Principia Meta-Ethica

Van Reken

• Publisher: Pickwick Publications
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781498224772
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Metaethics is the study of moral language, moral ontology, and moral epistemology. This book addresses each of these in a way accessible to both students and professional philosophers. Van Reken defends the classic view of moral realism, advanced by philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant. Moral language tends to be the focus of much current metaethical discussion, but this volume concerns itself more with questions of moral ontology and moral epistemology. The concept of the moral field is introduced, which helps distinguish what is moral and what is amoral (a discussion too often overlooked by moralists), and--adapting an epistemological theory developed by Alvin Plantinga--an argument is made that we can know moral truths. Principia Meta-Ethica presents a return to the core issues of metaethics and strengthens the case for moral realism with new arguments, distinctions, and concepts.

1

Moral Reality

The Moral Order

In 1993 Gene Outka and John P. Reeder edited the anthology Prospects for a Common Morality in which a variety of moral philosophers addressed the question of whether there are any prospects for a common morality. The rough idea of a “common” morality used by Outka and Reeder is a morality that is binding on all persons (universal) and could be justified to persons in a variety of cultures.1 Their notion of a common morality includes two parts: ontological and epistemological. Ontologically, it is a universal moral standard “by which everybody ought to live, no matter what the mores of his neighbors might be.”2 Epistemologically, it is a morality that could be justified to reasonable persons in a variety of cultures. So a common morality would be one which is both universally binding and rationally justifiable.

Two Views of the Prospects for a Common Morality

Disagreement over a common morality is an important part of what distinguishes postmodern from classical metaethics. Briefly stated, postmodern ethicists take the view that there are no prospects for establishing a common morality—a sharp departure from the classical view that there are prospects for it. I will consider each of these views regarding a common morality, starting with the more familiar postmodern view.

No Prospects for a Common Morality

The view that there are no prospects for a common morality became the dominant view in Western philosophy in the latter half of the twentieth century. Some attribute the beginnings of this postmodern view to Hegel and his claim that moral principles alone (such as Kant’s categorical imperative) are purely formal, devoid of moral content, and so moral principles are unable to help distinguish what is morally right and wrong. In Hegel’s view what was needed to fill this void was Sittlichkeit, the mores of an actual community. Thus Hegel helped to move the focus of moral inquiry from the general consideration of the conduct of human persons as rational beings to the more localized questions of beings-in-community.3 The mortal blow to the prospects of a common morality was not delivered by Hegel, but rather by Nietzsche. Gertrude Himmelfarb nicely summarizes the impact of Nietzsche on moral thought:

It was in the 1880s that Friedrich Nietzsche began to speak of “values” in its present sense—not as a verb, meaning to value or esteem something; nor as a singular noun, meaning the measure of a thing, but in the plural, connoting the moral beliefs and attitudes of a society . . . Early in the twentieth century, shortly after Nietzsche’s death, the sociologist Max Weber borrowed the word “values.” . . . [It] brought with it the assumptions that all moral ideas are subjective and relative, that they are mere customs and conventions, that they have a purely instrumental, utilitarian purpose, and that they are peculiar to specific individuals and societies.”4

One prominent contemporary philosopher who follows in the wake of Nietzsche is Richard Rorty, who is indignant at any idea of a common morality. He writes, “what counts as rational or as fanatical is relative to the group to which we think it necessary to justify ourselves—to the body of shared belief that determines the reference of the word ‘we.’”5 What is considered outrageous or fanatical behavior is always relative to a community with shared beliefs; there are no trans-cultural standards by which such judgments can be justified or condemned. This view implies that were an adult to crush the skull of a two-year-old with an axe, his act is not morally right or morally wrong in itself; rather, the fitting moral description of the act depends on the community in which the act is done. Some societies have practiced child sacrifice in order to please or appease some god or other. In such societies this was approved, and so is morally right. What practices and conduct persons engage in is neither morally right nor wrong independent of the approvals of the society—such approvals are the only way to measure the morality of any conduct. Since no act is intrinsically morally right or wrong, even Hitler’s final solution cannot be said to be morally wrong simpliciter.6

Richard Rorty is not primarily an ethicist, so perhaps his views regarding common morality should not to be considered typical for a postmodern ethicist. Alasdair MacIntyre, in contrast, has been one of the most influential and important ethicists in the latter twentieth century. In A Short History of Ethics MacIntyre takes the view that there is no hope of shaping a morality that is justifiable to persons in a variety of cultures. He sharply criticizes the attempt to “absolutize” any morality, claiming that moral concepts are neither timeless nor unhistorical.7 Moreover, he says there are no universally convincing reasons for believing in human rights. Human rights give rise to moral obligations, since if even one person has a right to something, then all others have a moral obligation to let that person exercise that right. So there is no common morality and there are no human rights. In some subsequent publications MacIntyre modified this view and has argued that morality does arise within a community with a shared understanding of what persons are and what virtues they ought to acquire. However, since communities do not share understanding of what persons are and what virtue is there are no prospects for a common morality. This view is similar to Rorty’s because it also limits the possible justification of moral claims to communities with shared ideas.

