North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa

Enabling Violence and Instability

Bruce E. BechtolJr.

• Publisher: The University Press of Kentucky
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780813175911
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Arms Control
• Index: Politics & International Relations

North Korea has posed a threat to stability in Northeast Asia for decades. Since Kim Jong-un assumed power, this threat has both increased and broadened. Since 2011, the small, isolated nation has detonated nuclear weapons multiple times, tested a wide variety of ballistic missiles, expanded naval and ground systems that threaten South Korea, and routinely employs hostile rhetoric. Another threat it poses has been less recognized: North Korea presents a potentially greater risk to American interests by exporting its weapons systems to other volatile regions worldwide.

In North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. analyzes relevant North Korean military capabilities, what arms the nation provides, and to whom, how it skirts its sanctions, and how North Korea's activities can best be contained. He traces illicit networks that lead to state and nonstate actors in the Middle East, including Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, and throughout Africa, including at least a dozen nations. The potential proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons technology and the vehicles that carry it, including ballistic missiles and artillery, represent a broader threat than the leadership in Pyongyang. Including training and infrastructure support, North Korea's profits may range into the billions of dollars, all concealed in illicit networks and front companies so complex that the nation struggles to track and control them. Bechtol not only presents an accurate picture of the current North Korean threat—he also outlines methodologies that Washington and the international community must embrace in order to contain it.

1

Setting the Context

North Korea has been engaged in proliferation to both state and nonstate actors on a large scale for many years. This is an issue that has gone largely unnoticed in both policy and academic circles—unless a headline-grabbing incident occurs (such as when North Korea was caught proliferating Scud missiles to Yemen in 2002). In fact, some scholars have even published relatively minor studies claiming that North Korea’s military proliferation has nearly shut down since the end of the Cold War. This is clearly untrue. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea needed to find another way to finance its elite and its very large military. One of the key ways to do this has proved to be profits from proliferation. This proliferation has been both robust and widespread.

Nation-states that North Korea has proliferated to in recent years include Iran (ongoing), Syria (ongoing), Libya, Burma, Pakistan, Ethiopia (ongoing), and a plethora of countries in sub-Saharan Africa (ongoing). But it does not stop there. North Korea has proliferated weapons to nonstate actors (and continues to do so) such as the Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah, al-Shabab, and Hamas. This issue is important because it affects security in the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. In addition, the WMD and related platforms (ballistic missiles) that North Korea continues to proliferate in the Middle East present a threat that could directly challenge the United States or nations in Europe. The key substantive aspects of this issue (which have never truly been addressed in a public forum) are how widespread the proliferation is, how much money North Korea is making from this proliferation, and how can it be contained or stopped. Clearly the impact of this proliferation has been quite compelling. Rogue nation-states armed with both chemical weapons and nuclear weapons, terrorists armed with weaponry that threatens the daily security of citizens in some of our closest allied countries (such as Israel), and conventional weapons that continue to disrupt security and stability in key regions where stability is already tenuous are all aspects of this issue that make it an important one for both American foreign policy and that of our allies (important allies such as Israel and the Republic of Korea).

North Korea has expanded and enhanced its proliferation efforts around the world since the end of the Cold War. Whether it is in the Middle East, Africa, or even someplace as far away as Cuba, North Korea continues to change its tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to bring in money for the regime and to support the elite as well as the military and its programs. North Korea’s proliferation program really consists of four key parts: (1) WMD and the platforms to carry them (ballistic missiles), (2) conventional weapons sales, (3) refurbishment of Soviet-era weapons for countries that still use them, and (4) technical and military assistance and advising. These programs have continued in the Kim Jong-un era and have in some instances even expanded. North Korean proliferation presents an international security dilemma that policy makers in many nations should address—and take efforts to contain. The profits from North Korea’s proliferation may be as high as in the billions of dollars, and they are contained in illicit networks and front companies so sophisticated and complex that the North Korean government has even had trouble tracking and controlling them.

