US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy

Candidates, Campaigns, and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton

Andrew Johnstone, Andrew Priest, Andrew Johnstone, Andrew Priest

• Publisher: The University Press of Kentucky
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9780813169064
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Campaigns & Elections
• Index: Politics & International Relations

While domestic issues loom large in voters' minds during American presidential elections, matters of foreign policy have consistently shaped candidates and their campaigns. From the start of World War II through the collapse of the Soviet Union, presidential hopefuls needed to be perceived as credible global leaders in order to win elections—regardless of the situation at home—and voter behavior depended heavily on whether the nation was at war or peace. Yet there is little written about the importance of foreign policy in US presidential elections or the impact of electoral issues on the formation of foreign policy.

In US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy, a team of international scholars examines how the relationship between foreign policy and electoral politics evolved through the latter half of the twentieth century. Covering all presidential elections from 1940 to 1992—from debates over American entry into World War II to the aftermath of the Cold War—the contributors correct the conventional wisdom that domestic issues and the economy are always definitive. Together they demonstrate that, while international concerns were more important in some campaigns than others, foreign policy always matters and is often decisive. This illuminating commentary fills a significant gap in the literature on presidential and electoral politics, emphasizing that candidates' positions on global issues have a palpable impact on American foreign policy.

1

“A Godsend to the Country”?

Roosevelt, Willkie, and the Election of 1940

Andrew Johnstone

In his famous Roosevelt and Hopkins, Robert Sherwood wrote that Franklin Roosevelt considered Wendell Willkie’s June 1940 nomination as the Republican candidate for the presidency to be a “Godsend to the country.” This was because it supposedly removed the “isolationist-interventionist” issue from the campaign. Given the dramatic events in Europe of the preceding two months, Roosevelt was relieved that there would be continuity in US foreign policy regardless of the election’s outcome. The frightening prospect of Roosevelt campaigning against an old-school non-interventionist such as Robert Taft or Thomas Dewey had been removed. As Sherwood wrote: “The importance of this consideration could hardly be overestimated.”¹

Yet this chapter argues that Sherwood did in fact overestimate the danger of such a development, a fact that has led to a misunderstanding of the nature of the 1940 election. While a straight and potentially bitter contest between isolationist and interventionist candidates was avoided and the continuity of the policy of aid to Britain was ensured, foreign policy was not neutralized as an election issue, and it remained a key theme for both candidates throughout the campaign. Roosevelt continued to be extremely cautious regarding foreign issues throughout the following four months. This was in part because he recognized that Willkie did not wholly reflect the Republican Party on foreign policy matters and that congressional noninterventionism was extremely strong. However, Willkie was also more critical of Roosevelt on foreign policy issues than has generally been accepted. This was largely a result of straightforward party politics: Willkie had an election to win. While the situation could perhaps have been worse, the selection of Willkie as the Republican candidate certainly did not mean that foreign policy issues were off the table. Even if FDR could afford to be less cautious regarding foreign policy issues, there is little evidence to suggest that he was.

Sherwood’s “Godsend” line has made it into much of the literature on the 1940 election. It appears in Steve Neal’s biography of Willkie supporting the idea that the country would be spared an isolationist-interventionist fight and that continuity of policy would be ensured.² It also features in Susan Dunn’s 1940 for the same reasons and in Roosevelt’s Second Act, with Richard Moe highlighting the quote while conceding that it was not entirely accurate.³ Yet it is not alone in perpetuating the idea that the choice of Willkie neutralized foreign policy as an issue, as other scholars have also expressed variants of the same argument. In Freedom from Fear, David Kennedy argued: “Willkie shared enough of Roosevelt’s own internationalist convictions that his candidacy, along with the [Frank] Knox and [Henry] Stimson appointments, helped to neutralize foreign policy as an issue for much of the campaign.” Only in the final days of the campaign did this change, he suggests, as “Willkie’s mounting political desperation and the abrasive nagging of isolationist Republicans like Vandenberg temporarily eclipsed the candidate’s internationalist convictions.”⁴ Again, however, this chapter argues that foreign policy clearly remained a critical issue for both candidates throughout the campaign and not just in the final days. With little to choose between the two men on domestic issues either, the war in Europe ensured that foreign policy would in fact be at the top of the campaign agenda in the election of 1940.

