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Postmodernism and Its Theological Offspring
What Is, or Was, Postmodernism?
On September 29, 2008, the stock market plunged 774 points, marking the advent of the so-called Great Recession. Yet in light of recent cultural history it also signaled the end of a different period, what had loosely been termed the âpostmodernâ era. The postmodern era was never really an âeraâ in the sense of a time interval that could be precisely dated. The term âpostmodernâ had come to serve as a master metaphor for what was, in truth, the cultural odyssey of the West throughout the post-Vietnam decades. If the referent of an era is registered only by a hyphen, we must still be postmodern in some decisive way of framing things, because there can technically be no such as thing as the âpost-post-modern.â The hyphen leaves it thoroughly open-ended.
At the same time, 2008 marked the onset of a certain disenchantment with the breezy and wide-eyed optimism that had distinguished not only the 1990s but most of the Reagan and first Bush administrations. That optimism had found an outlet in what was essentially an upbeat mood inherited from the cultural revolutions throughout the West during the sixties, namely, that the old, authoritarian and unassailable frameworks of meaning on both the right and left that had persisted throughout the industrial age were cracking and coming apart, and that a brave new and experimental world dominated by what Richard Florida would later term the âcreative classâ with their free play of ideas and the imagination was inexorably taking shape. But the Bush presidency, which ended just as the economic sirens were sounding, marked a turning point, and the optimism slowly began to ebb away. In consequence, something in our culture changed irreversibly after the autumn of 2008.
We are here, however, not to chronicle the rise and fall of postmodernism in the West. As with every cycle of history, what was once âall the rageâ has left its indelible impression on the present generation, and will affect generations to come. Even if we canât put a hyphen after the hyphen, time has already left its profound signature on the times from that hyphen. How do we characterize âpostmodernismâ? Overall postmodernism, if we can genuinely portray what was always an elusive, shape-shifting entity in both its birth and dotage, was consistently marked by a kind of highbrow inventiveness as well as commitment to intellectual and artistic boundary-breaking that accompanies times of collective confidence and optimism. Its quirkiness was an extended holdover from the cultural craziness and political anarchy of the late sixties and early seventies, corresponding to the life cycle of the Baby Boomers from impetuous youth to modish middle-agedness. When the general mood began to darken immediately after the turn of the millennium, especially after the destruction of the World Trade Center in September 2001 followed by the Afghan and Iraq wars, âpomoâ (as it was popularly known) had gone mainstream and had even embedded itself within the academic establishment, including that declining discipline loosely denominated as âtheology.â
But what did the word âpostmodernâ actually imply throughout what has been an almost forty-year run by now on the marquees of the cutting-edge culture? Whether âpostmodernâ over this span of time was utilized in a commendatory sense as progressive and âhip,â or in the calumnious voice of political conservatives during the Reagan interlude to excoriate so-called âalternativeâ lifestyles and values, the term itself had become irremediably diffuse and incapable of specification. Yet, in reality, it encompassed everything that was good, bad, or indifferent about the sea changes in social life that took place after the upheavals that commenced in the late 1960s and continued into the mid-1970s. In the early phases the ideas swirling around what we now understand as âpostmodernismâ were intrinsically associated with the intellectual movement known as âpost-structuralism,â which in turn was affiliated with the critical approach to reading texts that acquired the name of âdeconstruction.â Post-structuralism, as the locution implies, connoted a clutch of savants and thought-leaders from a patchwork of disciplines, primarily in France, who sought to transition from the dominant paradigm of cultural and linguistic analysis known as âstructuralism.â
The Ă©minence grise of structuralism in France at the time had been the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, but the same methodology had also played a feature role in the work of the famous French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. âDeconstructionâ as an interpretative procedure was launched on Gallic turf by the philosopher Jacques Derrida in the 1960s and imported into the United States with the translation into English of some of his most important early works during the seventies. These diverse trends, however, did not receive the âpostmodernâ stamp until the appearance of a book in the early 1980s by French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard entitled The Postmodern Condition.