The proliferation that North Korea engages in presents a number of foreign policy challenges to the United States. First of all, because Pyongyang proliferates to rogue nation-states such as Syria and Iran (among others), the threat to Washington’s key allies in the Middle East is profound (from both conventional weapons and WMD). In addition, the funds that North Korea is able to generate from its widespread proliferation to state and nonstate actors serve to maintain the regime’s ability to maintain its large military (which threatens the Republic of Korea) and to provide rewards to the small number of members in the elite who keep the government infrastructure running. Finally, the support to nonstate actors (terrorist groups) creates instability and violence in both the Middle East and Africa. It will be important for American policy—and a key focus for decision-making processes—to determine not only how widespread and dangerous North Korea’s proliferation and illicit activities are but also how to effectively contain and/or shut down these activities, something that has not yet occurred despite concerns in the United States, South Korea, Israel, and other allied nations. Thus, an important focus for American foreign policy can and should be on North Korea’s key centers of gravity (when it comes to proliferation) and Pyongyang’s vulnerabilities to American interdiction from foreign policy initiatives.

The weakened position of Kim Jong-un as compared to his father and grandfather and the instability in North Korea that has occurred as a result mean that proliferation of WMD (nuclear and chemical weapons technology) and the platforms that will carry that technology (ballistic missiles and artillery) as well as the array of conventional weapons that Pyongyang sells to state and nonstate actors are used as a key source of finance for military R&D, the lavish lifestyles of the elite, and other elements of North Korean society meant to maintain the Kim family regime. This should be a basic core assessment of any American analysis of North Korean capabilities—and should also be a basis for strategy regarding the DPRK. The DPRK has shown no indications of slowing down its military proliferation. In fact, evidence from recent years suggests stepped-up cooperation with Iran. Syria is even more troubling. The civil war there has created a customer in need of weapons and advising much more than during most of Kim Jong-il’s reign, a factor putting funds into North Korea’s coffers. Because North Korean proliferation to both the Middle East and Africa (and elsewhere) is ongoing, if unchecked, these activities will enable exacerbated threats to American security interests in both regions and (because of the range of ballistic missiles that Iran now possesses) Europe as well.

Research Methodology

I have employed traditional research methods as I have conducted this research. Several visits to Seoul have provided me the opportunity to conduct interviews with key defectors from numerous entities dealing with proliferation and illicit activities in North Korea. They have also offered the opportunity to collaborate with fellow scholars in both policy circles and academic circles there. In 2014, and again in 2015, I briefed members of the national security staff at the Blue House in Seoul (the South Korean equivalent of the White House) on North Korean proliferation. We also engaged in information sharing. The overriding theme at the conclusion of the briefing was, We want more information. Thus, my research has taken me (and will continue to take me) to where the weapons are going—the Middle East and Africa—more than anywhere else. My collaboration has included (and will continue to include) fellow scholars, law-enforcement officials, military officials, and policy makers. I have built an extensive network in some of these key areas, and this has allowed me to conduct in-depth research that has benefited the writing of this book.

Because in my view this issue is so compelling—and unique—it has been important to address it in a logical, practical manner. Thus, a prism to look through in order to clearly lay out what the aspects of this issue are in order to make policy-relevant assessments has been key. An analysis of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) aspects of this issue have allowed me to understand and articulate the challenges for international security that North Korea’s proliferation presents. The advanced paradigm that North Korea presents with its proliferation since the end of the Cold War is unique, difficult to analyze, and extremely dangerous to the national security of the United States (and its allies). Thus, research conducted on this issue has resulted in new, groundbreaking assessments relevant to policy makers on both sides of the Pacific and in the Middle East. This book will use the case studies methodology. In other words, once the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that North Korea uses are described—in relation to their proliferation, financial networks, and the way the money is used for regime policy and survival—I will conduct analysis entity by entity. Thus, there are individual chapters in my book that cover Iran, Syria, and African nations and also include nonstate actors (e.g., Hezbollah and Hamas are included in the chapters on Iran and Syria because they are so closely connected in their business dealings with North Korea). It is important to understand that this book must—by the very nature of the project that has been conducted to write it—be descriptive in nature. Thus, it analyzes what the North Koreans have that they proliferate, key players they proliferate to, how they proliferate and get around sanctions, and how their proliferation can better be contained.