Similarly, from a political science perspective, Adam Berinsky noted in his recent In Time of War: “For most of the fall of 1940, a single message emanated from both campaigns regarding the wisdom of involvement in the Second World War.”⁵ Yet, even if we accept that a single message existed for some of the fall, it was clear that there was a great deal of political maneuvering and concern behind the scenes. In his volume on foreign policy and elections, Robert Divine is one of the few historians to acknowledge that “foreign policy played a crucial role in Willkie’s calculations,” in that Willkie hoped to steal undecided voters who supported aid to Britain as well as Democrats who opposed Roosevelt’s breaking of the third-term tradition. But Willkie was also far more open in his criticisms of Roosevelt’s policies. For his part, Roosevelt—or, more accurately, members of his administration—took the risk of loosely equating Willkie with pro-Hitler sentiment, conceding that not all Republicans were pro-Hitler but that all isolationists were likely to vote Republican.⁶

The Candidates

Examining the candidates in 1940, it is clear that the election affected the choice of even those who ran. Given his personal history as a registered Democrat until 1939, it was by no means certain that the Indiana lawyer Wendell Willkie would have been the Republican choice without the war in Europe. The rapid rise in Willkie’s popularity between April and June 1940 happened at the same time as the Nazi blitzkrieg of Western Europe, and this was no coincidence. Given the popularity of the idea of supporting the Allies in Europe in their fight against fascist aggression, Willkie’s internationalist message of aid to Britain and France was more popular with many Republicans than the old-fashioned isolationism of Thomas Dewey or Robert Taft. Foreign policy was not Willkie’s top priority before the convention; his focus was, rather, on criticizing Roosevelt for being antibusiness at home. However, while he certainly did not sell himself as interventionist, Willkie made reference to the need to “sell whatever we want to those defending themselves from aggression.” By the time of the Republican convention, with France having fallen just two days before the GOP met in Philadelphia, Willkie’s stock had risen to the point where he was the Republican front-runner despite his trailing a distant second behind Dewey just a month earlier.⁷

In fact, opinion polls at this point suggested that a contest between a Democrat and a noninterventionist such as Dewey would have been no more challenging and could in fact have been less challenging than one between a Democrat and the more internationally minded Willkie. This is not simply because polls in early May—taken before the Nazi blitzkrieg—had not only Roosevelt but also Cordell Hull ahead of Dewey in what would have appeared to be a straight fight between the forces of internationalism and those of isolationism. The blitzkrieg only strengthened American support for Willkie’s message of aid to Europe and weakened the noninterventionist argument, suggesting that, while a battle against Dewey might have been bitterer, it might also have been easier. Instead, Willkie was ultimately chosen despite the Republicans’ struggle to reconcile their desire to support victims of fascist aggression with their desire to stay out of war, a struggle reflected in the party platform, which called for aid to all those fighting for liberty as long as that aid was not “in violation of international law or inconsistent with the requirements of our own national defense.”⁸

While there is still some debate on the issue, it seems clear that Roosevelt made his final decision to run again only in early July, following the Republican choice of Willkie. Of course, he had been considering running again prior to that because of the nature of world events, but he had the potential unpopularity of an unprecedented third term to think about. Even if the third-term issue threatened to hurt him, however, he was still the most attractive Democratic candidate, and his final decision was made in large part because he believed that he was the only Democrat who could beat Willkie, as Donahoe has previously argued. Polls revealed that FDR was far more popular than any other figure from his party, with 92 percent of support among Democrats. And, despite Cordell Hull’s foreign policy expertise, a clear majority of Democrats thought that the sitting president would handle the country’s foreign affairs best. This proved crucial in the summer of 1940.⁹

The Summer of 1940: Destroyer-Bases and Selective Service

Willkie secured the Republican nomination in the early hours of June 28, 1940, with Roosevelt securing the Democratic nomination on July 17. Yet the campaign trail did not begin in earnest until September, when Willkie began his trip around the nation. Willkie did surprisingly little in the interim aside from making his acceptance speech in Elwood, Indiana, on August 17, while Roosevelt actively avoided the campaign and focused on looking presidential. In this gap, the foreign policy focus switched to two contentious issues: the destroyer-bases exchange and the Selective Training and Service Act. Despite the fact that both candidates supported both measures, these issues generated heated domestic political debate and became part of the election campaign.