The word âpost-structuralismâ itself was given initial impetus by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, one of Derridaâs students, in her translation into English from the French of his sprawling, early tome Of Grammatology. However, the concept still was intimately ensconced with the somewhat recondite sensibility concerning arts and letters âafter structuralism,â that is, the next generation following the great suzerains of structuralist thought themselvesâClaude LĂ©vi-Strauss and Roland Barthes as well as Lacan. The notion of âdeconstructionâ was part of the legacy of Martin Heidegger. In his âLetter to a Japanese Friendâ (1983) Derrida discusses his desire to stay close to Heideggerâs âdestructionâ (German=Destruktion, or Abbau) of the history of metaphysics. Derrida wrote,
It was actually a little more complicated. Structuralism was by and large a European project. One might even be more selective and call it a French obsession, even if it had its own coterie of American adherents. The latter tended to congregate in the academic specialties of literary criticism and theory, which is why Derrida first secured his American beachhead among âlit-critâ professors at Yale University (the so-called âYale Schoolâ) that included Paul de Man, Geoffrey Hartman, and J. Hillis Miller. Even the majority of these then-fashionable âpoststructuralistâ luminaries, who acquired notoriety in the late 1970s, did not see themselves as offering primarily what Derrida called âanti-structuralistâ gestures. Post-structuralism referred primarily to the ongoing impact of Derridaâs 1966 lecture âStructure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.â From the very beginning the âpost-structuralistâ movement, later fuzzed in its range of implications as it was rebaptized âpostmodernism,â was closely associated with Derrida. Derrida, as his own correspondence suggests, was doing something rather unique.
The real context for the immigration of post-structuralism into the United States was the mere fact that more and more scholars in the humanities were fed up with the quasi-totalitarian regime of Anglo-American linguistic philosophy. It is hard to imagine from the vantage point of the present how pervasive analytic philosophy was in the academy from the early 1950s until well into the 1970s. Continental philosophy, whether French or German, was considered a weird kind of âcult,â as my own department chair in philosophy when I was an undergraduate referred to it. I can recall from my days as a doctoral student at Harvard a brief conversation I had at a social gathering with Willard Quine, one of the most famous analytic philosophers of all time. I told him I was doing my doctoral dissertation on Kant, and in response he sniffed, âoh, that mystic!â However, just as French post-structuralism was the intellectual by-product of the political turmoil in France during the late 1960s, its adoption by the American academy not quite a decade later can be seen as a kind of methodological revisionism that aped the cultural revolution of the sixties that had largely run its course by 1975.
It should also be noted that in the 1970s and early 1980s there was scant recognition in either philosophy or religious studies of a significant phenomenon known as âContinental philosophy.â That term only garnered acceptance (though it had been around before) in the 1990s. The operative label at the time was âphilosophical theology,â as distinguished from âphilosophy of religion,â the latter of which usually carried the implication of a series of problems and issues largely addressed through the analytic or empirical approaches. Few use the former phrase nowadays, currently replaced by âContinental philosophy of religion,â or âContinental theology.â The general word for Continental philosophy when Derrida first came on the scene was âexistential philosophyâ and/or âphenomenology.â
In its early iterations the term âdeconstructionâ was simply a coy neologism, a syntactical anomaly. Perhaps Derrida wanted to ensure that his venture was not confused with Heideggerâs. The genealogy of âdeconstructionâ can be linked directly to Derridaâs efforts to strum boldly the anti-Husserlian refrains in Heidegger within a totally new key that was largely informed not just by structural linguistics, but also Lacanian semiotics, the theory of signs. The way in which even prominent scholars of the present era use the term âdeconstructionâ today has little to do with how Derrida originally configured it. If one considers carefully everything Derrida composed prior to 1978, it becomes quite evident. The word âdeconstructionâ has been so mongrelized and bastardized by now, and I myself am inclined only to invoke it quite sparingly.
Philosophy, and what was once known as âphilosophical theology,â however, was probably the last redoubt of the academy to take an interest in âpost-structuralism,â or to even hear about it for that matter. I myself personally had never heard about it until 1977, and that was because I was at the time part of an interdisciplinary faculty reading group at my university, dominated by literary theorists. What I had been doing ever since I began publishing academic papers around 1974 was to try to find a philosophically sophisticatedâand legitimateâalternative to analytic philosophy. I was already steeped in Hegel, Heidegger, and the phenomen...