I have used very diverse sources to conduct the research necessary for this book. These sources include but are not limited to interviews, scholarship and books by experts in East Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the United States regarding North Korean military proliferation and the infrastructure that supports it, papers and presentations from conferences and symposia, analysis of speeches, press releases, press reports, and press conferences, interviews with defectors as well as current and former government officials in the United States, Israel, Ethiopia, and South Korea, US, Middle Eastern, African, and South Korean government reports, white papers, and legislative testimony, declassified defector reports, speeches and statements by policy makers in the United States, Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia, and papers, reports, and special releases by important think tanks, government agencies, public policy institutes, and universities. To provide further enlightenment on the sources used in this work, a selected bibliography is included.

This is the first book to address the weapons, systems, capabilities, training, and military infrastructure support that North Korea proliferates to the Middle East and Africa, how all this is proliferated (and the financial system that supports this proliferation and uses it to gain profit for the regime), whom these systems are going to, the types of proliferation that have occurred to specific state and nonstate actors, and methodologies for better containing this illicit activity. Everything I describe will be tied together in an analysis that will generate assessments previously unreported in whole prior to the publication of this book.

Importance of Study and Existing Literature

North Korea’s proliferation to state and nonstate actors has been an active part of its foreign policy since the Cold War. It continues today, yet many still do not understand the extent of these activities or the damage caused to stability in key regions important to the national security interests of the United States. There are some important reasons why Pyongyang’s proliferation and illicit activities have not gained a lot of attention in the West (though this seems to be changing since 2017) or been placed as a top foreign policy priority in either Seoul or Washington.

During the Cold War, North Korea essentially served as a proxy for the Soviet Union, contributing to, supporting, and often participating in proxy wars that Moscow found too distasteful for direct involvement. Thus, during the Cold War, North Korea frequently helped guerrilla and/or terrorist groups that believed in Communist ideology—often helping them attempt the overthrow of the governments in power. Most of these activities occurred in the Middle East and Africa. In return for these widespread activities, the Soviet Union completely subsidized the North Korean economy—and its military. Cuba played a very similar role during the Cold War. Because of the nature of North Korea’s support to these groups, it was largely seen as a small part of a larger picture; in other words, it was seen as simply another Soviet-supported and -funded operation for proxy violence, and a routine part of the Cold War. Because North Korea was seen as a satellite state, its participation in these activities was never a high priority—and thus the focus was more on their sponsor.

By the end of the Cold War, North Korea had contacts all over the world. It was these contacts that had been built up during the Cold War that helped Pyongyang create illicit activities following the fall of the Soviet Union. North Korea was already proliferating ballistic missiles to Iran beginning in the early 1980s, and the contacts with Iran’s Republican Guard Corps would later prove to be quite useful as Pyongyang would eventually use them to set up business (largely the sale of conventional weapons and training) with groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas (groups with close ties to Iran). In fact, largely because subsidies from the Soviet Union ended in 1990, North Korea increased it proliferation activities, building them up to the high levels we continue to see today. Customers have included (but are not limited to) nation-states and nonstate actors in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Yet, as in the Cold War time period, these activities—which threaten the stability of regions where key American allies are—received very little attention (a phenomenon that continues today). The reasons for their being a low priority (and the fact that North Korea’s proliferation receives very little attention) are different now than they were during the Cold War time period, but perhaps more profound. Since 1993, the United States and North Korea have been in on-again, off-again negotiations regarding Pyongyang’s nuclear weaponization program. These talks have been considered very sensitive, and, thus, aspects of North Korea’s rogue state activities have been overlooked in the interest of going after more important issues. Unfortunately, because of evidence showing that Pyongyang is now proliferating WMD and the platforms that support it as well as conventional weapons to some of the most rogue regimes on earth (as I will describe later), I believe it is important to explore the details of North Korea’s proliferation and illicit activities. I also believe it is important to analyze policy options that will work to contain and (eventually) shut down key aspects of these activities that threaten the security of the United States and key allies.

