important period, there are none that offer the theoretical and analytical rigor of this study. Combining theoretical perspectives with policy-relevant discussion, Korean Democracy in Transition sheds new light on the Korean model of democratization and makes a significant contribution to the field of comparative politics.

1

Rational Choice, Area Expertise,
and Democratic Transition
in Developing Societies

A Theoretical Framework

Rational choice refers to the application of microeconomic theory to various decision-making situations. It conceives of the individual as a goal-oriented actor who pursues the best available means to a given end (Booth et al. 1993; van Winden 1988). Rational choice theory assumes methodological individualism and purposeful action. According to methodological individualism, social processes and outcomes are the results of individual preferences and choices. Methodological individualism simply reminds us that only people can set goals, determine their preferences, and choose among possible alternatives. Thus, all group choices ultimately must be understood in terms of individual choices. Human action may be interpreted as directed toward attaining certain goals. People act for certain purposes, and we must understand these purposes in order to explain their actions (Ordeshook 1986).

Rational choice theory has been rigorously applied to many subfields of political science, including American politics, international relations, and, increasingly, comparative politics. The rational choice literature has grown so quickly that it is difficult to name representative writings without doing injustice to many others.

One criticism of the rational choice theory has been the potential lack of usefulness in analyzing political phenomena in developing (or non-Western) areas.¹ Critics object to the application of rational choice to the third world because actors’ goals depend on a culturally unique set of values and there is no way of characterizing goals and preferences independently of culture. The model of behavior driven by self-interest is itself culturally specific; it is present in some cultures and absent in others. Critics maintain that the concept of economic rationality applies to the forms of market society that emerged in the West in the early modern period. The rational choice approach is further criticized for ignoring traditions and norms of communities and collectivities by paying attention solely to the self-interest of individuals, even though collective norms are fundamental social factors in still traditional societies (Geertz 1971; Polanyi 1957; Cheng and Tallian 1995).

Another ongoing debate is about the usefulness of rational choice theory in analyzing particular real-world situations. The rational choice school has been known for its ability to develop general theories. With its methodological sophistication, it has developed prominent theories with many testable hypotheses, but according to its critics, this school has paid little attention to individual and real-world political events. Critics point to the abstract and logical character of game theory, but do so in order to condemn it. The failures of rational choice theory, Green and Shapiro declare, are “rooted in the aspiration of rational choice theorists to come up with universal theories of politics.” The result, they argue, is a preoccupation with theory development, accompanied by a striking “paucity of empirical application.” Research “becomes theory driven rather than problem driven”; its purpose is “to save or vindicate some variant of rational choice theory, rather than to account for . . . political phenomena” (Green and Shapiro 1994). These criticisms of rational choice theory led to the “rational choice vs. area studies” debate in political science (see, for example, Bates 1997a; Bates 1997b; Johnson 1997; and Lustick 1997).

In this book, I view the democratic transition in Korea as a succession of events (puzzles, problems, and so on). I also view a limited number of political elites as main participants in these events. Obviously, the democratic transition in any country cannot be explained solely by an elite or mass-driven theory. But I argue that elites played an important role in important political events and manipulated those events much more so than the masses ever could, and thus, the democratic transition in Korea requires, at least partly, an elite-driven explanation.² As I will show throughout this book, political elites’ history of personal rivalry (even among democracy movement leaders), desire to win over each other, and attempts to prolong the period of their influence played critical roles in the direction and process of democratic transition in Korea. Elites did not hesitate to take advantage of, or even deepen, existing political cleavages for personal gain (Almond et al. 2006). Huntington’s prophetic remarks apply to Korea as well as any other country: “institutions come into existence through negotiations and compromises among political elites calculating their own interests and desires” (Huntington 1984, 212). By applying various rational choice approaches to important political events in Korea, I will show that the concern about the over-emphasis of theory on the part of rational choice theory is over-stated.³

Various political “events” I analyze in this book range from the decision of the authoritarian government to open up the political process in 1987 to the presidential impeachment of 2004. I also discuss the latest political events in Korea in the concluding chapter of this book. Readers will notice that I analyze the “international” relationships among the United States, South Korea, and North Korea in chapter 6. I study, in particular, the uncertainty the United States and South Korea have about the real intentions behind the North’s gesture of reconciliation (and the uncertainty the North has about America’s intentions), utilizing Bayesian models. One may find it odd to see such a chapter in a book about democratic transition in South Korea.