Rorty and MacIntyre are representative of the moral climate of opinion among philosophers in the second half of the twentieth century. Many others could be identified, but these two clearly illustrate the postmodern opinion regarding metaethics.

Some Prospects for a Common Morality

The alternative to the postmodern view is that there are in fact some prospects for a common morality—the classical view. This understanding of metaethics has a much longer history—it goes back 2,500 years, and is advanced by ethicists that include Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, J. S. Mill, Immanuel Kant, and a host of others. More recently the view has been championed by thinkers like C. S. Lewis, Alan Donagan, and Alan Gewirth. Let’s consider what just a few of these had to say about a common morality.

The Roman philosopher Cicero makes clear that there is a universal moral law for all people. “There can be but one essential justice, which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.”8 Cicero is very clear about the importance of grounding this universal moral law in nature, not in common opinion. As such it is not a product of human beliefs, desires, or choices. “For all the questions on which our philosophers argue, there is none which it is more important thoroughly to understand than this, that man is born for justice, and that law and equity are not a mere establishment of opinion, but an institution of nature.”9 Cicero says that his view of morality was favored by all the philosophers of Plato’s old academy and those who followed Aristotle.10 Thus the classical view in the West has its origins in antiquity and was the dominant view of metaethics until the postmodern view came into vogue.

Augustine also thinks that there is a universal morality. Like Cicero, he identifies justice as the key feature of a permanent reality.

Some . . . thought that there was no such thing as absolute justice but that every people regarded its own way of life as just. For if justice, which ought to remain immutable, varies so much among different peoples, it is evident that justice does not exist. They have not understood, to cite only one instance, that “what you do not wish to have done to yourself, do not do to another” cannot be varied on account of any diversity of peoples.11

Augustine notes that some may think that the fact that different societies have different ways of life and varying standards of justice leads some to the view that there is no one immutable standard of morality. He counters this by giving one example of a moral precept (the silver rule12) that he asserts is binding on all persons, regardless of their diversity. The implication of Augustine’s view is that there are some local rules and customs that people follow, but that there is also at least one immutable precept that is common to every culture. From this it follows that if it is immutable it provides a standard with which every other local rule and custom must be logically consistent; if it is common to all societies and cultures, then they all must have rules and customs that are consistent with it.

In Mere Christianity C. S. Lewis notes that people share a common sense of right and wrong.13 Everyone finds it objectionable when someone cuts in a long ticket line that is moving slowly. He observes that even individuals who theoretically deny there is an objective morality often will appeal to it when they have experienced some gross injustice. Their claim is not merely that something illegal was done, but they want to make the stronger claim that something morally wrong was done. Lewis says that all persons, in any society, have similar reactions when treated unfairly. In the appendix to The Abolition of Man Lewis identifies many moral precepts that are common in many societies and gives a brief compilation of them,14 supplementing Augustine’s single immutable moral precept with a dozen or so which he claims are common to many societies. Virtually every society condemns traitors, believes a person should care for her parents, and condones general beneficence. He claims, similarly to Augustine, that the golden rule “do to others as you would have them do to you” can be found in one form or another in more than fifteen different cultures. In making this case Lewis is agreeing with Augustine and echoing Cicero, who writes: “But in nothing is the uniformity of human nature more conspicuous than in its respect for virtue. What nation is there, in which kindness, benignity, gratitude, and mindfulness of benefits are not recommended? What nation in which arrogance, malice, cruelty, and unthankfulness, are not reprobated and detested?”15 Lewis acknowledges that the existence of common virtues in different societies does not prove there is an immutable morality. He identifies this morality as the law of human nature and calls it the “Tao.” “I am not trying to prove its [the Tao’s] validity by the argument from common consent. Its validity cannot be deduced. For those who do not perceive its rationality, even universal consent would not prove it.”16

The common acceptance of some ...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Preface
• Chapter 1: Moral Reality
• Chapter 2: Moral Language
• Chapter 3: Basic Moral Propositions
• Chapter 4: Moral Principles
• Chapter 5: The Moral Field
• Chapter 6: Moral Epistemology
• Chapter 7: Grounding the Moral Order
• Bibliography