While there have been contributions to the scholarship regarding international security and North Korea’s illicit activities (to include proliferation), they have been far and few between. In addition, while much of this scholarship has been well researched and accurate, it typically focuses on other (nonmilitary) aspects of North Korea’s illicit activities, which can lead to confusion and misconceptions among readers, particularly policy makers. It is my intention for this book to cover all aspects of North Korean military proliferation, to include key nations and nonstate actors, the weapons being proliferated, methods of laundering the money, financial networks, and the role that these operations play in the DPRK infrastructure. Military proliferation—what is being proliferated, how it is proliferated, whom it goes to and the effects it causes in these regions, and case studies that provide in-depth details—has never before been the focus of a book. In fact, this book will be the first to focus on this unique yet important aspect of how North Korea generates funds for the regime, an important aspect of North Korea’s national security and economic survival.¹

Outline of Chapters

The following chapters will focus on key issues. While chapter 2 will focus on the capabilities the North Koreans have (vital if one is to understand the impact these weapons will have in volatile regions like the Middle East and Africa), chapter 3 will focus on the many methods and procedures they use in their proliferation. Chapters 4–6 will focus on case studies, and chapter 7 wraps up this work with conclusions and policy recommendations.

Chapter 2 will be important because policy makers, academics, and specialists cannot truly understand North Korea’s military proliferation unless they understand the capabilities and numbers of the systems North Korea is selling in unstable regions. North Korea’s nuclear weaponization program and its ballistic missile programs have developed compelling capabilities that can potentially threaten all the Middle East, Africa, and Europe when proliferated (and many of these systems have already been proliferated). North Korea’s advances in maritime capabilities are important as well, including a new submarine with long-range capabilities and a developing capability to fire a ballistic missile. The North’s ground forces have not been idle as high training levels and important initiatives in training have added to potential capabilities, including artillery and rocket systems that could create havoc in ongoing conventional conflicts in both the Middle East and Africa. Pyongyang continues to show no hesitancy in using its military capabilities to test and upgrade systems that, when proliferated, can raise important profits that support the elite and the military.

In chapter 3, I will address how North Korea has always been able to get around sanctions using some very clever TTP for getting its arms distributed. This has been an ongoing situation no matter what sanctions are imposed or the methods used to impose them. According to a North Korea defector who was an individual in charge of illicit arms deals, North Korean arms dealers often have studied at Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies. There, they would often undergo training making them fluent in English and Chinese. These are the people who deal with traders in other countries. There are several methods that North Korea uses to get around sanctions (and they are often changing). One method is to send containers across the Yalu River into China one-third or half filled with weapons. “The forwarder who received this cargo enters a port in a third country, where the containers are filled with freight unrelated to weapons and the paperwork is completed,” according to the North Korean defector. The containers are then laundered someplace like Hong Kong, Singapore, or some other large port in East Asia that has heavy traffic. The defector further states: “The containers are mixed with other cargo in those transit points. They are searched, but not thoroughly.” He further comments: “Even if customs or other officials roll their sleeves up and search for weapons, how can they possibly find the arms among the mountains of other containers headed to other countries?”² It is important to note that this method is one of many the North Koreans have used—as they are constantly adjusting their TTP to avoid detection and sanctions.

Another method the DPRK often uses is that of reflagging its ships. North Koreans have been documented in the past often changing the flagging on their merchant ships (using foreign-flagged ships with North Korean crews to ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• 1. Setting the Context
• 2. Understanding the Product: North Korea’s Military Capabilities
• 3. How Do They Do it? North Korea’s Illicit Financial Networks and Proliferation Modus Operandi
• 4. North Korea and Military Proliferation to Iran: Pyongyang’s Most Important Customer
• 5. North Korea and Syria: A Long and Ongoing History of Military Trade
• 6. North Korean Proliferation on the African Continent
• 7. Conclusions and Policy Implications
• Notes
• Selected Bibliography
• Index