Up until the first-ever summit of the two Koreas in 2000, the left half of the ideological spectrum had been “missing” in the political discourse in South Korea, even after the democratic opening in 1987. This was mainly due to the memory of the Korean War (1950–1953) and the existence of the Anti-Communism Law (which, by the way, still exists). Especially during the authoritarian era, just the perception of the “left” could cause imprisonment and even death. Almost all of the post-war political parties in Korea had been right-wing parties with little policy differences among them.

The summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jung-il and subsequent reconciliation at least partly changed the political discourse in South Korea. The existing right-wing parties and political leaders still have not relocated themselves in the traditional left-right dimension (that is, about the appropriate size of government) or social left-right dimension (abortion, gay rights, same sex marriage, etc.). However, a new issue dimension (or labeling) has emerged. After the initial euphoria of the summit and about ten years of reconciliation (which primarily meant the South’s economic assistance to the North), the South Korean population is facing (1) a group of progressive leaders/parties favoring continued reconciliation and (2) conservatives with assistance fatigue who are suspicious of the North’s real intentions for dealing with the South. In sum, the opening of the relationships between South Korea and North Korea and between the United States and North Korea helped a new issue dimension to emerge, changed the direction of political discourse, and fundamentally reshaped the democratic transition in South Korea. Therefore, these changing relationships must be at the core of any discussion of the subsequent democratic transition in Korea.

In this book, I will also attempt to show that, despite cultural differences, a common set of goals and beliefs may be assumed generally in analyses of political events in any country and therefore ample regularities and events in the third world can be analyzed meaningfully using a rational choice framework. Moreover, what sometimes appears to be the pursuit of a collective norm may be instead a collective pursuit of self-interest, as I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters.

Of course, we must not ignore the cultural differences across different regions of the world. At the same time, we must also not give up applying the whole theoretical tradition of rational choice in developing societies. Culture defines or modifies the set of acceptable strategies and participants’ preferences, and thus eventually potential outcomes of many political events. Instead of abandoning the theory itself or redefining its core concepts (e.g., Little 1991), we can first make sure that the set of participants, their preferences, and the strategies they use are reasonable in the eyes of area experts whose expertise is being analyzed by the researcher. In reality, this is the way social science research is conducted in many areas.

Thus, it is important in any rational choice analysis to carefully specify the preferences of individual actors—that is, what matters is what goes into the utility functions. This calls for the cooperation and coordination of rational choice theorists and area specialists, rather than the rational choice vs. area study controversy.

2

Kims’ Dilemma and
the Politics of Rivalry

An Analysis of the Democratic Opening
and the 1987 Presidential Election

Two seemingly peculiar events took place in South Korea prior to the presidential election in 1987. In June the governing party candidate, Roh Tae-woo, who was practically assured of a win in an indirect presidential election, agreed to a constitutional amendment that would require a direct election of the president in Korea. It was expected that either one of the two major opposition leaders, Kim Dae-jung or Kim Young-sam would be able to beat Roh Tae-woo, a relative newcomer, in a popular election. However, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam failed to agree on a single presidential candidacy and both of them ran for the presidency. The result was the unpopular governing party candidate Roh winning the popular election with a plurality of only 36.6 percent of those voting. Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung received 28 and 27 percent respectively.

This chapter attempts to analyze, from the rational choice framework, the seemingly irrational action on both sides—that is, the governing party candidate’s agreeing to a direct presidential election and the opposition candidates’ failing to take this opportunity to win the presidency. To do so, I need to discuss historical events leading up to the events of 1987.

