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âHalf-god, half-manâ: Nikos Kazantzakisâs The Last Temptation and Martin Scorseseâs The Last Temptation of Christ
You may have heard of the Blessed Mountain.
It is the highest mountain in our world.
Should you reach the summit you would have only one desire,
and that to descend and be with those who dwell in the deepest valley.
That is why it is called the Blessed Mountain.
KAHLIL GIBRAN1
I
For Nikos Kazantzakis, Jesus was both truly man and truly God, and the novelist set himself the task of finding some means of representing this unique being within the boundaries of prose fiction:
Although apparently denying divine omniscience (and indeed attributing to God indifference, amnesia and fear), Kazantzakis here fleshes out a persuasive model for understanding the purpose of incarnation. Mortal consciousness provides a perspective on existence that must be epistemologically different from divine knowledge. To know earthly intelligence, feel human pity, encounter âthe struggle to beget virtue and caresâ â these are forms of experiential awareness accessible only to man or to an incarnate God. When Kazantzakisâs work was published, this image of a passible God provoked outrage, particularly in his own Greek Orthodox Church,3 while today it has become much more familiar. Indeed Alister E. McGrath goes so far as to suggest that it has become a ânew orthodoxyâ for modern Christians to speak of a God who suffers within our world.4 Rowan Williams finds this emphasis as far back as the post-Apostolic writings of Ignatius of Antioch:
In the twentieth century Dietrich Bonhoeffer, JĂźrgen Moltmann, Kazoh Kitamori6 and many others have written eloquently of the pain and suffering of God, of âthe love of the Son and the grief of the Fatherâ.7 If Jesus lived fully as a man of his own time, in Brian Hebblethwaiteâs words, âsubjecting himself to the limitations of real humanity in order to achieve his purposes of revelation and reconciliationâ,8 then he suffered as a man; if God was truly revealing himself in Jesus, then as Hebblethwaite says, the incarnation must also have left its mark on God:
The suffering of Jesus, says Rowan Williams, is in some way âtaken into Godâ.10 âGodâs âpainââ, affirms Kitamori, âis at once his âloveââ.11 âI feltâ, wrote Kazantzakis in his notebook, âthe âsuffering godâ deeply within meâ.12
God, affirms Kazantzakis, is incomplete without man. But the contrary is also true:
By divine afflatus alone man becomes capable of intellectual and emotional creativity. As recipient of that godly breath, he acquires âthe power and audacity to continue creationâ and to do Godâs work in the world.14 âMan without Godâ is a mere animal, haunted by his anthropoid ancestry, and struggling to extricate himself from the coils of evolution. But conversely God without man could have no direct physical knowledge of the human existence that he himself had created.
In this remarkable meditation, Kazantzakis links the dual substance of Christ with the dual nature of man as the product of both nature and God. Creationism and evolution are juxtaposed as respectively theocentric and anthropocentric explanations of the universe. Evolution gets man up onto his hind legs. But the breath of God makes him want to stand. In his autobiographical work Report to Greco, Kazantzakis recalled the two great lightning bolts of scientific knowledge that shook his faith as a young man: the solar system and the theory of evolution.15 The latter destroyed for him the creation story of Genesis:
Obsessively the young Kazantzakis used to watch the behaviour of a neighbourâs pet monkey, now seen as âa caricature of manâ. He writes, âWas this my grandmother? . . . was I not a son of God, but of the monkey?â17 He gives the monkey wine to drink and finds himself in its quasi-sexual embrace; as he writes, âIts whole body pressed against mine, it kept sighing like a humanâ.18 He views the encounter as a âblack Annunciationâ and the monkey as some âdark angel departing from my windowâ.19 This attempt to bond with a simian is seen in the autobiographical narrative as both a liberation from dogma and a temptation to embark on a downward course of rediscovering the animal life of the flesh to search for the dark human roots that Darwin had uncovered.
Kazantzakisâs view of the âdual substanceâ of Christ assumed then that the two natures were utterly distinct, absolutely different and violently inimical one to another. In taking on human flesh, Jesus inherited and inhabited the contaminated body of human evolution, which Kazantzakis considered a dark material vulnerable to the influence of chthonic powers. Human beings, made equally in the image of God, share this ontological conflict:
Christian theologians throughout the centuries have struggled to define this âabsolute paradoxâ as Kierkegaard called the incarnation, to keep the two natures distinct, yet to explain their mysterious concurrence, and to understand how the two natures could have interacted in the one person, Jesus Christ. Kazantzakisâs talk of God âmixingâ with humanity seems to fall into the âheresyâ the confusion of the natures, against which those early credal statements sought so carefully to guard:
More than any other foundational doctrine of Christianity, this supposedly symmetrical and stable relationship between the persons of the Trinity has proved in practice a site of controversy. Kazantzakis was a novelist rather than a theologian, but his imaginative attempts to revalue the two natures, to think and feel across what St Thomas Aquinas called that great âimpassibleâ boundary,22 deserve to be read alongside the more fully developed philosophical arguments of contemporary Christology.
II
Kazantzakisâs Jesus is predominantly human, âfull of weakness, self-doubt, and ambivalenceâ.23 He is not at first consciously aware of his own divine status, his mission of salvation or his destiny of crucifixion. He encounters his divinity as something hostile and alien: a possession, a persecution, a haunting. Although messianic hope is second nature to him, as he is physically and emotionally joined to the suffering body of the Israelite people,24 he does not initially associate the coming with his own destiny. God comes to him as a dementia, a seizure or the sensation of claws dug into his skull. This seems less like a perfect hypostatic union than an uneasy affiliation between a weak and fearful human consciousness and a slumbering, latent divinity. Throughout the novel Jesus retains a love of life and of the earth, which seems to conflict with his divine destiny. This attachment is focused in his love for Mary Magdalene, his soul mate.25 In interior dialogue with a divine voice (a conversation dramatized as Jesus talking to himself), he affirms this conflict and this loyalty:
In the anachronistically named desert âmonasteryâ (a version of an Essene community that also recalls Kazantzakisâs own experiences of monastic communities as described in the âMt. Athosâ and âSinaiâ chapters of Report to Greco), Jesus confesses and is absolved,27 although in orthodox teaching he was of course incapable of sin: âHis subjection to human weaknesses in common with us did not mean that he shared our sins.â28 Kazantzakis relates a number of Christâs parables but then supplements them with alternative endings. Lazarus, for instance, persuades God to refresh the rich man for all eternity,29 and the foolish virgins are invited into the wedding.30 Kazantzakis writes, âMan forgives . . . is it possible then that God does not?â31 He even conceives the possibility that ultimately Godâs mercy might prove infinite, and the devil be welcomed back into heaven like the prodigal son.32 He gives Judas a special place in the working-out of his destiny, flirts closely with p...