After the fall of France, Britain stood alone in Western Europe. To help secure itself from German invasion, and to ensure the Atlantic lifeline to the United States, British prime minister Winston Churchill asked Roosevelt on June 15 for American destroyers. Over one hundred of these ships dating from the Great War had been recently refurbished; however, they had been refurbished for the defense of the United States, not the United Kingdom. Roosevelt initially saw no way to get the ships to Britain without opening himself up to sharp domestic criticism. With the United States undergoing its own preparedness campaign, giving the ships to Britain was a potential betrayal of national defense, and the possibility of the ships ending up in German hands could not be ruled out in July 1940.¹⁰

However, by the end of July, with the Battle of Britain under way, a further plea from Churchill for “50 or 60 of your oldest destroyers” met with greater support. As it became clear that Britain was not going to fall, Roosevelt was increasingly persuaded by the need to get more destroyers to Britain. With an upcoming election campaign looming, the question was how it could be done. With congressional authority deemed unlikely, it appeared that the best way to proceed was through executive action. Yet, while it was clear that Roosevelt wanted to facilitate a transfer of destroyers to Britain, he clearly wanted to do it on his own terms and—given the election—in as politically secure a manner as possible.¹¹

On the issue, Roosevelt had the support of a number of influential private citizens from two recently formed nonpartisan organizations: the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and the Century Group. The former was been set up in May to publicly urge greater aid to democratic nations in Western Europe in the face of the Nazi blitzkrieg; the latter was more private and evolved through June and July, working behind the scenes to influence the Roosevelt administration. At a July 25 meeting of the Century Group, it was suggested that the recently reconditioned destroyers be handed over to Britain. The group also argued that the ships be given in exchange for “naval and air concessions in British possessions in the Western hemisphere.” On August 1, three members of both organizations—Herbert Agar, Ward Cheney, and Clark Eichelberger—visited Roosevelt and put the suggestion of an exchange to him.¹²

The following day, Roosevelt’s cabinet meeting focused on ensuring the sale of fifty or sixty destroyers to Britain. The consensus at the meeting was that congressional legislation was required for any such arrangement. This meant that caution was required, and it was agreed that the president would contact William Allen White, the chairman of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, who had recently spoken to Willkie on the subject. After speaking with Roosevelt, White was to get Willkie’s approval to speak to and secure support from House minority leader Joe Martin and Senate minority leader and vice presidential candidate Charles McNary. Later that evening, White assured Roosevelt that Willkie’s view was the same as the president’s. Roosevelt countered that this was insufficient, noting: “Willkie’s attitude was not what counted.… Republican policy in Congress was the one essential.” The incident suggested that the president was less interested in the implications for the election than he was in securing the necessary legislation, but the fact that he used White to go through Willkie revealed a desire to keep Willkie close.¹³

White remained the main intermediary between Roosevelt and Willkie, even visiting the Republican in Colorado in an attempt to secure his support for the president. However, he was unsuccessful in his efforts to convince Willkie to publically support any destroyer sale or exchange. Willkie privately approved of the action, but he was unwilling to alienate more reluctant Republicans in Congress. He also preferred to wait until specific legislation was forthcoming, refusing to comment on proposals. White subsequently informed the president that he could not “guarantee either of you to the other” but that “there is not two bits difference between you on the issues pending.” The closest the president would get to an endorsement came on August 17, when Willkie stated in his acceptance speech that the loss of the British fleet would “greatly weaken” American defenses and German domination of the Atlantic would “be a calamity for us.”¹⁴