THE EVENTS TO BE ANALYZED

The eighteen years of authoritarian rule by President Park Chung-hee ended when he was assassinated by his own director of the Korean CIA in 1979. In early 1980, Koreans were cautiously optimistic about the prospect for democracy in Korea. They were dismayed by the assumption of power by Major-General Chun Doo-hwan, the commander of the Military Security Command, through a coup against the higher military command as well as the civilian authority. In October a new constitution was approved by a national referendum. Under the new constitution, Chun Doo-hwan won the presidency in an indirect election without competition in January of 1981.

When he took power, Chun disbanded all the political parties of the previous regime and banned the political activities of all the major political figures. In May 1980 several hundred citizens were killed in the suppression of the Kwangju uprising. Kim Dae-jung, a major opposition leader during the Park regime, was arrested on charges of inciting riots. He was sentenced to death, but his death sentence was later reduced to twenty years in prison.

As the political ban on former politicians was lifted for the most part in 1985, the newly strengthened opposition party began to call for a constitutional revision that would include direct election of the president. Faced with large-scale demonstrations by university students, President Chun implied that there was a possibility of a constitutional revision before the scheduled presidential election of 1987. Throughout 1986, however, the opposition demand for a presidential system of government including direct election of the president paralleled the government proposal of a parliamentary system of government.

As the deadlock between the governing party and the opposition on the issue of constitutional revision continued in early 1987, the opposition party was split as Kim Young-sam, a major opposition figure, announced the formation of a new party, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP). On April 13, President Chun announced his “grave” decision to suspend debate on constitutional revision, as the opposition was badly split and thus was not a responsible negotiating partner. Student protests escalated.

On June 10, the governing Democratic Justice Party (DJP) formally nominated Roh Tae-woo, a former army general and a classmate of Chun at the Korean Military Academy, as the party’s presidential candidate for the scheduled (indirect) presidential election later that year. Roh’s nomination was followed by extreme levels of violence on the streets of Korea, with firebombs and tear gas canisters being exchanged by students and police.

On June 29, the governing party candidate, Roh Tae-woo, shocked the nation by announcing his eight-point democratization plan, including direct presidential elections and the restoration of Kim Dae-jung’s political rights. After his political rights were restored, Kim Dae-jung became an advisor to the opposition Reunification Democratic Party, of which Kim Young-sam was the president. After a few meetings in September, the two Kims failed to agree on a single candidacy and each urged the other not to run for president.

On October 27 the new constitution was approved by a national referendum, with 93.3 percent of those voting accepting it. The next day Kim Dae-jung announced his candidacy and formed a new party, the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD). Now Kim Dae-jung’s split with Kim Young-sam was made official. On December 16, the governing party candidate, Roh Tae-woo, won the direct and popular election with 36.6 percent of the votes cast. The newly elected president, Roh Tae-woo, was sworn in on February 25, 1988. It was the first peaceful and orderly transfer of power in the forty-year constitutional history of the Republic of Korea.¹

From the description of events above, two questions arise about the seemingly irrational actions on the part of both the governing party and the opposition. Mainly, why did the governing party candidate, Roh Tae-woo, agree to a direct election at the risk of losing when the incumbent president, Chun Doo-hwan, had already declared, earlier in that year, that the presidential election would be held under the existing constitution, which provided for the indirect election of the president? Why didn’t the two Kims agree on a single ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• 1. Rational Choice, Area Expertise, and Democratic Transition in Developing Societies: A Theoretical Framework
• 2. Kims’ Dilemma and the Politics of Rivalry: An Analysis of the Democratic Opening and the 1987 Presidential Election
• 3. Building a New Party System: The 1990 Party Merger
• 4. A Theory of Government-Driven Democratization: The Kim Young-sam Years
• 5. Party Preferences and Institutional Choices: A Search for a New Electoral System
• 6. Uncertainty in Foreign Policy Making: Changing Relations among South Korea, North Korea, and the United States of America in the Twenty-First Century
• 7. A Risky Game to Play: The Politics of the Impeachment Game in 2004
• 8. Concluding Remarks
• Appendix A. Solution for the Equilibrium of the South-North Bayesian Game
• Appendix B. Solution for the Equilibrium of the U.S.–North Korea Bayesian Game
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index