However, by that point, Roosevelt was already negotiating with the British over the details of an exchange. As it became clear that the chances of congressional agreement on a destroyer sale were limited, he looked to find ways around Congress. Increasingly swayed by legal arguments that claimed he already had the authority to act, he moved to make the transfer work on his own, informing Churchill of his plans on August 13. The decision to circumvent Congress showed his determination to act, but it also meant that Roosevelt became even more concerned with the domestic political implications. He had faced the criticism of being a “dictator” through much of his second term, notably with his plan to enlarge the Supreme Court in 1937 and his attempts to influence the midterm Democratic primaries in 1938. The suggestion arose again in 1940 with his break from the two-term tradition, and any attempt to avoid Congress was likely to arouse further criticism.¹⁵

In order to defend himself, Roosevelt emphasized the benefits for America’s own national defense. In a press conference on August 16, he claimed that ongoing discussions with the British were solely regarding the acquisition of naval and air bases for the defense of the American hemisphere, with special reference to the Panama Canal. He largely evaded suggestions from reporters of a quid pro quo for destroyers, albeit clumsily. On September 3, the destroyer-bases exchange was announced to the public. The United States acquired the right to lease eight naval and air bases in the Western Hemisphere from Newfoundland to British Guiana. Newfoundland and Bermuda were gifts from Great Britain, while the other six were in exchange for fifty naval destroyers. Roosevelt justified the exchange on the grounds that it would improve the nation’s security “beyond calculation.”¹⁶

As expected, Willkie suggested that the country would support the deal, but he deemed the fact that the president had not taken the issue before Congress “regrettable.” He highlighted that the democratic processes should not be ignored in the fight between totalitarianism and democracy, but the measured nature of his response revealed his largely supportive attitude. That attitude was not shared by everyone in his party. Republican senator Gerald Nye called it a “dictatorial step,” while Republican representative Hamilton Fish argued: “It usurps the power of Congress, and violates international laws, the law of the United States and the Constitution. It is virtually an act of war.” Building on that congressional criticism, and belatedly recognizing that he was running for president, Willkie quickly allowed his own criticism of the deal to become more forceful. From his initial mild denouncement of the way in which the deal was conducted, he quickly took a harder line. Within three days, he called the trade “the most arbitrary and dictatorial action ever taken by any President in the history of the United States.”¹⁷

In the end, Roosevelt was convinced that he could act without an agreement and at the risk of subsequent criticism from Willkie. Yet, even if Willkie was not opposed to the idea of the destroyer-bases exchange, many Republicans in Congress were, and there were still political risks to the exchange that Roosevelt sought to limit by selling it as being in the nation’s interest and to its benefit. And, even though Willkie supported the idea of ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• 1. “A Godsend to the Country”? Roosevelt, Willkie, and the Election of 1940
• 2. FDR’s Closest Contender: Thomas E. Dewey and the 1944 Election
• 3. Containing Challenges: The Triumphs of Harry Truman in the Presidential Election of 1948
• 4. Confirming the Cold War Consensus: Eisenhower and the 1952 Election
• 5. When Public Opinion Does Not Shape Foreign Policy: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower in the 1956 Presidential Election
• 6. Leadership Experience in the Cold War: Cuba, Khrushchev, and Quemoy-Matsu in the 1960 Presidential Election Campaign
• 7. The Virtues of Moderation: Foreign Policy and the 1964 Presidential Election
• 8. Every Way Out: Vietnam, American National Identity, and the 1968 Presidential Election
• 9. The Peace Candidate: Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and the Election of 1972
• 10. Dealing with Defeat: Gerald R. Ford, Foreign Policy, and the 1976 Election
• 11. The Domestic Politics of War and Peace: Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and the Election of 1980
• 12. 1984, Regional Crises, and Morning in America: The Predawn of the Reagan Era
• 13. Ending the Cold War without Debate: Foreign Policy and the 1988 Election
• 14. Internationalism Challenged: Foreign Policy Issues in the 1992 Presidential Election
• Conclusion
• Acknowledgments
• List of Contributors
• Index